“[In] the years ahead,” the American President told Parliament on Monday, “I look forward to a reformed U.N. Security Council that includes India as a permanent member.” ... My news analysis ...
9 November 2010
The Hindu
Obama's UNSC statement a boost but India to be on probation
Siddharth Varadarajan
New Delhi: Barack Obama's endorsement of a permanent seat for India in a reformed U.N. Security Council represents a significant evolution of American policy towards both India and the world body.
“[In] the years ahead,” the American President told Parliament on Monday, “I look forward to a reformed U.N. Security Council that includes India as a permanent member.”
Led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the members of Parliament burst into thunderous applause when they heard those magic words. And yet, the absence of a timeline, Mr. Obama's use of passive voice and his caveat on India's “increased responsibility” all suggest that the U.S. expects India to bat for pet American causes in order to fully earn a seat at the global high table.
In July, senior American officials accompanying General Jim Jones, who was Mr. Obama's National Security Adviser at the time, told members of the Indian strategic community at an informal interaction that any decision to endorse India as a permanent member of the UNSC would depend on “our assessment of the extent to which India is likely to play a responsible role [there].”
Among the areas where President Obama expects India to demonstrate responsibility are sanctions on Iran and democracy and human rights promotion in places like Myanmar. If his exhortations left MPs unimpressed, this was not because anyone in the House supports a nuclear-armed Iran or the generals in Nay Pyi Taw. Rather, it was because of the double standards involved in the formulation of this checklist.
And yet, it would be churlish to deny the step forward that Mr. Obama has taken in signalling his support for an Indian permanent seat. Even if he has essentially handed the Indians a cheque that cannot easily be cashed, the U.S. President's words will strengthen India's hand as it seeks to press for reform of the U.N.
Until now, Washington had spoken only of a “criteria-based approach” to the selection of potential members of a reformed and expanded Security Council. In 2005, the U.S. said it “unambiguously supports a permanent seat for Japan” in the UNSC but the furthest it was prepared to go on India was this vague promise made by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns earlier this year: “We're open to expansion of permanent membership of the Council and we believe India's going to have a central part to play in the consideration that's going to come.”
This endorsement is less fulsome than what the U.S. has given the Japanese but the political impact of Mr. Obama's statement in other capitals around the world will be enormous. Russia, which has slowly backed away from its earlier unqualified support for India, will now come under pressure to abandon its insistence on “consensus” as a precondition for UNSC reform. That will leave the Chinese — who have not gone beyond stating their “understanding” of India's desire to play a greater role in world affairs, including at the U.N. — as the last among the five current permanent members to fully reveal their hand.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has often noted that the P-5 will not give up the powers they currently enjoy. Even a dilution of power would be unpalatable to them. The U.S. knows the P-5 will never lose their veto power and that any new permanent member will have to come in without the veto. What Mr. Obama is proposing, therefore, is not the dilution of power but its diffusion, that too over an unspecified time frame and with the unstated advisory that India would be on probation till the as-yet undefined process of expansion is complete.
Challenge to leadership
Dr. Singh is right in welcoming Mr. Obama's long-term affirmation of India's place in a reformed UNSC. But the challenge to the Indian leadership is in reconciling the political price Washington will demand for supporting its candidature with the expectation most U.N. members have from India's independent line in foreign policy and global security matters. If that independence flags, the world may see little merit in giving India a seat around the horseshoe table at Turtle Bay. But if that independence is asserted, a future American President may quietly drop Mr. Obama's less-than-ringing endorsement.
Showing posts with label United Nations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label United Nations. Show all posts
09 November 2010
14 October 2010
What India can bring to the high table
The U.N. Security Council needs a strong and independent voice on the burning issues of our time, not some feeble echo of a stale Western chorus... 14 October 2010
The Hindu
What India can bring to the high table
Siddharth Varadarajan
At an informal interaction with members of the Indian strategic community during the visit to New Delhi of General James Jones in July, an American official asked whether there was any decision the Obama administration could take that would be as ‘totemic' for the bilateral relationship as the Bush administration's July 2005 offer of a nuclear deal had been.
When it was suggested that an endorsement of India's candidature for a permanent seat in a reformed United Nations Security Council might arguably fit the bill, one official said the question was indeed being studied actively in Washington as part of the preparatory work for President Barack Obama's November visit. “But any decision will likely depend on our assessment of the extent to which India is likely to play a responsible role as a permanent member”.
I was reminded of that conversation when External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna told journalists on Wednesday that India's election as a non-permanent member of the UNSC with the support of 187 of the world body's 192 member states provided an opportunity for the country to “establish its credentials and credibility in handling issues which come up with a degree of responsibility.”
The key question, of course, is the metric one uses to measure “responsibility”. As the principal empowered organ of the U.N. system, the Security Council deals with questions of international security that are often intensely political. During the Cold War, the rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union meant the biggest questions of war and peace tended to be settled far away from the horse-shoe table around which the 15 members of the UNSC sat. But ever since the end of the bipolar division of the world, the work of the Security Council has undergone a quantitative and qualitative transformation. Consider this statistic. Prior to 1990, the total number of resolutions passed by it over 45 years was 646. In the 20 years since then, however, a total of 1295 resolutions have been passed, the last being No. 1942 of September 29, 2010, authorising a temporary increase in the military and police personnel contingents of UNOCI, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire.
India, incidentally, has sent soldiers for that operation and has historically been one of the top contributors to U.N. peacekeeping efforts around the world. Much of the UNSC's expanded docket has to do with the increase in peacekeeping responsibilities, the discharge of which is mostly without major controversy. But political considerations come into play on issues where the United States and its allies, especially Israel, or other big powers, have their own stake and want the Security Council to take a decision on a particular course of action. It is on these sorts of questions that India's performance as a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system will likely be tested.
Consider an example. In June this year, Brazil and Turkey, both non-permanent members of the Security Council, voted against a resolution imposing new sanctions on Tehran. Both countries had just helped to broker a crucial agreement under which Iran would have sent out a considerable part of its low-enriched uranium stock in exchange for the eventual supply of medical-grade enriched uranium for use in a research reactor. That agreement might well have served as a first step in the process of building confidence and trust between Iran and the West but the U.S. went out of its way to scuttle those prospects by insisting on the imposition of new punitive sanctions.
In the eyes of many if not most countries, Brazil and Turkey acted highly responsibly by voting against the sanctions resolution and insisting that the U.N. pursue the path of diplomacy and compromise rather than confrontation and coercion. How might India have voted had it been on the Security Council this summer? Would it have voted against, like Ankara and Brasilia? Or abstained, like Lebanon? Or voted for the resolution, like the remaining 12? Around the time the issue was being discussed, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and senior Indian officials had said on the record that India did not believe the imposition of sanctions would help resolve anything. Having helped to send the Iran file to New York by voting with the United States at the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2005 and 2006, India now realises the Security Council has not played a particularly useful role in finding a peaceful solution to the problem. But it is one thing to criticise sanctions in abstract and another to cast a negative ballot at the Security Council. When such a situation arises again, as it surely will in the next two years, there will be no shortage of pundits in India who will argue that New Delhi has more to gain by siding with the U.S. than by sticking to its position. “There is no way we can become a permanent member if we antagonise Washington”, we will be told, so let us use our non-permanent seat to demonstrate how “responsible” we really are.
The problem, of course, is that whatever Washington's expectations might be, the rest of the world values India precisely because of its ability to reason for itself and stick to its own positions. If the non-permanent seat India has just won is indeed to become a stepping stone for a permanent seat, the Manmohan Singh government will have to focus less on convincing the U.S. about how “responsible” it can be. It should instead work hard to demonstrate how a restructured Security Council built around the inclusion of rising powers like itself, Brazil and South Africa stands a better chance of solving the world's problems than the present outdated arrangement. Fortuitously, all three IBSA countries will be on the UNSC at the same time, as will the BRIC group.
Even as its salience in international affairs has increased, the UNSC has been singularly unsuccessful in dealing with new and emerging crises like terrorism and piracy or resolving existing problems like the illegal Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Syrian territory. For 13 long years, the Security Council remained seized of the Iraq file and maintained sanctions over that unfortunate country; and then, when the U.S. defied its mandate by illegally invading and occupying Iraq, it remained a mute and powerless spectator. There is a structural problem with the Council which runs must deeper than the existence of veto power in the hands of the P-5. Today, despite the growing American ability to mobilise all permanent members behind its initiatives, as in the case of Iran and even North Korea, the UNSC has not managed to make much headway because it is unrepresentative and because the solutions it proposes lack credibility.
At the end of the day, this is the strongest argument India and other aspirants for permanent seats can make. This will mean conceiving of, and pushing for, innovative approaches to the world's major problems, even if this rubs the United States or any other power the wrong way. Yes, any of the P-5 can veto the General Assembly's eventual recommendations for permanent membership as and when these emerge from the text-based negotiations now underway in New York. The U.S., for example, may well decide that an independent-minded India will not be an asset on an expanded Security Council. But if it were to ever take the extreme step of vetoing India's candidature, it would also have to then deal with the diplomatic, political and economic consequences of such an act.
01 August 2006
Qana massacre and the Security Council
The primary role of any Chapter VII resolution or expanded U.N. peacekeeping force must be to protect Lebanon from Israeli aggression.
1 August 2006
The Hindu
Qana massacre and the Security Council
Siddharth Varadarajan
TEL AVIV's announcement of a 48-hour suspension of air operations following the international outcry over the massacre of 56 Lebanese civilians — half of whom were young children — is not so much an act of contrition as an attempt to shift the American-Israeli war aims against Hizbollah and Lebanon on to a higher, more effective plane.
The fact that the Israeli authorities are granting this `grace period' primarily in order to allow the United Nations to evacuate any civilians who wish to leave southern Lebanon is itself a blatant declaration of the Olmert regime's intention to continue bombing residential areas. Serving notice on non-combatants and then flattening their dwellings does not exonerate Israel's commanders from culpability for violating the laws of war. Would Israel protest any less if Hizbollah preceded its barrage of Katyushas with a general warning to all residents of Haifa and northern Israel that they leave the area?
While the announcement of 48 hours breathing space is intended to allow anti-Israeli opinion around the world to settle down a little, its main purpose is to give Washington time to try and impose on the government of Fouad Siniora in Lebanon a NATO-led "international stabilisation force" armed with a `robust mandate' under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
The purpose of such a force would be to put into effect Resolution 1559 — a non-binding resolution of the Security Council passed in 2004 calling on the Lebanese government to disarm Hizbollah and assert its military control over the entire territory of Lebanon. The purpose of the force would certainly not be to facilitate a just political settlement and protect Lebanon from the kind of aggression Israel has regularly been launching since 1978.
Ever since UNIFIL (the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon) was first deployed 28 years ago, Israel has displayed utter contempt for the presence of international peacekeepers across the blue line. In 1996, it bombed a U.N. post at Qana, killing more than 100 civilians. Last week, it "accidentally" killed four peacekeepers and refused to allow the U.N. to join the investigation into the incident. Surely America, France or Britain would not allow the U.N. to probe an incident which occurred on their territory, Dan Gillerman, Israel's Ambassador in New York, argued lamely. Forgetting, conveniently, that the flattened U.N. post at Khiyyam was on Lebanese and not Israeli soil.
Mandate of U.N. force the key
Given its track record, Israel will allow the U.N. Security Council to stay its hand in Lebanon only if this results in the deployment of a well-armed U.S./NATO/European-led force — a force that would complete Tel Aviv's stated war aims for it. This is something that suits the Bush administration too. The U.S. sees Hizbollah as a powerful detachment of "international terrorism" and a tool of Syria and Iran. Thus, getting a `stabilisation force' on the ground in Lebanon — and on Lebanon's border with Syria, as Condoleezza Rice said on Monday — would be a relatively low-cost alternative to the more direct forms of military pressure on Damascus and Teheran that Washington can ill afford to exert for the moment.
Since the `war on terror' has been defined by American ideologues as an `endless war', the U.S. will not deploy in Lebanon unless it is confident of staying there indefinitely. Like Bagram in Afghanistan, Camp Bondsteel in Serbia and the enormous bases coming up all over Iraq, the proposed stabilisation force under the overall control of U.S. Central Command is likely to dig itself in. Therefore, if the Siniora government accedes to the deployment of the kind of force George W. Bush and Tony Blair have in mind, it might as well forget about asserting sovereign control over its "entire territory" for the foreseeable future.
But more dangerous than any symbolic affront to national honour what this will entail is the very real possibility that the `robust' international force would be no more effective in disarming and defeating Hizbollah than the Israeli armed forces have been in the past two weeks. Eventually, as Anglo-American casualties mount, sectarian militias are likely to be promoted as a conscious military strategy to undermine and contain Hizbollah. If the Lebanese people are lucky, the clock will be turned back to the chaos and mayhem that plagued them in the 1980s. If they are unlucky, they will become the next Iraq.
There is, of course, another alternative, if only the world could find a way to insist that the U.S. and Israel agree to it.
The starting point has to be the Israeli recognition of a simple fact: that it is Israel's legacy of disastrous wars against Lebanon that lies at the root of the present problem. Tel Aviv cannot take refuge under the claim that Hizbollah attacked first. Israel remains in illegal possession of Lebanese territory — the Sheba Farms — and is thus an occupying power. Secondly, there has hardly been a day since its withdrawal from Lebanon two years ago that Israel has not violated Lebanese air space or territorial waters. Thirdly, Israel has refused to provide the Lebanese government with a map of the thousands of landmines it buried throughout its erstwhile occupation zone in southern Lebanon, leading to the death and maiming of Lebanese civilians on an almost monthly basis. Fourthly, it is Israel that first placed civilians, including its own citizens, at risk by indiscriminately bombing Lebanese towns and villages.
Despite these provocations, the Lebanese people and government are entitled to question the wisdom of Hizbollah in unilaterally undertaking a mission to abduct two Israeli soldiers from across the Blue Line. And the seven-point formula presented by Prime Minister Siniora contains within it all the elements necessary for peacefully resolving the ongoing conflict as well as addressing the security concerns of Israel.
In a nutshell, what the Lebanese government and all major parties in parliament (including Hizbollah) are saying is that there should first be an unconditional and immediate ceasefire. A 48-hour suspension of air attacks is not the same thing. The ceasefire would then be followed by a number of steps, including an exchange of prisoners by both sides; the return by Israel of the Sheba Farms to Lebanon; an independent probe into the indiscriminate bombing Israel launched; the deployment of the Lebanese army all the way down to the border with Israel; the disarming of Hizbollah as an independent militia following national consultations; the provision by Israel of maps indicating the location of its land mines in southern Lebanon; and, finally, the deployment of a U.N.-led blue helmet force, which would help the Lebanese army ensure that Lebanon is never again attacked by Israel.
This is the big package the Security Council must act upon when it meets this week to resolve the crisis caused by Israel's latest aggression. Substituting this package for the one-point agenda of disarming Hizbollah through military means and attempting to dictate a broader political settlement with the Damocles Sword of Israeli air strikes hanging over Lebanon will only make matters worse.
1 August 2006
The Hindu
Qana massacre and the Security Council
Siddharth Varadarajan
TEL AVIV's announcement of a 48-hour suspension of air operations following the international outcry over the massacre of 56 Lebanese civilians — half of whom were young children — is not so much an act of contrition as an attempt to shift the American-Israeli war aims against Hizbollah and Lebanon on to a higher, more effective plane.
The fact that the Israeli authorities are granting this `grace period' primarily in order to allow the United Nations to evacuate any civilians who wish to leave southern Lebanon is itself a blatant declaration of the Olmert regime's intention to continue bombing residential areas. Serving notice on non-combatants and then flattening their dwellings does not exonerate Israel's commanders from culpability for violating the laws of war. Would Israel protest any less if Hizbollah preceded its barrage of Katyushas with a general warning to all residents of Haifa and northern Israel that they leave the area?
While the announcement of 48 hours breathing space is intended to allow anti-Israeli opinion around the world to settle down a little, its main purpose is to give Washington time to try and impose on the government of Fouad Siniora in Lebanon a NATO-led "international stabilisation force" armed with a `robust mandate' under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
The purpose of such a force would be to put into effect Resolution 1559 — a non-binding resolution of the Security Council passed in 2004 calling on the Lebanese government to disarm Hizbollah and assert its military control over the entire territory of Lebanon. The purpose of the force would certainly not be to facilitate a just political settlement and protect Lebanon from the kind of aggression Israel has regularly been launching since 1978.
Ever since UNIFIL (the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon) was first deployed 28 years ago, Israel has displayed utter contempt for the presence of international peacekeepers across the blue line. In 1996, it bombed a U.N. post at Qana, killing more than 100 civilians. Last week, it "accidentally" killed four peacekeepers and refused to allow the U.N. to join the investigation into the incident. Surely America, France or Britain would not allow the U.N. to probe an incident which occurred on their territory, Dan Gillerman, Israel's Ambassador in New York, argued lamely. Forgetting, conveniently, that the flattened U.N. post at Khiyyam was on Lebanese and not Israeli soil.
Mandate of U.N. force the key
Given its track record, Israel will allow the U.N. Security Council to stay its hand in Lebanon only if this results in the deployment of a well-armed U.S./NATO/European-led force — a force that would complete Tel Aviv's stated war aims for it. This is something that suits the Bush administration too. The U.S. sees Hizbollah as a powerful detachment of "international terrorism" and a tool of Syria and Iran. Thus, getting a `stabilisation force' on the ground in Lebanon — and on Lebanon's border with Syria, as Condoleezza Rice said on Monday — would be a relatively low-cost alternative to the more direct forms of military pressure on Damascus and Teheran that Washington can ill afford to exert for the moment.
Since the `war on terror' has been defined by American ideologues as an `endless war', the U.S. will not deploy in Lebanon unless it is confident of staying there indefinitely. Like Bagram in Afghanistan, Camp Bondsteel in Serbia and the enormous bases coming up all over Iraq, the proposed stabilisation force under the overall control of U.S. Central Command is likely to dig itself in. Therefore, if the Siniora government accedes to the deployment of the kind of force George W. Bush and Tony Blair have in mind, it might as well forget about asserting sovereign control over its "entire territory" for the foreseeable future.
But more dangerous than any symbolic affront to national honour what this will entail is the very real possibility that the `robust' international force would be no more effective in disarming and defeating Hizbollah than the Israeli armed forces have been in the past two weeks. Eventually, as Anglo-American casualties mount, sectarian militias are likely to be promoted as a conscious military strategy to undermine and contain Hizbollah. If the Lebanese people are lucky, the clock will be turned back to the chaos and mayhem that plagued them in the 1980s. If they are unlucky, they will become the next Iraq.
There is, of course, another alternative, if only the world could find a way to insist that the U.S. and Israel agree to it.
The starting point has to be the Israeli recognition of a simple fact: that it is Israel's legacy of disastrous wars against Lebanon that lies at the root of the present problem. Tel Aviv cannot take refuge under the claim that Hizbollah attacked first. Israel remains in illegal possession of Lebanese territory — the Sheba Farms — and is thus an occupying power. Secondly, there has hardly been a day since its withdrawal from Lebanon two years ago that Israel has not violated Lebanese air space or territorial waters. Thirdly, Israel has refused to provide the Lebanese government with a map of the thousands of landmines it buried throughout its erstwhile occupation zone in southern Lebanon, leading to the death and maiming of Lebanese civilians on an almost monthly basis. Fourthly, it is Israel that first placed civilians, including its own citizens, at risk by indiscriminately bombing Lebanese towns and villages.
Despite these provocations, the Lebanese people and government are entitled to question the wisdom of Hizbollah in unilaterally undertaking a mission to abduct two Israeli soldiers from across the Blue Line. And the seven-point formula presented by Prime Minister Siniora contains within it all the elements necessary for peacefully resolving the ongoing conflict as well as addressing the security concerns of Israel.
In a nutshell, what the Lebanese government and all major parties in parliament (including Hizbollah) are saying is that there should first be an unconditional and immediate ceasefire. A 48-hour suspension of air attacks is not the same thing. The ceasefire would then be followed by a number of steps, including an exchange of prisoners by both sides; the return by Israel of the Sheba Farms to Lebanon; an independent probe into the indiscriminate bombing Israel launched; the deployment of the Lebanese army all the way down to the border with Israel; the disarming of Hizbollah as an independent militia following national consultations; the provision by Israel of maps indicating the location of its land mines in southern Lebanon; and, finally, the deployment of a U.N.-led blue helmet force, which would help the Lebanese army ensure that Lebanon is never again attacked by Israel.
This is the big package the Security Council must act upon when it meets this week to resolve the crisis caused by Israel's latest aggression. Substituting this package for the one-point agenda of disarming Hizbollah through military means and attempting to dictate a broader political settlement with the Damocles Sword of Israeli air strikes hanging over Lebanon will only make matters worse.
29 June 2006
Towards the endgame in Nepal
The sooner a U.N. mission is in place to monitor the arms of the Nepal Army and Maoist PLA, the smoother will be the transition towards an interim government and Constituent Assembly elections.
29 June 2006
The Hindu
Towards the endgame in Nepal
Siddharth Varadarajan
EVENTS IN Nepal have moved so rapidly these past few weeks that King Gyanendra's April proclamation restoring parliament seems to belong to another political universe. Like the Long Parliament which Charles I was compelled to summon in 1640, the reconvened House of Representatives moved swiftly to assert the sovereign will of the people against monarchy. The king was stripped of his powers, the government and army were renamed, anti-democratic laws scrapped, and political prisoners released. But the historical analogy ends there. England descended into civil war as the Crown and Westminster struggled for supremacy. In Nepal, however, the assertion of popular will over palace and privilege offers the country its best chance of ending a decade of conflict.
On June 16, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and Maoist leader Prachanda reached an eight-point agreement that is a tribute to the wisdom and broad-mindedness of the Nepalese political forces. At the heart of the agreement is the formation of an interim government with the participation of the former `rebels.' Equally important are three propositions the seven-party alliance (SPA) and Maoists agreed to. First, that peaceful, competitive politics is the only way for parties to conduct their affairs and people to express their sovereignty. Secondly, that the weapons and army of both the government and the Maoists will have to be managed or monitored by the United Nations to ensure impartial elections. Thirdly, for there to be a "progressive restructur[ing] [of] the state," elections to the Constituent Assembly must take into account inequalities of class, race, region, and gender.
It stands to reason that the sole `legal' custodian of sovereignty — the House of Representatives — must perforce extinguish itself to make way for the interim government. At the same time, the eight-point agreement speaks of "making an alternative arrangement," perhaps an all-party-cum-civil society standing conference, to which the interim government will be answerable.
Even though India is used to the dissolution of parliament before early elections, Indian policymakers fear dissolution of the HoR could lead to a power "vacuum" in Nepal. These fears are misplaced. The fact is that India, or South Asia for that matter, has so far only seen "transfers of power" from one sovereign authority to another in which the continuity of state institutions was ensured. This is what happened in 1947, and even in 1971, when Bangladesh was created. What is happening in Nepal, however, is a revolution where constitutional legality and political power become highly fluid and contingent. Different political forces have competing agendas but their interaction is mediated by the popular desire for peace and an egalitarian social transformation. Whether one likes it or not, parties and state institutions that are not compatible with these aspirations will disappear.
Nature of U.N. mandate
Despite the centrality of arms monitoring to the timetable for elections and perhaps even the entry of the Maoists into an interim government, insufficient attention has been paid to the precise form U.N. involvement should take. India, which was sceptical about outside participation, conceded to Mr. Koirala earlier this month that the U.N. might play a useful role on the arms management front. But New Delhi is still chary of a U.N. resolution, even though this is a must for the deployment of U.N. police or military observers to Nepal.
Notwithstanding its indifferent record in peace making, the U.N. has been reasonably successful in the verification and implementation of ceasefire accords in civil war situations, including the management of weapons and armies. Most of these missions have been under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter on the pacific settlement of disputes. Two missions stand out for their success and relevance — the 1997 U.N. Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), and the 1992-1994 U.N. Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), in which Indian peacekeepers also participated. In both cases, U.N. military observers came to verify and monitor compliance with political agreements that had already been reached by government and rebels. The separation of combatants from both sides was overseen, as was the decommissioning of rebel arms. In the case of Mozambique, the mandate included demobilisation of 76,000 government and rebel soldiers, as well as the subsequent integration of 10,000 soldiers into a new national army.
Though the armed conflict in Nepal has taken a terrible toll, the scale of hostilities pales into insignificance when compared with either Mozambique or Guatemala. Thus, implementing a simple mandate should not be difficult for any prospective U.N. verification mission in Nepal. All the more so since the decommissioning of arms and demobilisation of soldiers from either side are not necessary for the conduct of free elections and will not be part of the mission.
Some statistics will illuminate the point more clearly. In Guatemala, for example, 2,928 combatants from the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) were demobilised and 535,102 weapons and rounds of ammunition handed over to the U.N. mission. In Nepal, according to data provided by Maj. Gen. Ashok K. Mehta in his new book, The Royal Nepal Army, the total number of "armed guerrillas" as of December 2004 is approximately 4,000. Even more revealing is the Maoist army's stock of arms. Gen. Mehta estimates the PLA's total weapons holdings at 2,895. Of these, nearly half, or 1,370, are .303 rifles. If the Maoists have emerged as a major political force in Nepal, it is perhaps not so much because of their guns — clearly, they do not have too many — but due to the appeal of their programme, most of which the SPA has now adopted.
As things stand, the Nepal government and the Maoists have agreed on a code of conduct for their armies. But violations of the informal ceasefire have occurred, with the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Kathmandu alleging that Maoist soldiers have killed nine individuals over the past month. If the Guatemala model is followed, a formal ceasefire needs to enter into force on the day the U.N. monitoring mission in Nepal ('UNMINEP') deploys. In consultation with Nepal Army and Maoist commanders, the barracks and assembly points where soldiers and weapons are to be sequestered for ease of monitoring can then be identified.
In Guatemala, the separation of soldiers and guerrillas was carried out through the establishment of two concentric areas — security zones and coordination zones — around eight URNG assembly points. Army units were not permitted to enter the security zone and police units could do so only in coordination with U.N. observers. In Nepal, since the army is also to be monitored, the 'UNMINEP' mission would need to be larger. At all assembly points and barracks, heavy guns would have to be warehoused under a double-locking system but army and PLA soldiers would retain personal weapons. Beyond a specified perimeter, however, personal arms would have to be deposited so that the presence of armed men and women in public areas does not compromise the free and fair nature of elections to the Constituent Assembly.
What India must do
For the U.N., Nepal can be the first practical project of the new Peacebuilding Commission, of which India is a member along with more than 40 other nations. But the mandate for the deployment of military or police observers will have to come from the General Assembly or Security Council, most likely the latter. The relevant resolution must be Chapter VI and not Chapter VII. Like the Guatemala resolution, it must make no reference to the situation in Nepal being a potential threat to international peace and security. It must also limit itself to the goals agreed to by the Nepalese political forces themselves. This is important because individual UNSC members — such as the United States — oppose the inclusion of Maoists in an interim government without first surrendering their arms and may seek to impose a broader mandate. This is where India must counsel its new `strategic partner' to abandon McCarthyism and accept reality.
Along with the doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and human rights experts recommended by the Lakhdar Brahimi panel on U.N. peace operations, the proposed U.N. mission in Nepal must work closely with civil society leaders who are already monitoring the code of conduct. In Mozambique, ONUMOZ went through difficult times but emerged with distinction because of the Mozambican people's desire for peace. The fact that this desire is just as strong in Nepal suggests the implementation of the transition roadmap will also be a success.
As an important neighbour that facilitated the broad partnership between the SPA and the Maoists, India need not worry about being kept out of the loop. Nor should it aspire to offer anything other than non-lethal logistical support for the U.N. mission in Nepal. It is not in the interests of the U.N. or of the Nepalese political forces — including the Maoists — to do anything that will make the people of India less secure. Coincidentally, the U.N. military adviser in the Department of Peacekeeping is currently an Indian, Lt. Gen. Randhir Kumar Mehta.
It is also time India adjusted to the impending reality of an interim government in Nepal with the participation of Maoists in key portfolios. One of the first acts of the new government will be to formally request the release of Nepali Maoist prisoners in Indian jails, including senior leaders like Mohan Baidhya (`Kiran') and Chandra Prakash Gajurel (`Gaurav'). Rather than waiting for this request, which has already been made orally by Mr. Koirala, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh should take the necessary legal steps for their immediate release. Such an act will not alter the balance of power between the SPA and the Maoists but will generate goodwill for India.
29 June 2006
The Hindu
Towards the endgame in Nepal
Siddharth Varadarajan
EVENTS IN Nepal have moved so rapidly these past few weeks that King Gyanendra's April proclamation restoring parliament seems to belong to another political universe. Like the Long Parliament which Charles I was compelled to summon in 1640, the reconvened House of Representatives moved swiftly to assert the sovereign will of the people against monarchy. The king was stripped of his powers, the government and army were renamed, anti-democratic laws scrapped, and political prisoners released. But the historical analogy ends there. England descended into civil war as the Crown and Westminster struggled for supremacy. In Nepal, however, the assertion of popular will over palace and privilege offers the country its best chance of ending a decade of conflict.
On June 16, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and Maoist leader Prachanda reached an eight-point agreement that is a tribute to the wisdom and broad-mindedness of the Nepalese political forces. At the heart of the agreement is the formation of an interim government with the participation of the former `rebels.' Equally important are three propositions the seven-party alliance (SPA) and Maoists agreed to. First, that peaceful, competitive politics is the only way for parties to conduct their affairs and people to express their sovereignty. Secondly, that the weapons and army of both the government and the Maoists will have to be managed or monitored by the United Nations to ensure impartial elections. Thirdly, for there to be a "progressive restructur[ing] [of] the state," elections to the Constituent Assembly must take into account inequalities of class, race, region, and gender.
It stands to reason that the sole `legal' custodian of sovereignty — the House of Representatives — must perforce extinguish itself to make way for the interim government. At the same time, the eight-point agreement speaks of "making an alternative arrangement," perhaps an all-party-cum-civil society standing conference, to which the interim government will be answerable.
Even though India is used to the dissolution of parliament before early elections, Indian policymakers fear dissolution of the HoR could lead to a power "vacuum" in Nepal. These fears are misplaced. The fact is that India, or South Asia for that matter, has so far only seen "transfers of power" from one sovereign authority to another in which the continuity of state institutions was ensured. This is what happened in 1947, and even in 1971, when Bangladesh was created. What is happening in Nepal, however, is a revolution where constitutional legality and political power become highly fluid and contingent. Different political forces have competing agendas but their interaction is mediated by the popular desire for peace and an egalitarian social transformation. Whether one likes it or not, parties and state institutions that are not compatible with these aspirations will disappear.
Nature of U.N. mandate
Despite the centrality of arms monitoring to the timetable for elections and perhaps even the entry of the Maoists into an interim government, insufficient attention has been paid to the precise form U.N. involvement should take. India, which was sceptical about outside participation, conceded to Mr. Koirala earlier this month that the U.N. might play a useful role on the arms management front. But New Delhi is still chary of a U.N. resolution, even though this is a must for the deployment of U.N. police or military observers to Nepal.
Notwithstanding its indifferent record in peace making, the U.N. has been reasonably successful in the verification and implementation of ceasefire accords in civil war situations, including the management of weapons and armies. Most of these missions have been under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter on the pacific settlement of disputes. Two missions stand out for their success and relevance — the 1997 U.N. Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), and the 1992-1994 U.N. Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), in which Indian peacekeepers also participated. In both cases, U.N. military observers came to verify and monitor compliance with political agreements that had already been reached by government and rebels. The separation of combatants from both sides was overseen, as was the decommissioning of rebel arms. In the case of Mozambique, the mandate included demobilisation of 76,000 government and rebel soldiers, as well as the subsequent integration of 10,000 soldiers into a new national army.
Though the armed conflict in Nepal has taken a terrible toll, the scale of hostilities pales into insignificance when compared with either Mozambique or Guatemala. Thus, implementing a simple mandate should not be difficult for any prospective U.N. verification mission in Nepal. All the more so since the decommissioning of arms and demobilisation of soldiers from either side are not necessary for the conduct of free elections and will not be part of the mission.
Some statistics will illuminate the point more clearly. In Guatemala, for example, 2,928 combatants from the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) were demobilised and 535,102 weapons and rounds of ammunition handed over to the U.N. mission. In Nepal, according to data provided by Maj. Gen. Ashok K. Mehta in his new book, The Royal Nepal Army, the total number of "armed guerrillas" as of December 2004 is approximately 4,000. Even more revealing is the Maoist army's stock of arms. Gen. Mehta estimates the PLA's total weapons holdings at 2,895. Of these, nearly half, or 1,370, are .303 rifles. If the Maoists have emerged as a major political force in Nepal, it is perhaps not so much because of their guns — clearly, they do not have too many — but due to the appeal of their programme, most of which the SPA has now adopted.
As things stand, the Nepal government and the Maoists have agreed on a code of conduct for their armies. But violations of the informal ceasefire have occurred, with the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Kathmandu alleging that Maoist soldiers have killed nine individuals over the past month. If the Guatemala model is followed, a formal ceasefire needs to enter into force on the day the U.N. monitoring mission in Nepal ('UNMINEP') deploys. In consultation with Nepal Army and Maoist commanders, the barracks and assembly points where soldiers and weapons are to be sequestered for ease of monitoring can then be identified.
In Guatemala, the separation of soldiers and guerrillas was carried out through the establishment of two concentric areas — security zones and coordination zones — around eight URNG assembly points. Army units were not permitted to enter the security zone and police units could do so only in coordination with U.N. observers. In Nepal, since the army is also to be monitored, the 'UNMINEP' mission would need to be larger. At all assembly points and barracks, heavy guns would have to be warehoused under a double-locking system but army and PLA soldiers would retain personal weapons. Beyond a specified perimeter, however, personal arms would have to be deposited so that the presence of armed men and women in public areas does not compromise the free and fair nature of elections to the Constituent Assembly.
What India must do
For the U.N., Nepal can be the first practical project of the new Peacebuilding Commission, of which India is a member along with more than 40 other nations. But the mandate for the deployment of military or police observers will have to come from the General Assembly or Security Council, most likely the latter. The relevant resolution must be Chapter VI and not Chapter VII. Like the Guatemala resolution, it must make no reference to the situation in Nepal being a potential threat to international peace and security. It must also limit itself to the goals agreed to by the Nepalese political forces themselves. This is important because individual UNSC members — such as the United States — oppose the inclusion of Maoists in an interim government without first surrendering their arms and may seek to impose a broader mandate. This is where India must counsel its new `strategic partner' to abandon McCarthyism and accept reality.
Along with the doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and human rights experts recommended by the Lakhdar Brahimi panel on U.N. peace operations, the proposed U.N. mission in Nepal must work closely with civil society leaders who are already monitoring the code of conduct. In Mozambique, ONUMOZ went through difficult times but emerged with distinction because of the Mozambican people's desire for peace. The fact that this desire is just as strong in Nepal suggests the implementation of the transition roadmap will also be a success.
As an important neighbour that facilitated the broad partnership between the SPA and the Maoists, India need not worry about being kept out of the loop. Nor should it aspire to offer anything other than non-lethal logistical support for the U.N. mission in Nepal. It is not in the interests of the U.N. or of the Nepalese political forces — including the Maoists — to do anything that will make the people of India less secure. Coincidentally, the U.N. military adviser in the Department of Peacekeeping is currently an Indian, Lt. Gen. Randhir Kumar Mehta.
It is also time India adjusted to the impending reality of an interim government in Nepal with the participation of Maoists in key portfolios. One of the first acts of the new government will be to formally request the release of Nepali Maoist prisoners in Indian jails, including senior leaders like Mohan Baidhya (`Kiran') and Chandra Prakash Gajurel (`Gaurav'). Rather than waiting for this request, which has already been made orally by Mr. Koirala, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh should take the necessary legal steps for their immediate release. Such an act will not alter the balance of power between the SPA and the Maoists but will generate goodwill for India.
21 June 2006
Will an Indian be the next U.N. chief?
In nominating Shashi Tharoor as its candidate for the top U.N. job, India is taking a gamble. The payoff in terms of international visibility is potentially high while the cost of defeat is low, but only if the game is played properly.
21 June 2006
The Hindu
Will an Indian be the next U.N. chief?
Siddharth Varadarajan
EVER SINCE India went head-to-head against Japan for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in 1996 and lost, official circles in New Delhi have had little appetite for standalone contests in international fora. Last year, when the country made a strong pitch for a permanent seat, it did so with the comforting security blanket of the G-4 firmly wrapped around it. Even so, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the PMO — perhaps sensing the difficult odds — chose not to get directly involved in that hunt and left all the lobbying and legwork to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
Against this backdrop, New Delhi's decision to nominate U.N. Under-Secretary-General Shashi Tharoor as its official candidate for the top job at Turtle Bay suggests a new willingness to take a risky gamble on the world stage. Mr. Tharoor finds himself fighting the charge of being "light-weight" and faces stiff competition from a host of declared (and undeclared) contenders. Even though the stakes are much higher for its nominee, the Government presumably evaluated both the probability of victory and the consequences of defeat and found the cost-benefit ratio of the venture to its liking.
Within the foreign policy establishment, the decision to back Mr. Tharoor was not taken easily. Some within the PMO saw merit in India endorsing his candidature but the MEA and our mission to the U.N. initially felt the risk was not worth taking. It was only on June 13 that the MEA sent a confidential cable to its Ambassadors informing them of India's decision to back Mr. Tharoor. The Ambassadors were instructed to sound out their host government's initial preferences. They were also told that the formal announcement would be made later in the month, though the same was done within 48 hours.
For Mr. Tharoor, defeat will almost certainly mean the end of his career at the U.N., where he has worked for more than two decades. If he is prepared to risk it all, one can only imagine he has done his homework carefully. For India, however, there are potential costs, none by themselves overly onerous though a lot will depend on the precise manner in which the election campaign proceeds from here on.
Unpredictable process
Barring the 18-year period between Dag Hammarskjold's election as Secretary-General in 1953 — in a race which saw Vijayalakshmi Pandit and Sir Benegal Narayan Rau of India also emerge as unsuccessful candidates — and the end of U. Thant's tenure in 1971, the selection process for the job of Secretary-General has involved a high degree of unpredictability. In 1971, Kurt Waldheim fought off Max Jakobson of Finland and Carlos Ortiz de Rosas of Argentina to emerge the winner. With the backing of both superpowers, the dour Austrian got re-elected in 1976 but was vetoed by China when he sought a third term in 1981. With the United States also vetoing the Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Salim Ahmed Salim, Javier Perez de Cuellar of Peru — who was an Under Secretary-General in the U.N. at the time — eventually emerged as the consensus candidate. In 1986, he was reappointed for a second term.
In 1991, Africa claimed the post as its own. Though candidates from outside the region were also nominated (such as the former Canadian Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney) the serious contenders were all African. Eventually, two front-runners emerged — Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt and Bernard Chidzero of Zimbabwe — with the Egyptian deputy foreign minister eventually triumphing. Five years later, the Clinton administration vetoed a second term for Mr. Boutros-Ghali, whose independence, particularly in matters involving West Asia, it had come to resent. Again, a slate of alternative African candidates emerged with Kofi Annan, the favourite at the outset, eventually rising to the top despite the initial opposition of France (because of his poor French).
While the U.N. Charter has little to say about the process of election, past precedent is a good guide to how the race will shape up this year. First, there is the question of Asia. The last four Secretaries-General have come from Africa, Latin America, and the "West Europe and Others group." Rotation is not mandatory but U.N. General Assembly resolution 51/241 of 1997 did note that the Secretary-General's selection should pay "due regard to regional rotation and gender equality." As of now, the U.S. is refusing to accept it is Asia's turn. And egged on by Washington — which favours Vaira Vike-Freiberga of Latvia or Alexander Kwasnieski of Poland — the East European group insists it should be allowed a chance. However, when the election process begins in earnest [See box: The election procedure], Asian candidates are likely to dominate in the same way that African ones did in 1991.
As of now, the other declared candidates are Jayantha Dhanapala, a highly-regarded diplomat from Sri Lanka, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon and Thai Deputy Prime Minister Suriakart Sathirathai, who has the backing of Asean though none of its members is on the Security Council. Pakistan is reportedly considering fielding a candidate of its own with Nafis Sadik, Mr. Annan's special envoy for HIV/AIDS, a likely choice as she has the advantage of being both Asian and a woman.
In canvassing support for Mr. Tharoor, the biggest obstacle India will face is the argument that a big country should not aspire to the post of Secretary-General. Small and non-aligned may have been an important formula during the Cold War but it is not clear why that should be the sole criterion now. In any case, two Indians were entered into the race in 1953 while Egypt — a large and important country with heavy involvement in diplomatic disputes in its neighbourhood — won the top job in 1991. In any case, to the extent that Mr. Tharoor has never held an official position in India, it is possible that other countries will see him as a candidate unencumbered by the baggage of national diplomacy.
But if the P-5 countries or Japan would never imagine fielding one of their own nationals, is the nomination of Mr. Tharoor a signal that India does not consider itself a major world power? Certainly this was a question many in the MEA asked, with the initial perception being that such a move might compromise the country's bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Predictably, this is the line Pakistani diplomats have taken. Regardless of perceptions, however, the fact is that the two processes — and timelines — are completely unconnected. India can get a permanent seat only if there is enough international momentum for Security Council reform; there is little it can do on its own. And there is no reason why an Indian Secretary-General should reduce the appetite of the G-4 and other aspirants for a permanent seat. Equally, if ever there is an expansion of permanent membership, it is inconceivable that India would not make the cut even if an Indian is Secretary-General.
A major handicap Mr. Tharoor will have to overcome is the perception that a consummate UN insider like him may not be the best person to push through the administrative reforms needed. Thanks to his close association with Mr. Annan, whose relationship with the Bush administration started souring soon after his second term began, Mr. Tharoor might also run the risk of American opposition. This is presumably where he hopes India will come in. Given the growing strategic partnership between Washington and New Delhi, the U.S. may not want to annoy India by blocking its nominee. At the same time, India should be wary of the quid pro quo that American support might involve.
Two pitfalls
Well before it took the decision to field its own candidate, India circulated a draft resolution in the U.N. General Assembly calling for the selection of the Secretary General to be democratised by giving the U.N.'s wider membership — and not just the Security Council — a decisive say in the process. Under the Indian proposal, which has the backing of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Security Council should present the General Assembly — where every country has one vote and none the veto — a slate of two or more candidates and ask it to choose one. The Indian proposal, which echoes UNGA resolution 51/241, took the P-5 — who are extremely protective of their veto privilege — by surprise. At least one of the P-5 was so offended that it sent a delegation to Delhi to "demand" an explanation.
One consequence of the Indian espousal of Mr. Tharoor's candidature will almost certainly be to soft-pedal, if not entirely drop, the proposal to increase the role of the GA. But if it does so, other countries will see India's commitment to the democratisation of the U.N. as insincere.
Apart from this issue, there is another "irritant" India has to contend with. If Pakistan decides to enter someone in the race, there is always the danger that the election will be seen not as a contest between individual candidates but between two nations perceived as prone to washing their dirty linen in public.
Under no circumstances should New Delhi allow the election to degenerate into one of those typical India-Pakistan squabbles for which the world rightly has little time. Indeed, nothing limits India's profile internationally more than its inability to transcend "regional disputes" and forge a consensus in its own "backyard."
One strategy might have been to jointly push for a South Asian candidate like Mr. Dhanapala. But having taken the plunge and nominated Mr. Tharoor, the Government must now join the campaign in earnest and ensure he wins the widest possible support. At the same time, it should also have an exit strategy in hand. At the first sign that Mr. Tharoor might not make it, India should find a way gracefully to withdraw its candidate and endorse the emerging Asian consensus candidate, whoever she or he might be. Whatever the outcome, India must emerge as a unifying force in Asia and not a divisive one.
21 June 2006
The Hindu
Will an Indian be the next U.N. chief?
Siddharth Varadarajan
EVER SINCE India went head-to-head against Japan for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in 1996 and lost, official circles in New Delhi have had little appetite for standalone contests in international fora. Last year, when the country made a strong pitch for a permanent seat, it did so with the comforting security blanket of the G-4 firmly wrapped around it. Even so, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the PMO — perhaps sensing the difficult odds — chose not to get directly involved in that hunt and left all the lobbying and legwork to the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
Against this backdrop, New Delhi's decision to nominate U.N. Under-Secretary-General Shashi Tharoor as its official candidate for the top job at Turtle Bay suggests a new willingness to take a risky gamble on the world stage. Mr. Tharoor finds himself fighting the charge of being "light-weight" and faces stiff competition from a host of declared (and undeclared) contenders. Even though the stakes are much higher for its nominee, the Government presumably evaluated both the probability of victory and the consequences of defeat and found the cost-benefit ratio of the venture to its liking.
Within the foreign policy establishment, the decision to back Mr. Tharoor was not taken easily. Some within the PMO saw merit in India endorsing his candidature but the MEA and our mission to the U.N. initially felt the risk was not worth taking. It was only on June 13 that the MEA sent a confidential cable to its Ambassadors informing them of India's decision to back Mr. Tharoor. The Ambassadors were instructed to sound out their host government's initial preferences. They were also told that the formal announcement would be made later in the month, though the same was done within 48 hours.
For Mr. Tharoor, defeat will almost certainly mean the end of his career at the U.N., where he has worked for more than two decades. If he is prepared to risk it all, one can only imagine he has done his homework carefully. For India, however, there are potential costs, none by themselves overly onerous though a lot will depend on the precise manner in which the election campaign proceeds from here on.
Unpredictable process
Barring the 18-year period between Dag Hammarskjold's election as Secretary-General in 1953 — in a race which saw Vijayalakshmi Pandit and Sir Benegal Narayan Rau of India also emerge as unsuccessful candidates — and the end of U. Thant's tenure in 1971, the selection process for the job of Secretary-General has involved a high degree of unpredictability. In 1971, Kurt Waldheim fought off Max Jakobson of Finland and Carlos Ortiz de Rosas of Argentina to emerge the winner. With the backing of both superpowers, the dour Austrian got re-elected in 1976 but was vetoed by China when he sought a third term in 1981. With the United States also vetoing the Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Salim Ahmed Salim, Javier Perez de Cuellar of Peru — who was an Under Secretary-General in the U.N. at the time — eventually emerged as the consensus candidate. In 1986, he was reappointed for a second term.
In 1991, Africa claimed the post as its own. Though candidates from outside the region were also nominated (such as the former Canadian Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney) the serious contenders were all African. Eventually, two front-runners emerged — Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt and Bernard Chidzero of Zimbabwe — with the Egyptian deputy foreign minister eventually triumphing. Five years later, the Clinton administration vetoed a second term for Mr. Boutros-Ghali, whose independence, particularly in matters involving West Asia, it had come to resent. Again, a slate of alternative African candidates emerged with Kofi Annan, the favourite at the outset, eventually rising to the top despite the initial opposition of France (because of his poor French).
While the U.N. Charter has little to say about the process of election, past precedent is a good guide to how the race will shape up this year. First, there is the question of Asia. The last four Secretaries-General have come from Africa, Latin America, and the "West Europe and Others group." Rotation is not mandatory but U.N. General Assembly resolution 51/241 of 1997 did note that the Secretary-General's selection should pay "due regard to regional rotation and gender equality." As of now, the U.S. is refusing to accept it is Asia's turn. And egged on by Washington — which favours Vaira Vike-Freiberga of Latvia or Alexander Kwasnieski of Poland — the East European group insists it should be allowed a chance. However, when the election process begins in earnest [See box: The election procedure], Asian candidates are likely to dominate in the same way that African ones did in 1991.
As of now, the other declared candidates are Jayantha Dhanapala, a highly-regarded diplomat from Sri Lanka, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon and Thai Deputy Prime Minister Suriakart Sathirathai, who has the backing of Asean though none of its members is on the Security Council. Pakistan is reportedly considering fielding a candidate of its own with Nafis Sadik, Mr. Annan's special envoy for HIV/AIDS, a likely choice as she has the advantage of being both Asian and a woman.
In canvassing support for Mr. Tharoor, the biggest obstacle India will face is the argument that a big country should not aspire to the post of Secretary-General. Small and non-aligned may have been an important formula during the Cold War but it is not clear why that should be the sole criterion now. In any case, two Indians were entered into the race in 1953 while Egypt — a large and important country with heavy involvement in diplomatic disputes in its neighbourhood — won the top job in 1991. In any case, to the extent that Mr. Tharoor has never held an official position in India, it is possible that other countries will see him as a candidate unencumbered by the baggage of national diplomacy.
But if the P-5 countries or Japan would never imagine fielding one of their own nationals, is the nomination of Mr. Tharoor a signal that India does not consider itself a major world power? Certainly this was a question many in the MEA asked, with the initial perception being that such a move might compromise the country's bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council. Predictably, this is the line Pakistani diplomats have taken. Regardless of perceptions, however, the fact is that the two processes — and timelines — are completely unconnected. India can get a permanent seat only if there is enough international momentum for Security Council reform; there is little it can do on its own. And there is no reason why an Indian Secretary-General should reduce the appetite of the G-4 and other aspirants for a permanent seat. Equally, if ever there is an expansion of permanent membership, it is inconceivable that India would not make the cut even if an Indian is Secretary-General.
A major handicap Mr. Tharoor will have to overcome is the perception that a consummate UN insider like him may not be the best person to push through the administrative reforms needed. Thanks to his close association with Mr. Annan, whose relationship with the Bush administration started souring soon after his second term began, Mr. Tharoor might also run the risk of American opposition. This is presumably where he hopes India will come in. Given the growing strategic partnership between Washington and New Delhi, the U.S. may not want to annoy India by blocking its nominee. At the same time, India should be wary of the quid pro quo that American support might involve.
Two pitfalls
Well before it took the decision to field its own candidate, India circulated a draft resolution in the U.N. General Assembly calling for the selection of the Secretary General to be democratised by giving the U.N.'s wider membership — and not just the Security Council — a decisive say in the process. Under the Indian proposal, which has the backing of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Security Council should present the General Assembly — where every country has one vote and none the veto — a slate of two or more candidates and ask it to choose one. The Indian proposal, which echoes UNGA resolution 51/241, took the P-5 — who are extremely protective of their veto privilege — by surprise. At least one of the P-5 was so offended that it sent a delegation to Delhi to "demand" an explanation.
One consequence of the Indian espousal of Mr. Tharoor's candidature will almost certainly be to soft-pedal, if not entirely drop, the proposal to increase the role of the GA. But if it does so, other countries will see India's commitment to the democratisation of the U.N. as insincere.
Apart from this issue, there is another "irritant" India has to contend with. If Pakistan decides to enter someone in the race, there is always the danger that the election will be seen not as a contest between individual candidates but between two nations perceived as prone to washing their dirty linen in public.
Under no circumstances should New Delhi allow the election to degenerate into one of those typical India-Pakistan squabbles for which the world rightly has little time. Indeed, nothing limits India's profile internationally more than its inability to transcend "regional disputes" and forge a consensus in its own "backyard."
One strategy might have been to jointly push for a South Asian candidate like Mr. Dhanapala. But having taken the plunge and nominated Mr. Tharoor, the Government must now join the campaign in earnest and ensure he wins the widest possible support. At the same time, it should also have an exit strategy in hand. At the first sign that Mr. Tharoor might not make it, India should find a way gracefully to withdraw its candidate and endorse the emerging Asian consensus candidate, whoever she or he might be. Whatever the outcome, India must emerge as a unifying force in Asia and not a divisive one.
UNSG race: Who gets to vote?
If India drops its proposal of having the General Assembly consider a slate of two or more candidates, then the next Secretary-General will be chosen by the 15 countries who are members of the Security Council.
Members likely to back Tharoor from the start: France, Greece
Members who may be induced to back him if India lobbies hard: Argentina, Britain, Congo-Brazaville, Ghana, Peru, Qatar, Russia, Tanzania
Members whom India can induce not to use the veto: China, United States
Others: Denmark, Japan, Slovakia
Members likely to back Tharoor from the start: France, Greece
Members who may be induced to back him if India lobbies hard: Argentina, Britain, Congo-Brazaville, Ghana, Peru, Qatar, Russia, Tanzania
Members whom India can induce not to use the veto: China, United States
Others: Denmark, Japan, Slovakia
The election procedure for chosing the UN Secretary General
UNDER THE Wisnumurti Guidelines — which built upon a transparent procedure first put in place in 1991 by Chinmaya R. Gharekhan who, as India's Permanent Representative to the U.N. and President of the Security Council, oversaw the election of Boutros Boutros-Ghali — a number of informal ballots are held in order to narrow the field down to the top two candidates:
The viability of each candidate may be assessed by means of a "straw poll(s)" to be conducted in accordance with the following procedure:
- Two types of papers will be distributed to the members of the Security Council. White papers for non-permanent members and red papers for permanent members. Each paper will contain a column listing the name of candidate or candidates, the first marked "encouraged" and the second "discouraged."
- Each member of the Security Council may indicate on the appropriate paper the candidate or candidates who it wants to encourage or discourage.
Candidates who are "encouraged" by the least number of members and who are "discouraged" by one or more permanent members, tend to withdraw from the fray. When Brian Mulroney polled just two votes in 1991, for example, the Canadian Government informed the Security Council that it could "no longer spare" the former Prime Minister.
At the early stages of this process, it is not unusual for members to support (i.e. "encourage") more than one candidate. In 1991, for example, both Boutros-Ghali and Mr. Chidzero went into the final, formal vote with more than the nine members required for a majority encouraging them. During this informal balloting, a negative vote by a permanent member does not mean the candidate concerned is eliminated.
It is only afetr this process establishes clarity about who the leading (or top two) contender(s) is/are that the Security Council proceeds to a formal vote.
If deadlock persists, either because of the top two candidates polling equal "encouraged" votes or because both face the veto (as happened in 1981), a compromise candidate who is not formally in the race till then is encouraged to enter the fray with the promise of unanimous election. That year, Mr. Perez de Cuellar was chosen to break the deadlock.
This time, the smart money is on Singapore's former Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, being drafted in the event of a deadlock among the other Asian contenders.
31 January 2006
Lifting the veil from the Security Council
Javier Perez de Cuellar told Chinmaya R. Gharekhan of India in 1991 that the U.N. Secretary-General's job had lost its charm now that the Cold War had ended and the Big Five would look to push their agendas through the Security Council.
Gharekhan sat at the Council for five years, first as India's ambassador and then as the special representative of Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Throughout this period he kept a diary and has produced an engrossing account of the UNSC's functioning through the Iraq, Haiti, Rwanda and Bosnia crises. But it is his account of the Vatican-like election process for the Secretary-General that is the most revealing.
31 January 2006
The Hindu
Lifting the veil from the U.N. Security Council
An able chronicle of the U.N.'s exertions, from Iraq and Bosnia to Rwanda and Haiti
SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
The Horseshoe Table — An Inside View of the U.N. Security Council
Chinmaya R. Gharekhan
Pearson Longman, Delhi: 2006. Rs. 550.
If there is one arm of the United Nations that has seen its work escalate almost exponentially since the end of the Cold War, it is the U.N. Security Council (UNSC).
Freed from the deadlock of competing superpower vetoes, the UNSC — as the world body's principal instrument for the maintenance of peace and security — has started playing an increasingly active role as peacekeeper, `peacemaker' and even enforcer. Prior to 1990, the UNSC had passed a total of 646 resolutions, at an average of around 15 a year since the U.N.'s founding in 1945. That year, it passed 33, including the famous resolution calling on Iraq to vacate its aggression against Kuwait (UNSCR 660), and in 1991 — the year Chinmaya R. Gharekhan first sat around the Council's horseshoe-shaped table as India's ambassador — the number was 41. By the time Gharekhan left the U.N. at the end of 1996, the UNSC had passed another 366 resolutions. With the passage of a resolution this January on the situation in Cote d'Ivoire, the score today has reached 1652, making that a total of 1,006 resolutions passed since 1990.
Shrinkage in stature
But if the UNSC has seen a huge increase in the volume and scope of its work, the office of the Secretary General (SG) has perforce had to shrink in clout and stature, if not size. Javier Perez de Cuellar, who served as SG from 1981 to 1991, had more than an inkling of what was in store for his successors. The post had become unattractive and would become more so in the future, he told Gharekhan when the latter, in his capacity as the rotating head of the UNSC came to consult him on a matter. "I met him... to discuss the situation in northern Iraq but he chose to give vent to his frustration with the impending `new world order' and the place of the Secretary General in it," Gharekhan writes in his very readable insider's account of the Security Council's role in the first half of the 1990s. "He was particularly concerned about the dominance of the Five. `Why should I have 10 eyes all the time looking over my shoulder to see what I am doing?... It is amazing that in spite of all that is going on, so many people are still interested in becoming Secretary General! They must be very brave people'," Gharekhan quotes the Peruvian telling him.
Perez de Cuellar was right. His successor, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt, flirted with bravery and came to grief. In his five years as SG, he alternated between defiance of the United States and its pushy ambassador, Madeleine Albright, and vain attempts at accommodation, only to pay the price. Alone among U.N. Secretary Generals, he was denied a second term, while his bete noire, Albright, who stooped as low as to try and convince Mrs. Boutros-Ghali to make her husband see `reason', went on to bigger and better things in the second Clinton administration.
Tragedies
Gharekhan's book — which draws liberally on the author's inside view, first as India's ambassador and then as Boutros-Ghali's special representative to the Security Council — provides an account of the improbably brave Egyptian's ouster as part of a narrative of the U.N.'s successes and failures from Iraq and West Asia to Bosnia, Rwanda and Haiti. It is an honest description of what happened, free of the victim's urge to clear his own name which mars Boutros-Ghali's own memoirs, Unvanquished: A U.N.-U.S. Saga (Random House, 1999).
Gharekhan's account of the UNSC's deliberations and consultations on the first Gulf War and its aftermath, as well as the evolving tragedies in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, provide many insights and details that specialists and laypersons familiar with the broad outlines will find enormously useful. But it is in the description of the 1991 and 1996 elections for SG — the first led to Boutros-Ghali's victory, the second to his ouster thanks to being vetoed by the U.S. — that this book breaks entirely fresh and fascinating ground. Peeling away the layers of mystique surrounding a process that has tended to be as opaque as the election of a Pope, Gharekhan provides a detailed and dare I say gripping account of the Tammany Hall-like games nations play to ensure that a candidate favourable to them in some way gets chosen for the top U.N. job. With the current incumbent, Kofi Annan, due to demit office at the end of 2006, prospective candidates and their backers would do well to read this book.
Relevance of the U.N.
If there is one omission in an otherwise comprehensive narrative, it is the Qana episode which, in my opinion, played a decisive role in ensuring Boutros-Ghali was denied a second term.
Qana was the tragic village in southern Lebabon where more than a 100 civilians who had taken refuge in a U.N. compound were killed by Israeli shells on 18 April 1996 during the notorious `Grapes of Wrath' operation launched by Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak. Boutros-Ghali set up an inquiry under the charge of a Dutch army officer, Major-General Franklin van Kappen. The inquiry report, finalised in the first week of May, suggested that Israel had deliberately targeted the U.N. compound and the civilians who had taken shelter there. Warren Christopher, who was the U.S. Secretary of State at the time, tried his best to get the SG to withhold the report or delete the offensive reference to Israel. Boutros-Ghali refused.
In his memoirs, Boutros-Ghali recounts his subsequent visit to Qana and how he wept upon meeting the villagers there. By contrast, Gharekhan's book is written with restraint, precision and even calm detachment. Individual bravery has its place in international diplomacy but he is a firm believer in the relevance of the U.N. to the contemporary world "despite the blow to its image and credibility" by Rwanda, Somalia and the Iraq-related events of 2003. His insider's account is bound to be considered a vital ingredient to the debate on reforming the world body.
06 August 2005
African Union pours cold water on India's campaign for U.N. seat
6 August 2005
The Hindu
African Union pours cold water on India's campaign for U.N. seat
NEW DELHI: India's hopes of winning a permanent seat on an enlarged United Nations Security Council hit a road block on Friday with the African Union (AU) — whose 53 votes in the General Assembly are crucial — insisting that any new permanent member of the UNSC must have veto power.
The AU's decision — taken at an extraordinary summit in Addis Ababa on Thursday — means Africa as a whole will not back the G-4 draft resolution authored by India, Japan, Brazil and Germany. As matters stand, the AU and G-4 have separate draft resolutions, neither of which is likely to garner the 128 votes necessary to win acceptance.
With India running out of options, the Ministry of External Affairs said it was a "matter of regret" that the African States were "unable to endorse an AU/G-4 Draft framework resolution" based on the compromise reached by the G-4 Foreign Ministers and representatives of the AU in London last month. The compromise involved the G-4 agreeing to increase the total size of the proposed Security Council to 26, rather than 25, so as to accommodate an additional African non-permanent member on a rotational basis. In return, the AU was supposed to drop its insistence on the veto. Though Nigeria pushed for acceptance of the compromise at the meeting, an alliance of North and East African States — Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Kenya and Zambia — effectively derailed the process.
When the G-4 draft was first circulated in May, it envisaged full veto powers for the proposed new permanent members. This provision was subsequently diluted and virtually dropped under pressure from many countries — mostly in Europe — worried that the proliferation of veto power might end up reducing the effectiveness of the Security Council. Of the more than 80 countries backing the G-4 draft on Friday, it is estimated that as many as 50 of them have strong views against the extension of veto power.
Although the G-4 must now collectively decide its next move, there is likely to be little or no appetite for a vote any time soon on the G-4 draft currently before the General Assembly. The External Affairs Minister, Natwar Singh, had spoken to his counterparts from Brazil, Germany and Japan to review the situation, an MEA spokesman said on Friday.
An attempt is being made to understand the African position and to see whether a critical mass of countries from the continent is prepared to break ranks with the AU's consensual position.
Apart from buying time in order to woo individual African supporters, the G-4 now has two options. The four can push for a vote or can announce that they will not seek a vote on their draft resolution, thereby living to fight another day.
To be united
The MEA spokesman said the G-4 would "continue to act in unity to promote the cause of U.N. reform, including UNSC reform." According to Indian officials, Security Council reform is firmly and irrevocably on the international agenda and this is largely due to the G-4's efforts.
At the same time, officials say, the G-4 will also have to guard against the "Coffee Club" taking advantage of dissonance in the camp of those who want more permanent seats. Italy and Pakistan have drafted a resolution based on U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan's `Model B,' envisaging the creation of semi-permanent membership. If both the G-4 and the AU do not press for a vote on their draft resolutions, the "Coffee Club" might seek to put its draft to vote. In the absence of competing proposals, it just might win a respectable level of support in the General Assembly though nowhere close to the 128 votes needed to pass.
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
The Hindu
African Union pours cold water on India's campaign for U.N. seat
Siddharth Varadarajan
| Addis Ababa meet insists that any new permanent UNSC member must have veto power |
The AU's decision — taken at an extraordinary summit in Addis Ababa on Thursday — means Africa as a whole will not back the G-4 draft resolution authored by India, Japan, Brazil and Germany. As matters stand, the AU and G-4 have separate draft resolutions, neither of which is likely to garner the 128 votes necessary to win acceptance.
With India running out of options, the Ministry of External Affairs said it was a "matter of regret" that the African States were "unable to endorse an AU/G-4 Draft framework resolution" based on the compromise reached by the G-4 Foreign Ministers and representatives of the AU in London last month. The compromise involved the G-4 agreeing to increase the total size of the proposed Security Council to 26, rather than 25, so as to accommodate an additional African non-permanent member on a rotational basis. In return, the AU was supposed to drop its insistence on the veto. Though Nigeria pushed for acceptance of the compromise at the meeting, an alliance of North and East African States — Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Kenya and Zambia — effectively derailed the process.
When the G-4 draft was first circulated in May, it envisaged full veto powers for the proposed new permanent members. This provision was subsequently diluted and virtually dropped under pressure from many countries — mostly in Europe — worried that the proliferation of veto power might end up reducing the effectiveness of the Security Council. Of the more than 80 countries backing the G-4 draft on Friday, it is estimated that as many as 50 of them have strong views against the extension of veto power.
Although the G-4 must now collectively decide its next move, there is likely to be little or no appetite for a vote any time soon on the G-4 draft currently before the General Assembly. The External Affairs Minister, Natwar Singh, had spoken to his counterparts from Brazil, Germany and Japan to review the situation, an MEA spokesman said on Friday.
An attempt is being made to understand the African position and to see whether a critical mass of countries from the continent is prepared to break ranks with the AU's consensual position.
Apart from buying time in order to woo individual African supporters, the G-4 now has two options. The four can push for a vote or can announce that they will not seek a vote on their draft resolution, thereby living to fight another day.
To be united
The MEA spokesman said the G-4 would "continue to act in unity to promote the cause of U.N. reform, including UNSC reform." According to Indian officials, Security Council reform is firmly and irrevocably on the international agenda and this is largely due to the G-4's efforts.
At the same time, officials say, the G-4 will also have to guard against the "Coffee Club" taking advantage of dissonance in the camp of those who want more permanent seats. Italy and Pakistan have drafted a resolution based on U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan's `Model B,' envisaging the creation of semi-permanent membership. If both the G-4 and the AU do not press for a vote on their draft resolutions, the "Coffee Club" might seek to put its draft to vote. In the absence of competing proposals, it just might win a respectable level of support in the General Assembly though nowhere close to the 128 votes needed to pass.
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
29 July 2005
UN reform: G-4 remains focussed on the African Union
29 July 2005
The Hindu
G-4 remains focussed on the African Union
NEW DELHI: With the 60th anniversary summit of the United Nations fast approaching, the G-4 group of countries comprising India, Brazil, Japan and Germany are battening down the hatches for the final stages of their united push for the reform of the U.N. Security Council.
"The whole world now realises this game is for real," a senior official told The Hindu on Thursday. "The time for holding one's cards has gone." Countries that had remained silent till now have suddenly found their voice. In the process, the G-4 has discovered new friends and supporters like Nigeria. And it also has a very clear idea of who the "wreckers" are, apart from already vocal opponents like Italy, Pakistan, Argentina, Mexico and South Korea. Principal among them is the U.S.
Landmark agreement
Fresh from the landmark agreement with a number of African countries in London on July 26, Indian officials involved in the campaign are planning to ratchet up their efforts. A fresh round of demarches — requests to co-sponsor and vote for the G-4 draft resolution — is being readied. In addition, India is asking its friends and supporters to take a stand against the draft resolution tabled by the Uniting for Consensus group led by Italy and Pakistan, which envisages no increase in the permanent category of seats in the Security Council.
For the present, all eyes are on the African Union, which is to hold a summit level meeting in Addis Ababa on August 4 — its second in less than a month. Under the terms of the compromise struck between the G-4 Foreign Ministers and the African Ministers and officials present in London, the African Union will drop its demand for the immediate grant of veto power for the six new permanent members proposed to be inducted. The Africans had also wanted an extra non-permanent seat, taking the size of the enlarged Council to 26, but have agreed to share that seat on a rotational basis with Latin America and Asia.
The meeting in London went down to the wire because a number of African countries refused to accept Nigeria's acceptance of the compromise. Among the "wreckers" were Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Kenya. Djibouti and Seychelles, which were initially opposed, later agreed. . External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh made an impassioned plea to the Africans not to let this historic opportunity to win representation for their continent on the Security Council pass by. "The meeting went on for 12 hours, but at the end, we had a deal", an official said.
Since the AU works by consensus, the agreement now has to be ratified by all members at the summit level.
This consensus may well break down, say Indian officials. These officials think those African countries which want to see their continent get two permanent seats will endorse the G-4 text. The estimate is that at least 40 if not more African states will vote in favour, which will bring the G-4 closer to the magic figure of 128 needed to pass their resolution. "If all goes well," said an official, "we will go for a vote in the General Assembly at the end of August."
"At the end of the day," said Natwar Singh, "victory is still not certain. If the G-4 resolution is not accepted, it will be a big tragedy for the U.N. and the world. But the four of us will remain united." What the G-4 has done is no small thing, he added. "We have firmly placed the issue of Security Council reform on to the international agenda and that cannot now be undone by anybody."
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
The Hindu
G-4 remains focussed on the African Union
Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI: With the 60th anniversary summit of the United Nations fast approaching, the G-4 group of countries comprising India, Brazil, Japan and Germany are battening down the hatches for the final stages of their united push for the reform of the U.N. Security Council.
"The whole world now realises this game is for real," a senior official told The Hindu on Thursday. "The time for holding one's cards has gone." Countries that had remained silent till now have suddenly found their voice. In the process, the G-4 has discovered new friends and supporters like Nigeria. And it also has a very clear idea of who the "wreckers" are, apart from already vocal opponents like Italy, Pakistan, Argentina, Mexico and South Korea. Principal among them is the U.S.
Landmark agreement
Fresh from the landmark agreement with a number of African countries in London on July 26, Indian officials involved in the campaign are planning to ratchet up their efforts. A fresh round of demarches — requests to co-sponsor and vote for the G-4 draft resolution — is being readied. In addition, India is asking its friends and supporters to take a stand against the draft resolution tabled by the Uniting for Consensus group led by Italy and Pakistan, which envisages no increase in the permanent category of seats in the Security Council.
For the present, all eyes are on the African Union, which is to hold a summit level meeting in Addis Ababa on August 4 — its second in less than a month. Under the terms of the compromise struck between the G-4 Foreign Ministers and the African Ministers and officials present in London, the African Union will drop its demand for the immediate grant of veto power for the six new permanent members proposed to be inducted. The Africans had also wanted an extra non-permanent seat, taking the size of the enlarged Council to 26, but have agreed to share that seat on a rotational basis with Latin America and Asia.
The meeting in London went down to the wire because a number of African countries refused to accept Nigeria's acceptance of the compromise. Among the "wreckers" were Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Kenya. Djibouti and Seychelles, which were initially opposed, later agreed. . External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh made an impassioned plea to the Africans not to let this historic opportunity to win representation for their continent on the Security Council pass by. "The meeting went on for 12 hours, but at the end, we had a deal", an official said.
Since the AU works by consensus, the agreement now has to be ratified by all members at the summit level.
This consensus may well break down, say Indian officials. These officials think those African countries which want to see their continent get two permanent seats will endorse the G-4 text. The estimate is that at least 40 if not more African states will vote in favour, which will bring the G-4 closer to the magic figure of 128 needed to pass their resolution. "If all goes well," said an official, "we will go for a vote in the General Assembly at the end of August."
"At the end of the day," said Natwar Singh, "victory is still not certain. If the G-4 resolution is not accepted, it will be a big tragedy for the U.N. and the world. But the four of us will remain united." What the G-4 has done is no small thing, he added. "We have firmly placed the issue of Security Council reform on to the international agenda and that cannot now be undone by anybody."
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
11 July 2005
G-4 favours U.N. vote "around July 20"
11 July 2005
The Hindu
G-4 favours U.N. vote "around July 20"
The Hindu
G-4 favours U.N. vote "around July 20"
Siddharth Varadarajan
| Africa could help garner the magic figure of 128 countries |
NEW DELHI: After taking stock of the international support for their proposal to expand the United Nations Security Council, the G-4 Foreign Ministers, meeting in London over the weekend, have agreed to put their draft resolution to vote in the General Assembly "around July 20."
This deadline is elastic but not open-ended, a senior official told The Hindu on Sunday, with everything depending on the "magic figure of 128" — the number of countries required to pass the resolution with a two-thirds majority. "This in turn depends on Africa," he added.
Crucial meet on July 17
External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh will meet his counterparts from Brazil, Germany and Japan in New York on July 17 for a final assessment of whether to press ahead with a vote or not.
If a compromise is reached with the African countries, voting, in all likelihood, will proceed on schedule. But if not, the vote will be put off till an understanding is reached.
In the run-up to that meeting, the G-4 Ambassadors to the United Nations will seek to bridge the difference between the G-4's draft and the proposals endorsed by the African Union (A.U.) at its summit in Libya last week.
The A.U. proposals are also in the process of being tabled as a separate resolution in the General Assembly. And as if the waters were not muddy enough, the `Coffee Club' group of countries, opposed to the addition of new permanent members, will also be tabling its resolution.
Harmonised text
"In our negotiations with the African countries, every effort will now be made by us to produce a harmonised text," a senior official said.
Like India, Japan, Brazil and Germany, the A.U. also wants the addition of six new permanent members, including two from Africa, but insists they must have the right of veto.
The G-4 countries had originally sought veto rights but agreed to hold that demand in abeyance for 15 years in order to win wider support. The A.U. proposal also involves one extra non-permanent seat for Africa, which would take the proposed size of the Security Council up to 26 rather than 25.
The weakest link
The Africans may drop their insistence on the veto but their plan to have an extra non-permanent seat could be a deal-breaker.
"I don't think any of the G-4 minds Africa getting an additional seat but then that would open up a can of worms. Latin America or the Caribbean may insist on one more for their grouping. More African countries would vote for our resolution but we would lose support on the other side," the official said.
"Africa is the weakest link. If a compromise is reached on the two resolutions, fine. But if at the end of the day there are still two separate resolutions, we might just have to accept that expansion [of the Security Council] will not happen this year."
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
07 July 2005
U.N. reform: India may agree to defer vote on G-4 resolution
7 July 2005
The Hindu
India may agree to defer vote on G-4 resolution on U.N. Council
The feeling is that it might be better to have an open-ended debate
Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI: With the G-4 countries' "deadline" for tabling their draft resolution on U.N. Security Council enlargement fast approaching, India is now leaning towards not insisting on an immediate vote in the General Assembly.
At the initiative of the Brazilian Foreign Minister, a meeting of the G-4 foreign ministers will be held in London on July 8 to discuss the future strategy. External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh will attend, as will his counterparts from Germany and Japan.
According to official sources, India still sees tremendous merit in the draft framework resolution being submitted to the General Assembly as early as next week. But rather than pushing through with a vote immediately, the feeling is that it might be better to have an open-ended debate on the resolution's proposals. Many countries have not yet clarified their position and a debate would help them to air their views without the fear of having immediately to commit a vote this way or that.
Political decision
At the same time, the officials conceded that the G-4 ambassadors to the U.N. were keen on going in for a vote immediately. "They feel the numbers add up and they may be right from their perspective in New York," a senior official told The Hindu. "But the decision to press for a vote has to be a political one in which the wider implications are considered by each of the G-4 governments."
The official said that a number of countries friendly to India and its bid had counselled a postponement of any vote and that New Delhi would accord due consideration to these views as well.
If the G-4 agrees to defer voting for now, India is likely to prefer that the resolution be formally taken up later in the year, perhaps in September. The feeling is that any postponement beyond 2005 would kill the momentum for reform.
New Delhi is convinced that a substantial majority of the world's countries will speak in favour of the G-4 draft which envisages the creation of six additional permanent members of the Security Council — two each from Asia and Africa, and one each from Europe and Latin America. "The African Union (AU) summit in Libya (which concluded on Tuesday) has broadly endorsed what we want by calling for two permanent members from Africa, an official said. At the same time, the AU was insisting on an additional non-permanent seat, which would take the size of the enlarged Security Council to 26 — rather than 25 as envisaged by the G-4.
That might just be one too many members for those countries concerned that a bigger UNSC might lose its effectiveness.
Though India has received more pledges of support for its own candidature than for the G-4 framework resolution, the officials said New Delhi was determined to maintain the unity of the G-4 at all costs. If the AU had chosen its two candidates, the G-4 could have been expanded to include them as well. "But we are all going to work closely with the Africans on this," the official said.
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
The Hindu
India may agree to defer vote on G-4 resolution on U.N. Council
The feeling is that it might be better to have an open-ended debate
Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI: With the G-4 countries' "deadline" for tabling their draft resolution on U.N. Security Council enlargement fast approaching, India is now leaning towards not insisting on an immediate vote in the General Assembly.
At the initiative of the Brazilian Foreign Minister, a meeting of the G-4 foreign ministers will be held in London on July 8 to discuss the future strategy. External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh will attend, as will his counterparts from Germany and Japan.
According to official sources, India still sees tremendous merit in the draft framework resolution being submitted to the General Assembly as early as next week. But rather than pushing through with a vote immediately, the feeling is that it might be better to have an open-ended debate on the resolution's proposals. Many countries have not yet clarified their position and a debate would help them to air their views without the fear of having immediately to commit a vote this way or that.
Political decision
At the same time, the officials conceded that the G-4 ambassadors to the U.N. were keen on going in for a vote immediately. "They feel the numbers add up and they may be right from their perspective in New York," a senior official told The Hindu. "But the decision to press for a vote has to be a political one in which the wider implications are considered by each of the G-4 governments."
The official said that a number of countries friendly to India and its bid had counselled a postponement of any vote and that New Delhi would accord due consideration to these views as well.
If the G-4 agrees to defer voting for now, India is likely to prefer that the resolution be formally taken up later in the year, perhaps in September. The feeling is that any postponement beyond 2005 would kill the momentum for reform.
New Delhi is convinced that a substantial majority of the world's countries will speak in favour of the G-4 draft which envisages the creation of six additional permanent members of the Security Council — two each from Asia and Africa, and one each from Europe and Latin America. "The African Union (AU) summit in Libya (which concluded on Tuesday) has broadly endorsed what we want by calling for two permanent members from Africa, an official said. At the same time, the AU was insisting on an additional non-permanent seat, which would take the size of the enlarged Security Council to 26 — rather than 25 as envisaged by the G-4.
That might just be one too many members for those countries concerned that a bigger UNSC might lose its effectiveness.
Though India has received more pledges of support for its own candidature than for the G-4 framework resolution, the officials said New Delhi was determined to maintain the unity of the G-4 at all costs. If the AU had chosen its two candidates, the G-4 could have been expanded to include them as well. "But we are all going to work closely with the Africans on this," the official said.
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
06 July 2005
Don't impose vote on draft U.N. proposals, SCO tells G-4
6 July 2005
The Hindu
Dateline Astana
Do not impose vote on draft U.N. proposal, SCO tells G-4
Calls for `new security concept' for Asia-Pacific
Siddharth Varadarajan
ASTANA (KAZAKHSTAN): The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which India has just joined as an observer, ended its summit here on Tuesday with a call for United Nations reform to follow the "principle of the broadest possible agreement."
In a blunt reference to the G-4 draft framework resolution for expanding the U.N. Security Council, the SCO — which links China and Russia with Central Asia — said it opposed all attempts to "try to set a deadline for U.N. reform or to impose voting on draft proposals on which major differences exist."
Indian officials were, however, unfazed by this unflattering reference to one of New Delhi's most important diplomatic projects. They said the SCO's stand was not a surprise since it closely mirrors what Russia and China said in their communiquИ at the end of President Hu Jintao's visit to the Russian Federation last week. "Look, we know Russia's stand and China's stand and we know who is a member of the SCO," a senior official said. Though the decision on when exactly to table the draft would be taken by the G-4 collectively, the plan is to do so later this month, he said.
Apart from advocating consensus-based U.N. reforms, other sections of the SCO declaration bear the unmistakable impress of last week's landmark Sino-Russian joint statement on the principles for the `New World Order in the 21st Century.' Calling the globalisation process "controversial," the SCO said "the right of all peoples to their own path of development should be fully respected." Only "multinational cooperation based on principles of mutual respect, equality, non-interference into internal affairs of sovereign states, non-confrontational thinking and progressive movement towards democratisation in the field of international relations" could promote global peace and security, the final statement said.
The SCO heads of state also called upon the international community "regardless of any differences in ideologies or social structures" to shape "a new security concept" and world order based on strengthening mutual trust.
Chinese President Hu Jintao said the SCO summit assumed great importance in the context of the "profound changes" under way in the regional situation.
The forum was entering a new period of pragmatic cooperation in which the task was to translate the existing potential into real and tangible results.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said the SCO declaration had "great international significance" because of the need to "respect and protect the diversity of civilisations and development models."
In an indirect reference to the invasion of Iraq and the aggressive championing of "democracy" by the United States in the region and around the world, Mr. Putin said it was necessary to oppose "the imposition of templates on states through the use of force."
Asia-Pacific region
The Asia-Pacific region would play an important part in securing peace and development in the 21st century, the SCO heads of state noted, but said, "no dividing lines should ever emerge in the region as a whole or in any of its parts."
The SCO declaration also envisages closer cooperation by member states to "effectively counteract new challenges and threats to international and regional security and stability."
Among the measures proposed are joint planning and implementation of anti-terrorist activities, cooperation in the "development and use of modern technical equipment used to fight new challenges and threats," the training of relevant personnel and harmonisation of national laws governing security provisions.
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
The Hindu
Dateline Astana
Do not impose vote on draft U.N. proposal, SCO tells G-4
Calls for `new security concept' for Asia-Pacific
Siddharth Varadarajan
ASTANA (KAZAKHSTAN): The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which India has just joined as an observer, ended its summit here on Tuesday with a call for United Nations reform to follow the "principle of the broadest possible agreement."
In a blunt reference to the G-4 draft framework resolution for expanding the U.N. Security Council, the SCO — which links China and Russia with Central Asia — said it opposed all attempts to "try to set a deadline for U.N. reform or to impose voting on draft proposals on which major differences exist."
Indian officials were, however, unfazed by this unflattering reference to one of New Delhi's most important diplomatic projects. They said the SCO's stand was not a surprise since it closely mirrors what Russia and China said in their communiquИ at the end of President Hu Jintao's visit to the Russian Federation last week. "Look, we know Russia's stand and China's stand and we know who is a member of the SCO," a senior official said. Though the decision on when exactly to table the draft would be taken by the G-4 collectively, the plan is to do so later this month, he said.
Apart from advocating consensus-based U.N. reforms, other sections of the SCO declaration bear the unmistakable impress of last week's landmark Sino-Russian joint statement on the principles for the `New World Order in the 21st Century.' Calling the globalisation process "controversial," the SCO said "the right of all peoples to their own path of development should be fully respected." Only "multinational cooperation based on principles of mutual respect, equality, non-interference into internal affairs of sovereign states, non-confrontational thinking and progressive movement towards democratisation in the field of international relations" could promote global peace and security, the final statement said.
The SCO heads of state also called upon the international community "regardless of any differences in ideologies or social structures" to shape "a new security concept" and world order based on strengthening mutual trust.
Chinese President Hu Jintao said the SCO summit assumed great importance in the context of the "profound changes" under way in the regional situation.
The forum was entering a new period of pragmatic cooperation in which the task was to translate the existing potential into real and tangible results.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said the SCO declaration had "great international significance" because of the need to "respect and protect the diversity of civilisations and development models."
In an indirect reference to the invasion of Iraq and the aggressive championing of "democracy" by the United States in the region and around the world, Mr. Putin said it was necessary to oppose "the imposition of templates on states through the use of force."
Asia-Pacific region
The Asia-Pacific region would play an important part in securing peace and development in the 21st century, the SCO heads of state noted, but said, "no dividing lines should ever emerge in the region as a whole or in any of its parts."
The SCO declaration also envisages closer cooperation by member states to "effectively counteract new challenges and threats to international and regional security and stability."
Among the measures proposed are joint planning and implementation of anti-terrorist activities, cooperation in the "development and use of modern technical equipment used to fight new challenges and threats," the training of relevant personnel and harmonisation of national laws governing security provisions.
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
28 May 2005
Security Council reform: A bridge too far?
| Date:28/05/2005 http://www.thehindu.com/2005/05/28/stories/2005052801191200.htm Opinion - Leader Page Articles Siddharth Varadarajan
IN CIRCULATING both the draft of a framework resolution on Security Council reform and an ambitious timetable for the United Nations General Assembly to vote on it, India, Japan, Germany, and Brazil have taken their quest for permanent membership of the world body's highest organ to a point of no return. So long as the discussion on reform remained confined to the theoretical front, the countries concerned could afford to be expansive in their ambitions. Not any more. The G-4's ship has set sail and cannot now be recalled. On the choppy seas ahead lie two, and only two, outcomes. The four Governments must either meet success — collectively or singly — or face the bitterness, loss of international prestige and ignominy on the home front that defeat will inevitably bring with it. The draft framework resolution commits the G-4, as the four aspirants call themselves, to seeking six new permanent seats on the Security Council. The Council's size is to be increased from 15 to 25. The new permanent members are to be chosen on the basis of two each from Asia and Africa, one from Latin America/Caribbean, and one from among `West European and Other' states. In addition, the draft calls for increasing the number of non-permanent members by four, up from the present 10, on the basis of one each from Africa, Asia, Latin America/Caribbean, and East Europe. The inclusion of an additional seat for East Europe was proposed by Germany, which felt this was the only way to win the backing of the 20-odd states in that region. The reform envisaged differs in two respects from `Model A' and `Model B' put forward recently by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his report, In Larger Freedom. Both models had envisaged an increase in membership of the Security Council to 24, one less than the G-4 draft's 25. More significantly, the G-4 resolution calls for the right to block resolutions. Under the sub-head `Veto', it states: "the new permanent members should have the same responsibilities and obligations as the current permanent members." According to well-placed Japanese sources, the veto issue led to "heated discussions" among the G-4 nations, primarily India and Japan, with the former insisting there be no discrimination between permanent members and the latter counselling flexibility. The Japanese side managed to get the Indians to use the words "should have" instead of "shall have" in the paragraph on veto power, though one leading Japanese international law expert admitted to me that `should' and `shall' have an identical legal meaning quite distinct from the non-mandatory implications of a word like "may." However, it is evident that the G-4 is prepared to be flexible on the veto front. The `Talking Points' distributed by Germany to U.N. members along with the draft resolution say the question of veto "should not be a hindrance to Security Council reform." And in an attempt to convince the U.S. that the Security Council expansion will not reduce the body's capacity to take decisions that Washington might want, the G-4 draft also proposes to reduce the percentage of affirmative votes required to pass a resolution from the present 9 out of 15 (60 per cent) to 14 out of 25 (56 per cent). Incidentally, had this voting percentage been in place in February 2003, the U.S. would have managed the required eight affirmative votes to win backing for its intended invasion of Iraq. Clever voting method With Tuesday's `compromise' meeting in New York between the G-4 and the `Uniting for Consensus' group led by Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, and South Korea ending in a deadlock, it does seem as if the General Assembly will be asked to vote on the resolution sometime in June. The draft envisages a two-stage election procedure. First, the framework resolution must be passed by two-thirds of the U.N. General Assembly — that is, 127 countries. Within a yet-to-be-specified number of days following the adoption of the resolution, "interested states" must "submit their candidatures to the President of the UNGA." In mid-July, all 191 countries will choose six states by secret ballot to become permanent members of the Security Council in conformity with the geographical pattern already indicated. The G-4 draft also stipulates that "if the number of states having obtained the required majority falls short of the number of seats allocated for permanent membership, new rounds of balloting will be conducted for the remaining seats, provided all ballots shall be restricted to candidates [already registered], until six states obtain the required majority to occupy the six seats." The procedure envisaged is ingenious on two counts. Multiple rounds mean the G-4 nations do not compete against one another; and by restricting candidates to those registered within a fixed time-frame, the G-4 protects itself against a regional dark horse emerging in the event of, say, one or more of the group's nations failing to win a two-thirds majority despite several rounds of balloting. It is only after this procedure is completed that a comprehensive Charter-amending resolution, incorporating the changes already voted on, will be submitted for another vote in accordance with Article 108 of the U.N. Charter. This requires that the changes be adopted by a two-thirds majority and subsequently ratified by two-thirds of U.N. members, including all the existing permanent members of the Security Council. The Charter Articles proposed to be amended are 27 (2) and (3) and 109 (1) (on voting procedures), though the G-4 draft, curiously, forgets to mention Article 23, where the names of the five permanent members are listed. By staggering the reforms process in this manner, the G-4 hopes to present the five permanent members (the P-5) with a fait accompli that they must either accept or reject in toto. If China wants to veto Japanese permanent membership, for example, it will have to reject the entire package and run the risk of alienating not just Japan but the other five newly elected permanent members as well. Similarly, the U.S., which favours only the inclusion of Japan, will not be able to cherry-pick; it will have to accept all six as permanent members. Japanese officials take heart from what happened in 1963, when membership of the Security Council was expanded from 11 to 15. Only China (whose seat was held by Taiwan) among the P-5 voted in favour of the UNGA resolution calling for expansion. France and the Soviet Union voted against (the Soviet position was that there should be no change in the Charter until the Chinese seat went to the Peoples' Republic), while Britain and the U.S. abstained. However, all five eventually went on to ratify the Charter amendment. The hunt for 127 But while ratification by the P-5 is the final hurdle, the G-4 will not find the earlier stages smooth sailing. Even on procedural grounds, there are likely to be objections with some arguing that the framework resolution be ratified by the P-5 first. The Italians are already asking how they can choose countries to fill seats that do not legally exist. Latin American and Caribbean states do not find the G-4 proposal attractive and there is strong opposition in parts of West Europe as well. Japan's influence in Asia is negative, and in many world capitals the joke is that a Japanese berth on the UNSC will only increase Washington's vote from two (U.S. and U.K.) to three. Between now and mid-June, Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil will push their case worldwide. And since the vote on the framework resolution will be an open one, the G-4 will get to see which of its friends (or recipients of largesse) kept their promises and which did not. However, there is very little time left and the Indian campaign, in particular, is far from getting into high gear. External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh's inexplicable eleventh hour cancellation of an important meeting with West African countries in Senegal earlier this month is a case in point. What is also perplexing is the G-4's insistence on the veto rather than a demand for its abolition. Since both outcomes are equally unacceptable to the P-5, it would be better for the G-4 to incorporate, at least initially, a demand that has widespread international support — so that the proposed expansion contributes to the democratisation of the world body. Strengthening the role of the General Assembly should also be part of the reform plan. Even now, it is not a toothless body. Last year, for example, the UNGA overrode the U.S. veto in the Security Council by referring Israel's illegal wall in the Occupied Territories to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. For Japan and Germany, the urgency of the current campaign is understandable. Both countries have an ageing population and economies whose relative strength in the world — though impressive — is nevertheless on the decline. If Tokyo and Berlin miss the bus, they can forget about permanent membership of the UNSC for all time to come. For India and Brazil, however, the future is not so bleak. Failure now will bring a certain loss of face, but there will come a time when the world comes knocking on their doors. © Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu |
29 April 2005
A veto proposal for the G-4
| Date:29/04/2005 http://www.thehindu.com/2005/04/29/stories/2005042906451100.htm Opinion - News Analysis Siddharth Varadarajan
INDIA AND Japan are tilting at windmills in demanding that the enlargement of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) include extension of the veto to the proposed new permanent members. Apart from being unrealistic, the demand for veto power shows the two countries have not correctly understood the reason why the majority of the world wants the Security Council to be reformed in the first place. Most nations — barring a handful like Israel who have been the beneficiary of vetoes — consider the veto power of the five existing permanent members (P-5) to be profoundly undemocratic. India, Japan and other aspirants to permanent status would be naïve to imagine that others would support the extension of this privilege to a handful of rising powers. Indeed, the greater the emphasis on the veto, the greater will be the suspicion that what Japan and India are really after is not the democratisation of the U.N. but their own accommodation in an unequal set-up. All states look to further their interest and it is hardly surprising that India and Japan would seek to do the same. But what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Other countries, too, will look out for what's best for them. And there is no doubt that medium-sized or small countries will back Model B — which adds eight new semi-permanent members with four-year terms but no new permanent ones. Given the high degree of consensus with which the African Union operates, virtually every state in Africa can nurture the hope of becoming a semi-permanent member for at least one term of four years. And in Latin America, Europe and Asia too, many countries would feel they have a fair chance of occupying a Model B seat at some point. In contrast, Model A gives them nothing. Indeed, getting Model A past the U.N. general Assembly will be a tough enough task for the G-4 without them muddying the waters by demanding the veto. What India and Japan need to do is make a virtue of out of necessity by building on the world's opposition to the veto and proposing that the UNGA demand its abolition. Once the P-5 oppose this, as they surely will, a compromise formula should be proposed whereby the ability of the non-permanent, non-veto wielding members to restrain the UNSC from acting in particular ways is strengthened. The `veto power' exercised by the P-5 flows directly from Article 27 of the U.N. Charter, which specifies the voting procedure for adopting resolutions. Decisions on "procedural matters" are made by an affirmative vote of nine (out of 15) but "on other matters" the affirmative vote of nine must include the "concurring votes of the permanent members." Though the veto is wielded much less today than it was during the Cold War, the power to block resolutions is still routinely exercised. The worst offender, of course, is the U.S., which is responsible for 70 per cent of vetoes cast since 1986, most of them to bail out Israel. The two Chinese vetoes — of U.N. observers to Guatemala and a U.N. force for Macedonia — were linked entirely to these two countries recognising Taiwan. Correctly understood, the veto is not so much a positive power as a negative one: A country with a veto only acquires the power to restrain the UNSC from acting in a particular manner. In order to pass a resolution, however, a permanent member must convince (or arm-twist) at least eight other members to vote yes. As the failure of the U.S. to win support for its illegal invasion of Iraq in February 2003 demonstrated, this is not always an easy matter. Curiously, none of the models for UNSC enlargement have suggested what the number of votes needed should be for a resolution to be passed. A pro rata application of the current 9 out of 15 ratio would suggest that at least 15 positive votes are needed to get a resolution passed in a council of 24. India and Japan should propose that if the P-5 are not willing to give up their veto power, they should at least agree to raise the bar for a resolution — especially Chapter VII resolutions authorising sanctions, the use of force or the prosecution of cases in the International Criminal Court — to 18 or 19 positive votes. This way, resolutions dealing with international peace and security would require a higher degree of consensus and reduce the ability of the P-5 to get the UNSC to act in a partisan or politicised manner. This would still be an imperfect solution. But were India and Japan to steer the debate in this direction, they would find greater support for their candidature in an enlarged Council. © Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu |
26 April 2005
India and the problem of U.N. reform
The Hindu, April 26, 2005
There’s a lot more to discuss with Secretary-General Kofi Annan than just a permanent seat in the Security Council.
By Siddharth Varadarajan
WHEN THE United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, meets Indian leaders this week to discuss the ambitious agenda for reform of the world body outlined by him in a landmark report last month, he will find his hosts almost singularly pre-occupied with one issue: the expansion of the U.N. Security Council.
Though this is unfortunate, it is not surprising. Mr. Annan’s report, "In Larger Freedom," contains many other suggestions - both good and bad - which can affect India’s interests in a number of ways. There may be unease in New Delhi at the expanding prerogatives of the Security Council on issues such as the use of force, proliferation, and intervention, for instance, but successive governments have tended to take the view that these concerns can be dealt with once India makes it to the high table that is permanent membership.
Whatever reservations an oversensitive Government might have had about Mr. Annan in the past, the Secretary-General is seen as an ally in this quest for a permanent seat. Though the formal debate on the expansion of Security Council membership began in 1997 with the proposal for the induction of five new permanent members without veto by Razali Ismail - who was President of the General Assembly at the time - it is only with Mr. Annan’s appointment of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004 that the drive for expansion has moved into top gear. Indeed, by asking member states to take a decision on this in time for the U.N. summit of world leaders in September 2005, Mr. Annan is clearly hurrying the process along. And while his report calls for consensus, Indian officials were pleased to note that it also says failure to reach a consensus "must not become an excuse for postponing action."
So far, Mr. Annan has remained agnostic about the two proposals outlined in his report (see box), though the Indian Government would ideally like him to throw his weight behind Model A. This, of course, is unlikely to happen because there is a genuine and even bitter divide between countries on this question. Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, South Korea and others claim to have brought together more than 40 countries under their `Uniting for Consensus’ banner in opposition to Model A. Some of these countries oppose particular candidates for permanent membership; others feel they would have a better chance at representation under Model B.
While the two proposals for expanding the membership of the Security Council have generated the most excitement - and heartburn - around the world, including India, there has regrettably been virtually no debate on a whole raft of equally controversial proposals being made by Mr. Annan.
Ostensibly a product of the standoff between the United States and the U.N. in the run-up to the illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003, Mr. Annan’s report represents an effort to overhaul the structure, direction and even legal architecture of the U.N. and its organs and agencies so as to make them more relevant to the problems of today and more effective in dealing with the problems. The report distils many of the observations and recommendations made by the High-Level Panel into a more manageable and, in some respects, politically acceptable set of proposals. However, barring some recommendations - such as the creation of an Integrated Peacebuilding Commission to help war-torn countries create viable new institutions, or the establishment of a democracy fund - several proposals, though eminently reasonable, have not found favour with one or several influential member-states. (See box)
Conceptual flaw
On the use of force, Mr. Annan’s report correctly notes that the U.N. Charter is flexible enough to allow states to defend themselves under a wide variety of circumstances. Article 51 gives countries the right to defend themselves against an imminent threat, and latent but not imminent threats can still be responded to with force provided the Security Council approves it. In suggesting that any decision to authorise the use of force be based on four criteria - (i) the seriousness of threat, (ii) purpose of action, (iii) principle of proportionality, and (iv) chances of success - the report is attempting to ensure the Security Council does not act out of purely political considerations.
However, its recommendation that the Security Council adopt a resolution setting out these principles is unlikely to be accepted by the U.S.
If there is one conceptual flaw in the report, it is the failure to recognise that the credibility problem of the Security Council stems not just form its "ineffectiveness" or unrepresentative character but from its lack of accountability. At a time when the Security Council’s prerogatives seem to be expanding at a fast pace, there also needs to be some effective institutional mechanism for reviewing - if not restraining - the exercise of power by the Council. For example, the Algerian jurist and former President of the International Court of Justice, Mohammed Bedjaoui, has suggested that member-states should have the right to seek a judicial review by the ICJ of an Security Council resolution which affects them. And the former U.N. Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had advocated greater reliance by the General Assembly on Article 96 of the U.N. Charter in order to refer to the ICJ "questions concerning the consistency of resolutions adopted by U.N. bodies with the Charter of the United Nations".
On two other issues, too, Mr. Annan’s report needs to be widely debated in India before its proposals are adopted.
The discussion on the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is lop-sided, focussing exclusively on the tightening of dual-use technologies rather than seeking new mechanisms to restrain the development of new types of nuclear weapons and missiles (including missile defence systems) by the U.S. and other big powers.
Mr. Annan calls on all states to adopt the model Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (thereby accepting full-scope safeguards) and accept restraints on the development of uranium enrichment and plutonium separation technologies.
These might well be necessary, but non-nuclear NPT members should not give up their right to develop civilian technologies without the nuclear weapons states giving up something in exchange. Similarly, the report’s endorsement of the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative - in which the U.S. and its allies give themselves the right to interdict ships on the high seas suspected of carrying illicit nuclear, biological or chemical cargoes - is a little surprising. One would have thought the U.N. Secretary General would advocate the use of a U.N. or multilateral forum for the negotiation of any new instrumentality.
Simply stating that the Conference on Disarmament "faces a crisis of relevance" because of "dysfunctional decision-making procedures" is not good enough. Mr. Annan should have come up with proposals to increase the CD’s effectiveness.
Finally, on the question of terrorism, Mr. Annan has done well to produce a working definition of terrorism that should be acceptable to all: "Any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act."
However, his attempt to set aside the objection that "state terrorism" be excluded from this purview because states are regulated by other laws such as the Geneva Convention is problematic. As Palestinians, Iraqis and others have found out, accountability for the wrongful use of force by states (by Israel or the U.S. and others) is very poorly regulated and enforced.
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