A fork in the road for the U.S. in South Asia

President Obama can call an end to the Fourth Afghan War and allow the Pakistani Army to fill the void, or he can shift tack and push for an end to the alliance between generals and jihadis that lies at the root of the region's terror complex.



3 May 2011
The Hindu

A fork in the road for the U.S. in South Asia

Siddharth Varadarajan

In tracking down and killing Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani town of Abbottabad on Sunday night, America finally seems to have got something right.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were the result of a catastrophic intelligence failure in which different American agencies failed to connect the dots. In response, the George W. Bush administration launched not one but two wars, first in Afghanistan and then Iraq, but did not manage to capture or kill the mastermind behind those attacks. The military sledgehammer produced collateral gains and losses for the U.S. — regime change in Kabul and Baghdad but thousands of body bags too, military bases in the cockpit of Asia but international opposition and even opprobrium as well, a bonanza for its arms and contractor industries but also a fiscal deficit which helped pave the way to a full blown financial crisis.

While counter-terrorism gains such as the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed were almost all intelligence driven, the preoccupation with a military approach to the ‘AfPak' region has produced the single biggest liability for Washington: a toxic dependence on the Pakistani army. GHQ, Rawalpindi's associations and entanglements with terrorist groups ensures the “war” being fought remains unwinnable. No amount of tinkering at the margins, no Petraeus or McChrystal plan, no proposal of rehabilitation and reintegration of the Taliban, has helped the Pentagon overcome this fundamental flaw.

Patience wearing thin

Though the U.S. gave Pakistan a very long rope, signs that Washington's patience was wearing thin have been multiplying in recent months. As the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and GHQ happily played both sides of the ‘war on terror' game in pursuit of their own long-term political and strategic objectives, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was quietly distancing itself from its unreliable Pakistani counterpart. The Raymond Davies affair — in which no less a person than President Barack Obama saw fit to intervene — brought this decoupling out into the open in a particularly dramatic fashion. The Abbottabad operation is also likely a product of America going solo on Pakistani soil.

Last month, Admiral Mike Mullen openly accused the Pakistani military of collusion with the Haqqani network and other terrorists operating in Afghanistan. It is safe to assume he laid this charge in full knowledge of the fact that bin Laden was living in Abbottabad, a town north of Islamabad that is a stone's throw away from the Pakistan Military Academy in Kakul. The fact that the world's most wanted man could remain undetected in a small town crawling with soldiers and officers suggests either a high degree of dysfunctionality within the Pakistani system or, worse, a high degree of collusion. Plausible though the first option is, most Americans inside and outside the administration — not to speak of officials and lay persons the world over — will likely believe the second.

Mr. Obama was gracious enough to say in a general sort of way that America's “counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding” but a senior administration official who briefed reporters later on Monday was blunt about the limits of that cooperation. “We shared our intelligence on this bin Laden compound with no other country, including Pakistan,” he said.

Pakistan and Afghanistan

Where do U.S. relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan go from here? Indian officials fear there will be growing domestic political pressure on Mr. Obama to declare the ‘Fourth Afghan War' over and accelerate the drawdown of U.S. troops in the run-up to the 2012 presidential election. But just because the U.S. is waging a war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is no reason for India to fear its departure. At stake is what remains to fill the void. The insurgency in Afghanistan can only be defeated by strengthening the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), on the one hand, and expanding economic opportunities for the country's peoples, on the other. Unfortunately, the former has only recently become an American priority and even then, Washington remains unwilling to allow the ANSF to develop critical assets like an air force. As for development, it is contingent on security and stability, both of which have proved elusive.

If the Pakistani military has run with the jihadi hares even as it has hunted with American hounds, it has done so in anticipation of Washington's eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan. At the same time, this cannot be an argument for the indefinite extension of the American military presence in that country — especially when U.S. troops and aircraft have killed a large number of innocent civilians. Ten years on, it should be clear that the problems in Afghanistan do not have a military solution, at least not one the U.S. can deliver. What America can and must do, however, is to choose its friends wisely and to use its economic and political clout to ensure the Army's nexus with jihadi groups in Pakistan is weakened and destroyed. If indeed the ISI was kept in the dark about Abbottabad, this is a bad augury for the Pakistani military. But unless the U.S. is prepared to go further down that fork in the road, the terrorists who are already preparing themselves to take bin Laden's place will continue to find fertile ground inside Pakistan.

How India blinked on U.S. inspections of PM's jet

Wary of political fallout, New Delhi asked Washington to stay quiet on the fact that it had shifted the goalposts of the sale agreement

24 March 2011
The Hindu

How India blinked on U.S. inspections of PM's jet
‘India wary of image of U.S. officials tramping around head of state’s plane’

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: Three years after issuing a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) on Boeing aircraft that India was buying for use by the Prime Minister and other VVIPs, the United States unilaterally foisted an amendment mandating intrusive annual end-use inspections of them by American personnel.

When the Cabinet Committee on Security approved the purchase plans in September 2005, it was on the basis of an LOA that did not require physical inspection of the highly sensitive aircraft. But in May 2008, the U.S. handed over to the Indian side a number of changes to the LOA, including a requirement for annual Enhanced End-use Monitoring inspections of the Large Aircraft Infrared Counter-Measures (LAIRCM) the planes come equipped with.

The LAIRCM is a self-protection suite that allows the pilot to take counter-measures if the aircraft comes under attack while in air.

According to a cable sent to Washington on May 5, 2008 from the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, accessed by The Hindu through WikiLeaks, the Indian side strenuously objected to the American demands when they were first made. In a meeting with U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James Clad in May 2008, Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretary Gaitri Kumar “raised Indian concerns over what it perceived was the ‘reopening' of the LOA for the Boeing VVIP aircraft India had agreed to purchase in 2005, specifically mentioning the ‘intrusive' end-use monitoring (EUM) agreement for the protection suite India was now being asked to sign as problematic. We don't mind if it is recast for some financial or technical thing,' she stated, ‘but to insert an EUM requirement retroactively and say if you don't agree we'll put it in storage, that would make our people flip'.” (152359: secret).

That India eventually agreed to American monitoring of the aircraft is already known, even if the details were never made public. But the Embassy cables give an unprecedented insight into the tug-of-war that followed the demand. The cables also reveal the “creative wording” the two sides used, in which India agreed to give U.S. inspectors annual physical access to the LAIRCM on the planes but the politically explosive term of “on-site inspection” was replaced by “on-site review.”

NSA’s appreciation

According to a cable sent on May 29, 2008 (155930: confidential), the amended LOA was initialled that day. In fact, National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan expressed his “appreciation for the text's creative wording, such as using ‘joint consultation to include an on-site review' in lieu of ‘on-site inspection'”, because of “political sensitivities… over the principle of on-site inspections.”

The Indian side, however, remained wary of how the story would play out once it became clear that the government had allowed the U.S. to arbitrarily alter the terms of the aircraft deal. India made it clear on the day of the initialling that it wanted no public discussion of the fact that the goal posts had been moved. “Following [Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Mitchell] Shivers' expression of empathy for India's perception that the U.S. had added the EUM requirement after an initial LOA had been signed in 2005, Foreign Secretary [Shiv Shankar] Menon noted his appreciation but asked that there be no future reference to any ‘shifting of the goal posts,' rather that the entire deal had just been a continuum of discussions,” the cable, sent under the name of U.S. Ambassador David Mulford, recorded.

Other cables track the meetings Mr. Mulford had with Mr. Narayanan and Mr. Menon in the run up to May 29 in order to convince the Indian government to agree to that shift.

More than the substance of on-site inspections, the Indian government was worried about the public reaction to American inspectors getting access to the Prime Minister's plane, American officials dealing with the matter of end-use monitoring for the VVIP Boeing jets concluded. On May 14, Ambassador David Mulford met Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon to discuss the matter and “urged him to begin ‘sensible negotiations' to resolve the enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM) arrangements for the VVIP jets quickly (153810, May 14, 2008, confidential). The cable quotes Mr. Menon saying he had been through the proposed amendment and that he felt “there are ‘no insurmountable difficulties in reaching an understanding that would meet your requirements and ours'.”

‘Reassuring’

Though Mr. Menon “found the amendment ‘reassuring,' because the details that it laid out [for keeping the LAIRCM secure] mirror those that the Indian government also wishes to enforce”, Ambassador Mulford wrote. “We have a huge interest to make sure it is well protected — not just by us but by others — and we have no problem with high standards, the Foreign Secretary stressed. At the same time, notes the Ambassador, “Menon also pointed out that, because the aircraft attracts high-level political attention, the presentation of the inspections regime needed rewrQing [sic]”.

Mr. Mulford ended his cable with the following comment: “At no point in the conversation did Menon reject inspections, and he appeared resigned to on-site verification, as shown by his acceptance of a site visit by negotiators. The problems that the Foreign Secretary saw in the US' proposed amendment dealt primarily with the cosmetic presentation it seemed, which he believes gives the impression of associating the VVIP aircraft, and by extension the Indian Government, too closely with the U.S.”

The Indian stake

In a meeting with Mr. Mulford (155283, May 23, 2008, confidential), the NSA “agreed that the Indian government had a stake in protecting the LAIRCM's technology, and he recognized that if the U.S. and India prolong negotiations over the EEUM, ‘our Prime Minister will not have a plane'.” But, he insisted, “We need to work in a manner that provides comfort to both sides.” Mr. Mulford ended his cable with the observation that “As Narayanan makes clear, on-site U.S. inspections of the prime minister's jet make the Indian government pause”. The risk, he wrote, is “that the UPA government's opponents might use the image of U.S. officials tramping around the Indian head of state's plane to garner votes in the upcoming general elections”.
Such an image “fits into the campaign messages already espoused by the opposition BJP, which accuses the government of an overriding weakness, and the Communists, who denounce the growing friendship with the U.S. But our willingness to resolve the issue in New Delhi at a high level could help alleviate the Indians' anxiety and point the way towards a middle ground that protects both the LAIRCM and the UPA government”.

Text of EUM note, initialled on May 29, 2008

May 28, 2008

Proposed EUM Note for Indian VVIP Aircraft:

“Pursuant to section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, the USG will accomplish end-use monitoring for the defense articles and defense services transferred in this Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) as set forth in this note and the specific Enhanced EUM physical security and accountability requirements annotated in the note to this LOA titled ‘Unclassified AN/AAQ-24(V), Large Aircraft Infrared Counter-Measures (LAIRCM) System (Revised).'

“At least annually, at the request of either party, at a mutually acceptable date, India and the USG will execute joint consultations, to include an on-site security review of the transferred articles and related security and custody procedures. India agrees to make available inventory and accountability records it maintains to U.S. personnel conducting end-use monitoring. The provisions of this note apply only to LOA IN-D-QJD and to no other transfers with the Purchaser or any other country or international organization.” [155930: confidential, May 29, 2008].

(This article is a part of the series "The India Cables" based on the US diplomatic cables accessed by The Hindu via Wikileaks.)

In the print edition of The Hindu, this story was split in to two. The URL of the second part is here.

Bribery charge must now be investigated

The Embassy cable suggests a serious crime was committed on Indian soil to which U.S. diplomats were privy. The Prime Minister cannot cite lame arguments to justify inaction...





19 March 2011
The Hindu

Bribery charge must now be investigated

Siddharth Varadarajan

Since politics is a distraction, consider the following retelling of the WikiLeaks tale. An activist dies in a traffic accident. CCTV footage from a bank nearby suggests he might have been murdered but the case is never investigated properly. Three years later, a newspaper publishes what it says is an American Embassy cable sent a few days before that suspicious accident. In the cable, a U.S. diplomat quotes a multinational company executive talking loosely about how he paid money to some criminals to convince the activist to get out of his way.

How would a civilised country which values the rule of law react to such a disclosure? Would the government cite technicalities about the “unverified and unverifiable” nature of the “purported” cable and the executive's protestation of innocence and not even bother to ask the police to look into the matter? Or would it reassure the nation that even though the information is unverified, it will do its best to find out the truth?

In the face of the political firestorm that The Hindu's publication of a secret U.S. Embassy cable about payoffs to MPs has generated, all that the people of India needed was an assurance from the UPA government that the serious crime of bribery, if established by a proper investigation, would not go unpunished. What they got instead was cynical obfuscation.

Speaking in Parliament on the subject, Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have mounted a ‘technical' and wholly ineffective defence of the government.

The July 17, 2008 cable sent by U.S. Charge d'Affaires Steven White stated that a Congress politician named Nachiketa Kapur — described as a “political aide” to Captain Satish Sharma, M.P. — showed an Embassy staff member “two chests containing cash and said that around Rupees 50crore-60 crore (about $25 million) was lying around the house for use as pay-offs” to MPs to ensure that the Manmohan Singh government won the confidence vote that was set for July 22. The cable, which was accessed by The Hindu from WikiLeaks, also quotes Mr. Kapur saying Ajit Singh's Rashtriya Lok Dal was paid Rs.10 crore for each of its MPs.

That the RLD was actively being wooed can be seen from the Union Cabinet's July 17, 2008 decision to rename Lucknow airport ‘Chaudhry Charan Singh Airport' after Mr. Ajit Singh's father. Other inducements were also on offer but in the end, the RLD voted against the government. Here Nachiketa Kapur turned out to have been remarkably prescient. After claiming the RLD MPs had been paid off, the Embassy cable notes: “Kapur mentioned that money was not an issue at all, but the crucial thing was to ensure that those who took the money would vote for the government.”

In the face of this damaging information which is contained in a secret cable that was never meant to be publicly circulated (that too in a redacted form) till at least 2018, Mr. Mukherjee and Dr. Singh made five lame points.

First, the Finance Minister told Parliament on Thursday that since the allegation of bribery applies to the 14th Lok Sabha which has since been dissolved, the 15th Lok Sabha had no locus standi to discuss the issue.

Second, he said the cable was a sovereign communication between different branches of the U.S. government, was covered by diplomatic immunity and that the information it contained could neither be confirmed nor denied by India. Despite the U.S. State Department saying publicly last year that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had spoken to External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna to warn him of the impending publication of confidential cables by WikiLeaks, Dr. Singh told Parliament: “The Government of India cannot confirm the veracity, contents or even the existence of such communications.”

Third, the Finance Minister said the information about bribery in the cable would not be considered admissible evidence in any court of law. The Prime Minister added that “many of the persons referred to in those reports have stoutly denied the veracity of the contents,” as if the country ought to be satisfied by mere protestations of innocence by the accused.

The government's fourth argument was that a Parliamentary committee had probed the matter and concluded that there was “insufficient evidence.” Finally, the Prime Minister took refuge behind the “court of the people,” declaring that since the Congress got re-elected in 2009 the charge of bribery had been “rejected by the people.” By this logic, the Congress has no right to accuse Narendra Modi of complicity in the 2002 massacres since this allegation has been “rejected by the people” not once but twice.

Instead of hiding behind technicalities and dubious political arguments, government managers could have defused the crisis by promising that the information contained in the cable would be probed. It is nobody's claim that the contents of a U.S. Embassy cable should be treated as gospel truth. Of course, the reason the cable struck a wider chord is because there is corroborating evidence of bribery having taken place in the run-up to the confidence vote. There are video recordings from a sting operation conducted by CNN-IBN and a Parliamentary committee tasked with probing the matter in 2008 felt there was enough material for the appropriate investigative agencies to conduct a probe. That said, the Embassy cable's contents still need to be verified.

Captain Satish Sharma, Nachiketa Kapur and Ajit Singh have all said the allegations against them are false. Captain Sharma has denied Mr. Kapur was ever his political aide and the latter has said he had only passing contact with the Congress MP and with U.S. Embassy officials. Are they lying? Or was the U.S. Embassy staff member being economical with the truth when he told the Charge d'Affaires he had been shown the cash?

A proper police investigation conducted by an agency like the CBI under the supervision of the Supreme Court can certainly make a fair attempt to establish where the burden of truth lies.

Mr. Mukherjee is right that the cable is sovereign diplomatic communication but India can surely request its “strategic partner” to help probe an allegation that has diminished the country's democratic institutions in the eyes of its people and the world. For starters, the U.S. can be asked to identify the unnamed Embassy staff member. If he was an Indian employee or an American without diplomatic status, there would be absolutely no problem in the CBI recording his statement and asking him to join a criminal investigation. He could tell us, for example, where his conversation with Mr. Kapur took place. The staffer reported back to Mr. White that he was told Rs.50 crore or Rs.60 crore was “lying around the house.” Which house was he referring to? Even if the Embassy “staff member” was a diplomat — one theory is that it was the Political Counsellor himself who dropped his descriptor because he had inadvertently become party to a criminal act — diplomatic immunity would not come in the way of him informally helping the police in their investigation. India can also ask the U.S. to waive his immunity. Moreover, the call records of Captain Sharma and Mr. Kapur can be examined to fix their physical locations and ascertain the nature of their relationship, especially on the day the meetings mentioned in the cable took place. This can then be triangulated with the telephone number of the U.S. Political Counsellor, whose number is known to the Indian authorities. These are the minimum steps that any self-respecting democracy would want to take in the face of such a serious charge.

On the eve of the July 22, 2008 vote of confidence, I wrote an op-ed in The Hindu where I said: “Even if the government wins the trust vote on Tuesday, the Prime Minister and the Congress will not be able to live down the taint of impropriety surrounding their victory.” The more I think about it, the more convinced I am that the listlessness, drift and corruption that so many commentators have indicted the Manmohan Singh government for in its second innings have their origins in the manner in which that trust vote was won. The UPA lost its moral centre that day, and with it, its political bearings.

In a hideous coincidence, the taint of bribery has come back to haunt the government at a time when the nuclear dream which was supposed to make it all worth it is slowly evaporating in plumes of deadly radioactive steam above Japan. “If implemented in the way it is promised, [the nuclear deal] would increase the country's energy options in the long-run,” I wrote in the same op-ed. “But no deal is so good that it merits the short-circuiting of democratic propriety through horse-trading or worse.”

The Opposition is wrong to insist that the Prime Minister must resign because of the leaked cable. But he has a moral obligation to ensure the cable's contents are investigated properly. Refusing to do so would be an act of immense political folly, especially in the light of all the scam allegations that have buffeted his government.

My interview to a Chinese magazine on Obama's visit to India

Sanlian LifeWeek, "one of the most widely circulated weekly magazines in China with 300,000 readers per week in more than 30 Chinese big cities" contacted me last week to get my views on the visit to India by US President Barack Obama.

According to the journalist who wrote to me, the magazine is published by Sanlian Publishing House, which was founded in the 1930s and is one of China's largest publishing houses of long history.

Since it is rare for an Indian journalist to speak to Chinese readers, however briefly, I was more than happy to provide my two fens worth!

I don't know how much of this they actually used in the published story but their questions and my full answers are below... (If any reader of this blog knows Chinese, I'll be happy to send them a PDF of the story which the magazine sent me)

Interview Questions

Question 1: Many Chinese analysts are less optimistic than India media about Obama's present visit. It is widely believed here while Obama gains economic benefits substantively from this trip, India only gets symbolic gesture from Obama’s supporting India's political ambition to become a permanent member of Security Council. Obama's trip is motivated by economic interest, while India expects political gains. How do you see this gap? How do you see what this trip has brought to the US and to India?

Varadarajan: The United States has three main objectives in developing closer relations with India and these were the focus of President Obama's visit.

The first is to gain economic benefits from commercial and military deals. This goal was only partially fulfilled. $10 billion worth of Indian commercial deals were announced but many of these were previously agreed. As for defence, the big contract for 126 fighter aircraft has yet to be decided between the US, French, Russian and European vendors. The second goal was to dispel the idea that the Obama administration was less committed to the strategic partnership than George W. Bush was. On this front, he was successful, particularly by making the announcement of support for an Indian permanent seat at a future, expanded UN Security Council, and by endorsing the Indian positions on terrorism and the need for a 'step by step' dialogue with Pakistan where easier issues are taken up first. The third goal was to encourage India to work closely with America in the East Asian region and help Washington better manage the uncertainties stemming from China's rise. On this front, he was only partially successful. The Indians are happy to expand their role in Asia and East Asia but are wary of doing so under the "leadership" of anyone, especially the Americans. Nor do they want to be seen as American "allies".

The Indian goals from the visit were also three-fold. First, to make a further dent in the high technology-denial regimes and complete the process started in 2005 with the Indo-US nuclear deal. On this front, India achieved some successes. Three of its companies were taken off the US Entities List, Obama promised that India would be treated the same as other American friends and a commitment was made to push for Indian membership of multilateral export control regimes like the NSG and the MTCR. The second goal was to achieve a better convergence of views on regional security issues, especially terrorism, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Here, India was only partially successful. Obama came away with a better understanding of India's concerns on terrorism emanating from Pakistan and also of the importance of India's role in Afghanistan. But the US President remains too trustful of the Pakistani military and too distrustful of diplomatic options with Iran, from the Indian point of view. The third goal was to win greater US acceptance of the global role that India aspires to play. This was met with success: the US endorsed India's candidature for a permanent Indian seat and also spoke of working together with India to have a dialogue with other states possessing nuclear weapons (such as Pakistan, China, Russia etc) on nuclear doctrines.

It is true that the promise of a UNSC seat is open-ended and, in a way, conditional on India playing the part of a "responsible stakeholder" from the American viewpoint. But Obama's endorsement will create space for India to push its cause more effectively.

Question 2: The New York Times analyzed Obama's Indian trip as a necessity to counter assertive China. One example in case is the large scale military deal with India. But to many Chinese analysts and experts, in real politics, this is not true. Do you think the U.S. and India take each other as a strategic democratic partner to counter China in Asia?

Varadarajan: It may be simplistic to characterise American policy towards Beijing as one of "countering China". Yes, the US is worried by what it sees as growing Chinese assertiveness. So are many countries in Asia, especially India, Viet Nam etc. The US also makes a lot of noise about the lack of transparency in Chinese defence policy and defence spending. In reality, the US is by far the strongest military power in the world and has been using its armed might in Asia for several decades, often with very negative consequences for the region (eg. Viet Nam war, Iraq war of 2003).

The US and Chinese economies are closely intertwined but this does not mean there is no strategic rivalry. Power for both the Chinese and the Americans means the same thing: no restriction on their own freedom of action and the ability to deny that complete freedom to others. During the Cold War and after, the US relied on a network of allies to project its power in Asia. Today, America itself may not be in decline but some of these allies, especially Japan, are in decline. The thrust of US policy over the past 15 years has been to build a new network of partnerships that can sustain American hegemonic interests in Asia. And Pentagon planners believe India has the potential to be the most important of such partners, given its military capability, democratic culture and regional and even global aspirations. To this end, the Pentagon has been encouraging arms sales and inter-operability with the Indian military and also been pushing for access to Indian bases.

The Indian side, however, is wary. They would like access to the latest American hardware and are keen to benefit from military exercises but they do not intend to serve as a junior partner in such a project. There is resistance within India to signing agreements like the Logisitcs Support Agreement and CISMOA. And while many Indians are wary of Chinese military power and feel the need to grow Indian capabilities as a counter or hedge, there is no support for a military gang-up with the US against China. Most see such a strategy as dangerous for the region.

Question 3: Historically, India holds an independent policy towards many issues and seldom follows the U.S. As some Indian scholars put, India has its own global strategy and is not interested in any kind of military alliance. What is your opinion? How do you see the U.S. and India’s divergence in issues like US’s AfPak policy and towards Iran, and more broadly, their Asian version?

Varadarajan: There are some in India who would like the country to work more closely on global issues with the United States but the overwhelming majority support an independent foreign policy. This means that just as there will be issues on which we will work with the US, there will also be issues where we will work closely with other countries and this may also mean taking stands and positions that run counter to what the US wants. We have seen this on the world trade talks issue (Doha round), as well as on the climate change issue. Even on Iran, the Indian position today is at variance with the American one. India does not believe sanctions and coercion are the way forward, for example.

Differences may also crop up on the question of Asian security architecture when it becomes clear that the US intends not to work as a partner of Asia and East Asia but seeks to lead and direct it. But here, it is important for Chinese readers to understand that hardline Chinese policies and attitudes, especially when it comes to territorial disputes and boundary questions, are making it easier for the American side to push its role and even "leadership" in Asia. The US would like nothing more than to be able to play on the insecurities and fears of China's neighbours.

India and Obama: Trading one hyphenation for another

India may no longer be bracketed with Pakistan in American thinking but its hyphenation with China does not augur well for the relationship or the region...







12 November 2010
The Hindu

Trading one hyphen for another

Siddharth Varadarajan

Speaking to an audience of businessmen in New Delhi in May 2009, Robert D. Blackwill struck a dark and pessimistic tone about what the arrival of Barack Obama in the White House portended for India. As George W. Bush's ambassador, Mr. Blackwill had helped effect a major transformation of the bilateral relationship. But four months into the tenure of his successor, he was concerned that “there may be a substantial change under way in the quality and the intensity of U.S.-India relations.”

The main reason for this was the change in Washington's attitude towards Beijing. According to Mr. Blackwill, President Bush “based his transformation of U.S.-India relations on the core strategic principle of democratic India as a key factor in balancing the rise of Chinese power.” Going by early indications, however, “it is not clear that the Obama administration has the same preoccupation with the rise of Chinese power and India's balancing role in it.”

Ambassador Blackwill was not alone in reading the tea leaves that way. The world financial crisis had increased the clout of China and there was much breathless talk of ‘G-2', a new Sino-American compact to stabilise the global economy. “So China today appears, at least to me, to be on a substantially higher plane in U.S. diplomacy than India, which seems to have been downgraded in administration strategic calculations,” Mr. Blackwill noted. One consequence of this downgrading was the role the Obama administration appeared to encourage China to play in South Asia. The joint statement issued at the end of President Obama's visit to Beijing in November 2009 spoke about the two countries increasing their cooperation towards the goal of “bringing about more stable, peaceful relations in all of South Asia.” Not surprisingly, India saw red.

Twelve months later, however, the world seems to have spun around to the Bush axis again. The U.S. no longer harbours illusions about a G-2 in which China would play the role of a junior partner. Tension with Beijing has returned across a wide range of bilateral issues from currency and trade to naval deployment and maritime security. The past year has also seen a deterioration in China's relations with several Asian powers like India, Japan and Vietnam, with disputes flaring up over stapled visas for Kashmiri-domiciled Indians and disputed islands in the South China and East China seas. It is in this context that President Obama and his advisors seem to have rediscovered the importance of India.

In a triumph of strategic path-dependence over political fantasy, President Obama has returned to the baseline policy the United States has been following for the past decade. This is the policy of renewing alliances and creating “partnerships” in Asia so as to sustain American domination and leadership in a region that is otherwise increasingly being influenced by China's rise. And at the heart of this policy is encouraging India to get more involved in the East Asian economic and strategic space. “Today, the U.S. is once again playing a leadership role in Asia,” President Obama said in his speech to the joint session of Parliament earlier this week. [We] want India to not only “look East”, we want India to “engage East”…”

The crucial words here are the “leadership role” of the U.S. They provide the context for the increased engagement Mr. Obama wants to see as he exhorts India to go east. The Manmohan-Obama joint statement talks of the two leaders having a shared vision for peace, stability and prosperity in “Asia, the Indian Ocean region and the Pacific region.” They also speak of the need for an open, balanced and inclusive architecture in the region.

Without going into the merits or demerits of India looking and engaging the East under American “leadership,” the essentially derivative nature of the Indo-U.S. relationship needs underlining. What is common to the warming to India under Bush, the cooling in the initial months of the Obama administration, and the current warmth is, in a word, China. American attitudes towards Beijing appear to have become a better predictor of temperature on the Indo-U.S. front than anything intrinsic to the bilateral relationship. And that can't be a good thing.

The reality of this equation for Indo-U.S. cooperation in the strategic and military sphere is reinforced by some of the views collated by Bethany N. Danyluk and Juli A. MacDonald in The U.S.-India Defense Relationship: Reassessing Perceptions and Expectations, a report prepared for the Pentagon in November 2008. “If there were no China,” a U.S. Navy officer is quoted as saying in the unclassified report, “we would still engage [India], but maybe not to the same extent. There are plenty of opportunities for cooperation, but China drives a lot of what we are doing”.

The 2008 report, which updates a similar survey of American and Indian policymakers' attitudes that the Pentagon commissioned in 2002, provides a valuable insight into the other imperatives that also seem to be driving the American desire to have India look east. These include the expectation that India could relieve some of the regional security burdens currently borne by the U.S., with its overextended military commitments, and the idea that Washington ought to somehow leverage the relationships India has in the region to achieve mutual objectives “in places where the United States would like to maintain a lower profile.” According to one American official quoted: “The United States is trying to get out of the one-on-one hub-and-spoke mentality. We need to figure out where the United States injects itself effectively. Where it does not, it would be helpful to have India engage these actors horizontally.”

The picture that emerges, then, is a complex one in which American off-shore balancing is combined with the outsourcing of hegemonic responsibilities in East Asia.

The fact that the U.S. hopes to benefit from increased Indian engagement in East Asia can hardly be an argument against India looking east. But the hyphenation with China that the American policy towards India is predicated on should make us pause for thought. Though India — and even the U.S. — are not in the business of containing China, this explicit hyphenation of two major Asian powers in American public discourse creates unnecessary complications for New Delhi. For example, the Chinese attitude towards a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council for India may be outrightly hostile if Beijing concludes that Washington is being motivated by some crude notion of a balance of power in Asia. Of course, China may still be hostile in the absence of such a motive but it might reconcile itself to the rise of Indian power if it believes this power will not be used to hurt its legitimate core interests. Sending out such a signal is essential for India.

As India and China grow, they will inevitably rub up against each other in their respective backyards. India does not like the growing Chinese influence in South Asia any more than China will welcome India's increasing presence in East Asia. But when this presence comes bundled together with an American one, the mix can seem suffocating and lethal for both. Just as India reacted so negatively to America speaking of a Chinese role in South Asia, China is likely to be shell-shocked by the copious references to East Asia in the various speeches and statements that were made during Mr. Obama's recent visit to India. It may react by reaching out and playing catch up with a country it has unnerved with its statements on the border issue this past year. Or it may ratchet up the pressure. Or it may just wait and see whether Mr. Obama's domestic difficulties and changes in global dynamics push Washington into once again warming towards Beijing and cooling towards Delhi.

India's relationships with the U.S. and China will never be completely independent of each other but the challenge for Indian policymakers is to ensure each is free standing and independent of the pushes and pulls which occur between Washington and Beijing. The U.S. does not do partnerships. That is why Mr. Obama reminded Indian parliamentarians of the leadership role America is playing in Asia. But Asia doesn't need leaders and followers. So long as Washington insists on leading the show, the Asian architecture India and the U.S. speak about cannot be genuinely open, balanced and inclusive. As New Delhi slowly recovers from the Obama whirlwind, this is one message that needs to be internalised.

Obama's UNSC statement a boost but India to be on probation

“[In] the years ahead,” the American President told Parliament on Monday, “I look forward to a reformed U.N. Security Council that includes India as a permanent member.” ... My news analysis ...

9 November 2010
The Hindu

Obama's UNSC statement a boost but India to be on probation

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: Barack Obama's endorsement of a permanent seat for India in a reformed U.N. Security Council represents a significant evolution of American policy towards both India and the world body.

“[In] the years ahead,” the American President told Parliament on Monday, “I look forward to a reformed U.N. Security Council that includes India as a permanent member.”

Led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the members of Parliament burst into thunderous applause when they heard those magic words. And yet, the absence of a timeline, Mr. Obama's use of passive voice and his caveat on India's “increased responsibility” all suggest that the U.S. expects India to bat for pet American causes in order to fully earn a seat at the global high table.

In July, senior American officials accompanying General Jim Jones, who was Mr. Obama's National Security Adviser at the time, told members of the Indian strategic community at an informal interaction that any decision to endorse India as a permanent member of the UNSC would depend on “our assessment of the extent to which India is likely to play a responsible role [there].”

Among the areas where President Obama expects India to demonstrate responsibility are sanctions on Iran and democracy and human rights promotion in places like Myanmar. If his exhortations left MPs unimpressed, this was not because anyone in the House supports a nuclear-armed Iran or the generals in Nay Pyi Taw. Rather, it was because of the double standards involved in the formulation of this checklist.

And yet, it would be churlish to deny the step forward that Mr. Obama has taken in signalling his support for an Indian permanent seat. Even if he has essentially handed the Indians a cheque that cannot easily be cashed, the U.S. President's words will strengthen India's hand as it seeks to press for reform of the U.N.

Until now, Washington had spoken only of a “criteria-based approach” to the selection of potential members of a reformed and expanded Security Council. In 2005, the U.S. said it “unambiguously supports a permanent seat for Japan” in the UNSC but the furthest it was prepared to go on India was this vague promise made by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns earlier this year: “We're open to expansion of permanent membership of the Council and we believe India's going to have a central part to play in the consideration that's going to come.”

This endorsement is less fulsome than what the U.S. has given the Japanese but the political impact of Mr. Obama's statement in other capitals around the world will be enormous. Russia, which has slowly backed away from its earlier unqualified support for India, will now come under pressure to abandon its insistence on “consensus” as a precondition for UNSC reform. That will leave the Chinese — who have not gone beyond stating their “understanding” of India's desire to play a greater role in world affairs, including at the U.N. — as the last among the five current permanent members to fully reveal their hand.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has often noted that the P-5 will not give up the powers they currently enjoy. Even a dilution of power would be unpalatable to them. The U.S. knows the P-5 will never lose their veto power and that any new permanent member will have to come in without the veto. What Mr. Obama is proposing, therefore, is not the dilution of power but its diffusion, that too over an unspecified time frame and with the unstated advisory that India would be on probation till the as-yet undefined process of expansion is complete.
Challenge to leadership

Dr. Singh is right in welcoming Mr. Obama's long-term affirmation of India's place in a reformed UNSC. But the challenge to the Indian leadership is in reconciling the political price Washington will demand for supporting its candidature with the expectation most U.N. members have from India's independent line in foreign policy and global security matters. If that independence flags, the world may see little merit in giving India a seat around the horseshoe table at Turtle Bay. But if that independence is asserted, a future American President may quietly drop Mr. Obama's less-than-ringing endorsement.

In a first, India, U.S. for dialogue of all nuclear weapon states

At stake, a symbolic erasure of the distincion between NPT-recognised nuclear weapon states and NWSs outside the treaty...

9 November 2010
The Hindu

In a first, India, U.S. for dialogue of all nuclear weapon states

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: The United States has become the first nuclear weapons state (NWS) as defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to endorse the idea of talks between the five NWSs and the three nuclear-armed nations outside the NPT, i.e. India, Pakistan and Israel.

In their joint statement issued on Monday, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President Barack Obama “affirmed the need for a meaningful dialogue among all states possessing nuclear weapons to build trust and confidence and for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines.”

The statement adds: “They support strengthening the six decade-old international norm of non-use of nuclear weapons.”

Until now, the U.S. has remained firmly wedded to the NPT framework and structures — or to bilateral forums with other NWSs like Russia — for all dialogues related to nuclear weapons. Others like China have also been reluctant to engage in any discussion with India on nuclear strategic issues such as no first use, risk reduction and confidence-building measures.

What Mr. Obama and Dr. Singh envisage, however, is a framework which will bring all eight countries possessing nuclear weapons together for a dialogue on building trust and confidence, a major step in the direction of harmonising the NPT, which the three outsiders will never sign, with the wider aim of “universal and non-discriminatory global nuclear disarmament in the 21st century.”

In doing so, India and the U.S. have assembled the basic building blocks of a framework which has the potential to transcend the NPT, while remaining faithful to the twin goals of non-proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The joint statement also says the U.S. intends to support India's full membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime in a phased manner “and to consult with regime members to encourage the evolution of regime membership criteria, consistent with maintaining the core principles of these regimes,” as the Indian government simultaneously moves ahead with coming into conformity with these regimes' export control requirements.

The Hindu has learned that in the course of the negotiations, the U.S. side confirmed to India that NPT membership would not be one of criteria for India's membership. Moreover, a commitment to this effect was read into the official records.

India, which is pushing for an international no first use agreement and a Nuclear Weapons Convention outlawing atomic arms, considers its position on doctrinal issues to be far ahead of that of the U.S. Although the Obama administration has spoken of reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in its military doctrine in the latest Nuclear Posture Review, this is the first time the U.S. is committing itself to a dialogue on the issue with all other countries possessing nuclear weapons.

Manmohan's dinner diplomacy a hit with Obama

In which the Obamas get to find out who's who in Delhi ...







8 November 2010
The Hindu

Manmohan's dinner diplomacy a hit with Obama

Siddharth Varadarajan

Any doubts Barack Obama might have had about the political pecking order in India is likely to have been settled by the seating arrangement at the private dinner Prime Minister Manmohan Singh threw for the visiting U.S. President at his residence on Race Course Road on Sunday night.

The 50 Indian and 20 American invitees were sprinkled across 10 tables arranged under a high-domed, open tent on the lawns just outside the bungalow once known as “7 RCR” that serves as the Prime Minister's residential camp office.

Among the high-profile invitees were Ministers, politicians, film stars, captains of industry, bureaucrats and the odd academic, environmentalist and even journalist. And at the head table, alongside the two principals and their spouses, pride of place was given to three politicians whose importance for the current and future state of the government is just a notch below that of Dr. Singh: Congress president Sonia Gandhi, Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee and the member of Parliament from Amethi, Rahul Gandhi.

If Ms. Gandhi's place at the high table needs no explanation or comment, Mr. Mukherjee's presence there — especially when his American counterpart, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, was seated elsewhere — sent a clear message about his status as the primus inter pares of senior Ministers, several of whom (S.M. Krishna, A.K. Antony, P. Chidambaram) were also present at the dinner . As for Mr. Gandhi's slot on the high table, Mr. Obama could be forgiven for thinking this was part of some sort of grooming exercise. If I win a second term as U.S. President, he must surely have asked himself, is this the man I might be dealing with in India in 2014?

Whatever the future portends, however, Mr. Obama knows Dr. Singh is the man who calls the shots on the bilateral front for now. The two leaders spent nearly an hour closeted together in a meeting without aides or note-takers, giving the assembled guests a chance to freely mingle over endless glasses of pomegranate and mousambi juice. What they discussed is not known. Shortly after 8 p.m., everyone was asked to get into a U-shaped line by the SPG chief, B.V. Wanchoo. The Prime Minister and the U.S. President then walked in with their spouses. Mr. and Mrs. Obama proceeded to shake hands and exchange a few words with each of those present.

No one from the Left parties appears to have been invited. But the Prime Minister did invite Arun Jaitley and L.K. Advani from the Bharatiya Janata Party, as well as the former National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra. The other Ministers present were Sharad Pawar, Kapil Sibal, Salman Khursheed, Anand Sharma and Prithviraj Chavan.

The tables at which guests were seated were named after prominent Indian-Americans or American individuals with a strong India link like Dalip Singh Saund (the first and only Indian to be elected to the U.S. Congress) and Norman Borlaug of the Green Revolution. Live entertainment was provided by the Navy band and the BSF's camel band.

Apart from Mr. Gandhi, the Prime Minister invited several young MPs to the dinner including Meenakshi Natarajan, Priya Dutt, Harsimrat Kaur and Kanimozhi. The Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Omar Abdullah, suggested Mr. Obama take the time to visit his State, an invitation the U.S. President said he would take up when he was able to find time to travel a bit more in the region. Among the film personalities present were Aamir Khan and Shabana Azmi. Chess wizard Viswanathan Anand was also there, as were atomic energy stalwarts Anil Kakodkar and Srikumar Banerjee. The industrialists present included Anu Agha of Thermax, Ratan Tata, Azim Premji, Swati Piramal and N.R. Narayana Murthy. Top bureaucrats included National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon, Principal Secretary to Prime Minister T.K.A. Nair, Cabinet Secretary K.M. Chandrasekhar, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao, Media Adviser to Prime Minister Harish Khare and Culture Secretary Jawhar Sircar.

A partnership built on flawed assumptions

If the big ticket arms and nuclear purchases the U.S. expects India to make do not materialise, much of the warmth in the relationship will evaporate...





5 November 2010
The Hindu

A partnership built on flawed assumptions

Siddharth Varadarajan

For all its appeals to “shared values” like democracy as a counter to China, the United States has not fully understood the meaning and significance of Democratic India's emergence as a global player.

At one level, this is hardly surprising. The U.S. itself developed a full-blown capitalist system and rose to global pre-eminence at a time when a large section of its population did not have the right to vote. The same is true of Great Britain and Japan and Europe. In the post-World War II period, countries which registered the greatest success in establishing a free market system tended not to be democratic. If capitalism and multi-party democracy come as a package in many countries today, it is capitalism which got off the starting block first in virtually all of them, leaving its imprint on democracy.

India's ruling class, on the other hand, was handicapped by the need to harmonise in real time the anti-democratic consequences of a market-based economy with the procedural and substantial requirements of a democratic polity. Of course, economic elites have had the greatest influence in policymaking but their power has always been contested. As a result, universal adult suffrage — and the wider deliberative process that comes along with it — has had more of an impact on the development of capitalism in India than in the rest of the “free world”. Unsurprisingly, the country's global outlook has also been tempered by this aspect of its polity.

The U.S. sees the macro growth data and has a fair idea of where India will be in economic terms two decades from now. It sees the rise and wants to get in at the ground floor. This was the meaning behind the gratuitous promise, made during the presidency of George W. Bush, of helping India emerge as a world power. But India is not in need of that “help”. Its rulers have their own global ambitions and they are not interested in becoming a client state or even a military ally or partner. Those are the two kinds of relationships the United States is used to having with countries around the world. That is why early signs that India will play the power game differently have been greeted in Washington with bewilderment, consternation and even anger.

In the countdown to President Barack Obama's visit to India, American officials have expressed their frustration over the new nuclear liability law. They are also upset with India's reluctance to sign “foundational” defence agreements like the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and the Communication and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA). Having done the heavy lifting at the Nuclear Suppliers Group to win an exemption for India from the cartel's export ban in 2008, the U.S. fears its own companies may not be able to benefit from the multi-billion dollar Indian nuclear market. Westinghouse and GE are squeamish about selling their reactors because the new Indian law opens a door for them to be held liable in the event of an accident caused by defective equipment. The executive branch may have wanted a more lenient law but Parliament thought otherwise. Despite this, the American side is looking for ways to undo the legislation.

If the Indian liability law goes beyond the international norm in insisting that suppliers too shoulder a part of the risk involved in the nuclear power generation business, this is because India is the first democracy to go in for a massive expansion of nuclear capacity in recent years. If the U.S. administration is unable to appreciate the sensitivity of the question in a country which experienced the Bhopal disaster, it could at least look at how the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico has forced a rethink of liability limits in the United States. Instead, suggestions are being made that the Indian nuclear operator contractually take on the entire liability burden of its supplier even when an accident is traced back to faulty equipment. The end result of this pressure, of course, is that Parliament is likely to demand the right to scrutinise any reference to liability in the commercial contracts the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) signs with American vendors.

On the defence side, the LSA and CISMOA aim to boost interoperability between the Indian and American militaries, and pave the way for more arms sales from the U.S. Washington has both commercial and strategic reasons for developing a close military-to-military relationship with India. Billions of dollars of business and thousands of American jobs are riding on the weapons choices India will make over the next few years. But the U.S. is also keen to use its intimacy with the Indian armed forces to outsource low-end operations in the region, particularly in disaster management and counter-piracy.

India, on the other hand, is reluctant to sign these agreements because it is wary of the wider strategic implications. The U.S. has been an expeditionary and even belligerent power in Asia and though the Indian government supports the American war in Afghanistan, the 2003 invasion of Iraq had disastrous consequences throughout the region. With many in Washington speaking of a looming confrontation with Iran over the nuclear issue — a confrontation that would make the Iraq war look like a tea party — why should India do anything to facilitate American military deployment in the region?

Confronted with the Indian refusal to sign on the dotted line, American officials say the LSA and CISMOA texts on offer are identical to what dozens of countries have had no problem signing. In making this argument, the U.S. forgets that India is not an ally or a subordinate partner. Washington cannot hope to simply replicate the way it does business with Australia or Japan. Even if there are sections of the Indian establishment that would like to go along with these agreements, the political implications are far too complicated. This is a reality the U.S. will have to live with.

One test of the Indo-U.S. “strategic partnership” will be if it is able to survive an Indian refusal to spend billions of dollars on American military hardware. Though the technologies on offer seem tempting, India needs to proceed with caution given the end-use restrictions and the ban on modifications that America has imposed on all weapons it sells. Given the fickleness of the U.S. political system and the almost whimsical way in which technology and supply restrictions are imposed and lifted, India will place itself at risk by getting too dependent on American supplies for major weapon systems.

While the “unreliability” of the Americans is not in dispute, there are some in India who see this as a small price to pay in order to buy U.S. support against the “unpredictability” of the Chinese. It is true that the increasing assertiveness of China has rung alarm bells in many parts of Asia and that New Delhi needs to develop an effective strategy to manage what is likely to be an increasing complex relationship with Beijing. The White House has made much of the fact that Mr. Obama's visit to India will be followed immediately by visits to three other Asian democracies — Indonesia, South Korea and Japan. “There is a message in this to China,” a senior U.S. official said in Delhi last month. After fantasising in 2009 about a joint condominium with Beijing, Washington today appears slowly to be moving to the other extreme. In a few years time, it will be ready to move right back. It is essential that India have excellent relations with the United States. But these relations have to be free-standing, built with all the confidence that a rising, democratic power can muster, our eyes looking forward rather than sideways at the constant swings of an American pendulum.

In South Asia, Obama juggles tactical, strategic considerations

Tries to balance long-term Indian partnership with need for immediate gains from Pakistan ...






13 April 2010
The Hindu

In South Asia, Obama juggles tactical, strategic considerations
Tries to balance long-term Indian partnership with need for immediate gains from Pakistan

Siddharth Varadarajan

Washington: In holding virtually back-to-back meetings with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart, U.S. President Barack Obama symbolically underscored the delicate nature of the balancing act his administration is attempting to perform.

The exercise involves doing whatever it takes to keep the strategic partnership with India ticking along – a relationship that is of enormous long-term strategic value to the U.S. – while extracting maximum cooperation on the Afghanistan front from Pakistan and the Pakistani military establishment, a tactical, short-term necessity of the highest order for both the Pentagon and Mr. Obama's Democratic Party as they seek to draw down the Afghan war.

Briefing reporters about the Obama-Manmohan meeting on Sunday, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao quoted the U.S. president as saying there was no country in the world where the opportunities for a strong, strategic partnership are greater and more important to him personally or to the United States, than that with India.

Taken at face value, these words are a throwback to the George W. Bush era, whose strategic embrace of India from 2004 onwards produced the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement. Indian officials present in the meeting told The Hindu it was reassuring to hear the U.S. President speak directly and warmly about the importance of the bilateral relationship at a time when inter-agency differences on Pakistan and Afghanistan — particularly between the Defence and State departments — have created the impression in New Delhi that Washington no longer considers its partnership with India to be important.

Indian officials said Mr. Obama gave the impression of being aware that the Pakistani military – whose patronage in the past of extremist groups is widely recognised to lie at the root of the present problems of terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India – had yet to make a full course correction. A timely reminder of the double-game the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate in Pakistan is still playing was provided on Sunday by the Washington Post, which front-paged allegations sourced to American intelligence officials that the ISI had quietly released two Taliban commanders previously in their custody.

Though the Pentagon has consistently sought to push the argument that India needs to be more accommodating of Pakistani concerns across the Durand Line and the Line of Control in Kashmir, Mr. Obama made it a point to reassure Prime Minister Singh that he welcomed the continuing Indian development assistance to Afghanistan. True, the White House readout on this was brief and to the point, and omitted the reference Mr. Rao made in her briefing to the press about Indian “sacrifices.” But a more public expression of American support for India's interests in a country the Pakistani military considers its backyard would be unrealistic given the business Washington hopes to transact with GHQ in Rawalpindi.

Indian officials have taken heart from the fact that President Obama did not link his stated desire to see a reduction in tension between India and Pakistan with what is happening on the Afghan front. Even his reference to the need for tension to be reduced was understated. “If you weren't paying attention, you'd have missed it,” an Indian official who was in the room said, adding that the President made no reference to talks or dialogue, composite or otherwise.

But Mr. Obama brought up the subject of India-Pakistan relations again in his meeting with Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani later in the day. He told the Pakistani leader that Prime Minister Singh favoured greater engagement with Pakistan. Mr. Gilani responded by saying he agreed and that Islamabad had always believed that is the way things should be.

While it is too early to take full stock of the Obama-Manmohan meeting, it would seem as if India and the U.S. have come away with a slightly better understanding of each other's policies and constraints.

Even before the April 11 bilateral, senior Indian officials said it would be wrong to assume the U.S. does not know what it is doing with Pakistan or that it is blindly placating the military establishment in the hope that its war in Afghanistan could be outsourced. Indeed, the official conceded that the U.S. was acting rationally in trying to use parts of the Pakistani system to its advantage, while also developing other options. What India didn't want was for any act of appeasement to undermine its own legitimate interests in Afghanistan. In this context, the meeting between President Obama and his Kazakh counterpart, Nursultan Nazarbayev, is especially significant with Astana agreeing to participate in the ‘Northern Distribution Network' supplying U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

The fact that the U.S. did not press India to resume the composite dialogue with Pakistan despite the Pentagon's strong internal advocacy of such a line suggests the Obama administration is not buying the ‘threat from India' alibi the Pakistani military cites as the reason for holding back on the Afghan front.

The one area where major differences remain is over Iran. As anticipated, President Obama gave Prime Minister Singh a detailed account of meetings the U.S. is holding at the U.N. aimed at imposing a new round of sanctions on Iran. According to Ms. Rao and other Indian officials, Dr. Singh said India did not believe sanctions would be effective, especially since they end up hurting the common man. The Prime Minister also expressed concern over what the drive for sanctions would do to the prospect for dialogue with Iran. In the end, the two leaders agreed to disagree.

Obama walks tightrope with Manmohan, Gilani

Appreciates India's interest in Afghanistan; tells Pakistan that extremists do not distinguish between victims ...

13 April 2010
The Hindu

Obama walks tightrope with Manmohan, Gilani

Siddharth Varadarajan and Narayan Lakshman

Washington: India and the United States made a fresh push on Sunday to dispel the clouds of uncertainty hovering over their relationship in the wake of America's increasing dependence on Pakistan as a partner in its war against extremism in Afghanistan.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Barack Obama, accompanied by their top advisers, met here for 50 minutes on the eve of the Nuclear Security Summit. A few hours later, the U.S. President sat down with Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani of Pakistan.

The U.S. President reassured Dr. Singh that he “welcomed the humanitarian and development assistance that India continues to provide to Afghanistan,” the White House said in a statement. Providing an Indian account of the discussions, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao said President Obama told the Prime Minister the U.S. “fully appreciated India's interest in Afghanistan and recognised the enormous sacrifices that India has made in helping to stabilise that country.”

Mr. Obama also sought to put to rest speculation on America's reluctance to allow Indian investigators access to David Coleman Headley, the Lashkar-e-Taiba operative arraigned in Chicago for his role in the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Ms. Rao described the U.S. President as being “fully supportive of our request for provision of such access.”

In his meeting with Prime Minister Gilani, Mr. Obama said that “extremists do not distinguish between us and we are truly facing a common enemy,” a White House readout of the exchange said. Mr. Obama also sought to dispel Islamabad's fears that the U.S. had sinister designs towards the country's nuclear programme, Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi told reporters later.

Playing his role as an economist to the hilt, Prime Minister Singh told Mr. Obama about the role the U.S. and G-20 could play in speeding up the recovery of the global economy. India was also playing a role in the “architecture of high economic growth,” he said, but warned that the terrorist onslaught in the region “could affect our growth prospects.” This terrorist menace should be tackled and this was an issue on which India and the U.S. stood on the same side, Ms. Rao quoted the Prime Minister as saying. “He said this with specific reference to what is happening in Pakistan and Afghanistan. How this menace was tackled would determine the future of the South Asian region, the Prime Minister said. He mentioned in this context the issue of David Coleman Headley and also the tremendous rise in infiltration across the Line of Control.” Dr. Singh also brought up the activities of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and terrorists like Hafiz Saeed and Ilyas Kashmiri, “as also the fact that unfortunately there was no will on the part of the government of Pakistan to punish those responsible for the terrorist crimes in Mumbai of November 2008,” Ms. Rao said.

Directly spelling out New Delhi's expectations, the Prime Minister said that this was an area “where the partnership of India and the United States could make the difference.”

According to Ms. Rao, President Obama said he shared Dr. Singh's vision of South Asia and that he favoured the reduction of tensions between the two countries. At this point, the Prime Minister stressed the need for Pakistan to take convincing action against those accused of involvement in the Mumbai attacks, the Foreign Secretary said. She added that Mr. Obama fully understood Indian concerns about the LeT and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The U.S. was engaging Islamabad on these issues and would be sensitive to the concerns India has expressed in the context of American security assistance to Pakistan. Asked to elaborate what that meant, Mr. Rao said the issue would be monitored “keeping India's concerns in mind.”

Iran sanctions push casts shadow on Manmohan-Obama meet

Washington has been trying to garner international support for tightening screws on Tehran...

11 April 2010
The Hindu

Iran sanctions push casts shadow on Manmohan-Obama meet

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: Apart from lingering concerns over aspects of the U.S. administration's AfPak policy, it is the latest American sanctions drive against Iran that most immediately concerns Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's advisers as he goes into a bilateral meeting with President Barack Obama here on Monday afternoon.

Asked about the agenda of the meeting — which is being held on the eve of the Nuclear Security Summit — a senior Indian official said the two leaders would cover the full range of bilateral, regional and international issues.

Apart from discussions on how to move the bilateral relationship forward in the run-up to the Foreign Minister-level strategic dialogue set for June, Afghanistan and Iran are the issues expected to dominate. “It is obvious the U.S. will raise what bothers them most, which is Iran,” said the official. For the past few weeks, Washington has been trying to garner international support for tightening economic sanctions on Tehran over the nuclear issue, a move that key countries like China and Brazil are resisting.

Though India is not a member of the United Nations Security Council, the U.S. is keen to enlist its support. But New Delhi is not convinced. “We don't think sanctions are needed or that they will solve the problem,” said the official, speaking on background. “We have complied with whatever sanctions the UN imposed but only as part of a broader process of engagement with Iran.” The Iranians, he said, had repeatedly told India that they do not want nuclear weapons.

“Unfortunately others don't believe that. So the only way to resolve this is through the [work of the] International Atomic Energy Agency” rather than through coercive means.

Red rag to Washington

The official also confirmed that India, like China, had accepted Iran's invitation to participate in an international conference in Tehran on April 17-18 on the theme of ‘Nuclear Energy for All, Nuclear Weapons for None.' That conference, scheduled right after the Nuclear Security Summit to which the Islamic Republic has not been invited, is another red rag to Washington, which has quietly been discouraging other countries from attending.

The senior official said the Prime Minister would also discuss the AfPak issue with Mr. Obama. Asked about recent reports suggesting the Pentagon favoured a smaller Indian footprint in Afghanistan, the official said “our role [there] is not a function of India-U.S. relations. We just happen to have the same goals. But we will play our role with or without the U.S. because we have core interests in our periphery which we will protect. The issue really is about coordination.”

No change in role

Since the Manmohan-Obama meeting of November 2009, the situation in the region had evolved. “There are two things here – first, the increasing predominance of the Army and second, legal statutes are being modified to transfer power back to the prime minister.” The official said the U.S. couldn't be blamed for trying to use the Pakistani military as part of its strategy of pacifying Afghanistan.

But in India's assessment, Pakistan's role in Afghanistan had not really changed and was unlikely to in the future.

India shared the same goal as the U.S., the official said – the establishment of a peaceful, neutral Afghanistan free from foreign interference. “Last year, there was talk of giving regional powers a greater role. But not much has happened, perhaps because of the Iran-U.S. tension, and now the situation in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia. There are so many moving parts in this equation it needs reviewing constantly.”

India upset with Holbrooke view on Kabul attack

U.S. AfPak czar Richard Holbrooke has irritated India with his statement on Wednesday that the terrorist attack in Kabul which claimed seven Indian lives was not targeted on India or an Indian facility...

5 March 2010 update: Holbrooke says sorry.




4 March 2010
The Hindu

India upset with Holbrooke view on Kabul attack

Siddharth Varadarajan

Indian officials have described as “absolutely incorrect” the statement by Washington's AfPak envoy, Richard Holbrooke, that India was not the target of last week's terrorist attack in Kabul.

The officials expressed surprise and even consternation at this assertion, which, they said, ignored the fact that the terrorists' primary target was a building used by the Indian medical mission. The U.S. assessment, they said, also ran counter to what Afghanistan's intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security, has established so far.

On Tuesday, NSD spokesman Saeed Ansari told AP in Kabul that there was evidence Urdu-speaking Pakistanis from the Lashkar-e-Taiba had been involved in the attack and not the Afghan Taliban.

According to Indian officials, the NSD has established that the terrorists were indeed looking for Indians and had specific information about who was present, including NGO women from SEWA and a senior diplomat on secondment to the Afghan Interior Ministry.

For now, officials here are guarded about which Pakistan-based terrorist outfit might be involved. “Groups like the Haqqani network, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and LeT are all mixed up with one another,” an Indian official said on condition of anonymity. “What we know at present is only circumstantial but [things] should be clearer in a while,” said another official, adding, such are “the glorious uncertainties of barbarism.”

Speaking to reporters in Washington on Wednesday, Mr. Holbrooke said: “I don't accept the fact that this was an attack on an Indian facility… There were foreigners, non-Indian foreigners hurt. It was a soft target. Let's not jump to conclusions.” He added: “I understand why everyone in Pakistan and everyone in India always focuses on the other. But please, let's not draw a conclusion for which there's no proof.”

New Delhi, however, believes there is no room for doubt. “A huge bomb is detonated just outside the Indian medical mission. A terrorist walks in lobbying grenades and firing from room to room. He had prior knowledge about the occupants… If this is not an attack targeted on Indians, what can it be?” said a senior official.

Indian officials also said the Afghans would not make an allegation of Pakistani involvement loosely. “From their point of view, this is a risky statement to make since their government is making overtures to Pakistan,” said an official. “So for their intel people to say the LeT was involved and that it has close ties with the ISI — obviously they are taking a huge risk and must have very good information.”

Afghan investigators have noted that last week's terrorist attack was very different from the January 18 Taliban strike at the Faroshga mall in central Kabul. The gunmen had allowed Afghan shoppers to leave before training their fire on the security forces and destroying the building. In contrast, the Afghans guarding the Indian medical mission were the first to be shot dead by the terrorist who entered the compound following the huge explosion triggered outside. “The guards shouted ‘Don't kill us, we're Afghans' but they were shot all the same,” an Indian official said.

With Major Ritesh Roy of the Army Education Corps succumbing on Wednesday to injuries sustained during the February 26 attack, the total number of Indian fatalities has risen to 7.

Afghan message to India: Do not be deterred

Kabul, Delhi to tell U.S that Pakistan cannot have veto on bilateral ties


12 October 2009
The Hindu

Afghan message to India: Do not be deterred

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: Afghanistan has told India at the highest level that the most fitting response to last week’s terrorist attack on its embassy compound in Kabul would be for the Indian government to step up its ongoing efforts to strengthen the development and security capabilities of the Afghan authorities through infrastructure projects, police and human resource training.

The Obama administration told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh last month that it did not see India’s assistance in Afghanistan as a source of “regional tension” — a charge laid recently by the senior most U.S. military officer there in a confidential report. Nevertheless, Indian and Afghan officials recognise the need for both countries to tell the American side that Pakistan cannot have a veto over the kind of relationship Kabul wishes to build with New Delhi.

U.S. Under Secretary of State William Burns will be in Delhi for routine foreign office consultations on October 16 and India’s views on the matter will be conveyed to him.

Though the Indian side has been careful not to accuse any group or country of being behind Wednesday’s suicide attack, Afghan officials have pointed the finger at Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate.

Asked for their view of the Afghan assessment, senior Indian officials told The Hindu that New Delhi was waiting to see what Afghan investigators and the intelligence agencies of other friendly countries are able to turn up.

The bomb itself, involving 150 kilos of plastic explosives, was highly sophisticated and more powerful than the device which was used in the July 2008 attack on the embassy.

Closed-circuit television had captured clear images of the Toyota vehicle used by the terrorist.

Although the Taliban officially claimed responsibility for the attack on October 8 by posting a statement in Pashto on its website (shahamat.org), the statement was subsequently deleted from the site.

Why the Taliban or their advisers would have second thoughts about this claim is a question Afghan and Indian investigators are likely to be asking themselves.

Of some concern to Indian and Afghan officials was the ease with which the vehicle was able to enter the high security street where the Indian chancery is located. Other important offices, like the Afghan interior ministry, are also located there.

Afghan agencies are now likely to examine the possibility of the Taliban or Gulbuddin Hikmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami infiltrating a section of the Kabul security establishment.

Although India has no intention whatsoever of getting involved in Afghanistan militarily, officials here say India and like-minded countries in the region need to prepare themselves for the day that the U.S. withdraws from the country. In practical terms, this means working to strengthen the capabilities of the Afghan security forces — something U.S. President Barack Obama’s AfPak policy neglects — as well as greater consultation and cooperation with Afghanistan’s neighbours like Iran, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Russia and China.

The officials said India’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting on Afghanistan in March and Dr. Singh’s decision to attend the SCO summit in Yekaterinburg in June had to be seen in this wider context.

Prime Minister’s delegation subjected to American profiling

U.S. rejection of visas for Muslim journalists nearly derailed Manmohan’s visit to G20...

10 October 2009
The Hindu

Prime Minister’s delegation subjected to American profiling

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: A potential crisis in bilateral relations with Washington was averted at the eleventh hour last month when the United States reversed a decision to deny visas to all Muslim journalists who were part of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s official media delegation to the G20 summit in Pittsburgh.

The visas, which were denied pending “additional administrative processing,” were only granted one day before the Prime Minister’s departure following a demarche – or diplomatic request — from the highest levels of government.

None of the Indian officials involved in the process wished to speak on record about the incident, which they said was a clear case of religious “profiling” by the U.S. embassy in Delhi.

As always happens during Prime Ministerial visits, the passports of the accompanying official media delegation were sent a few days in advance to the U.S. embassy for the necessary visas to be stamped. But when the passports were returned, three journalists – all of them Muslim – were handed yellow visa denial slips stating that they had been found “ineligible to receive a visa under Section 221(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”

The yellow slips said their application required “additional administrative processing before a final decision can be made.” But there was no indication of how long this could take. The embassy note tersely stated that applicants would be contacted “once this administrative processing has been completed.” U.S. diplomats informally said this process could take anywhere from four to eight weeks or longer.

With the Prime Minister set to fly out in less than two days, this ‘don’t call us, we’ll call you’ message sent alarm bells ringing in South Block. Officials were quick to realise the political consequences of the American side essentially disallowing the only Muslims in the Prime Minister’s delegation from travelling with him to Pittsburgh.

The three individuals concerned were senior and respected journalists who, like other members of the delegation, had been security cleared. One was an editor of a popular regional daily and two of them had travelled abroad with the Prime Minister before.

“No discrimination”

U.S. officials informally told this reporter that the names of three men had triggered a computerised alert for additional verification. But when The Hindu formally asked the U.S. embassy in Delhi whether it was a coincidence that all the Muslims in the delegation were so selected for additional visa screening and that none of the non-Muslims were, embassy officials said “the U.S. Government does not discriminate on the basis of race or religion.”

They added: “Since many applicants are subject to additional administrative processing, the U.S. Government urges all visa applicants to apply for visas as far in advance of the trip as possible. We also routinely expedite cases in which individuals require to travel urgently.”

Asked whether it was U.S. policy to subject visa requests by Indian Muslims to a lengthier process of background checking, they said consular officers “review each application and make a determination regarding whether an applicant … needs additional processing. These decisions are based on the review of each individual’s case.”

With Dr. Singh set to travel again to Washington on an official visit this November, The Hindu asked whether Muslim members of his official delegation could again experience delays in their visa applications. The embassy officials replied: “This question should be directed to the Government of India. They know the dates of the visit and who will be travelling with the Prime Minister. Have they already applied for visas?”

U.S. sees rising Indian influence in Afghanistan as problem

India is damned if it does (help Afghanistan) and damned if it doesn't....

22 September 2009
The Hindu

U.S. sees rising Indian influence in Afghanistan as problem

Siddharth Varadarajan

In the clearest statement to date of Washington’s reservations about the rising Indian economic and political profile in Afghanistan, the top American general in charge of the war against the Taliban and other insurgents there has said India’s increasing influence in the insurgency-wracked country “is likely to exacerbate regional tensions”.

In his ‘Commander’s Initial Assessment’ on the war in Afghanistan dated August 30, made public on Sunday, General Stanley A. McChrystal said the situation there is “serious” and “deteriorating”. Though a significant section of his report emphasises the need for a change in U.S. strategy and the way U.S. forces deployed there “think and operate”, the section on “external influences” is likely to grate on New Delhi’s ears because of its implication that India ought to scale back its presence in order to placate Pakistani fears about growing Indian influence.

“Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan, including significant development efforts and financial investment. In addition, the current Afghan government is perceived by Islamabad to be pro-Indian”, the McChrystal report notes. But it adds: “While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India”.

India has extended more than $1 billion to Afghanistan in financial and development assistance and is training the Afghan police force and bureaucracy. In recent years, it has been asked by key European countries like Britain and France to step up its assistance even as the U.S. has warned of a negative reaction by Pakistan.

The coy phrase ‘countermeasures’ in the McChrystal report is clearly a reference to Pakistan stepping up its funding of anti-Indian and anti-Afghan (and thus anti-U.S.) insurgent groups and terrorists.

However, in its section on Pakistan, the report only says that insurgent and violent extremist groups based in that country “are reportedly aided by some elements of Pakistan’s ISI”, an assessment far less categorical than what U.S. officials and military commanders have said before in public and private. The report zeroes in on Al-Qaeda’s links to the Haqqani network (HQN) inside Pakistan and says “expanded HQN control could create a favourable environment for AQAM to re-establish safe-havens in Afghanistan”.

The HQN is believed to be behind the bombing of India’s embassy in Kabul in 2007 and the recent assassination of Afghanistan’s deputy chief of intelligence, Abdullah Laghmani, and is widely suspected of enjoying the patronage of the ISI.

Though the McChrystal report falls short of prescribing that India scale back its presence in Afghanistan, the implication is clear: the U.S. is dependent on Pakistani support for the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s capacity to use extremists to hurt American interests remains high, and that India should realise its assistance to Afghanistan might provoke Islamabad into taking “countermeasures”.

Gen. McChrystal calls for additional U.S. forces but says “focusing on force or resource requirements misses the point entirely ? Success is achievable, but it will not be attained simply by trying harder or ‘doubling down’ on the previous strategy”.

In line with the Pentagon’s view of the damage that mounting civilian casualties have had on the image of the U.S. and Nato forces in Afghanistan, the McChrystal report squarely admits that “pre-occupied with protection of our own forces, we have operated in a manner that distances us — physically and psychologically — from the people we seek to protect. In addition, we run the risk of strategic defeat by pursuing tactical wins that cause civilian casualties or unnecessary collateral damage. The insurgents cannot defeat us militarily; but we can defeat ourselves”.