| Date:28/05/2005 http://www.thehindu.com/2005/05/28/stories/2005052801191200.htm Opinion - Leader Page Articles Siddharth Varadarajan
IN CIRCULATING both the draft of a framework resolution on Security Council reform and an ambitious timetable for the United Nations General Assembly to vote on it, India, Japan, Germany, and Brazil have taken their quest for permanent membership of the world body's highest organ to a point of no return. So long as the discussion on reform remained confined to the theoretical front, the countries concerned could afford to be expansive in their ambitions. Not any more. The G-4's ship has set sail and cannot now be recalled. On the choppy seas ahead lie two, and only two, outcomes. The four Governments must either meet success — collectively or singly — or face the bitterness, loss of international prestige and ignominy on the home front that defeat will inevitably bring with it. The draft framework resolution commits the G-4, as the four aspirants call themselves, to seeking six new permanent seats on the Security Council. The Council's size is to be increased from 15 to 25. The new permanent members are to be chosen on the basis of two each from Asia and Africa, one from Latin America/Caribbean, and one from among `West European and Other' states. In addition, the draft calls for increasing the number of non-permanent members by four, up from the present 10, on the basis of one each from Africa, Asia, Latin America/Caribbean, and East Europe. The inclusion of an additional seat for East Europe was proposed by Germany, which felt this was the only way to win the backing of the 20-odd states in that region. The reform envisaged differs in two respects from `Model A' and `Model B' put forward recently by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his report, In Larger Freedom. Both models had envisaged an increase in membership of the Security Council to 24, one less than the G-4 draft's 25. More significantly, the G-4 resolution calls for the right to block resolutions. Under the sub-head `Veto', it states: "the new permanent members should have the same responsibilities and obligations as the current permanent members." According to well-placed Japanese sources, the veto issue led to "heated discussions" among the G-4 nations, primarily India and Japan, with the former insisting there be no discrimination between permanent members and the latter counselling flexibility. The Japanese side managed to get the Indians to use the words "should have" instead of "shall have" in the paragraph on veto power, though one leading Japanese international law expert admitted to me that `should' and `shall' have an identical legal meaning quite distinct from the non-mandatory implications of a word like "may." However, it is evident that the G-4 is prepared to be flexible on the veto front. The `Talking Points' distributed by Germany to U.N. members along with the draft resolution say the question of veto "should not be a hindrance to Security Council reform." And in an attempt to convince the U.S. that the Security Council expansion will not reduce the body's capacity to take decisions that Washington might want, the G-4 draft also proposes to reduce the percentage of affirmative votes required to pass a resolution from the present 9 out of 15 (60 per cent) to 14 out of 25 (56 per cent). Incidentally, had this voting percentage been in place in February 2003, the U.S. would have managed the required eight affirmative votes to win backing for its intended invasion of Iraq. Clever voting method With Tuesday's `compromise' meeting in New York between the G-4 and the `Uniting for Consensus' group led by Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, and South Korea ending in a deadlock, it does seem as if the General Assembly will be asked to vote on the resolution sometime in June. The draft envisages a two-stage election procedure. First, the framework resolution must be passed by two-thirds of the U.N. General Assembly — that is, 127 countries. Within a yet-to-be-specified number of days following the adoption of the resolution, "interested states" must "submit their candidatures to the President of the UNGA." In mid-July, all 191 countries will choose six states by secret ballot to become permanent members of the Security Council in conformity with the geographical pattern already indicated. The G-4 draft also stipulates that "if the number of states having obtained the required majority falls short of the number of seats allocated for permanent membership, new rounds of balloting will be conducted for the remaining seats, provided all ballots shall be restricted to candidates [already registered], until six states obtain the required majority to occupy the six seats." The procedure envisaged is ingenious on two counts. Multiple rounds mean the G-4 nations do not compete against one another; and by restricting candidates to those registered within a fixed time-frame, the G-4 protects itself against a regional dark horse emerging in the event of, say, one or more of the group's nations failing to win a two-thirds majority despite several rounds of balloting. It is only after this procedure is completed that a comprehensive Charter-amending resolution, incorporating the changes already voted on, will be submitted for another vote in accordance with Article 108 of the U.N. Charter. This requires that the changes be adopted by a two-thirds majority and subsequently ratified by two-thirds of U.N. members, including all the existing permanent members of the Security Council. The Charter Articles proposed to be amended are 27 (2) and (3) and 109 (1) (on voting procedures), though the G-4 draft, curiously, forgets to mention Article 23, where the names of the five permanent members are listed. By staggering the reforms process in this manner, the G-4 hopes to present the five permanent members (the P-5) with a fait accompli that they must either accept or reject in toto. If China wants to veto Japanese permanent membership, for example, it will have to reject the entire package and run the risk of alienating not just Japan but the other five newly elected permanent members as well. Similarly, the U.S., which favours only the inclusion of Japan, will not be able to cherry-pick; it will have to accept all six as permanent members. Japanese officials take heart from what happened in 1963, when membership of the Security Council was expanded from 11 to 15. Only China (whose seat was held by Taiwan) among the P-5 voted in favour of the UNGA resolution calling for expansion. France and the Soviet Union voted against (the Soviet position was that there should be no change in the Charter until the Chinese seat went to the Peoples' Republic), while Britain and the U.S. abstained. However, all five eventually went on to ratify the Charter amendment. The hunt for 127 But while ratification by the P-5 is the final hurdle, the G-4 will not find the earlier stages smooth sailing. Even on procedural grounds, there are likely to be objections with some arguing that the framework resolution be ratified by the P-5 first. The Italians are already asking how they can choose countries to fill seats that do not legally exist. Latin American and Caribbean states do not find the G-4 proposal attractive and there is strong opposition in parts of West Europe as well. Japan's influence in Asia is negative, and in many world capitals the joke is that a Japanese berth on the UNSC will only increase Washington's vote from two (U.S. and U.K.) to three. Between now and mid-June, Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil will push their case worldwide. And since the vote on the framework resolution will be an open one, the G-4 will get to see which of its friends (or recipients of largesse) kept their promises and which did not. However, there is very little time left and the Indian campaign, in particular, is far from getting into high gear. External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh's inexplicable eleventh hour cancellation of an important meeting with West African countries in Senegal earlier this month is a case in point. What is also perplexing is the G-4's insistence on the veto rather than a demand for its abolition. Since both outcomes are equally unacceptable to the P-5, it would be better for the G-4 to incorporate, at least initially, a demand that has widespread international support — so that the proposed expansion contributes to the democratisation of the world body. Strengthening the role of the General Assembly should also be part of the reform plan. Even now, it is not a toothless body. Last year, for example, the UNGA overrode the U.S. veto in the Security Council by referring Israel's illegal wall in the Occupied Territories to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. For Japan and Germany, the urgency of the current campaign is understandable. Both countries have an ageing population and economies whose relative strength in the world — though impressive — is nevertheless on the decline. If Tokyo and Berlin miss the bus, they can forget about permanent membership of the UNSC for all time to come. For India and Brazil, however, the future is not so bleak. Failure now will bring a certain loss of face, but there will come a time when the world comes knocking on their doors. © Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu |
28 May 2005
Security Council reform: A bridge too far?
21 May 2005
Manmohan Singh and the economy
The Hindu
Manmohan Singh and the economy
The biggest job, employment generation, has been left undone.
BY Siddharth Varadarajan
GIVEN THE Indian economy's deep-rooted structural problems — which relate more to the chronic insufficiency of aggregate demand than to mere macroeconomic imbalances — one year is too short a period in which to say anything definitive about the performance of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the economic front.
The United Progressive Alliance Government inherited an economy whose vital statistics seemed reasonably comforting on the surface. Even if the annualised growth rate of 8.1per cent envisaged by the Tenth Five Year Plan was never really tenable given the recession in manufacturing from 2001 to 2003, the economy nevertheless managed to grow at a creditable average rate of between 6 and 7 per cent per annum.
But beneath the surface of this statistically significant achievement lay three significant weaknesses, which the BJP and its allies were to pay the price for in full measure. The economy was failing to generate sufficient employment; declining levels of public investment in the economic and social infrastructure of the country were beginning to take their toll, particularly in the rural sector; and the distributional aspect of the reforms process was distinctly unhealthy, as measured by rising inequality and the shift in relative factor incomes in favour of corporate profits at the expense of wages.
In the 2004 general election, the NDA fell victim to the political disenchantment these economic failings inevitably generated. In its campaign, the Congress successfully tapped into people's anxieties about the direction of the economy and promised either the outright reversal of certain BJP policies — such as the undermining of food security for the poor through the dismantling of the Public Distribution System — or a critical re-evaluation of dogmas like privatisation. However, no one issue fired the public imagination — particularly in the countryside — more than the promise made by the Congress during the campaign of providing employment to the poor.
One year on, the Prime Minister has clearly not managed to bring about a change on the employment front. To give him the benefit of the doubt, the structural processes producing jobless growth in India and other more mature capitalist economies are not easy to comprehend, let alone deal with in such a short time frame. Dr. Singh has managed to shepherd the economy along the steady-state path it was already on, except for the initial bout of inflation generated by the rising international price of oil.
A sub-optimal path
However, there is little recognition of the fact that this steady-state path is a sub-optimal one for the country as a whole, even if foreign investors and the Indian corporate sector appear happy to be on it.
Indeed, the manner in which the UPA Government has diluted the commitment it made in its Common Minimum Programme for a comprehensive employment guarantee programme for the country's rural poor suggests the issue of joblessness is not being taken seriously at the highest levels. The fact that Dr. Singh is beginning his second year now with not even the watered-down Bill on employment guarantee anywhere close to getting legislative assent is the single biggest failure of the UPA Government on the economic front.
By allowing unfounded fiscal concerns about the cost of funding the employment guarantee programme to come in the way of the most important economic initiative his Government has promised to take, the Prime Minister is undermining the credibility of his own party's election campaign.
Dr. Singh also lost an opportunity to turn the fiscal argument on its head by being more aggressive on the tax reform front. Late last year, he had dropped broad hints that the next budget would involve a major overhaul of the country's tax system — something which is urgently needed given the low tax-GDP ratio.
What Finance Minister P. Chidambaram produced this year, however — including the irritating cash withdrawal tax and the fringe benefits tax — bore absolutely no resemblance to the Prime Minister's promises of reform. This, then, is the Government's second major failing on the economic front.
The issue is not the ability to push tax collections up in a year but whether the UPA was willing to show the political spine necessary on the taxation front. And it has been found wanting.
16 May 2005
Universities must heed wake up call: Interview with Deepak Nayyar
| Date:16/05/2005 http://www.thehindu.com/2005/05/16/stories/2005051603561100.htm Opinion - Leader Page Articles
Isn't there something fundamentally wrong with the Indian university system today? Even the few centres of excellence we have are largely unable to keep up with global standards as far as research or teaching infrastructure is concerned. Deepak Nayyar: Our universities have been in decline since the early 1970s. What happened to the Republic of India happened to the universities in India. We saw an erosion in values, a decline in the work ethic, a dilution of institutions, and that has taken its toll. If I think back to the time when I was a student — I spent five years from 1962 to 1967 at St. Stephens College and the Delhi School of Economics before going to Oxford — the difference between the two institutions then was visible but not striking. The quality of education DU provided in economics was world class. And John Hicks said to me, why have you come to Oxford? Is this because the number of students has gone up without a corresponding increase in teachers, facilities? Average levels declined as there was a proliferation of universities where not much attention was paid to standards in the new institutions. But the older institutions — the Universities of Allahabad, Calcutta, Mumbai, Madras, Aligarh — also experienced a decline. Now the University of Delhi, all said and done, has remained the premier university in India. Today, it still provides educational opportunities for undergraduate students that are at par with possibly much of the outside world. There is of course a diversity, we are large ... Are the current levels of investment in our universities adequate? I think the resources allocated to higher education are simply not adequate to meet the needs of our times. Do higher fees provide a way out of this problem? There is an incentive compatibility problem. In Delhi, university fees have remained Rs.15 a month for undergraduates and Rs.18 for postgraduates for almost 50 years. But this is not what a student pays. Colleges over the years have raised fees. Typically you pay Rs.300-1000 a month depending on which college you're at. Much of this has come not in the form of fees but disguised as library development charge, campus development fund etc. Why? Because the UGC formula for computing grants is to estimate total expenditure, deduct total income and give the rest as grant-in-aid. Fees for capital expenditure do not get adjusted. The UGC method of allocating resources creates no incentive to raise fees. Fees, of course, have to be raised but two conditions are essential. First, when universities raise fees, the entire increase for, say, five years should accrue to the institution. Later a sharing formula can come. Second, you have to make sure there are scholarships to support those who cannot afford the restructured fees. In our universities, you have this paradox of affluent students paying next to nothing and a large number of students from poor backgrounds who find even low fees burdensome. You had once suggested college students should pay what they paid as fees in high school. This way the poor could study free, and the rich pay no more than what they were paying in class XII anyway. The most logical solution to the problem is for universities to charge students fees that they paid when they left school. It is logical, just and fair, because it measures your ability to pay. But this has not been readily accepted because of concerns that this may not be consistent with law. Somebody may go to court saying `why should I pay more for the same educational opportunities?' Yet, I do believe it is possible to bring about a consensus on restructuring fees. I suppose had I been here a year longer, I would have done it. We are close to it. There is recognition on the part of everybody that what we have as university fees is anachronistic. A student will pay Rs.30 for a coffee at Barista, Rs.150 for a movie ticket at a multiplex, Rs.10 to park a car every day, and yet pay the university only Rs.15-18 a month! We need to index link what we charge as fees. A few years ago, a leading Indian sociologist and historian was told he was ineligible for a job in a sociology department in Bangalore because his MA was in economics, not sociology. A student who has an MA in Women's Studies from abroad is not allowed to enrol for a PhD in history. Surely these kinds of absurd rigidities — at a time when inter-disciplinarity is being encouraged worldwide — have to be ended? Despite the large numbers and diversity at the undergraduate level, what we have done in Delhi is dramatic. We have restructured programmes, not simply revised courses. The BA Pass course is now state-of-the-art, the BA Hons allows interdisciplinary courses. We have also restructured science courses that were caught in the boundaries of yesteryears. But at the postgraduate level? Let's say an economics professor at the Delhi School wants to introduce a course on the application of game theory to resource conflicts. This would go through a whole rigmarole of approvals that would take years. Abroad, she could just up and offer it. What about students assessing their lecturers? Why can't we have that? So at the end of the day, the issue of university leadership is crucial. © Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu |
14 May 2005
India and Nepal: A policy in search of a rationale
| Date:14/05/2005 http://www.thehindu.com/2005/05/14/stories/2005051401431000.htm Opinion - Leader Page Articles Siddharth Varadarajan
THE MANMOHAN Singh Government's decision to formally announce the lifting of its embargo on military supplies to Nepal marks the end of the first chapter of a passionate — and sometimes acrimonious — internal debate in which the External Affairs and Defence Ministries squared off against each other. At stake are not just safari-suited — or uniformed — egos, or even the question of military aid to Nepal. For what the King's February 1 palace putsch has done is triggered the most sweeping reassessment of India's Nepal policy since 1990. Influential sections in New Delhi are now beginning to think of what life in the Himalayan kingdom might be like without the king. Officially, India still clings to the twin-pillar formula — that constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy are equally crucial for Nepal's political stability. But privately, senior officials say that the King and his ambitions are the root cause of the instability in his country. "Of course we believe in the twin pillars," one senior official told me recently, "but if we have to choose between Nepal and the monarchy, India is going to choose Nepal." To be sure, this assessment is not universally shared within the upper echelons of the Government. On February 1, officials in the Ministry of External Affairs were quite clear that the King's action was a shameless power grab aimed at undoing the 1990 Constitution and turning the clock back to the bad old days of the panchayat era. Never comfortable with the King's decision to dismiss Parliament in the first place, the MEA argued that now was the time to take a tough line in favour of democracy. This assessment was shared by other sections of government, notably the National Security Council Secretariat. But even as the issue of an arms embargo began to be openly debated, a counter-view surfaced which sought to portray the palace takeover as essentially a defensive action aimed at dealing with the Maoist insurgency. Working on parallel tracks, King Gyanendra sought to use all his royalist and military connections in India as a means of pressing his case with New Delhi. Had the BJP still been in power at the Centre, the Nepal king would doubtless have activated the `Hindu' network of his friend Vishnu Hari Dalmia as well. Be that as it may, he nevertheless did manage to get a number of individuals with `royal' or `Gurkha' connections to lobby for him in the corridors of power. With most opposition leaders in jail and the palace clamping down on media freedom, the Manmohan Singh Government wisely decided to announce an arms embargo. Given the internal divisions, however, it also chose to be guarded and ambiguous in making that announcement — perhaps to make room for a future U-turn. "Let me give you the correct and exact position," the MEA spokesman was instructed to say on February 22. "The issue of military supplies to Nepal has been under continuous review taking into account the evolving situation in that country. In view of the current disturbed conditions in Nepal, it is a fact that no military supplies have been delivered since the 1st of February 2005." The "correct and exact" words are important here. What was being announced was not a policy but a statement of "fact". "That no military supplies have been delivered," and that the reason for this was not the palace coup or the state of emergency but merely "the current disturbed conditions in Nepal." Preoccupation with ambiguity It was obviously the same cultivated but clumsy preoccupation with ambiguity that led Dr. Manmohan Singh's advisers to have him inform the press in Jakarta on April 23 that the question of military supplies to Nepal was being looked at "in the proper perspective." The fact that this formulation — as unhelpful as it was tautological — came hours after King Gyanendra told reporters in Jakarta he had received "specific assurances" from the Prime Minister that military supplies would continue only heightened suspicions that New Delhi had something to hide. That countries make U-turns in policy is not surprising. The least that one can expect for a country that wants a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council, however, is that it not shy away from providing a rationale for its policy switch. Instead, all we got was studied silence. If it took the Government of India 17 days to confirm something that the Nepalese monarch had already announced, the only logical explanation is the deep divide which exists between the MEA and MoD on the issue. The Cabinet Committee on Security finally puts its imprimatur on the resumption of military supplies on May 6. But even now, say officials involved in the process, there is enough fuzziness in the decision to ensure the bureaucratic tug-of-war continues for some time. The Gurkha factor What has irritated the Government's Nepal watchers elsewhere on Raisina Hill is the claim by their uniformed counteraprts that the suspension of military supplies was lowering the morale of Gurkha soldiers in the Indian Army, or rendering their families in Nepal vulnerable to attack by the Maoists. For years, the MoD has refused to recruit Gurkhas settled in India into the Army, saying the recruitment of Nepalese Gurkhas provided India with `leverage' in Nepal; now it turns out, it is the King of Nepal who has all the leverage and India has none at all. Besides, the Gurkhas in the Indian Army have no ethnic or institutional ties to the soldiers in the RNA. "It's ridiculous. The whole issue is a red herring," an official said. © Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu |
10 May 2005
It's official: India to send arms to Nepal
| 10 May 2005 The Hindu Front Page Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI: The on-again, off-again status of arms supplies to Nepal has finally been resolved with the Manmohan Singh Government clearing the immediate dispatch of materiel "already in the pipeline." This means supplies approved when India suspended military assistance following King Gyanendra's seizure of power on February 1. The Hindu has learnt that the decision was taken by the Cabinet Committee on Security at a meeting on Friday. According to well-placed sources, the CCS also resolved to place the question of future arms shipments to Nepal "under constant review." An understanding on the resumption of arms supplies — and a "road-map" for the restoration of political processes in Nepal — was reached between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and King Gyanendra in the Indonesian capital on April 23. But a question mark hung over the issue with the arrest soon thereafter of Sher Bahadur Deuba and other senior Nepali leaders on charges of "corruption." When King Gyanendra lifted the state of emergency on April 30, India welcomed the decision. Privately, however, senior officials here saw it as an example of the King making a virtue out of necessity: under the 1990 Constitution of Nepal he could not have prolonged the Emergency without the endorsement of Parliament. Reports reaching the South Block subsequently also made it clear that emergency-like conditions continue to prevail in Nepal with the King now placing travel restrictions on politicians, journalists and other critics of the coup. If this negative assessment of the King's commitment to the restoration of democracy forced a eleventh-hour rethink, the Indian armed forces' strong representations in favour of sending weapons to the Royal Nepal Army appear to have eventually carried the day. © Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu |
09 May 2005
Mr. Bush and the Riga Axioms
| Date:09/05/2005 http://www.thehindu.com/2005/05/09/stories/2005050906171100.htm Opinion - News Analysis Siddharth Varadarajan
HISTORIANS OF the Cold War will not have missed the significance of President George W. Bush choosing Riga as the venue for his speech on Saturday repudiating the 1945 Yalta Agreement. Before the United States extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in 1933, it was the American legation in the Latvian capital that served as the State Department's observation post on Moscow. The three Baltic republics were independent from 1921 until their absorption into the Soviet Union in 1940 following the rapid collapse of the Low Countries and France and the fear in Moscow that Hitler would soon turn his attention eastward. In the 1920s, Riga was where Kremlin watchers like Loy Henderson and George F. Kennan cut their teeth. Other members of this group, which drove U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union in the pre-war period, were James Forrestal, the Dulles brothers, and William Bullitt. Deeply suspicious of Stalin, they advocated the creation of a cordon sanitaire around the USSR. And despite the imminent threat posed to Europe and the world by Hitler, they ruled out the possibility of cooperating with the socialist state in dealing with the Nazi menace. When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the U.S. was forced to come out in support of Moscow. This support was grudging and tactical; elements of the influential Riga group thought it would be better to let Hitler and the Soviet Union destroy each other and it was perhaps this thinking that led to the unconscionable delay in the Western Allies opening up the Second Front. Notwithstanding Washington's desire to limit the scope of Russia's influence in Europe, the fact that the Red Army played a decisive role in smashing the Third Reich and liberating a dozen countries meant the "Riga axioms" gradually gave way to a more realistic assessment of the Soviet Union and the position it occupied in the world as a Great Power. This realism reached its apogee at Yalta, a small town in Crimea where Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt met from February 4 to 11, 1945, to discuss the post-war scenario. The Yalta axioms envisaged a cooperative security framework in which the three Great Powers agreed to work together to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism by demanding the unconditional surrender of Germany and ensuring its leadership was prosecuted for war crimes. They also undertook to enable the liberated peoples of Europe to create democratic institutions of their own choice and enshrined the principle of unanimity amongst the Great Powers (i.e. the veto) as a procedure for the smooth functioning of the proposed United Nations and its Security Council. Finally, Yalta was where it was decided that the USSR would enter the war against Japan three months after Germany,s surrender and that the U.S. and Russia would jointly occupy Korea below and above the 38th parallel respectively. Soon after Yalta, the big three reached an impasse over the fate of Poland with the U.S. and Britain going back on their commitment that the pro-communist government already in place in that country need not be disbanded but merely made more representative. Twelve months later, Kennan sent his famous Long Telegram from Moscow and Churchill made his Fulton, Missouri speech on the Iron Curtain. The Riga axioms, as the historian Daniel Yergin points out in Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State, were back in business. But when Mr. Bush said in Riga that Yalta was "one of the greatest wrongs of history" because it traded the freedom of small nations for the goal of stability in Europe, he was not merely echoing Cold War dogma. He was also sending out a message to the world — and particularly to Great Powers like Russia and China — that the era of collective security established at Yalta and later, at the United Nations, is decisively over. And that if the restraints placed by this system ever come in the way of U.S. national interests, they will be brushed aside. "We will not repeat the mistakes of other generations — appeasing or excusing tyranny, and sacrificing freedom in the vain pursuit of stability," Mr. Bush declared. Spirit of Yalta Speaking to a joint session of Congress on March 1, 1945, Roosevelt hailed the spirit of Yalta. "The Crimea Conference was a successful effort by the three leading Nations to find a common ground for peace. It ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries — and have always failed. We propose to substitute for all these, a universal organisation in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a choice to join." That universal organisation, of course, was the U.N. Sixty years later, Mr. Bush has little time for universal organisations. Instead, he believes in unilateral action. At Riga, he has served notice to the world that he is ready to take the good fight against "tyranny" beyond Iraq. Stability be damned. © Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu |
07 May 2005
'India will not be used by any power': Interview with Natwar Singh
| Date:07/05/2005 http://www.thehindu.com/2005/05/07/stories/2005050706681100.htm Opinion - Interviews
King Gyanendra came out of his meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Jakarta last month saying arms supplies to Nepal would continue. India has not contradicted him. Are we going to resume sending weapons? Natwar Singh: The supply of arms to Nepal is under constant review. In Jakarta, the Prime Minister spelt out our concerns about the post-February 1, 2005 events, that they were a setback to the democratic process which, he felt, should be resumed before anything could be done. And we had hoped the King would take some action. But then Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba was arrested. The emergency has been lifted but it is still partial in many ways. Given the nature of our very close relations with Nepal, we have to be extremely cautious and very patient. It's our hope and endeavour to see that normalcy returns. And military supplies... The question remains under review. But has a first shipment of arms now been sent to Nepal, the tranche that was held back in February? The details I don't know. That only the Defence Minister will know. On the issue of relations with the United States, your party opposed sending Indian troops to Iraq. On other issues too, you were critical. Now that you are in government, in what way are the UPA's policies towards the U.S. different from those of the NDA? Relations with the U.S. have improved considerably in the past 12 months — they have never been better. With regard to Iraq, our policy is governed by the unanimous resolution of Parliament in 2003. We have donated $10 million to the international trust fund for Iraq, and offered to assist them in civil service training, the framing of a constitution. In the Opposition, the Congress had criticised the BJP for committing Indian support to the American missile defence programme. You asked whether the cost-benefit to India had been taken into account. However, the UPA is continuing with the NDA's policy on this. What is the benefit to India that you see now? I don't think we have taken any decision on it. But missile defence remains a component of the NSSP process. Under the NSSP, currently we are only in the phase of being given briefings on the missile defence programme. No decision has been taken that we are going in for, say, the purchase of an anti-missile defence system. The interest part is, of course, quite obvious, because it is a technology which can have important uses for us, it is certainly in our interest to keep abreast of all these technologies. The U.S. is currently giving you briefings on this, including confidential briefings on the system. It is to our advantage. Many countries say missile defence will fuel a new arms race, that it only encourages the other side to produce more missiles. We've not taken a position on this. When President Musharraf was here, he said converting the Line of Control into the border is unacceptable to Pakistan, redrawing the LoC is unacceptable to India and that both countries favour soft borders. Do you think this provides a framework within which the issue of Kashmir can be discussed? The composite dialogue is going extremely well. For example, in his Jakarta speech, General Musharraf said relations were improving so well they could be an example to the rest of the world. I must say that without his personal involvement, it would not have been possible to have the bus service started. During his visit here, the two leaders got on very well. They also know there are certain things which can't be done overnight. We have also said we are hoping the commitment made on January 6, 2004, will be honoured by the Pakistani side... There is some terrorist activity going on, but the overall Indo-Pak. scene looks more promising than it has done for many decades. Why is that? Have we changed, or have the Pakistanis changed? I think the global scenario has changed. And I also think the change in the atmosphere in both countries at the peoples' level also helped a great deal. We know the difficulties, they know the difficulties. But if contacts increase — President Musharraf himself said, "Why only a bus across the LoC, why not trucks with goods?" We have also asked them why our goods can't go through Pakistan instead of through Dubai, which is a loss to both countries. Some people in the U.S. and India say China is a `strategic threat' to both countries and that Washington and Delhi need to coordinate their policies. How do you see this evolving triangular relationship in the next 20 years? I think our relationship with the U.S. in no way affects our relationship with the Chinese. We have very good relations with the U.S., very good relations with China. These relations are getting better, if you just take the trade figures. We don't subscribe to this theory that any country is using India as a counterbalance for another country... India would not like to be used by any power. We have to look after our own national interests. The `guiding principles' on the border settlement with China give rise to the possibility of territorial adjustments in the future. Do you think a change in the map of India is something that would be acceptable to public opinion? We are looking at a boundary settlement from the overall perspective of bilateral relations. The first stage of the work of the Special Representatives was completed with the signing of the agreement on the guiding principles. In the second stage, the SRs have been asked to hold discussions to reach a consensus on the agreed framework of the boundary settlement. It would be premature now to talk of the outcome of the discussion of the SRs. Whatever the outcome, it will be within the limits defined by the political parameters, the guiding principles laid down by both sides. How does the Government look at the prospects of resuming the peace process in Sri Lanka? We are looking at a solution that takes into account the concerns of all the people of Sri Lanka. Our view with regard to Eelam is well known; it has not changed. We are for the sovereignty, territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. We are concerned about the LTTE having built an airstrip and having two aeroplanes and there's news about more coming. Will India resist U.S. pressure on the Iran-Pakistan-India gas tie-up and go ahead with the pipeline? I said so at my press conference with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice when she made the views of the U.S. known. I said we have very good relations with Iran, we have no problems with Iran. The pipeline is mentioned in the statement issued in September [2004] in New York by the Prime Minister and President Musharraf. Our Petroleum Minister is going to Pakistan very soon. The earlier impression was that India was the stumbling block. We are not. Our energy needs are going to increase exponentially in the next 20 years and there's no other way but to have this kind of an arrangement. On the reform of the U.N. Security Council, is India proposing an "Option C" as opposed to "Option A" and "Option B" [both without the veto] proposed by the High-Level Panel or is India willing to go along with Option A? We have, along with Brazil, Japan and Germany, made our position well known. We are hoping to table a resolution and are hoping to have a very large co-sponsorship for the resolution before the General Assembly meets in September. A lot of people think this is a matter for the Security Council to decide. No, this is a matter for the General Assembly to decide with a two-thirds majority. There are 54 nations from Africa, they are very important players in the expansion process. Our position has, so far, been that India should be in the Security Council with a veto. A third view is that the veto should be abolished, which is unlikely. There is another point of view that there could be an informal arrangement that no one country can veto, there should be two or three. Given the world scenario today, with the U.N. having 192 members, it will be very difficult for any of the P-5 to exercise their veto against the popular mood for change. We are also realistic enough to know that the present five will not like the veto to be extended to other members. [The] Prime Minister has said that we are against any discrimination between the old and the new. The African view is the same. What we have to remember is that these five permanent members have to go back to their respective parliaments ... If the U.S. Senate doesn't ratify, there's a new situation. Now, from what Secretary-General Kofi Annan told us, his expectation is that howsoever strong the reservations of one permanent member against a new one ... in today's climate it would be difficult to exercise the veto. At the most, that power would abstain. Why doesn't India stick to its earlier stand that the veto, per se, is undemocratic and should be done away with? It's not excluded. The discussions are going on at various levels, at various forums and they will be further intensified in the next few weeks. You can't even rule out, and I am taking the extreme position — the contradictions are so great, the differences so obvious, that nothing may happen. And, that'll be a great tragedy. © Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu |
05 May 2005
The dough is in the land, not the bread
| Date:05/05/2005 http://www.thehindu.com/2005/05/05/stories/2005050507641100.htm Opinion - News Analysis Siddharth Varadarajan
 A FIGHT FOR THEIR RIGHTS: Suspended workers demonstrate in front of Modern Food Industries in New Delhi on Sunday, May Day. IN AN interview soon after Modern Food was privatised, Arun Jaitley, who was Disinvestment Minister at the time, declared it was not the job of the Government to make bread. Five years later, the former PSU's new owners seem to believe it's not their job either. The company's flagship factory is on the verge of being shut down so the land can be used for more "productive purposes"; bread production is to be outsourced as a "low cost solution" to the losses the company is still incurring, and the remaining employees are being encouraged to accept a new VRS package. This is not the way things were supposed to have gone. The January 2000 sale of Modern Food Industries Ltd (MFIL) to HLL — subsidiary of FMCG multinational Unilever — was hailed by the erstwhile BJP-led National Democratic Alliance Government as a landmark event that would establish a new paradigm in the revival of inefficient public sector companies. "It is a success story inasmuch as all jobs have been saved and an attempt has been made to revive a loss-making unit," Mr. Jaitley told the Rajya Sabha soon after. So carried away by his salesman-like zeal was he that at the end of May 2000 he told The Hindu employment would actually go up in the company. He couldn't have been more mistaken. When HLL took charge of Modern Food, the total number of employees was 2,037. The PSU also owned nearly 4,50,000 square metres of prime land in cities across India, including Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Bangalore, and Kolkata. Today, it is not clear how many workers the company still employs. What we do know is that as of August 31, 2003, the numbers were down by 51 per cent to 1,007. (Reply to Lok Sabha unstarred question by Arun Shourie, December 3, 2003). With the company pushing another round of VRS, especially in Delhi, the union now estimates there are less than 700 workers remaining. It says a majority of MFIL's 21 units have been closed and alleges bread is being produced by contract labour in outsourced "sweatshops." Not by bread alone As for MFIL's land, one 8,000 sq metre plot in Bangalore has been sold for Rs.2.48 crore and a 20,000 sq metre plot in Faridabad on Mathura Road outside Delhi is currently on offer. Chesterton Meghraj, the property dealers handling the sale, say the plot is likely to sell for around Rs.15-20 crore. According to the Modern Food Industries Employees Union, the company's move to get its land on Lawrence Road, Delhi — where its main bread unit is located — converted to freehold is also the prelude to its eventual sale as real estate. Even as it is selling its land holdings in and around Delhi, MFIL placed an advertisement last month seeking to rent industrial premises for setting up a bread manufacturing unit. Asked about this anomaly, an HLL spokesman told The Hindu , "Lawrence Rd is a costly location for a bread factory, when one takes into account all costs... It was therefore decided that it would be in the best interests of the company if the losses incurred by the unit could be stopped and all assets deployed for productive purposes." The main asset to be redeployed, of course, is land. When MFIL was privatised — 74 per cent of its equity was first sold to HLL for Rs.105.45 crore, and the remaining 26 per cent handed over for Rs.44 crore — the union, independent analysts and several MPs from the Left and the Congress (including Manmohan Singh) had alleged the land had not been valued correctly and might alone be worth much more than the Rs.150 crore paid by HLL for MFIL. The NDA sought to refute allegations of undervaluation and assured its critics the new owners would not be able to dispose of the land as they liked. Estimates of high land value are "somewhat misleading," Jaswant Singh told the Rajya Sabha on April 27, 2000, as Leader of the House. "Land is there only notionally. It is leasehold land. It is meant specifically for the function, it is specifically for the purpose of food processing." HLL in default? Officials and Ministers also put the word out that the Shareholders Agreement between HLL and the Government of India made it mandatory for the new owners of Modern Food to obtain government approval for any sale of MFIL's land for a specified period, even after the entire government equity is divested. This assurance was widely reported at the time and not contradicted by anybody. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on August 14, 2003, Mr. Shourie too hinted that HLL was not free to do as it pleased. "The employees of MFIL have... alleged that the Strategic Partner had sold assets and discontinued the bakery business in violation of the terms of the Shareholders Agreement, which will be gone into by the Fact-Finding Committee [set up by the Prime Minister]," he assured the House. This statement was made after the Government had already sold its remaining 26 per cent stake in Modern Food to HLL. Asked last week by The Hindu whether HLL had sought prior approval from the Government for the sale of the Faridabad and other properties, a company spokesman denied this was necessary. "There is no pre-condition regarding sale of land or for that matter the sale of any of the assets of MFIL, as the final sale of Government of India shares in MFIL to HLL was an unconditional and purely commercial transaction." HLL also denies it has any plans of quitting the bread-making business and says the land is being sold to retire debt. "HLL/MFIL is committed to turning around MFIL," the company spokesman insisted. "It is our intention to reduce the losses at our loss-making bread units, and indeed Delhi is our highest loss-making unit... Accordingly, unviable operations at any location will be placed under a close business scrutiny, and if outsourcing is indeed the appropriate low-cost solution, this will be resorted to." Whatever the spin, the sale of land and the closure of units suggest HLL sees greater value in MFIL's underlying assets than in its core business of making bread. The irony is that the previous government anticipated this problem. "Perhaps the biggest concern on the part of the government in case of strategic sale of PSUs is that of asset stripping by the strategic partner (SP)," a Department of Disinvestment website document on strategic sale agreements states. "Most of the PSUs have valuable assets in the shape of plant and machinery, land, buildings etc. The SP may well dispose of these assets, make money on that and quit, leaving another sick industry behind... Therefore a clause on affirmative rights of government in case of sale etc. of assets after takeover should exist." To give the devil his due, this added caution on behalf of the DoD and its two erstwhile Ministers, Mr. Jaitley and Mr. Shourie, might well have been an afterthought given the bad experience of Modern. But what is unacceptable is the way in which whistleblowers were victimised by the company and dismissed by Ministers as troublemakers. Right from the start, union leaders like Gobind Yadav, V.K. Narang, and Ganesh Thakur had cautioned the Government that the new owners were not interested in reviving Modern Food. Mr. Yadav was suspended by MFIL's management and dismissed in 2002. However, he has since won his case in the labour court and the Delhi High Court has ordered MFIL to reinstate him with back wages. At the end of the day, the story of India's first full-scale privatisation is not a happy one. The employees say that since the purpose of the privatisation has not been served, MFIL should once again be nationalised. At a minimum, they say, the sale of land without government clearance — though HLL says this is not needed — might well constitute an "event of default", allowing the Government to "buy back" MFIL's shares at 25 per cent less than the sale price. Whatever the Manmohan Singh Government decides, this much is clear: old free market dogmas like privatisation aren't panaceas. When the policy is past its sell-by date, the bread it produces is also likely to be stale. © Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu |
01 May 2005
Slaying the demons of distrust
URL: http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsMay2005/cover2may2005.htm
Cover Story
Slaying the Demons of Distrust
Moving away from traditional rigidities, Musharraf and Manmohan Singh seem to be working towards bold and creative solutions.
From Siddharth Varadarajan in Delhi
"Meri kya auqat ke main kisi ko rokun? Kaha jata hai ke Gharib Nawaz ke darwaze aap tabhi pahunchh payenge jab woh bulayange" said Jaswant Singh, immediately after the failed Agra Summit of 2001, when asked whether the Indian government had prevented General Pervez Musharraf from visiting the shrine of Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti in Ajmer.
That was then and now is now. In contrast to 2001, General Pervez Musharraf not only made it to Ajmer Sharif after all, but also managed to return with something much more edifying than the bitterness and rancour that accompanied him back on his flight to Islamabad that fateful July.
There may not have been any concrete outcome on Baglihar or Siachen, trade or terrorism, leave alone Kashmir, but no Pakistani or Indian analyst should make the mistake of believing the results of the recent summit between the General and the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, were anything less than momentous. For the first time in recent years, the two sides managed to establish something resembling a relationship of trust with each other. After laying their concerns on the table, each left the meeting room with a promissory note from the other. If the General agreed to stay the course and continue to rein in the armed extremists who are out to scuttle the peace process, Manmohan assured his guest that India would not shy away from discussions about a "final settlement" of the Kashmir issue. And despite the attempts by officials and commentators to cast doubts on the intentions of the other side, both men appear determined to trust their own instincts.
The irony is that the days leading up to last month's path-breaking meeting had seen both sides consciously seeking to talk down the hype. Indeed, at an off-the-record briefing a few hours before the General arrived in New Delhi, senior Indian officials cautioned that the impending summit was not really a summit or even a mini-summit but simply an occasion for a frank exchange of views. And yet, what transpired during the 36 hours the Pakistani President was in the Indian capital was as significant as anything the two countries have seen in recent years.
The joint statement read out before the press by Prime Minister Singh in his deadpan style may seem anodyne on the surface, but within its terse sentences and paragraphs - as well as the call made by General Musharaf and Dr. Singh in separate meetings with the press to make existing borders irrelevant - lie most of the elements of a roadmap for peace between India and Pakistan.
Though the statement avoided formally mentioning the notion of "soft borders" - the concept needs to be fleshed out and debated adequately in both countries before it can actually be served up - the summit document is noteworthy in six respects.
First, it stresses the irreversibility of the peace process now underway. The two leaders are saying that come what may, there will be no turning back from what has been achieved so far - the resumption and enhancement of cross-border traffic and people-to-people contact, including sports, and the ceasefire along the Line of Control, as well as up in the Siachen Glacier. Specifically, this means the self-imposed quarantine India brought about by cutting all air, raid and road links following the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on Parliament, will, hopefully, never again be repeated.
Secondly, it says that terrorism will not be allowed to disrupt the relationship. The specific formulation is worth noting: "The two leaders pledged that they would not allow terrorism to impede the peace process." Terrorism, here, is no longer a stick for India to beat Pakistan with but a problem which confronts both countries equally. If the statement implies that Islamabad will continue to work to ensure terrorist incidents are not planned or launched from territories it controls, New Delhi, too, has undertaken not to over-react to the odd terrorist incident that might still take place.
In other words, India and Pakistan have jointly resolved not to give terrorists the right to veto the peace process through dramatic acts of violence.
Thirdly, the statement stresses that the purpose of having discussions on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir is to reach a "final settlement." In contrast, the September 24, 2004 statement issued in New York spoke of "possible options for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the issue," while the January 6, 2004 joint statement spoke of the "peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides." However, the reference in the latest statement to a 'final settlement,' though refreshing, is hardly new. Those in India who have been critical of this reference - especially the Bharatiya Janata Party - have forgotten it is, in fact, taken directly from the Simla Agreement of July 2, 1972, Clause 6 of which commits both governments "to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalisation of relations, including the questions of prisoners of war and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of diplomatic relations."
But if the words "final settlement" are not new, General Musharraf has managed to get the Indian government to make a major discursive shift. After conceding the need for a final settlement as far back as 1972, India, somewhere along the line, chose to take the view that this was unnecessary. Reams of paper have been wasted on futile debates about whether Kashmir is a core issue or not. Despite the eight outstanding issues to be resolved between the two countries under the Composite Dialogue Process, Manmohan has now agreed that Kashmir is the key. By returning to the Simla language, India and Pakistan have wisely agreed to give the Kashmir issue the importance it actually has and not remain hostage to the linguistic sensibilities of those who do not know the diplomatic history of the bilateral relationship.
Fourthly, having stressed the need for a final settlement, the statement suggests preliminary steps consistent with the notion of soft borders. Thus, it speaks of further measures "to enhance interaction and cooperation across the LoC," including passenger movement and trade.
Allowing trucks to cross the LoC - presumably laden with fruit on the outbound, and Pakistan-made consumer goods on the inbound - is a radical leap of faith for India and as it will eventually allow the economic geography of the region to revert to its pre-Partition days. The position of Jammu as an entrepot, not just for the valley but also Poonch and Rajouri - once the road to Rawalakot in Pakistan is opened up (or even the old 'Mughal Road' to the valley) - would be undermined, which could have unintended consequences for Jammu and Kashmir. Though Pakistan has tended to oppose the opening up of the LoC to trade between the two parts of the erstwhile princely state, it is India which could stand to lose because a softer LoC allows Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir to bypass Indian trade routes to the outside world.
Fifth, the joint statement undertakes to speed up deliverables, such as an agreement on Siachen and Sir Creek, and strive for greater business interaction. So long as Pakistan had the impression that India was using confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a diversionary tactic to avoid reaching a final settlement on Kashmir, it was not interested in forward-movement on trade or fast-tracking the solution of specific disputes that have readymade agreements for the taking. By not shying away from the Kashmir issue, India has achieved what it wanted: a Pakistani commitment to put easier problems on the front-burner.
Sixth, Dr. Singh and General Musharraf have not only endorsed the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline in the face of U.S. criticism of the project, but also expanded the scope for energy cooperation between their two countries. Given the growing demand for energy in both Pakistan and India and the need for South Asia to access Iranian and Central Asian oil and gas, it is essential that the two countries start a broad energy dialogue.
In his interaction with Indian editors, General Musharraf reiterated the proposal for soft borders made by him a few days before the summit in an interview to Reuters. It is my belief that the Indian side - our leadership and the bulk of our media - has not yet understood the shift that the General's endorsement of soft borders along the LoC implies. To drive home the point, he reminded the editors of Pakistan's uncompromising position that the LoC should not become the border, India's official position that that there could be no redrawing of borders and the only possible via media between these two positions, a soft border. "The LoC cannot be permanent, borders must be made irrelevant and boundaries cannot be altered. Take the three together and now discuss the solution," he said.
A soft border is the only administrative arrangement that allows India and Pakistan to maintain their respective de jure or de facto sovereignties in Kashmir while not coming in the way of the people of the divided state enjoying the fruits of a unified territory. The LoC need not be made permanent or redrawn; the solution is to make it irrelevant. Examples exist of territorial disputes between states that have been resolved in this manner to the satisfaction of both countries and the affected population. South Tyrol, whose people were once part of Austria but who became part of Italy following the First World War, is a good example. There is also the evolving example of Northern Ireland, where Britain was forced to concede that the administrative and political status quo was untenable.
Critics of General Musharraf in Pakistan fail to appreciate the sea-change that has come about in official Indian attitudes towards the Kashmir question in the past year or so. Admittedly, not all of this change is attributable to the General. Nevertheless, the fact remains that for the first time India has a Prime Minister who, right from day one, has been advocating soft borders as the solution. From demanding that Pakistan return to India Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the Northern Areas to the traditional fallback position of making the LoC an international boundary, the Indian position on the Kashmir issue was a rigid one. New Delhi also always took the view that the aspirations or views of the Kashmiri people were irrelevant or, at best, fully accounted for by the presence of an elected provincial government in Srinagar. Today, Manmohan says it is the need to improve the lives of the Kashmiris that must drive the Pakistan-India peace process forward. His decision to over-rule his officials on the issue of allowing passengers on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus to travel without passports was a promising first sign. Hopefully, there will now be many more.
Ever since General Musharraf started speaking of finding "out of the box" solutions by negating those outcomes that are unacceptable to both sides, a process of churning and introspection has begun. By speaking of the need to make borders irrelevant, both sides have begun to move away from traditional rigidities towards a set of possibilities that are creative and bold. People in both India and Pakistan must now put maximum pressure on their respective governments to allow this process to continue.
Siddharth Varadarajan is Deputy Editor of The Hindu and one of India's leading commentators on foreign and strategic affairs.
