The NSA on Pakistan, Sharm el-Sheikh and terrorism

On Saturday, I interviewed National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan on a wide range of issues but primarily India's Pakistan policy in the wake of the November 26-29, 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai and the July 16, 2009 Sharm el-Sheikh summit between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Yusuf Raza Gilani of Pakistan...

31 August 2009
The Hindu
[In the print edition, this story was carried in two parts. The url for Part 2 is here]

Hafiz Saeed not ‘litmus test’ but Pakistan action important: NSA
‘Sharm el-Sheikh was neither a step forward nor backward’

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: In his first substantive comments on relations with Pakistan since the July 16 Sharm el-Sheikh summit, National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan said that averting another major Mumbai-like incident was the government’s top priority and that unless Islamabad took “real action” against those involved in terrorism, the progress it had reported so far in the Mumbai case would amount to “a chimera.”

In an interview to The Hindu on Saturday, he painted a picture of official frustration at Pakistan’s unwillingness to act against the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Muhammad despite the fact that there was concrete information about these groups re-establishing training camps. “In places like Manshera and Muzzafarbad, enlargement of what I would call training camps is going on… Their capabilities are increasing and we see the threat, and the threat is not to Kashmir but to some of the hinterland areas. That is our concern. That is what [our] agencies are concentrating on.”

As for LeT chief Hafiz Saeed, India had provided information about his involvement in the Mumbai attacks. “I wouldn’t like to use a strong term like ‘litmus test.’ But it’s important … If an incident of this nature has taken place and if [Pakistan] is saying ‘Yes, we are willing to go the extra mile to help you,’ if [they] don’t take action in an instance of this kind, then what can [we] expect?” One of the terrorists, ‘Kasab,’ had provided information about Saeed’s role, Mr. Narayanan said, adding that if Pakistan was now going to say, ‘Give us enough evidence that in a final court of law a thing of this kind can stand,’ then “there is nothing that you can really do in these matters.”

Mr. Narayanan said that establishing the facts about the Mumbai attacks was important in order to tell the world about the kind of threat Pakistan posed, but avoiding another major attack was vital from the domestic point of view. “I think the basic question for us is, will they do something to prevent another incident? The Prime Minister has made it clear that there are enough items in the pipeline that cause concern. Now, they should do something on that. And since there is no [international] pressure exerted on them on that, I don’t know whether they will be [willing]. We have not seen any evidence of that. So we presume nothing is happening.”

Seeking to draw a line under the controversy surrounding last month’s meeting between Manmohan Singh and Yusuf Raza Gilani, National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan on Saturday replied in the negative when asked whether the Sharm el-Sheikh summit between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan had been a step forward. “But,” he hastened to add, “it certainly wasn’t a step backward.”

The inclusion of Balochistan in the joint statement had made many critics see red but Mr. Narayanan was categorical that it made no difference to India’s position. Asked whether there were any scenarios where he felt India might regret the B-word, the NSA said no. “Frankly, we don’t see the reference to Balochistan as something culpatory, that there is something we are doing.” Mr. Gilani brought up the subject and this was mentioned in the statement. “Now whether we should have put out a complete rebuttal in the joint statement — well, it is a joint statement and it becomes difficult sometimes to put all these things down.”

Asked whether he would rather the reference wasn’t there, the NSA replied: “I don’t think it makes much of a difference. Well, if it was not there, probably somebody could not even mention it ... But they mention it all the time anyway.” Pakistani leaders keep telling all the foreign dignitaries they meet that India is involved in Balochistan, he said. “They’ve made it a point to say our consulates in Afghanistan are involved in Balochistan and Waziristan. So it’s not as if they haven’t been saying these things.” India, he said, is very clear. “We are not involved in Balochistan. Not because of anything else, but because it just doesn’t make sense … to do the kind of thing that the Pakistanis accuse us of — putting a few bombs here, bursting something else. So somebody can always use it, to say, ‘Oh, there is some reference to Balochistan.’ But so what”? Mr. Narayanan added that “most of the western intelligence agencies who have the capabilities know we are not involved there.”

The NSA attributed the progress Pakistan had made so far in investigating the Mumbai case to American pressure. Asked if he’d expected Islamabad to do as much as it had, he said, “We didn’t. But we knew that if the Americans leaned on them, they would. And, therefore, most of our effort at the high level, at least from my side … was primarily to get them to lean on the Pakistanis.” India knew that whatever it said or did, the Pakistanis would do little. “I think the Americans certainly helped a lot… Since their nationals were also killed, [we told them] this was as much an attack on you as it is on us.” Thanks to the FBI and CIA, he said, “the Pakistanis were more forthcoming in accepting some of the basics.” But he said he did not expect them to go any further on the investigative front. “They’ve done just enough to take the heat off them from the West. I think that’s where we are.”

Acknowledging that sections of the Pakistani establishment had begun recognising the threat terrorism posed to Pakistan itself, Mr. Narayanan expressed concern about the fact that only the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and its allied groups were being seen as a problem across the border and not the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. “Of course, we don’t what Pakistan to become a fundamentalist state — but what is our primary interest? That we do not want another group to come out of Pakistan and attack us. And that will come from the Lashkar, Jaish and so on. And nothing has happened. We’ve seen no evidence of any of that. And if the information that is coming our way is any index, there’s been little let up on this. Of course, some sections [of the Pakistani establishment] will be concerned about the growth of fundamentalism and extremism, but this is not translating into taking action against what I would call the ‘Punjab group’ which is basically attacking us.”

Pakistan was approaching the threat posed by terrorist groups from a “purely military standpoint,” the NSA said. “And the military takes them item by item. ‘Which is the group that is our main enemy now? The main enemy is the TTP and those groups involved in Swat, Waziristan, FATA etc. This other group is not causing us trouble. There is no evidence of any LeT attack [against us]’. Of course, umbilical connections between all these groups are emerging. In a more orderly society, I think they would say, let’s nip it in the bud before it becomes a problem in the Punjab, which is the real heartland of Pakistan. But we’ve seen no evidence of this. I can’t say whether they are thinking about this. We can only go by actions.”

The NSA was dismissive of Pakistan’s latest request for India to provide information about the terrorist threats the Prime Minister spoke about recently. Laughing, he said, “It’s kind of like telling the robber where the jewels are, literally, I mean, if you tell them how we come by this information, what the source is!”

He said that at this time “it is very difficult to engage in this.” India’s principal aim was “not to assuage Pakistan’s concerns” but to ensure something does not take place on its soil. The joint anti-terror mechanism had been a “leap of faith” on the part of the Prime Minister but it collapsed soon after it was set up. Mr. Narayanan said not all intelligence came from “deep penetration sources.” A lot of information about terror threats came from electronic intercepts by India, the U.S., Britain and others. “Now, to say the Pakistanis alone have never been able to intercept anything of this kind and something has [to be shared], you see, it puts a big question mark on the bona fides to say, please share it with us. Now whatever we have shared in the past, nothing has happened.”

Reminded about the Sharm el-Sheikh statement’s reference to sharing real time, credible information about threats, Mr. Narayanan said India “will provide real time information but it is part of an intent.” If relations improved and India saw Pakistan taking action against the LeT and JeM, it could pass on information. But in any case, the expectation from the joint statement is that each country would inform the other about threats emanating from its territory, the NSA clarified. “If something is happening on their soil, who should be having that information? It’s that country’s intelligence agencies who should be monitoring this and passing on the information to us. And if we have information about something going to take place in Pakistan, we should be sharing it with them. That is what is real time [sharing]. For India to tell Pakistan, ‘We believe someone is going to attack us,’ is really not the intention. They are supposed to pass on to us real time intelligence, that ‘We understand something of this kind is going to happen, please take precautions, please take necessary care’.”

NSA: India doesn’t need another nuclear test

Says K. Santhanam's claims about ‘fizzle’ will increase international pressure on India to sign CTBT ...





30 August 2009
The Hindu

NSA: India doesn’t need another nuclear test
Says claims about ‘fizzle’ will increase international pressure on CTBT

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: Describing India’s commitment to its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing as “steadfast”, National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan on Saturday came down hard on those making a case for the resumption of testing by claiming the May 1998 thermonuclear device test had been a failure.

In an interview to The Hindu, the NSA described the man at the centre of the current controversy --- former Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) scientist, K. Santhanam --- as “a bit of a maverick” who had no locus standi to comment on the measurement of the test yields despite being the DRDO’s point-person at the Pokhran test site in 1998.

Asked whether Mr. Santhanam’s claims had undermined the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent because this was the first time Western doubts about the yield of the 1998 test had been echoed by a DRDO insider, Mr. Narayanan said: “First and foremost, DRDO has nothing to do with [this aspect of the] tests, frankly, whatever plumage they may like to give themselves. The measurements are not done by DRDO”.

Citing the “authorised and proven measurements” of yields done by Anil Kakodkar and S.K. Sikka from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, he said nobody had really questioned their conclusions. “If those who were involved come forward and say, ‘I have looked at the measurement and these are the mistakes’ that would be different. If Santy says, ‘I have an independent set of measurements about the tests’, let him come forward”, Mr. Narayanan said, referring to Mr. Santhanam by his nick-name. Western analysts had been questioning the Pokhran-II tests because “they don’t want to recognise that we are a nuclear weapon power, particularly that we are capable of a fusion device”, the NSA said. “Now if Santy honestly believed that there was something about it, he should have said so [then], not 10 years later.”

Mr. Narayanan said that Mr. Santhanam’s statement would lead to increased international pressure on India on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), even though U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had publicly declared that Washington had no right to make demands on Delhi until it had itself ratified the treaty. “I think we are going to face pressures from the international community. They don’t know Santy … I mean, he is extremely bright but he is a bit of a maverick in these matters! But the international community is going to say that this is one of India’s very devious methods of preparing for a test, that [our] scientists are saying that was a fizzle, therefore India may find it necessary to prove itself once again. This is my worry. I hope it doesn’t happen”.

Anticipating a “new rash of [statements] saying India should not test”, Mr. Narayanan said, “In any case, our decision not to test has nothing to do with this. We have a voluntary moratorium. At the moment, our people feel that we don’t need a test. I suppose that’s where we are”.

Asked whether he could think of a situation where India might want to resume nuclear testing in the absence of a deterioration in the international security environment, the NSA said, “As of now, we are steadfast in our commitment to the moratorium. At least there is no debate in the internal circles about this”.

No view on CTBT yet

But if that were the case, did the Manmohan Singh government stand by the formulation first advanced by Atal Bihari Vajpayee as Prime Minister in September 1998 --- that India would not stand in the way of the CTBT entering into force? Throughout the world, that statement was understood to mean India would have no problem signing the treaty if the others whose ratification is required for the CTBT to enter into force --- especially the U.S. and China --- did so. Mr. Narayanan
ducked a direct response. “I think we need to now have a full-fledged discussion on the CTBT. We’ll cross that hurdle when we come to it”.

'Fizzle' claim for thermonuclear test refuted

Back up charge with scientific evidence, says government’s top scientist ...



28 August 2009
The Hindu

'Fizzle' claim for thermonuclear test refuted
Back up charge with scientific evidence, says government’s top scientist

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: The government on Thursday strongly refuted claims that the 1998 test of a thermonuclear device had been a failure, with Principal Scientific Adviser R. Chidambaram telling The Hindu that those questioning the tests yield had an obligation to back up their charge with scientific evidence.

He was responding to the recent statement by a former defence scientist, K. Santhanam, that “the yield in the thermonuclear device test was much lower than what was claimed.” Mr. Santhanam, who cited only unspecified “seismic measurements and expert opinion from world over,” went on to say that this was the reason India should not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The stated success of the second generation nuclear device tested on May 11, 1998, was questioned at the time by a number of Western seismologists who said the seismic signatures detected by them were at variance with the claimed yield of 45 kilotons. Although the controversy subsided somewhat once scientists from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre — which designed the weapon — published their scientific evidence, it is likely to be reignited once again since Mr. Santhanam represented the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) team at the Pokhran-II tests and is the first member of that group to echo the arguments of those who say the thermonuclear device failed to work properly.

“If Mr. Santhanam has any scientific data to back up what he has claimed, I am sure BARC scientists would be more than happy to debate it,” said Dr. Chidambaram. “Without that, this kind of statement means nothing.”

In a 2000 article, 'The May 1998 Pokhran tests: Scientific aspects', republished in 2008 with some updated details, in a French journal, Atoms for Peace, Dr. Chidambaram has argued that western seismologists who under-estimated the Pokhran yields did so because they did not take into account the geological structure at the Indian testing range. They also failed to appreciate that India’s weapons designers purposely went for lower yields because the shots had to be fired in existing shafts which could not be dug any deeper for fear of detection. Higher yields, then, would have caused damage to nearby villages and also led to the possible venting of radioactivity.

Dr. Chidambaram wrote that the thermonuclear device tested was “a two-stage device of advanced design, which had a fusion-boosted fission trigger as the first stage and a fusion secondary stage which was compressed by radiation implosion and ignited.” He said the argument that the secondary stage failed to perform is belied by post-shot radioactivity measurements on samples extracted from the test site which showed significant activity of sodium-22 and manganese-54, both by-products of a fusion reaction rather than pure fission. “From a study of this radioactivity and an estimate of the cavity radius, confirmed by drilling operations at positions away from ground zero, the total yield as well as the break-up of the fission and fusion yields could be calculated.” Based on this, he said, BARC scientists worked out a total yield of 50 +/- 10 kt for the thermonuclear device, which was consistent with both the design yield and seismic estimates.

As for the sub-kiloton tests of 0.3 and 0.2 kt of 13 May 1998, which the International Monitoring System for verifying CTBT compliance failed altogether to detect, he said “the threshold limit for seismic detection is much higher in, say a sand medium than in hard rock; the Pokhran geological medium comes somewhere in between” and so it was not surprising these two tests did not show up on the IMS.

“Let someone refute what we have written, then we can look at it,” said Dr. Chidamabaram, adding that he was yet to see a published critique of BARC’s scientific assessment by any laboratory-based scientist abroad.

A former senior official of the erstwhile Vajpayee government confirmed to The Hindu that there had been differences of opinion between BARC and DRDO scientists after the May 1998 tests, with the latter asserting that some of the weapons tests had not been successful. The internal debate was complicated by the fact that the DRDO experts, including Mr. Santhanam, were not privy to the actual weapon designs, which are highly classified. But the issue was resolved after a high-level meeting chaired by Brajesh Mishra, who was National Security Advisor at the time, in which the BARC experts established that DRDO had underestimated the true yields due to faulty seismic instrumentation. And the radioactivity analysis provided the clincher.

Since 1998, whatever his private reservations might have been, Mr. Santhanam appears to have stuck closely to the official line in his public pronouncements.

On the fifth anniversary of Pokhran-II, for example, he said in an article in Outlook that “the asymmetry with respect to China stands largely removed” thanks to the 1998 tests. Since China was a proven thermonuclear power at the time and India was not, it is hard to reconcile this optimistic assertion with the scientist’s current claim that the thermonuclear device India tested was “a fizzle.”

Similarly, in June 2007, Mr. Santhanam declared on CNN-IBN on a programme about the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in which this correspondent was also a participant: “After May 1998, there was a clear declaration from India that we don’t have to conduct any more nuclear tests. India should not have any problem legalising this position. But this is subject to the condition that if the international security condition changes, then we should be allowed to test."

The diminishing of Indian democracy

Jaswant may be right or wrong about Jinnah but the BJP’s intolerance towards different interpretations of the past compromises its future and the country’s as well.








21 August 2009
The Hindu

The diminishing of Indian democracy

Siddharth Varadarajan

At the best of times, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s line and manner of comportment have borne scant resemblance to the norms of democracy. But for India’s principal opposition party to expel one of its seniormost leaders for nothing more than having written a book establishes a new low in our political discourse.

Jaswant Singh’s expulsion and the Gujarat government’s shocking decision to ban his book, Jinnah: India, Partition, Independence, have revealed the undemocratic core of the BJP’s politics and diminished the stature of Indian democracy as well. That the book is a work of historical analysis pertaining to events which occurred more than 60 years ago and not a critique of the BJP’s policies or ideology is symptomatic of both Hindutva’s own authoritarianism and the new intolerance that is permeating every aspect of social and political life in India. That the book has almost certainly not been read in its entirety or even partially by all or even some of the BJP leaders who voted unanimously to expel Mr. Singh is testimony to the mob mentality which prevails at the highest levels of the party. Seventeen years ago, the party took part in the demolition of an ancient mosque in Ayodhya. Today, it is taking its political vandalism one step further, into the realm of ideas, by declaring as heretical — and even criminal — the writing of history that does not conform to its own narrow views.

To be sure, the malignancy of intolerance runs deeper in our body politic than most of us would like to admit. If Chief Minister Narendra Modi is able to ban a book simply because it allegedly contains “objectionable remarks” against Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and reaches “whimsical conclusions” about the Freedom movement, this is because other parties and other state governments have banned works of history on grounds that were equally capricious. In 2004, the Congress-NCP coalition in Maharashtra imposed a ban on James Laine’s scholarly biography of Shivaji. This after goons, who obviously had the protection of the state establishment, had vandalised the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute in Pune where Professor Laine had done some of his research. Elsewhere in India, uber-regionalists, hyper-nationalists and religious fanatics pose as self-appointed guardians of literary, historical or religious icons and threaten violence on authors, playrights, actors, artists, poets and musicians who do not conform to their hagiographic standards. The slightest deviation from the norm in representation or analysis is treated as blasphemy, defamation. And, in the absence of the rule of law being properly enforced, writers and cultural workers are forced to appease their extremist detractors.

The first BJP leader to fall foul of the lakshman rekha of independent thought was, ironically, L.K. Advani. In 2005, he was attacked for painting a picture of the founder of Pakistan that contained shades of grey rather than the usual black and white. Under pressure from the RSS, Mr. Advani was forced to backtrack, moving a political resolution on Jinnah that effectively recanted his earlier characterisation of the Muslim League leader as ‘secular’. Today, his back to the wall for having led the BJP into electoral defeat twice in a row, Mr. Advani is in no mood to provide succour to Mr. Singh. When hands went up in Shimla to expel his intellectual fellow-traveller, the BJP’s Prime Minister-in waiting dutifully joined in. If revolutions are said to devour their children, counter-revolutions sometimes end up consuming their prophets.

Of course one can fault Mr. Singh for being a willing part of the politics of intolerance all these years. Perhaps he did not realise in 1992 that the clubs which rose to obliterate a part of Indian history would one day be raised against the very idea that there could be multiple histories. Perhaps he did not foresee then that those who destroy mosques are equally capable of banning books.

The Jaswant Singh affair is first and foremost an oracle for the atrocious state of affairs in the BJP but it also forces us to ask: Can Indian democracy survive without the freedom to think and write? Can it flourish without the right to question and interrogate received wisdom? Can it be vibrant without being able to take irony, humour, irreverence and even a bit of disrespect in its stride? The individual fate of Mr. Singh need not detain us here but the manner and basis for his expulsion will further circumscribe the arena for debate and discussion within and between political parties. And if the Gujarat government’s ban on his book is allowed to prevail, it will have a chilling effect on a wide range of academic and cultural endeavours across the country.

Indian signals on Nepal peace process are mixed

Prevarication on integration of Maoist combatants into Nepal Army should end ...


19 August 2009
The Hindu

NEWS ANALYSIS
Indian signals on Nepal peace process are mixed

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: As India welcomes Madhav Kumar Nepal on his fist visit as Prime Minister of the Nepali Republic, its policymakers find themselves grappling with two contradictory impulses.

Having contributed in no small measure to the manner in which the crisis over the unsuccessful sacking of Nepal’s erstwhile army chief unfolded last May, New Delhi feels obligated to send out a strong message of support for the man upon whose shoulders the burden of being Prime Minister fell following the resignation of Maoist leader Prachanda. But India also knows that the current political arrangement — with Maoists in the Opposition and the ruling coalition weighed down by infighting, nepotism and sloth — is unlikely to meet the stipulated May 2010 deadline for the country’s new constitution to be written.

New constitution

Strongly backing Mr. Nepal today, then, makes sense only if it is part of a plan to help his government take the kind of statesmanlike decisions the young republic sorely needs if it is to keep its tryst with destiny.

Nepal’s interim statute provides for an additional six months to finalise the new constitution in the event of a national emergency.

But if elections are delayed, the increasing distrust and bitterness between the Maoists and its two smaller political rivals, the Nepali Congress and the Unified Marxists-Leninists, could well push politics into free fall. Once that happens, the peace process — under which the Maoist insurgents gave up their armed struggle in exchange for integration into a democratised national army — might well be imperilled.

Having led their parties into electoral defeat last April and refused to allow a new leadership to rectify things organisationally, NC and UML bosses would be quite happy to see the writing of the constitution delayed and elections postponed. A section of the Indian establishment also believes the current stalemate is good, primarily because it thinks this will cause a split in the Maoists. That is why New Delhi, which initially underwrote the peace process, has, of late, been sending negative signals to key stakeholders in Kathmandu on the one issue which lies at the root of the crisis in Nepal: integration.

Combatants waiting for integration

Nearly 20,000 combatants from the People’s Liberation Army have been living unarmed in cantonments for the past three years waiting for integration into Nepal’s army and paramilitary forces.

Six months ago, there was consensus on the principle of integration. The only debate was over whether PLA combatants would enter the Nepal army unitwise or individually. Of course, the Nepal army brass opposed integration and did their best to block it.

That is why the erstwhile Prachanda government made the sacking of General Rookmangad Katawal an issue on which it was prepared to quit. Since then, however, the discourse on integration has become more opaque.

Integration was an essential part of the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Maoists and the government, but senior NC and UML leaders are saying this cannot now happen.

Civilian supremacy

Delaying or preventing integration is a double-edged sword. It keeps Maoist cadres out of the Nepal army but it also prolongs the existence of the PLA as a standalone force. India needs to counsel the Nepal government and brass that an integration process which involves a limited number of PLA soldiers will not alter the “professional” nature of the army.

At the same time, the army itself needs to be democratised to bring its ethos and structures in line with the aspirations of the new republic. And there cannot be any ambiguity in a democracy about the supremacy of a duly elected government.

Enshrining the principle of civilian supremacy in the interim constitution is something no political party can have a serious objection to. And that may well be all that is required to get the Maoists back on board. Once that is done, the process of writing the constitution and integrating the PLA can be pushed simultaneously so that by May 2010 both tasks are over.

Trust deficit between Maoists and India

One obstacle in the way of such a compromise is the huge trust deficit between the Nepali Maoists and the Indian government. The Maoist leadership squandered most of the goodwill it had built up in New Delhi by not delivering on its assurances and promises. And the Indian side also made mistakes. Prachanda and his colleagues need to introspect but India can ill afford to stand on ceremony.

The unravelling of the Nepal peace process may not mean a return of the Maoist insurgency. But it will lead to the fragmentation of Nepal’s polity in ways that will be harmful to India’s interests.

Rather than wait for that to happen, New Delhi must offer all the help it can to enable the Nepali political parties to complete their peace process.

And it can do no better than to stop sending negative or mixed signals on integration.

Madhav Kumar Nepal: ‘Let the Maoists sit in opposition’

“Integration of combatants will be based on letter and spirit of past agreements” ... In an exclusive interview to The Hindu on the eve of his first official visit to India as Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, Madhav Kumar Nepal spoke at length about the problems the peace process is facing. The interview took place at his official residence in Kathmandu on August 16. Excerpts...



18 August 2009
The Hindu

‘Let the Maoists sit in opposition’

Siddharth Varadarajan

In an exclusive interview to The Hindu on the eve of his first official visit to India as Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, Madhav Kumar Nepal spoke at length about the problems the peace process is facing. The interview took place at his official residence in Kathmandu on August 16. Excerpts:

You are coming to India at a time when there is great uncertainty surrounding both the fate of the peace process in Nepal and the task of writing a new constitution. Yet you have been saying you want to discuss major new projects like Pancheshwor with New Delhi. What exactly is on the agenda?

The visit is basically a goodwill one… There is a new government in India after the elections and there is a new government here in Nepal too. So we have to discuss issues of mutual interest. Basically the task is to build up relations to a new height.

So you are not looking for progress on any one issue? You agree that talking about big projects seems unrealistic.

Yes, the current stage is not so conducive because there are lot of problems inside the country. The Maoists, now they are out of government, are creating many hurdles here. But we are hopeful things will come to a proper position. In the meantime, we have to do something that will be beneficial for Nepal. That’s why we have a plan to develop our hydropower potential to the maximum extent and for that we need foreign investment, cooperation with India on these matters. The same is true about tourism. India with a huge population, Hindu population, has a religious touristic destination in Nepal. Apart from that, there is a huge trade deficit between Nepal and India. We have to find ways to reduce that deficit. So there are many issues that need to be pushed ahead properly.

It is the view of many that the peace process cannot proceed unless serious efforts are made to bring the Maoists back in, to form a national government. Your party leader, Jhalanath Khanal has been saying this. But others in the UML and Nepali Congress speak differently. Do you feel it is important to reach out to the Maoists and find a way of bringing them in?

We need to address the serious concerns and sensitivities of the Maoists but we cannot fulfil all their demands and aspirations. They still have an insurgent mindset, extreme left ideological remnants in their minds. Until and unless they get rid of all these ideological dogmas and all kinds of nondemocratic and undemocratic thinking, it will be very difficult to address their concerns.

But what they are asking for is only a debate in the Constituent Assembly. What is undemocratic about that?

They are demanding that the President’s step [rejecting the dismissal of former army chief Rookmangad Katawal] should be discussed in parliament. We have a provision in our constitution that there cannot be any debate on the president’s decisions. We have to abide by that. If they believe the president acted against the constitution, there is a provision to move an impeachment motion in parliament. That is the proper way. But they don’t dare to do that. Rather they want to discuss some other resolutions there, hoping this will divide the house and they will benefit, or embarrass the president and will put moral pressure on him. As Prime Minister, how can I allow others to embarrass the president there? He cannot go there to defend himself. So how can it be allowed?

But even in an impeachment motion, he cannot go there and defend himself. It seems as if you are raising a procedural objection when your objection is more political. The Maoists essentially want a discussion on civilian supremacy. This can easily be separated from Katawal and the President’s decision and an agreement reached on the core principle. If there is a will to solve this and bring the Maoists back in, surely it is not difficult to come up with a compromise solution in terms of procedure.

This is linked to the intention of the Maoists. We don’t see any good intention of the Maoists on this. We have been insisting that whatever has happened has already been passed, so let’s look for future. We can have a discussion among political parties and a task force can be created to look at what is the system in other countries, how relations between the president and prime minister are and how civilian supremacy is legally and constitutionally managed, and then come out with some recommendations.

Also, whatever is needed to assure the Maoists can be done. They were asking to see General Katawal retire smoothly. That was done. There were these rumours about him extending his term, keeping him as adviser to president, etc. But he is not there any more. So we have taken positively their concerns and addressed them.

The danger is the longer the stalemate persists, the harder it will be for the CA to finish writing the constitution.

Yes, I do feel that. But once the door is opened, the Maoists may have another demand raised! So we are not fully convinced that they have only one demand before us. We had an agreement that they would cooperate in the budget session but they have gone back on it. This shows the extremist line is dominating in the Maoist party. And we should not just bow down before that extreme left opinion.

Recently NC leader Girija Prasad Koirala said the Maoists could meet the same fate as the LTTE. Some people here are talking about a ‘Sri Lanka type solution’ of all-out war. Don’t you think such comments further vitiate the atmosphere and should be avoided?

I don’t have any comment on this. Whether he has and why he has mentioned this, [Mr. Koirala] may have his own opinion I can’t defend, nor contradict it.

Where do you stand on the issue of integration? Do you support the integration of a portion of combatants of the Maoist Peoples Liberation Army in the Nepal Army as was agreed? And by when must this be done?

First, we must resolve the peace process and among all the remaining issues, the situation of combatants in the cantonments needs to be completed, resolved. The cantonments must be closed before we finalise the constitution. That is very clear. Without resolving completely the issue of combatants in the cantonments, we cannot decide finally the constitution. Second, how to resolve the issue of combatants? This must be done as per the agreement and understanding among the parties. Whatever agreement is there between Maoists and government, and the other political parties, that must be respected by all. So the government will respect the letter and spirit of whatever is written there. If there is clear mentioning of integration in the army, then that must be done. If it is written combatants should be integrated in the security forces, then this requires more elaboration and clarification.

What do you think the agreements say?

I have not gone deeply into it.

But you helped draft those agreements. You know what is written!

When the issue will come up… but I have made it clear, whatever is written, we will implement.

The problem is there are so many interpretations and this is fuelling mistrust. The Indian ambassador [Rakesh Sood] has given his own interpretation that there should only be “integration into society”, not army. Mr. Koirala and K.P. Oli say no integration. So will your line prevail or that of Mr. Koirala and Mr. Sood and Mr. Oli?

All these discussions should take place in the special committee. That is the proper place. But the Maoists are creating hurdles there.

But you are insisting on being the chair.

Because I am the PM. Also, remember, they are the party whose combatants need to be properly managed. It doesn’t seem proper if they should take the chair of the committee. It will smooth the way to do all things properly if I am there, if a third person takes charge of running the committee. This will help the Maoists.

I come back to the issue of trust deficit. Recently, you said 5000 PLA soldiers could be integrated in the Army. Then you backtracked. People say this was after some generals came to see you.

No army generals up to now came to me and asked anything. In those comments, I had just mentioned what [Maoist leader] Prachanda had told to me about how many PLA combatants should be integrated in the Army.

How worried are you about the law and order situation in the Tarai? There are said to be more than 100 armed groups operating.

I am worried. Our government has made a plan to deal with it properly. We have to distinguish between criminal groups and those that have political ideology behind them. The latter need to be brought in ambit of peace process. As for those groups which are criminal, they must be dealt with sternly. Abductions, killings, extortion, don tendencies should not be tolerated. And we need the cooperation of India.

One of the complaints Indian officials had about Prachanda when he was prime minister was that they felt he was trying to play the ‘China card’. What is your assessment of his foreign policy?

I think we should not play any cards against others.

Is that what you think Prachanda was doing?

I can’t say about him, it is not good that I should just raise any charges against him. But our policy should be transparent and clear. We don’t like to see any activities inside Nepal against our neighbours. And we don’t have to play against each other. We have to take our neighbours into confidence. We are real and genuine friends of India and Nepal cannot have a peaceful environment until it takes the confidence of all neighbours. So we don’t have to play Chinese card against India and Indian cards against China. Why do that? This would be a very sectarian and short-term strategy. It is not good.

So equidistance would also be your approach?

I don’t think mentioning the word equidistance will be good. We have to take maximum advantage of our geographic location. Nepal borders India from three sides. What we can achieve from India cannot be achieved to that extent from China. But we have to keep in mind Nepal is an independent, sovereign country. The sentiment and patriotism of the Nepali people should be taken into account. Otherwise there are people who can create controversies and rumours against friendly countries.

Does India take Nepal for granted? Your visit will be the umpteenth by a Nepali prime minister to Delhi. But the last time an Indian Prime Minister paid an official bilateral visit to Kathmandu was I.K. Gujral in 1997.

The political instability here may be one of the reasons. And we may not have tried hard enough to invite friendly country prime ministers to come. So we have to think about that. We have to see the visits should be reciprocal.

If there is a possibility of forming a national government to complete the peace process with Maoist participation or even leadership, would you be prepared to give up power?

This government is supported by 22 parties and they are part of the government. If it is possible, the Maoists should enter into this alliance or join the government. But Maoists are reluctant. They are willing to be in opposition. That is ok, if they have that sort of desire, they can sit in opposition. It need not be a worry that they are not in the government. My government has the support of a comfortable majority and we should not worry. 22 parties have agreed on a common minimum programme. So why all this talk about a national government? We have to accept the rules of the game. That if you have the majority, you form the government. And we have the majority. Earlier, they were in the government because they had a majority. So my government is a national government. It is not an anti-national government or semi-national government. It is a full-fledged national government. The Maoists should accept it. They should not have this pain in their heart that they are outside of government. This is of their own doing. This opposition phobia should not be there.

India not fixated on Saeed, wants action on terror

New Delhi has followed policy of flexible containment since November 2008 ... Fate of any one individual cannot serve as an “acid test” of Pakistan’s commitment...






7 August 2009
The Hindu

India not fixated on Saeed, wants action on terror

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: Contrary to the demands of the Opposition and a section of the media, the government does not believe the fate of any one individual can serve as an “acid test” of Pakistan’s commitment to act against the perpetrators of last November’s terrorist attacks in Mumbai.

But senior officials acknowledge the line they are walking is a fine one, demanding that Islamabad act against high profile terror propagandists like Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Hafiz Saeed while not allowing the future course of Indian engagement with Pakistan to be narrowly tied to his status alone.

In the fog that has enveloped Indian politics post-Sharm-el-Sheikh, however, such subtleties tend to get lost on the UPA government’s critics.

On Tuesday, Opposition MPs cited a newspaper headline —“Saeed trial acid test for Pakistan: Krishna” — to demand that the government not agree to talks at any level with Islamabad until Saeed has been punished. The BJP asserted, on the basis of the same newspaper report, that the views of the External Affairs Minister differed from the contents of last month’s India-Pakistan joint statement and that the government should clarify which was correct. Had they read beyond the headline, of course, they would have seen that nowhere in the story did S.M. Krishna actually refer to the case against Saeed or any other individual as an “acid test,” let alone a precondition for the Foreign Secretary-level talks that the Sharm-el-Sheikh statement provides for.

Senior officials say the demand for such acid tests is simplistic and runs counter to the policy of flexible containment New Delhi has followed since November 2008. The government, they say, has been careful not to tie itself down to a narrow metric for measuring the degree to which Pakistan is taking action against terrorist groups operating from its soil. This ambiguity allows India the option to keep pressing Pakistan to do more than it has done at any point in time while keeping a window open for calibrated normalisation when it is clear that Islamabad may be unwilling or unable to neutralise all or some of its assets.

Dismantling terror

According to South Block sources, what New Delhi wants is action against the planners and perpetrators of the Mumbai attack and credible action by Islamabad to ensure that Pakistani territory is not used by terrorists to strike India. In practical terms, this means first disabling and then dismantling the infrastructure of terror that was developed as an instrument of military policy by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies over two decades. By all accounts, Saeed occupies an important spot in that infrastructure and Indian officials would like to see him put out of commission. Though they concede this is unlikely to happen, insisting on action serves as a deterrent to the LeT which might fear an increase in international pressure on Islamabad in the event of another attack. But if insistence is turned into a precondition, the strategy runs the risk of going down a dead-end.

Even if Islamabad fails to deliver on the Saeed front, the Indian side believes the proper and sustained prosecution of the LeT’s Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi and Zarrar Shah would ultimately affect the ability of Saeed and all Pakistan-based terrorist handlers to run operations. Effective immunity and the presumption of official patronage have been the primary drivers behind the ability of jihadi organisations to recruit cadres. If that immunity were to disappear, even if for LeT foot soldiers, a crack in the terrorist infrastructure would have been effected.

Hillary visit over, U.S. says it backs ENR ban on India

State Department’s “press guidance” was never publicised in India ...




5 August 2009
The Hindu

Hillary visit over, U.S. says it backs ENR ban on India

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: A day after Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reversed U.S. policy by telling a press conference here last month that “clearly we do not” oppose the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology to India, the State Department quietly issued a “press guidance” contradicting her remarks.

But curiously, the guidance was never publicised in India, where America’s attempts to block ENR sales at the G8 and NSG had triggered a huge political controversy and where the confusion caused by her remarks was the greatest.

“U.S. policy on restricting transfers of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology, equipment and facilities has not changed,” the State Department noted on July 21 in guidance made available to The Hindu on August 4, one day after The Washington Times first reported the existence of this clarification.

“We support the policy set forth in the recent G8 summit non-proliferation statement to implement on a national basis strengthened controls on such transfers,” the guidance noted, adding: “Efforts by the U.S. and members of the G8 to restrict transfers of ENR technology are not aimed at India, or any other country, but reflect our global non-proliferation efforts. Efforts by the G8 to restrict transfers of ENR technology are independent of our civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India and in no way diminish our strong commitment to fully implementing the agreement.”

The guidance also clarified that in mentioning the U.S. agreement with India, “the Secretary was referring to the fact that the United States has granted India advanced consent to reprocess U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel.”

In fact, Ms. Clinton had made no reference to reprocessing spent fuel. “We have just completed a civil nuclear deal with India,” she said on July 20. “So, if [the transfer of processing and enrichment technology] is done within the appropriate channels and carefully safeguarded, as it is in the case of India, then it is appropriate.”

Although the U.S. is the prime mover behind the G8 ban and the NSG proposal to exclude non-NPT signatories from ENR transfers, the latest State Department guidance is the first time Washington has publicly acknowledged its support for the anti-India move.

Since existing NSG guidelines prohibit all nuclear transfers, including ENR items, to non-NPT signatories, the new ENR-specific rule will only affect India which otherwise enjoys a blanket waiver from the NSG’s restrictions.

Listen to me on NPR on India, Pakistan and the U.S.

KUOW in Seattle, a part of the National Public Radio network in the U.S., interviewed me, Ahmed Rashid and Arif Jamal for a programme on "Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and Islamic Extremism"...

29 July 2009
KUOW.ORG
Download and Listen here

Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and Islamic Extremism

07/29/2009 at 9:00 a.m.

Journalist Ahmed Rashid says that the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan has resulted in "an unstable and nuclear armed Pakistan, a renewed al–Qaeda profiting from a booming opium trade, and a Taliban resurgence and reconquest." What do a resurgent al–Qaeda and Taliban look like? How are they related? Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travelled to India last week. What does the conflict between India and Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir have to do with the troubles in Afghanistan? We'll try to untangle the relationships between Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.

Guest(s)

Siddharth Varadarajan is a journalist with the Hindu, India's leading English–language newspaper. He joins us from Dehli, India.

Ahmed Rashid is a Pakistani journalist based in Lahore. He writes for the Daily Telegraph, The Washington Post, The International Herald Tribune, The New York Review of Books, BBC Online and The Nation. His books include "Jihad," "Taliban," and "The Resurgence of Central Asia." He frequently appears on NPR, CNN and the BBC World Service. Rashid's latest book is "Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia."

Arif Jamal is a Pakistani journalist based in Islamabad. He is a contributing writer to The New York Times and is currently a fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights policy at Harvard. He has written for The Pakistan Times, The News, Radio France International and the CBC. His book is "Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir."

The CNN-IBN debate on the PM's Pakistan speech

I took part in a debate on Rajdeep Sardesai's show on CNN-IBN the night Prime Minister Manmohan Singh addressed Parliament on his Pakistan policy. The other participants were Arun Jaitley, Leader of the Opposition in the Rajya Sabha, and Nasim Zehra, the senior Pakistani journalist, on the phone from Islamabad...

8:30-9:00 PM - 30 July 2009
CNN-IBN

The video links are in seven parts: Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 Part 4 Part 5 Part 6 Part 7

And the summary as put out by the channel is below...

Keep talking but force Pak to act against terror

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Wednesday defended his government's foreign policy in after a prolonged attack by the Opposition in Parliament. Manmohan said that India had to carry on dialogue with Pakistan and severing talks with Pakistan was not an option.

He also gave out details of the 34-page dossier where Pakistan has agreed to the involvement of terror groups based on its soil in the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack and has given details of its investigation including the arrest of those Lashkar-e-Toiba leaders Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi and Zarar Shah.

He also referred to Atal Bihari Vajpayee's efforts to make peace with Pakistan while defending the Indo-Pak joint statement and repeatedly stressed that zero tolerance policy on terror was still on.

He once again stressed no composite dialogue will take place unless Pakistan acted on terror but Pakistan's word must be trusted and the Opposition must allow the government to verify Islamabad's actions.

His answer to the contentious line on Balochistan was, however, far from convincing for the Opposition with Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Lok Sabha MP Yashwant Sinha slamming the government and asking why was there such a difference in interpretation of the statement.

Sinha warned that Balochistan would return to haunt India in the future. Even Janata Dal (United) clamed that there was a divide between the government and the Congress party on the issue and said that India was under pressure from the US during talks with Pakistan at Sharm-el-Sheikh.

Senior BJP leader Arun Jaitley, Associate Editor of The Hindu Siddharth Varadarajan, former diplomat KC Singh, Pakistani political analyst Naseem Zehra and Pakistan's Ambassador to the UN Abdullah Hussain Haroon joined CNN-IBN to discuss the Indo-Pak joint statement issued at Sharm-el-Sheikh.

Has Prime Minister successfully explained how terror is delinked from talks with Pakistan?

Prime Minister has said that meaningful talks with Pakistan can only take place when terror infrastructure is dismantled. It seems that the de-bracketing of terror talks from composite dialogue has been successfully answered.

Arun Jaitley claimed that there was no consistency in what the Prime Minister had said in Parliament and added that mere statements could not be the basis of foreign policy.

“I have no problem with what the Prime Minister said in Parliament but the problem is that what the Prime Minister said is completely inconsistent with the joint text which is the written word that the Government of India has signed. International relations are governed by joint text and not by unilateral statements made in your own country. The document says dialogue is the only way forward. It them goes on to say that action against terror cannot be linked to composite dialogue... the two have to be de-bracketed, which means that there is a change of policy. My problem is that you give emphasis to dialogue with terror contrary to the January 6, 2004 document that was dialogue without terror. The present document is dialogue irrespective of terror,” said Jaitley.

“According to me the Prime Minister has made a unilateral statement which is not connected to the document. The statement made today s runs counter to the written commitment of the Government of India. The joint text is loaded against us - be it Balochistan, be it terror,” he said.

Siddharth Varadarajan agreed with Jaitley’s assessment but pointed that that the joint statement served the interests of both India and Pakistan

“Jaitley is right in pointing to inelegant drafting of joint statement. But that inelegant drafting was deliberate because it allowed both India and Pakistan to walk away with interpretations which satisfies their domestic audiences. The Prime Minister has said that Pakistan does not have to wait for the composite dialogue to begin to act against terror. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousf Raza Gilani said last week that whatever Manmohan Singh has said on the floor of the House is what we agreed to at Sharm-el-Sheikh,” said Varadarajan.

So the problem seems to be in drafting and not with the interpretation.

Jaitley once again took potshots at the statement.

“I think a charitable explanation would be incompetence... a realistic interpretation would be that the policy has changed and that they are not bold enough to admit to the country that 'yes we did change the policy',” said Jaitley.

However, Varadarajan claimed that there would be no composite dialogue till Pakistan acted against terror.

“This is not about the language of the statement. The practical consequence is embodied in its very last paragraph where it says that the foreign secretaries will meet and the foreign ministers will meet. It is very clear that there is no resumption of composite dialogue and the Prime Minister has clarified this. Gilani when he was asked in Sharm-el-Sheikh that does this mean that composite dialogue will resume essentially said that he hopes that it does,” he said.

Pakistani political analyst, however, harped on the fact that India and Pakistan had not stopped talking even in the aftermath of the war in Kargil.

“There are two things. One, in the last decade Pakistan and India's experience has been that dialogue is really the tool that helps us deal with most of the problems. Even terrorism is being dealt with this tool called dialogue. Your Prime Minister has made it clear that we are not going to abandon dialogue. On the other hand Pakistan-India relations cannot basically move towards any fruitful cooperation unless and until unless security related issue which is of terrorism is addressed whether we are talking about Kashmir, Mumbai or Balochistan. Within weeks of Kargil, Brajesh Mishra and Pakistan's senior Foreign Ministry official Tariq Fatmi met in Geneva, which means BJP too recognises that dialogue is crucial when there is a problem,” said Naseem.

Manmohan Singh said that when Vajpayee took peace initiatives the Congress then in Opposition supported the government. But now the foreign policy consensus seems to be breaking down.

“In principle dialogue is really the way forward. Engagement with Pakistan would be necessary but you have to decide at what level the engagement would go on. But the question is will this dialogue go on with the condition that Pakistan will bring down terror and not allow its territory to be used or irrespective of the Pakistani attitude the dialogue will go on. We want a dialogue without terror. The document that Manmohan Singh and Gilani have signed does not reflect the foreign policy consensus in India,” claimed Jaitley.

Will Balochistan haunt Manmohan Singh in dealing with Pakistan?

Varadarajan pooh-poohed the idea saying nothing of that sort will happen.

“It is much ado about nothing. The absence of Blaochistan before the joint statement did not prevent Gilani in raising it vociferously in Sharm-el-Sheikh. Tomorrow if Pakistan has evidence they will raise it and we will discuss it. If you are involved and foolish enough to leave evidence then it will be raised. If you are not involved and there is no evidence why worry about any discussion,” said the veteran journalist.

Jaitley was sceptical and said that Balochistan would be a sore point for India.

“That is too simplistic an explanation. The reference to Balochistan is not for nothing. Words are not put into joint text, which do not carry any meaning or purpose. When Prime Minister said Pakistan is also a victim of terror he brought Pakistan at parity with India. At Sharm-el-Shiekh the Prime Minister went as a victim of terror and came back virtually saying that India is the perpetrator of terror as far as Balochistan is concerned,” said Jaitley.

Has Manmohan Singh carried forward Vajpayee's legacy?

Singh said during the debate in Parliament that if "sworn enemies like Iran and US can think of starting to talk why not Pakistan and India". He also said that "it is time to trust Pakistan and that's what Vajpayee did and I am following that legacy".

Jaitley was once again quick to punch holes in the argument.

“There is not much of difference except one point. It is good to follow Vajpayee legacy and to work towards dialogue with Pakistan. But must you delink dialogue with terror? Must we have dialogue with terror or must we have dialogue without terror? To accept in writing that we can have dialogue with terror is not Vajpayee legacy,” said the erudite lawyer.

Varadarajan pointed out that Vajpayee has agreed to resume talks on mere verbal assurances by Pakistani leadership that its territory won’t be used for launching attacks against India.

”Let us set aside Sharm-el-Shekih and take the bull by the horn. At Islamabad on January 6, 2004 prime minister Vajpayee agreed to resumption of dialogue on nothing other that promise from president Prevez Musharraf that his territory would not be used for terrorist attacks against India. Musharraf said that his action against dialogue would be based on a sustained and productive dialogue. He was linking the two. This statement is an improvement on that. Secondly why do we forget that Pakistan has gone the farthest than it has ever gone in acknowledging that its territory has been used by terrorists. This is a major concession. Whether they follow through and successfully prosecute the big fish remains to be seen. But it would be churlish on our part not to recognise that and not to build a policy based on that reality,” he said.

A confident Manmohan creates space for flexible response

The Prime Minister's speech in Parliament on Wednesday on Pakistan and terrorism was one of the finest I've seen him make... I can't say he has brought complete clarity to a policy that is still contradictory and confused but he has opened up room for the government to be more flexible and innovative in the months ahead. And given the hysterical response which greeted Sharm el-Sheikh, that is no mean achievement...

30 July 2009
The Hindu

NEWS ANALYSIS

A confident Manmohan opens space for flexible response

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: The Prime Minister’s authoritative statement in Parliament on relations with Pakistan accomplished the impossible: answering hardline critics in India fearful of the resumption of dialogue while not compromising the domestic credibility of his potential interlocutors across the border or hurting the prospects for peace between the two countries.

In being equally mindful of his Pakistani audience, Manmohan Singh was returning a favour to Yusuf Raza Gilani. Soon after his Sharm el-Sheikh meeting, the Indian Prime Minister had told Parliament the joint statement’s reference to delinking action on terror from the composite dialogue process did not mean talks would automatically be resumed. Rather than publicly join issue, the Pakistani Prime Minister had graciously told reporters — much to the consternation of hardliners there — that “whatever [Dr. Singh] said on the floor of the House ... is what we agreed.”

That is why Dr. Singh was careful to emphasise on Wednesday the need for India to make sincere efforts to live in peace with Pakistan, to reach “an honourable settlement of the problems between us,” to keep channels open. “Unless we want to go to war with Pakistan, dialogue is the only way out,” he asserted at the end of his speech, “but we should do so on the basis of ‘trust but verify’.”

Despite feverish media speculation about the Congress having washed its hands of his latest initiative, Dr. Singh spoke with the full backing of the Treasury benches as he rebutted the Opposition’s charges and defended the joint statement of July 17. If proof was needed of how effective his intervention on Pakistan was, BJP MP Sushma Swaraj, who rose to question him as soon as he had finished speaking, provided it. Ms. Swaraj, who only last week had referred to the joint statement as “shameful”, kept quiet on the subject this time around, asking only for clarifications on the government’s stand on climate change and reprocessing.

In the fullness of time, Dr. Singh’s response to the debate will be seen as a potential game changer in India’s official discourse on Pakistan, especially his emphasis on the inevitability of engagement, his clarity on the fact that the alternative to dialogue was war, his fear that the absence of direct talks with Pakistan would allow foreign powers to get involved in the region to India’s detriment, and his recognition of the need to strengthen Pakistan’s civilian leaders.

On all these points, the Prime Minister is far ahead of the “national mood” that retired diplomats and generals still fighting the battles of the past have created on our TV channels. Of course, as far as the here and now is concerned, Dr. Singh stressed that the only practical agreement in Sharm el-Sheikh had been for the two foreign secretaries and foreign ministers to meet. The composite dialogue, he said, would have to wait.

But if there is going to be no immediate change of policy, the Prime Minister was also keen to emphasise the significance of Pakistan admitting for the first time that its territory had been used for terrorist acts against India. This, he reminded the Opposition, was more than the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government had managed to achieve. Recounting the setbacks like Kargil, the Kandahar hijacking and the terrorist attack on Parliament which followed the NDA’s peace initiatives in Lahore and Agra, Dr. Singh nevertheless praised Atal Bihari Vajpayee for the courage he had shown as Prime Minister in not giving up the quest for “permanent peace.”

He was also generous enough to acknowledge that the Pakistani dossier on Mumbai, handed over before Sharm el- Sheikh, had allowed India to move forward because it showed Islamabad had begun to act against some of the terrorists involved. Of course, the dossier “showed progress, though not adequate progress” in addressing India’s concerns and he hoped Islamabad would do more.

It is clear that resumption of dialogue is very much on the horizon but India will calibrate the pace of engagement to the degree to which Islamabad moves ahead on its commitments to act against terror.

Through his intervention, however, the Prime Minister has steered the bilateral relationship away from the dead-end to which the Opposition’s arguments would have sent it and created room for the government to be more flexible in its approach.

Missing the wood for the trees on Pakistan

Pakistan’s response to Mumbai may not be good enough, but delaying dialogue will not produce a better outcome for India ...

29 July 2009
The Hindu

Missing the wood for the trees on Pakistan

Siddharth Varadarajan

When Manmohan Singh explains his government’s policy towards Pakistan to Parliament on Wednesday, the worst thing he can do is to disown, downplay, retract or resile from the joint statement he issued with Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani in Sharm el-Sheikh on July 17.

So irrational and poisonous has the Indian debate on the joint statement become that the Government is today under enormous psychological pressure to declare Sharm el-Sheikh a mistake. The Congress party is tongue-tied and a junior minister for external affairs unwisely sought refuge in the irrelevant plea that the text the Prime Minister had agreed to is not a legal document. The implication is clear: Sharm el-Sheikh may be a sell-out, but the sale deed is not legally binding so don’t worry.

What the opposition’s noise and government’s poor salesmanship have done is reinforce the idea that the current Indian policy of not talking to Pakistan --- in place since the Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 2008 --- is working fine and that there is no need for any change or adjustment. This is unfortunate. For, in the run up to Sharm el-Sheikh, Dr. Singh was bold enough to recognise the policy had already yielded the most it could. And that it was time to prepare the ground for change.

The idea that not talking is a good strategy is based on four myths, all of which are deeply flawed.

Myth #1: The Composite Dialogue benefits Pakistan and is bad for India.

Four rounds of composite dialogue have been completed and the fifth was under way when the Mumbai attacks happened. Progress has been modest in some areas like trade and CBMs, negligible in others like the Kashmir dispute and terrorism. But the achievements are not insignificant: An MoU to increase the frequencies, designated airlines and points of call in either country of air services; an agreement for trucks from one side to cross the border up to designated points on the other side at the Wagah-Attari border; an increase in frequency of the Delhi-Lahore bus service; an MoU between the Securities and Exchange Board of India and Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan; completion of the Joint Survey of Sir Creek and adjoining areas; agreement on consular access; implementation of CBMs with a view to enhancing interaction and cooperation across the LoC such as increased frequency of Muzaffarabad -Srinagar and Rawalkot-Poonch bus service, intra-Kashmir trade and truck service.

Of these, Sir Creek and cross-LoC CBMs are especially significant. Resumption of Composite Dialogue would lead to the Sir Creek issue being settled quickly, allowing both India and Pakistan to finalise their exclusive economic zone claims under the Law of the Seas convention. And measures could be taken to increase bilateral and cross-LoC trade. The Jammu Traders Association, for example, would like the current weight restriction on trucks to be increased from 1.5 tonnes to 10 tonnes. Traders on both sides also want the two governments to improve communications and banking facilities, which are virtually non-existent. It is hard to imagine why India would want to delay agreement on these kinds of issues.

Myth #2: Stopping the composite dialogue will protect India from further terrorist attacks.

The biggest fear the Congress party and Prime Minister Singh have as they move towards the resumption of dialogue with Pakistan is the political consequences of another major terrorist strike. The fear is justified. But not talking will hardly reduce the capability or intention of Pakistan-based terrorists. And to the extent to which talking may make Islamabad’s cooperation in fighting terror more likely, dialogue may even reduce the chances of a major terrorist strike. Of course, the truth is that the Pakistani government and military are unable to prevent terrorist attacks on their own soil. Even if India had full confidence in Islamabad, it would be foolish for any Indian government to rely on anything other than homeland security to protect itself. Too often in the past, a hardline stance vis-à-vis Pakistan was seen as a substitute for toning up and professionalising the Indian police, intelligence and security apparatus. And the country paid a heavy price.

Myth #3: Stopping the Composite Dialogue helps India put pressure on Pakistan to take action against terrorism.

Within the Pakistani establishment, the military and the ISI are least enthusiastic about the resumption of composite dialogue. As are the various terrorist groups and their sympathisers. Indeed, hardliners in Pakistan are critical of the civilian government for appearing as if it is desperate for talks with India. It is this military-intelligence-jihadi nexus which has been the most vocal about India’s alleged involvement in Balochistan. That is why Mr. Gilani was anxious to take back from Sharm el-Sheikh some proof of the fact that he had raised the Balochistan issue with Dr. Singh.

Myth #4: Pakistan has “not done anything” to bring the perpetrators of Mumbai to book

Time will tell how serious Islamabad is about prosecuting the Lashkar-e-Taiba men it has charged for their role in the Mumbai case, and whether the ‘big fish’ like Zaki-ur-Lakhvi or Zarrar Shah are convicted or just LeT footsoldiers. But more than the fate of the individuals involved, India has reason to feel satisfied Pakistan has accepted in writing that the crime was hatched and executed from Pakistani soil. This is more than any Pakistani government has ever done in the past and it would be churlish to deny this reality. That said, given the manner in which power in Pakistan is fragmented, it is unlikely that the system there will go any further than it already has in meeting India’s post-Mumbai concerns, at least for now. If the consensus in India is that Pakistan has “not done enough”, then the country should be prepared for a long period during which there will be no dialogue, and bilateral relations will slowly deteriorate.

The joint statement

As far as the Sharm el-Sheikh statement is concerned, there is no doubt that better, more careful drafting was needed. A crucial sentence therein --- “Action on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these should not be bracketed” --- can be read two ways.

But even if India now says this does not mean the dialogue process should be delinked from Pakistani anti-terror actions, the sentence’s second, more direct meaning --- that those actions should not depend on the dialogue process --- is a definite improvement over the Islamabad joint statement of January 6, 2004. There, the operational paragraphs were: (i) India saying the prevention of terrorism would take forward the dialogue process, (ii) Pakistan assuring India it would not permit its territory to be used for terrorism, and (iii) Pakistan emphasising that “a sustained and productive dialogue addressing all issues would lead to positive results”.

It is clear that this reference to “positive results” was in relation to Pakistan’s commitments on terrorism. In other words, the Islamabad statement implicitly linked Pakistan’s actions on terror to “a sustained and productive dialogue addressing all issues”. To that extent, Sharm el-Sheikh is an improvement, though what matters at the end of the day are actions and not words

On Balochistan, Sharm el-Sheikh was not the first time the situation in the Pakistani province became an issue in the bilateral relationship. On December 27, 2005, the Ministry of External Affairs made the internal situation there a foreign policy concern: “The Government of India has been watching with concern the spiralling violence in Balochistan and the heavy military action, including the use of helicopter gunships and jet fighters by the Government of Pakistan to quell it. We hope that the Government of Pakistan will exercise restraint and take recourse to peaceful discussions to address the grievances of the people of Balochistan”, it said.

Islamabad hit back the same day, with its foreign ministry spokesperson rejecting the Indian statement as “unwarranted and baseless”. The statement was “tantamount to meddling in internal affairs”, the spokesperson said, adding, “India often shows an unacceptable proclivity to interfere in internal affairs of its neighbours”. Next, the Pakistani spokesperson made a comparison with Kashmir: “The statement is all the more surprising from the spokesman of India, a country that has long tried to suppress the freedom struggle of the Kashmiri people…”

Having made Balochistan a bilateral issue in such a public manner, India can hardly object to a Pakistani prime minister raising it in a summit meeting or linking it to Kashmir.

History will pass judgment on the wisdom of allowing a reference to the rebellious province in the joint statement. But what matters most is not the reference but the reality. If Indian agencies are not involved, no ‘Kasabs’ will ever be found and Pakistan will get little traction from raising the B word in bilateral or international forums. But if an Indian Kasab is ever found there, the absence of a reference to Balochistan in a joint statement will provide New Delhi no protection from the charge of involvement. The Prime Minister said India has nothing to hide. There is no reason to imagine he was whistling in the dark.

The bottom line behind India-U.S. 3.0

In between lobbying for American arms sales and nuclear reactor parks, Hillary Clinton spent barely two hours out of five days in official discussion with her Indian hosts...



24 July 2009
The Hindu

The bottom line behind India-U.S. 3.0

On July 8, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described India as an “emerging” global power. Ten days later she dropped the adjective, India’s entry on the world stage coinciding with her own moment of arrival on Indian shores. Ms Clinton was well advised. There is nothing the Indian elite likes more than having its great power ambitions stoked in this manner. But along with great flattery comes greater responsibility. And having declared India wort hy of global power status, American commentators have been breathlessly asking whether the country is “ready” to step up to the plate and play ball. “India wants to be seen as a major world power,” a New York Times editorial noted condescendingly. “For that to happen, it will have to drop its pretensions to nonalignment and stake out strong and constructive positions.”

The purpose behind Ms Clinton’s visit was twofold. First, to build new structures of engagement that might bring Indian thinking on major global issues like climate change, trade and disarmament in line with the “strong and constructive positions” the U.S. takes and away from the alternative consensus India is trying to build at different forums like BRIC, IBSA, G-20, G-77 and NAM. This she did by proposing a strategic dialogue consisting of “five pillars,” ranging from non-proliferation and climate change to trade, investment and agriculture. The second purpose was transactional: how to translate the strategic partnership with India into commercial gains for American businesses.

On both counts, Ms Clinton’s five-day visit was an unqualified triumph. The new strategic dialogue architecture was unveiled, and a strong foundation laid for nuclear and military sales. Both sides pretended to exchange views on burning international issues. But with barely an hour set aside for her official meeting with External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna, it is obvious that Ms Clinton was not particularly interested in hearing what her Indian hosts had to say on Iran and other subjects. Especially since she had already heard the one thing most important to her — end use.

Setting aside the publicly and privately expressed reservations of its armed forces, the United Progressive Alliance government agreed to an end use monitoring (EUM) agreement providing for the physical verification of defence items purchased from the U.S. None of India’s major defence suppliers imposes such a condition, though of course it may welcome the opportunity to do so in the future now that the country has shown a willingness to open its doors. India also gave in to the U.S. request to identify the two nuclear parks where American-supplied reactors will be installed. This at a time when Washington is attempting to renege on its commitment to facilitate full civil nuclear cooperation with India by getting the Nuclear Suppliers Group to introduce an NPT-only rule for the sale of enrichment and reprocessing items.

Much has been said about how the U.S. insists on EUM arrangements with all its defence customers and that India cannot expect to be given a waiver from a requirement that is embedded in American law. Chapter 4.5.7 of the Pentagon’s Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) spells out the EUM condition for foreign military sales: “Sales and assistance may be made to countries only for purposes of internal security, legitimate self-defense, for preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of the means of delivering such weapons, civic action, or regional or collective arrangements consistent with the United Nations (UN) Charter, or requested by the UN… Proper use of U.S.-origin items is a joint responsibility of the recipient and U.S. personnel. U.S. representatives have primary responsibility until items are physically transferred to the recipient. The recipient then assumes this responsibility, based on agreements under which transfers are made, including transfer to a third party or other disposal or change in end-use.”

As the CAG discovered during his scrutiny of the Jalashva (formerly USS Trenton) landing dock ship India bought from the U.S. a few years ago, American weapons contracts come not just with potentially intrusive inspections but also with a “legitimate self-defence” end use requirement whose interpretation is bound to be contingent on wider political equations. For example, Israel has used U.S.-supplied aircraft and munitions in nakedly aggressive acts against its neighbours countless times but Washington has never held these to be a violation of the self-defence condition. But tomorrow, if India uses an American-supplied jet for an anti-terrorist operation outside its borders that the U.S. does not approve of, the end-use language of SAMM 4.5.7 may well be invoked against New Delhi. The Trenton was sold to enable India to deploy troops for humanitarian missions in the region that the U.S. may be unable or unwilling to undertake. If India tries to use it for “offensive” purposes, however, it may well have to contend with U.S. protests.

Every country that sells arms abroad does so for commercial gain. Many countries also use arms sales as a tool of foreign policy. But only the U.S. uses these sales as a tool of military policy as well. Arms transfers help build interoperability. And they also help shape the way the receiving military operates. What is on offer, therefore, is not an off-the-shelf sale but a comprehensive package whose components are not available for cherry picking. After the EUM agreement will come the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and a Logistics Supply Agreement (LSA). It is not a coincidence that almost all of America’s customers for advanced military hardware are either formal alliance partners, major non-Nato allies or client states, none of whom has a problem with providing U.S. inspectors access. Before it plunges headlong into a closer military relationship, India needs to carefully consider what this entails.

Part of the problem has to do with mistaken assumptions and flawed understandings in India of what its strategic partnership with the U.S. involves. India assumes that American interests and strategies in the region are congruent with its own. India also believes a strategic partnership means the Americans will understand and share its concerns and priorities on most big issues and, at a minimum, not act against Indian interests wherever there are divergent views. For the U.S., on the other hand, the partnership is all about shaping India’s choices and priorities. It is about ensuring that India does not bandwagon with other rising powers. And acting against Indian interests (as it is now doing at the G8 and NSG) is not seen as a contradiction. That is why Indian apprehensions about President Barack Obama’s commitment to the strategic ties established by George W. Bush were so misplaced. This partnership helped open the doors of nuclear commerce for India but also led to a number of Indian doors being opened for the American side. Surely it would be most un-American for the new administration to not seek entry.

If India-U.S. 2.0 was all about laying the groundwork for cooperation in a variety of fields, India-U.S. 3.0 is where Washington gets to cash in. The U.S. intends to ensure that India honours the Letter of Intent it gave last September promising to place orders for nuclear reactors capable of generating at least 10,000 MW of electricity. The American arms industry — which lobbied hard for the passage of the nuclear deal through Congress — also intends to collect. And the Pentagon, which, in many ways, spearheaded Washington’s outreach to India in the 1990s and again after 9/11, would like to ramp up military-to-military cooperation using common equipment as a springboard.

In the weeks before the Hillary visit, U.S. officials not only worked out the agenda that was to be covered but also announced their intentions loud and clear. It is not a coincidence that the “five pillars” were identified not in the joint Indo-U.S. statement but in a separate “fact-sheet” issued by the U.S. embassy. Sadly, very little of this ideation and articulation took place on the Indian side. If India had a positive, proactive agenda of what it hoped to get out of the visit, this was kept a tightly guarded secret. Certainly, there was no public expression of it. When difficult issues arose in the public domain — like the attempt by the Obama administration to get the G8 to ban ENR sales to India — these were ducked and a senior Minister fielded to tell Parliament that the government was not unduly concerned.

India’s engagement with the U.S. is one of the most exciting and challenging aspects of the country’s foreign policy today. But unless this high-stakes game is handled properly, with planning, foresight and determination, it could well turn out to be dangerous.

ISI chief to India: talk to us, we make policy too

New Delhi will only respond to request made by Pakistani government...

23 July 2009
The Hindu

ISI chief to India: talk to us, we make policy too

Nirupama Subramanian and Siddharth Varadarajan

ISLAMABAD/NEW DELHI: Days before Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart Yusuf Raza Gilani met in Egypt, the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence floated a suggestion that India deal not just with Pakistan’s civilian government but also directly with its Army and intelligence agency.

Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha made the out-of-the-box overture during a meeting earlier this month with the three Indian defence advisers representing the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force attached to the Indian High Commission in Islamabad, The Hindu has learnt.

The sit-in at Lt. Gen. Pasha’s office in Rawalpindi on July 3 took place entirely at his initiative, though it was ostensibly convened in response to a request made by the Indian High Commission “years before.” It is normal for defence advisors attached to various diplomatic missions in Islamabad to seek and be granted calls on the ISI director-general — a wing of the ISI is the co-ordinating agency for them — but Indians have rarely had an audience.

During their discussion, Lt. Gen. Pasha and the defence advisors did not refer to the Mumbai attacks or the investigations into it, either on the Indian or Pakistani side. Nevertheless, senior officials in Delhi saw the interaction as an attempt by the ISI to “reach out” to India in the run-up to the Sharm el-Sheikh meeting of the two Prime Ministers.

The Hindu has learnt that during the course of the extremely cordial meeting, Lt. Gen. Pasha came clean in stating that the ISI and the Pakistan Army were involved in framing Pakistan’s India policy, along with the Foreign Office. He made the oblique suggestion that India deal directly with these three institutions if it had a similar three-way mechanism.

In their effort to understand the genesis of this idea, Indian officials sought to establish whether the ISI chief — who has a reputation for speaking his mind freely — had merely made an off-the-cuff remark or was floating a trial balloon after consultations with all other “stakeholders” in the Pakistani establishment.

Ministry of External Affairs officials asked Pakistan’s High Commissioner to India Shahid Malik about the ISI chief’s suggestion, but the envoy was unaware that the meeting had even taken place. This led the MEA to conclude that the Pakistani foreign office may not be in the loop.

Asked about the July 3 meeting last week, Mr. Malik confirmed to The Hindu that it took place but said he was unaware of what was discussed. Major-General Athar Abbas, the Pakistani military spokesman, said he had no knowledge of the meeting. Officials at the Indian High Commission in Islamabad also refused comment.

Highly placed South Block officials told The Hindu that India is not averse to talking to the Pakistani military or the ISI even as it engages with the civilian government but there were two problems with the suggestion. First, any proposal to open new lines of communication must come from the Pakistani government. And second, the power structures in India and Pakistan cannot really compare with each other.

Although Prime Minister Singh and Prime Minister Gilani agreed the ISI chief could come to India in the immediate aftermath of last November’s terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Islamabad quickly backtracked. Since then, no formal proposal for interaction between the ISI and an Indian intelligence agency has been made. Indeed, Mr. Gilani told reporters at Sharm el-Sheikh that the question of an intelligence chiefs’ dialogue did not come up in his meeting with Dr. Singh, a fact confirmed by Indian officials.

But apart from form, it is the question of structure that poses an obstacle. “The Research & Analysis Wing operates within the law and is subordinate to the government,” a senior intelligence official told The Hindu. “There, the government is subordinate to the ISI, which is a law unto itself.”

South Block officials said the Indian High Commissioner and his officers could and should be in touch with the Pakistani army and intelligence chiefs. “But I wonder what would be the point of the Indian Army Chief talking to his Pakistani counterpart … their job definitions are so different.”