Modi's 'action-reaction' quote

After taking on some apologists for Narendra Modi on Twitter, I realised the limitation of the 140 character limit for responses. These guys will probably never be satisfied... As I tweeted, Modi apologists are like Holocaust deniers, who say Hitler didn't kill the Jews but they sure deserved to die. For the Modi apologists, their hero didn't say the post-Godhra massacres were a 'reaction' but they believe the Muslims who got killed in 'reaction' had it coming anyway.

Anyhow, for what it's worth, I am posting an excerpt from my 2002 book where the action-reaction quote is given. As a bonus, I am including the section on Atal Bihari Vajpayee's appalling Goa speech that year, also the subject of disinformation and redaction by embarrassed BJP sympathisers...

Except from Chapter 1, ‘Chronicle of a Tragedy Foretold’ by Siddharth Varadarajan. In Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy, ed. Siddharth Varadarajan (Penguin, 2002)

From Golwalkar to Newton

When one examines the politics of the RSS and BJP today, it is striking to see the manner in which the arguments of Golwalkar and Savarkar about Muslims and Christians as ‘foreigners’ and ‘enemies’ resonate in the pronouncements and activities of these organizations. There is a clear line which connects the founding principles of the RSS to the mass killing of Muslims in Gujarat. Golwalkar’s obsession with a purely Hindu nation in which non-Hindus would have no rights, the ‘Newtonian’ rationalizations of genocidal violence provided by Narendra Modi, and Prime Minister Vajpayee’s sweeping attack on Muslims in his speech to a BJP meeting in Goa in April are all part of the same chauvinist discourse.

At its Akhil Bharatiya Karykari Mandal meeting in Bangalore in mid-March, 2002, the RSS adopted a controversial resolution titled ‘Godhra and After’ in which Muslims were cautioned that they would only be safe in India if they won the ‘goodwill’ of Hindus. By ‘Hindus’, of course, was meant the RSS. ‘Let Muslims realise that their real safety lies in the goodwill of the majority’, the resolution stated. It added, ‘The reaction of this murderous incident in Gujarat was natural and spontaneous. The entire Hindu society cutting across all divisions of party, caste and social status reacted.’56 Elaborating on the resolution, RSS joint general secretary Madan Das Devi told the press, ‘Hindus live and let live. This does not mean Hindus can tolerate insults. They (Muslims) are safe if they win our goodwill . . . respect us and we will respect you.’ Asked to explain the real meaning of what he was trying to say, Devi said, ‘Any killing is unjustifiable but at the same time there will be reaction to any action.’57 In similar vein, BJP president Jana Krishnamurthy told the press during the party conclave in Goa, ‘In any communal strife, there is always one who provokes and another (who is) provoked.’ Strongly implying that the attacks on Muslims were provoked, he criticized the media and others for ‘advising and attacking the provoked. This has given rise to a psychology amidst the provoked that it is the victim in every sense’.58

The first use of this morally perverse ‘Newtonian’ logic of action and reaction to justify the killing of Muslims after Godhra was made by Modi in an interview to Zee Television on 1 March, even as the violence was at its peak. And ironically, it wasn’t so much a reference to the burning of the Sabarmati Express as to press reports that former Congress MP Ehsan Jafri—who was lynched by a Sangh Parivar-led mob at his residence in Chamanpura, Ahmedabad on 28 February—had fired at the mob in order to try and disperse them. Modi said that Jafri’s ‘action’ of firing had infuriated the mob and that the massacre which followed was a ‘reaction’. Since his remark generated a huge controversy59 and led the Gujarat information department to deny that he had said any such thing, it is worth reproducing his exact quote: ‘Kriya pratikriya ki chain chal rahi hai. Hum chahate hain ki na kriya ho aur na pratikriya. (What is happening is a chain of action and reaction. What I want is that there should be no action and no reaction).’ Asked about the violence which erupted throughout Gujarat on the day of the VHP-sponsored bandh, he said:

Godhra mein jo parson hua, jahan par chalees mahilaon aur bacchon ko zinda jala diya, is mein desh mein aur videsh mein sadma pahunchna swabhavik tha. Godhra ke is ilake ke logon ki criminal tendencies rahi hain. In logon ne pahele mahila teachers ka khoon kiya. Aur ab yeh jaghanya apraadh kiya hai jiski pratikria ho rahi hai. (It is natural that what happened in Godhra day before yesterday, where forty women and children were burnt alive, has shocked the country and the world. The people in that part of Godhra have had criminal tendencies. Earlier, these people had murdered women teachers. And now they have done this terrible crime for which a reaction is going on).60

Apart from being a crude attempt to deflect criticism of his failures as chief minister, Modi’s ‘action-reaction’ theory is also morally repugnant. As Vir Sanghvi has argued, ‘What Mr Modi and his ilk are really saying is this: Because the riots were a response to a horrific and immoral act at Godhra, they are somehow less morally reprehensible . . . But cause-and-effect cannot be a moral philosophy. You cannot whitewash an event, wipe away somebody’s guilt or provide moral justification by pointing to the cause of their behaviour.’61

Steeped in the RSS teachings of historical enmity between Hindus and Muslims and unencumbered by the formal trappings of political office, VHP leader Ashok Singhal took Modi’s Newtonian logic one step further. For him, the situation in Gujarat was ‘a matter of pride.’ ‘It is a befitting reply to what has been perpetrated on the Hindus in the last 1,000 years . . . Gujarat has shown the way and our journey of victory will begin and end on the same path.’62 The VHP’s Pravin Togadia held out another direct threat. ‘Wherever there is Godhra, there will be Gujarat’, he said. ‘In Gujarat, for the first time there has been a Hindu awakening and Muslims have been turned into refugees. This is a welcome sign and Gujarat has shown the way to the country.’63 Togadia’s inflammatory statement was formalized by the VHP later in a resolution adopted at a conference in Hardwar at the end of June where Muslims throughout India were warned that Gujarat could be repeated and that they could all be driven into refugee camps.64

In 1939, Golwalkar had argued that ‘only those movements are truly “National” as aim at re-building, revitalising and emancipating from its present stupor, the Hindu Nation. Those only are nationalist patriots, who, with the aspiration to glorify the Hindu race and Nation next to their heart, are prompted into activity and strive to achieve that goal. All others are either traitors and enemies to the national cause, or, to take a charitable view, idiots.’65 It was left for senior BJP leader and spokesman J.P. Mathur to take this logic forward and describe the killing of Muslims in Gujarat as a ‘patriotic reaction’ to what happened at Godhra. ‘I don’t know why the people and the media have been calling the violence in Gujarat riots. These are not riots, but the reaction of nationalist forces to the Godhra carnage . . . The so-called secular leaders like I. K. Gujral, Chandrashekhar, Sonia Gandhi, Mulayam Singh Yadav are also in league with the anti-national forces. Whenever nationalist forces come out to challenge the anti-national elements, these people come to the rescue of the Muslims,’ Mathur said.66 There is no ambiguity in Mathur’s statement, nothing is left to chance: Muslims are anti-national, those who attack them are nationalists.

When the Mask Slipped

Perhaps the most significant elaboration of the Golwalkar-Savarkar thesis of India as a Hindu nation beset by Muslim trouble-makers in recent times was that provided by Prime Minister Vajpayee in his speech to the BJP national executive meeting in Goa on 12 April 2002.67 The speech is remarkable for the manner in which it attempts to justify the murder of Muslim citizens in Gujarat by referring to Godhra and contrasting the supposed ‘traditional tolerance’ of Hindus with the alleged ‘intolerance’ of Muslims.

Like Golwalkar, who believed only Hindus were true Indians, Vajpayee uses ‘us’, ‘our’, ‘Hindus’ and ‘Indians’ interchangeably throughout his speech. He begins by making an observation about Hindu kingdoms in ancient Cambodia. ‘No king destroyed a temple or damaged the deities’ idols at the time of attacking another king. This is our culture. This is our outlook, which treats all faiths equally.’ India, he said, was secular before Muslims and Christians set foot on her soil. Once they came, they had freedom of worship. ‘No one thought of converting them with force, because this is not practiced in our religion; and in our culture, there is no use for it.’ Here, the Prime Minister was trying to contrast the ‘tolerance’ of Hindus and Hinduism, which he described as ‘our religion’, with the supposed intolerance of Muslims and Christians. The reference to the destruction of idols and conversion ‘with force’ is a standard part of the RSS arsenal. At the root of major incidents of violence, he said, was ‘growing intolerance’. Since Hindus are, by definition, tolerant, the obvious inference is that this ‘growing intolerance’ is on the part of the Muslims. Turning immediately to the burning issue of the day, he asked:

What happened in Gujarat? If a conspiracy had not been hatched to burn alive the innocent passengers of the Sabarmati Express, then the subsequent tragedy in Gujarat could have been averted. But this did not happen. People were torched alive. Who were those culprits? The government is investigating into this. Intelligence agencies are collecting all the information. But we should not forget how the tragedy of Gujarat started. The subsequent developments were no doubt condemnable, but who lit the fire? How did the fire spread?

Here, in as unsophisticated a fashion as Modi had stated it, we find Vajpayee presenting his own version of Newton’s Third Law. There is no remorse about the killing of hundreds of innocent people, no apologies for the failure of the government to protect its citizens. He makes no attempt to distinguish between the criminal perpetrators of the Godhra attack and the innocent victims of the ‘subsequent tragedy in Gujarat’. For him, Muslims are an amorphous, undifferentiated lot who collectively ‘lit the fire’. They were to blame, not his party men who took part in the ‘subsequent developments’.

Going from the specific to the general, Vajpayee then launched a frontal attack on Muslims. He asserts that ‘For us, the soil of India from Goa to Guwahati is the same, all the people living on this land are the same. We do not believe in religious extremism. Today, the threat to our nation comes from terrorism’. Who is this we and where exactly does this ‘threat to our nation’ come from? The Hindi text provides a clue. Vajpayee deliberately uses the Urdu word mazhabi for ‘religious’ (rather than the Hindi word dharmik) when he says ‘religious extremism’.68 We do not believe in religious extremism; it is the Muslims. And terrorism, of course, is synonymous with Islam, or ‘militant Islam’, as Vajpayee chose to put it. But having first made a distinction between militant Islam and tolerant Islam, he then makes a sweeping generalization about all Muslims:

Wherever Muslims live, they don’t like to live in co-existence with others, they don’t like to mingle with others; and instead of propagating their ideas in a peaceful manner, they want to spread their faith by resorting to terror and threats. The world has become alert to this danger.

The statement is classic hate speech, but after it generated a huge controversy, Vajpayee claimed his remarks were aimed not at all Muslims but only ‘militant Muslims’. The Prime Minister’s Office subsequently issued a doctored version of the speech in which the word ‘such’ was inserted between ‘Wherever’ and ‘Muslims live’. Many newspapers subsequently printed this version. It was not until a privilege motion was raised in Parliament—for Vajpayee had made the mistake of claiming on the floor of the House on May 1 that the doctored version of the speech was the true version—that he was forced to admit the word ‘such’ had been deliberately interpolated. However, he reiterated that ‘no one who reads my entire speech and takes note of the tribute I have paid to the tolerant and compassionate teachings of Islam, can be in any doubt that my reference . . . is only to the followers of militant Islam’.69

The allegation of Muslims not living in co-existence with others and not mingling with others is such a standard trope in RSS propaganda that Vajpayee’s claim of intending to refer only to militant Muslims does not seem very convincing. Earlier in his speech, he had equated militant Islam with terrorism. ‘Not mingling with others’ is a peculiar charge to level against terrorists. In any case, it was a bit odd for the prime minister to talk about terrorism and militancy as if they were the preserve of the adherents of Islam—especially at a time when his own Sangh Parivar was heavily involved in acts of terror in Gujarat. But there was a deeper level of dishonesty in the charge against Muslims, for it is precisely the policy of the RSS to ghettoize and isolate the Muslim community. As sociologist Dhirubhai Sheth has argued, it was not accidental that the Muslims who bore the brunt of the Sangh Parivar’s violence in Gujarat were those who chose to live in Hindu-majority areas. The communal killings in the state, he says, have exposed the dishonesty of the ‘Hindutvavadis’ who reproach Muslims for not entering the ‘national mainstream’ but then beat them back into their ghettos whenever they do emerge.70

In another attempt to soften the impact of his Goa remarks, Vajpayee told Parliament that he was as opposed to militant Hinduism as he was to militant Islam. ‘I accept the Hindutva of Swami Vivekananda but the type of Hindutva being propagated now is wrong and one should be wary of it.’ Having said this, however, he went back to square one by adding that although there were laws to deal with such an eventuality, he was confident no Hindu organization would become a danger to the country’s unity.71 In other words, only Muslim (or Christian or Sikh) organizations have the potential of endangering the country’s unity. After maligning Vivekananda—who never spoke of Hindutva but of Hinduism—Vajpayee went straight back to the teachings of Golwalkar and Savarkar.

Apart from reverting to the usual chauvinist line of the Sangh Parivar, Vajpayee was also diverting the debate into a dead end. The issue is not whether he personally opposes militant Islam or Hinduism but whether, as prime minister, he is prepared to defend the constitutional rights of all Indians. Regardless of his own views and beliefs, a prime minister cannot speak for only a section of citizens. Do the Muslims of Gujarat have the right to physical security? Is he prepared to punish those who have committed crimes regardless of their political or ideological affiliation? Rather than dealing with these questions, Vajpayee is trying to cover up his own political failure and culpability.

It is remarkable that Vajpayee’s first televised address to the country was only on 2 March—after the seventy-two hours of apparent freedom enjoyed by the Sangh Parivar in Gujarat expired—and even then, all he could do was appeal for calm and tolerance.72 In fact, his attempt to blame the ordinary people of Gujarat—and their supposed lack of ‘harmony’—for the mass killings in their state was a disingenuous manoeuvre aimed at absolving himself, his party colleagues and the state machinery they control, of any responsibility for the crimes. Like Rajiv Gandhi in November 1984 and Narasimha Rao in January 1993, Vajpayee will go down in history as a prime minister who preached the virtues of tolerance even as he turned a blind eye to the massacre of innocent citizens. Instead of using national television to tell the people of Gujarat that the genocidal mobs would be put down with a firm hand—and that policemen failing to protect the life and liberty of all would be punished—Vajpayee delivered a sermon on the need for religious sadbhavna.

There was little passion or feeling in what he said, no words of succour for the victims, no anger or opprobrium for the killers. He said the violence was a ‘black mark on the nation’s forehead’ but he couldn’t bring himself to say that retaliatory attacks on Muslims for what happened at Godhra would attract the same punishment as the burning of the train. Here was a violent disturbance that had made a mockery of State power as it is supposed to operate yet the prime minister issued no dire warnings to those who were challenging his authority and power as chief executive. In the US, President George W. Bush and his senior aides publicly warned citizens against attacking Muslims, Arabs and other immigrants following the World Trade Centre terrorist strike. In less than a year since 9/11, a man in Texas has been sentenced to death for the ‘retaliatory’ murder of a Sikh immigrant. To date, however, Vajpayee has yet to even publicly acknowledge that Muslim citizens of India were victimized in Gujarat or to threaten the attackers with the severest consequences.

Indeed, Vajpayee was later to demonstrate that he was so loyal to his party and Parivar that he didn’t mind undermining the majesty of the State and his own office. On 17 April, he said that if only Parliament had condemned Godhra, the subsequent massacres would not have happened. The fact is that he is leader of the House and could have ordered a discussion and condemnation of Godhra on the day it happened—instead of the scheduled presentation of the Budget. In early May, he made another curious statement, this time on the floor of the Rajya Sabha: That he had decided to remove Modi in April but didn’t act fearing a backlash in Gujarat. ‘I had gone to Goa making up my mind on changing the ruler in Gujarat but according to my own assessment, I felt that the change in leadership will only worsen the situation.’73 At the time, the only people opposed to a change in leadership were the RSS and VHP. Removing Modi may or may not have provided temporary relief for Gujarat’s beleaguered Muslims but it was odd for the prime minister to admit being held hostage to the threats of criminals and goons. ‘Vajpayee,’ wrote B.G. Verghese, ‘placed the diktat of the mob above his oath of office . . . the emperor has no clothes, stripped of the last shred of moral authority.’74

ENDNOTES
56 The full text of the resolution may be accessed at www.rss.org/reso2002.htm
57 ‘RSS asks Muslims to shun extremist leaders,’ Hindu, 18 March 2002; ‘Hindu goodwill key to Muslims’ safety: RSS,’ Hindustan Times, 18 March 2002.
58 Smruti Koppikar, ‘BJP chief reads riot act to Muslims,’ Indian Express, 13 April 2002.
59 ‘Blame it on Newton’s Law: Modi,’ Times of India, 3 March 2002.
60 Interview by Sudhir Choudhury, Zee TV, 1 March, 2002. Reproduced as Annexure 4A in the Editors Guild Report, p. 38. The denial issued by the Gujarat Government’s Directorate of Information on 3 March 2002 states, ‘The Chief Minister has never mentioned such Newton’s (sic) third law,’ and is reproduced in the Editors Guild report, pp. 73-4. But though Modi did not himself invoke Newton’s name when he spoke of action and reaction, his reference to the law was obvious.
61 Vir Sanghvi, ‘Gujarat: Cause and Effect,’ Hindustan Times, 21 April 2002.
62 ‘ISI hand in Godhra incident: Singhal,’ Hindustan Times, 6 May 2002.
63 Amita Verma, ‘VHP to test war on jihad in UP,’ Asian Age, 7 June 2002.
64 Hindu, 24 June 2002; Amar Ujala (Dehra Doon edition), 24 June 2002.
65 In We, or Our Nationhood Defined. p 44.
66 Onkar Singh, ‘Gujarat violence is patriots’ reaction to Godhra: Mathur,’ rediff.com, 3 May 2002. http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/may/03train.htm (Accessed on 20 June 2002)
67 The speech is reproduced unedited in the Appendix.
68 His exact words were ‘Hum mazhabi kattarta mein vishwas nahin karte’. The fact that mazhabi is the only Urdu word used in the sentence is not accidental. In Sangh Parivar literature and propaganda, whenever a positive reference to religion is made, the word used tends to be dharm, implying Hinduism; when the reference is negative, the word used tends to be mazhab. See M. Zeyaul Haque, ‘The Language of Hate,’ Milli Gazette, 1 June 2001.
69 The ruling by Lok Sabha Speaker Manohar Joshi on a privilege motion moved by Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi on 9 May, 2002, quotes the PM as admitting that the ‘video tape of his speech at Goa did not contain the word “such”.’ ‘Privilege motion against PM rejected,’ Hindu, 17 May 2002.
70 Dhirubhai Sheth, ‘Is dangey ko samajhne ke liye…,’ Rashtriya Sahara, 9 March 2002.
71 ‘PM wanted to sack Modi but feared reaction,’ Times of India, 7 May 2002.
72 ‘It’s a black mark, says PM,’ Hindu, 3 March 2002.
73 ‘PM wanted to sack Modi but feared reaction, Times of India, 7 May 2002. His remark in Parliament condemning Godhra was made at a public function to felicitate former PM Chandrashekhar. ‘A lesson or two for his teacher,’ Hindu, 18 April 2002.
74 B.G. Verghese, ‘Farewell to Rajdharma,’ Times of India, 23 May 2002

'Going to the media accentuates India, China differences'

The following is a partial, rush transcript of the part of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s press conference in Hua Hin, Thailand on Sunday dealing with India-China relations. The transcript was prepared by The Hindu's correspondent, Siddharth Varadarajan.

'Going to the media accentuates India, China differences'

The following is a partial, rush transcript of the part of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s press conference in Hua Hin, Thailand on Sunday dealing with India-China relations. The transcript was prepared by our correspondent, Siddharth Varadarajan.

Q: Did you raise the issue of Chinese incursions with Premier Wen?

Manmohan Singh: I had a frank and constructive exchange of views with Premier Wen, both during our formal meetings and during the gala dinner last night. We discussed all these issues and agreed that existing mechanisms for bilateral cooperation should be used to resolve all issues amicably in the spirit of the SCP. As you know, the Chinese foreign minister will be visiting India and the two foreign ministers will have an opportunity to discuss all issues which have bearing on our relationship.

The Premier and I reaffirmed the need to maintain peace and tranquility on the border pending a resolution of the boundary question. Both of us agreed that we should continue and strengthen efforts to build political trust and understanding.

Question: Will the Dalai Lama’s proposed visit to Arunachal Pradesh complicate India-China relations and make resolution of the boundary issue more difficult?

Manmohan Singh: Well, all I can say is that I explained to Premier Wen that the Dalai Lama is our honoured guest, he is a religious leader. We do not allow the Tibetan refugees to indulge in political activities, and that as proof of that, last year, we took resolute action at the time of Olympics when there were reports that some Tibetan refugees might disrupt the process. And that’s the position that I explained to Premier Wen.

Question: At the banquet last night?

Manmohan Singh: Yes.

Question: Were the Chinese convinced of your explanation on the Dalai Lama? is there any change in his plans to travel to Arunachal Pradesh?

Manmohan Singh: I am not aware of the plans of the Dalai Lama. I have explained this position to the Chinese leadership. We have also agreed that whatever outstanding issues there may be between us -- and there is the complex boundary question which cannot be wished away -- there are established government channels to exchange views on all these issues and one doesn’t have to, therefore, go to the media to accentuate or exaggerate the amount of differences that prevail. We both agreed that the boundary question is a complex question, that pending resolution of the boundary question we both have an obligation to maintain peace and tranquility along the border.

Question: I am from Assam and there is a lot of concern about Chinese river projects. Did you raise this issue with Premier Wen?

Manmohan Singh: Well, I did raise this issue of Premier Wen Jiabao yesterday. I conveyed to him that cooperation in the areas of transborder rivers is of mutual benefit. Premier Wen said that keeping in mind the overall friendly relations and humanitarian aspects, the Chinese side has been providing hydrological data during the flood season. He said the relevant discussions on transborder river issues could be held through the Expert Level Mechanism that we have constituted.

Question: The Chinese have started issuing different visas for Kashmiris. Did you raise this issue?

Manmohan Singh: There was a general discussion on all bilateral issues. I did not specifically raise this issue because I thought that the position is quite clear as far as we are concerned, whether it is Arunachal Pradesh or Jammu and Kashmir, they are integral parts of our country. I didn’t raise this and it was not raised on their side.

Question: India has objected to China building infrastructure in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. Did this matter come up?

Manmohan Singh: I did not raise this specific issue but we both agreed that whatever issues are outstanding, they should be discussed two days later when the foreign ministers of our two countries are going to meet. As you know, the Chinese foreign minister will be coming [for the Russia-India-China trilateral]. So there will be opportunities for the two foreign ministers to discuss views on all outstanding issues.

India, China agree to disagree on border, not peace

Contentious issues like the boundary and water projects were discussed but not the Dalai Lama's proposed visit to Arunachal Pradesh. Premier wen agreed that technical experts could discuss Indian concerns about Chinese water projects ...





25 October 2009
The Hindu

India, China reaffirm need to keep border peaceful

Siddharth Varadarajan

Hua Hin, Thailand: Despite handing over a démarche, or formal protest, to India the previous night over the Dalai Lama’s plans to visit Arunachal Pradesh, China on Saturday chose not to raise the matter during the keenly watched meeting here between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Premier Wen Jiabao.

With the world and their own publics riveted by the heightened bilateral rhetoric of the past few weeks, the two leaders sought to dispel the gathering clouds of tension by focussing on the positives in the relationship. Each side acknowledged their differences but agreed not to let these come in the way, a senior Indian official, N. Ravi, told reporters after the meeting ended.

Mr. Ravi’s briefing points avoided any specific mention of contentious issues. “The Prime Minister stressed that neither side should let our differences act as an impediment to the growth of functional cooperation between the two countries,” he quoted Dr. Singh as saying. He added that Premier Wen “concurred … that issues that may arise in the course of our bilateral relations should be properly handled through discussions and they should not become an impediment in the development of our friendly relations.”

But senior officials told The Hindu on condition of anonymity that difficult issues were raised and discussed, especially the recent tension over the boundary question and lingering uncertainties about upstream water projects on the Yaluzangbu, as the Brahmaputra is known on the Chinese side.

In a reference to the growing assertiveness of Chinese border patrols along the Line of Actual Control separating the two countries, Dr. Singh reminded Mr. Wen of the understanding that peace and tranquillity would be maintained at the LAC even as the Special Representatives sought to find a solution to the boundary question. According to Indian officials, the Chinese premier reaffirmed this understanding twice. He said the border dispute was “complicated and difficult” and that both sides must have “courage, vision and patience” in order to reach a settlement that was “fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable.” He also noted that in 2,000 years of shared historical and civilisational ties, India and China had been through a “very difficult period” just once.

Without making specific reference to any upper riparian projects, Prime Minister Singh conveyed in his opening remarks India’s concerns about the need for relevant information and data sharing. Premier Wen said some data had been shared in the past but agreed that a proposed meeting of technical experts — the joint expert-level mechanism on trans-border rivers is supposed to meet annually but has been delayed this year — could take the issue up.

On Friday night, the Chinese embassy in Delhi asked the Ministry of External Affairs to prevent the Dalai Lama from visiting Arunachal Pradesh, senior officials told The Hindu. But even though the boundary issue figured in the Manmohan-Wen talks, the Tibetan spiritual leader was not mentioned directly or indirectly by either side.

“I guess there was no need to”, said an Indian official. “Their démarche, and yesterday’s attack on the Dalai Lama in Peoples’ Daily, said it all”.

World big enough for India and China, says Wen Jiabao

Echoing the words of Manmohan Singh from a few years back, China also tries to focus on cooperation rather than conflict...

25 October 2009
The Hindu

World big enough for India and China, says Wen Jiabao

Siddharth Varadarajan

Hua Hin, Thailand: India and China on Friday confounded the dire predictions being made of renewed rivalry and distrust by reaffirming their intention to work closely together on a wide range of issues and to not let differences over the border become an impediment to future cooperation.

In his opening remarks at delegation-level talks with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the 15th Asean summit here, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said strengthened bilateral relations served the interests of the two countries, the region and world. He later recalled Dr. Singh’s oft-quoted remark about there being enough space for both India and China to develop, adding that there was “still more space in the world” for the two countries to grow together. If the “Asian Century” is to become a reality, he added, it was important for India and China to live in harmony and friendship and enjoy prosperity, a senior Indian official who was present in the meeting told reporters later.

Dr. Singh warmed to this theme, reiterating India’s willingness to cooperate with China on global issues like climate change, world trade and the financial crisis. Providing an account of the talks, N. Ravi, Secretary (East) in the Ministry of External Affairs, said the Prime Minister described economic and trade relations between the two sides as “a vital pillar” of the relationship despite the payments imbalance, a point Premier Wen responded to by promising to work with India to handle the growing trade deficit. He also said China encouraged its companies to invest in India and welcomed Indian investments in China. The two leaders then agreed to take steps to ensure bilateral trade reached the $ 60 billion annual target by 2010.

According to Mr. Ravi, Dr. Singh said both sides needed to build better understanding and trust at the political level so that bilateral relations remained strong despite existing differences. He spoke of growing exchanges in the defence field and proposed that India and China observe the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations “in a fitting manner.” Among the options proposed was a cultural festival.

Premier Wen responded to the suggestion by saying both sides should seize the opportunities provided by the 60th anniversary “to heighten our bilateral relationship.”

On December 30, 1949, Jawaharlal Nehru sent a telegram to Zhou Enlai, who was China’s Foreign Minister at the time, informing him of India’s decision to recognise the People’s Republic of China. Following talks in Beijing, formal diplomatic relations were established on April 1, 1950.

Dateline Hua Hin: No Asia without us, India reminds Asean, Japan

In back to back meetings with Hatoyama and the Asean X, Manmohan stresses one big point...







25 October 2009
The Hindu

No Asia without us, India reminds Asean, Japan

Siddharth Varadarajan

Seeking to up the level of engagement with Asean, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Friday proposed the establishment of a joint task force that could ensure a “substantive outcome” for India’s 10th summit with the South-east Asian grouping in 2012 and also offered to play host to the bilateral gathering that year.

In a further reminder of the centrality of India to the emerging institutional arrangements in Asia, he also urged Japan’s new Prime Minister, Yukio Hatayama, whom he met on the sidelines of the Asean summit, to use the existing East Asia Summit platform — which includes India — as the building block for his proposed East Asian Community.

According to a senior Indian official, Dr. Singh and Mr. Hatoyama had “a good discussion on the future of the East Asia Summit process and on the importance of evolving an open and transparent regional economic arrangement.” The official said the two leaders agreed that this regional architecture needs to be based on the new opportunities that India and Japan, as important economies, present to the region. He added that the Japanese Prime Minister noted India’s importance to the EAS process.

Declaring cooperation with Asean to be “an article of faith,” Dr. Singh told the 10 regional leaders gathered here for the 7th bilateral summit with India that he was keen to strengthen links with the region, including by quickly concluding negotiations on the Trade-in-Services and Investment Agreement which could complement the free trade agreement in goods concluded in August this year.

In keeping with the theme of this year’s Asean summit — ‘enhancing connectivity, empowering peoples’ — Dr. Singh proposed the establishment of an India-Asean Round Table that could provide policy inputs on future areas of collaboration, and enhanced cooperation in agriculture, food security and the application of space technologies.

He also made an off-beat suggestion: that India and Asean jointly consider organising a “commemorative ship expedition” in 2011-12 on the sea routes developed during the 10th to 12th centuries linking India with South-East Asia and East Asia.

Though India has been engaging Asean since 1992, the level of its engagement is still much less than that of other powers. Beijing recently announced a $10 billion China-Asean Fund on Investment Cooperation and $15 billion worth of commercial credit to support infrastructure development in the Asean region. And in November, the U.S. will hold a long-awaited summit with the grouping, close on the heels of its accession to Asean’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
Asean sees ‘connectivity’ as central to cementing its role as the primary driver of regional integration. In a statement issued on Friday, Asean leaders described the group as located at the crossroads of a region bounded by India in the west, China, Japan and Korea in the Northeast, and Australia and New Zealand in the south. “Asean thus has the potential to physically anchor itself as the transportation, ICT and tourism hub of this region.”

Despite marking the western boundaries of the region, India is still not seen as central to community building in East Asia. The leaders of Asean, China, Japan and South Korea issued a separate statement Friday reaffirming their commitment to the Asean+3 process as “a main vehicle towards the long-term goal of building an East Asian community with Asean as the driving force”. India’s preference would for Asean+6 to be designated the “main vehicle” since it has a guaranteed seat on that ride

Manmohan to seek end to verbal sparring with China

India is aware of the political complexities of the Dalai Lama's proposed visit to Arunachal Pradesh...






24 October 2009
The Hindu

Manmohan to seek end to verbal sparring with China

Siddharth Varadarajan

Hua Hin: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao will meet here on the sidelines of the 15th Asean summit on Saturday morning in an attempt to put an end to the infelicitous and even sharp exchange of words between the two sides in recent weeks.

Beginning with exaggerated Indian media reports of an alleged increase in Chinese incursions along the undemarcated Line of Actual Control, the rhetoric has now taken on a life of its own with government-run newspapers in Beijing accusing India of “hegemony,” Indian analysts making dire predictions of conflict, and senior Chinese officials making repeated public demarches about Arunachal Pradesh as part of their claim that the Indian state is actually a part of Tibet.

Although the immediate focus of China’s assertive pronouncements and actions is apparently Arunachal and also Jammu and Kashmir – the Chinese embassy in Delhi recently began issuing visas to the state’s residents on a separate sheet of paper rather than stamping their Indian passports – the war of words has cast a shadow over not just the ongoing boundary negotiations but also the positive long-term trend in bilateral relations between the two countries.

Indian officials say the Prime Minister is keen to continue the positive momentum and work with China to give greater depth to the ‘strategic and economic partnership’ and that he hopes Premier Wen will agree that the two countries need to find ways of preventing differences over the boundary from spilling into other areas.

At the heart of the recent deterioration in optics is the proposed visit to Arunachal Pradesh by the Dalai Lama, spiritual leader of the Tibetan Buddhists and a man Beijing reviles as a separatist bent on pushing for the independence of the Autonomous Region.

The Indian side has said repeatedly and publicly that the Dalai Lama is a guest and is free to visit any part of the country he wishes.

Though there is no indication that New Delhi will rethink its position, senior officials say the intention is not to score points over China or to use the visit in order to underline the status of Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of India.

Indeed, one official told The Hindu that the wider politics of the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang were complicated. China, after all, cites the monastic connection between Tawang and Tibet as the basis for its claim to the town and state, a connection that would be reinforced by the Dalai Lama’s coming visit. During his visit to the monastery there in 2003, the Dalai Lama had in fact said he believed Tawang was a part of Tibet. Since then, the Tibetan spiritual leader has said he accepts the McMahon line, which forms the basis for the Indian demarcation of the Sino-Indian border, much to the consternation of Beijing. Some officials believe the Chinese fear is that the Dalai Lama may use the occasion of his visit to Tawang to tell mediapersons the district is an integral part of India.

People’s Daily on Friday published a commentary, ‘Dalai Lama goes further down traitorous road’ in which it accused the “Dalai Lama clique” of “[cooperating] closely with India whenever Sino-Indian border negotiations are being held or the Indian side is maliciously speculating over a border dispute.”

As matters stand, it is not clear when the Dalai Lama will make the journey or whether he has applied for and received an inner line permit that all foreigners in India need to visit Arunachal Pradesh. His advisers initially said the Tibetan spiritual leader would travel to the State on November 8 but now maintain the dates have not yet been finalised.

Dateline Hua Hin: India looks east amidst changing Asian equations

Manmohan Singh in Thailand for Asean, East Asia Summits ...

24 October 2009
The Hindu

India looks east amidst changing Asian equations

Siddharth Varadarajan

Hua Hin, Thailand: As a renewed debate rages on the future structure of cooperation in East Asia, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh arrived at this beach resort on the Gulf of Siam Friday for back to back regional summits carrying one big message: the evolving Asian economic community should be based on “an open and inclusive regional architecture”.

But in a part of the world where China has risen, India is rising, Japan has declined and the United States is looking to reprise its Cold War role as a leading ‘Asian’ power, everything hinges on the question: how open should open be? As of now, there is little clarity on the matter.

The East Asian Summit, which will meet here on October 25, brings the 10 nations of ASEAN together with China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. The United States is excluded, a prospect Washington has been prepared to live with till now since the EAS is so loosely structured. But America’s patience is wearing thin, now that the recent parliamentary elections in Japan have turned the terms of the strategic game in Asia upside down.

Prime Minister Yukio Hatayama and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) have announced their intention of pushing for an East Asian Community modelled on the European Union with an ambitious future agenda for cooperation in economic and political spheres. There is even talk of an Asian currency to reduce the region’s reliance on the dollar. The Japanese and Chinese are divided on whether the EAS platform should serve as the springboard for the EAC or whether the community should begin with ‘ASEAN+3’ (i.e. Japan, China and Korea). But even if Tokyo and Beijing don’t see eye to eye on India, both agree that the U.S. need not be included.

As Japan pushes for a more independent foreign and even security policy, it sees less need for the U.S. to play the role of an off-shore balancer, a position at least one influential ASEAN country, Singapore, has publicly questioned.

At Hua Hin, Dr. Singh will find the EAS states gingerly feeling their way around these prickly questions. Even before the Japanese rediscovery of Asia, the EAS had decided officially to discuss the formation of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) to facilitate and expand trade. But now the potential agenda could widen. The Prime Minister acknowledged this when he noted that the EAS meeting “will provide an opportunity to discuss … [the] future direction for community building and cooperation”.

According to Indian officials, India’s ‘right’ to be part of any future arrangement springs not just from its regional heft but the extent of its economic engagement with ASEAN, which is likely to remain the formal driver of integration even if bigger players like China and Japan are the anchors.

On Saturday, Prime Minister Singh will attend the seventh Indo-ASEAN summit here at a time when bilateral trade is around $48 billion and a Free Trade Agreement in goods has just been signed between the two sides. In a statement on Friday, he said that India’s enhanced engagement with the ASEAN was at the heart of its ‘Look East’ Policy. “The conclusion of the India-ASEAN Trade-in-Goods Agreement in August 2009 is a major first step in our objective of creating an India-ASEAN Regional Trade and Investment Area.”

Apart from meeting Chinese premier Wen Jiabao on Saturday morning, Dr. Singh will hold a separate bilateral meeting with Mr. Hatoyama, who has already conveyed to the Indian side his willingness to travel to Delhi before the end of the year for the annual India-Japan summit. The Prime Minister will also meet President Nguyen Minh Triet of Viet Nam, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva of Thailand and Hun Sen of Cambodia, the last two of whom are locked in a war of words over Phnom Penh’s decision to play host to Thaksin Shinawatra, the fugitive former Prime Minister of Thailand.

Climate change lessons from a Nobel prize winner

Averting the tragedy of the atmospheric commons will require binding, equitable arrangements between countries, big and small. If only this year’s Peace prize winner listens to Elinor Olstrom...






14 October 2009
The Hindu

Climate change lessons from a Nobel prize winner

Siddharth Varadarajan

One of the winners of the Nobel prize for economics this year, Elinor Olstrom, is a pioneer in the study of the economics of the ‘commons’ — common property resources which, by virtue of being available to everyone free of cost, tend to be over-exploited. Thus, fish stocks may be over-harvested, meadows overgrazed, rivers polluted, the ozone layer depleted. All are examples of resources where ‘market’ mechanisms like ‘price’ do not operate to restrain consumption by individuals.

Given the focus of neoclassical economics on the optimal allocation of scarce resources, it is perhaps not surprising that the commons became a distinct field of study within the academic discipline only in the late 1960s, following Garret Hardin’s seminal 1968 article in Science, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons.’

Hardin argued that freedom in a commons brings ruin to all, whether one is speaking of simple herdsmen grazing cattle on a meadow or factories emitting effluents or smoke into a river or the skies. “The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them,” he wrote. “Since this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of ‘fouling our own nest,’ so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free enterprisers.”

The implications of Hardin’s work were politically controversial. Anthropologists argued that the problem, though cast in the framework of the rural or pastoral economy, was actually a manifestation of modernity and industrial capitalism. That the tragedy was not of the ‘commons’ but of the ‘moderns,’ who did not respect traditionally evolved norms that allowed for the maintenance of harmony between human beings and the environment. However, economists and governments were quick to seize on the implications of Hardin’s work; devising rules and institutions to limit the overconsumption of common resources became something of a cottage industry. Most argued, like Hardin, in favour of privatisation and the assignment of property rights; others made a case for nationalisation or the use of taxation. But most academic approaches to the commons dealt with the problem as a local one with a limited number of essentially homogeneous players.

Prof. Olstrom was perhaps the first economist to seek to harmonise this field of study and to emphasise that there was no “single, best way” of preventing the inevitability of the ‘tragedy.’ She also insisted on the study of commons problems where the number of actors is scaled up and their nature is heterogeneous. She demonstrated theoretically and empirically that privatisation or government regulation or management of common property resources often produced outcomes inferior to locally managed, self-regulated common property regimes. She then abstracted a set of design principles necessary for such arrangements to work.

But while compact communities and states have had reasonable success in finding solutions within their jurisdiction, the international community is not very well-equipped to deal with its single biggest resource problem today: the future of our atmospheric commons.

As Prof. Olstrom put it in a 2008 article co-authored with other economists, emitters have every incentive to overuse the atmospheric commons as a repository for the wastes associated with burning fossil fuels since the immediate cost to them of this factor of production is zero and the long-term, marginal cost is also less than what an emitter might have to spend by himself to use a different production technique that limits his greenhouse gas emissions. This is, of course, the classic Hardin problem. “But the present and future costs to society of this practice are enormous. Estimates of these costs vary. But there is compelling evidence that the eventual costs will exceed the cost of changing our current practices to limit emissions of greenhouse gases by a large margin.”

No clear predictions

With a national regulator, it is not difficult to devise rules of the road to deal with this problem, or even to enforce the ‘national’ share of an internationally agreed solution as conceived by the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. But in a world marked by the unequal distribution of power, reaching an agreement internationally is proving difficult. “One of the problems we face when we move up to the global level is that unanimity is required for most international treaties,” Prof. Olstrom wrote in a 2002 journal article. “While we have all sorts of chances to learn from experiments in local commons, we have only one globe and the risks of experimentation are much greater.” In sum, she concluded rather pessimistically, “we do not have clear predictions for beating the tragedy of the commons at a global level.”

When it comes to the atmospheric commons, the problem of regulation is compounded by the heterogeneity of the international system. The benefits and costs of either maintaining the ‘business as usual’ status quo or aggressively reducing GHG emissions are unevenly distributed across nations. By a quirk of geography and economics, those countries least responsible for climate change have the most to lose from it — tiny Maldives is all set to disappear as sea levels rise because of global warming — while the biggest culprits have the least incentive to do anything about it. A case in point being the United States, which refused to sign up to the Kyoto Protocol and even today is trying its best to avoid shouldering its historic responsibility to cut its GHG emissions.

“The bad news,” Prof. Elstrom wrote, “is that when users cannot communicate, don’t have trust, can’t build it, and don’t have rules, we have to expect the tragedy of the commons to occur.” This is the fate which awaits the world if the forthcoming U.N. conference on climate change in Copenhagen ends without the world’s major emitters of greenhouse gases agreeing to significant cuts in their emissions.

But if diplomats can engage in direct discussion and — crucially, have the autonomy to change some of their own national rules — “they may be able to organise and overcome the tragedy,” Prof. Olstrom concluded. With seven weeks to go before Copenhagen, the signs are not looking good. The Bangkok climate change talks which ended on October 9 saw the developed countries advocating the U.S. model of watered down domestic targets rather than the kind of internationally binding GHG reduction targets embodied in the U.N. process so far. Without which the tragedy of the atmospheric commons will never be averted.

Afghan message to India: Do not be deterred

Kabul, Delhi to tell U.S that Pakistan cannot have veto on bilateral ties


12 October 2009
The Hindu

Afghan message to India: Do not be deterred

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: Afghanistan has told India at the highest level that the most fitting response to last week’s terrorist attack on its embassy compound in Kabul would be for the Indian government to step up its ongoing efforts to strengthen the development and security capabilities of the Afghan authorities through infrastructure projects, police and human resource training.

The Obama administration told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh last month that it did not see India’s assistance in Afghanistan as a source of “regional tension” — a charge laid recently by the senior most U.S. military officer there in a confidential report. Nevertheless, Indian and Afghan officials recognise the need for both countries to tell the American side that Pakistan cannot have a veto over the kind of relationship Kabul wishes to build with New Delhi.

U.S. Under Secretary of State William Burns will be in Delhi for routine foreign office consultations on October 16 and India’s views on the matter will be conveyed to him.

Though the Indian side has been careful not to accuse any group or country of being behind Wednesday’s suicide attack, Afghan officials have pointed the finger at Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate.

Asked for their view of the Afghan assessment, senior Indian officials told The Hindu that New Delhi was waiting to see what Afghan investigators and the intelligence agencies of other friendly countries are able to turn up.

The bomb itself, involving 150 kilos of plastic explosives, was highly sophisticated and more powerful than the device which was used in the July 2008 attack on the embassy.

Closed-circuit television had captured clear images of the Toyota vehicle used by the terrorist.

Although the Taliban officially claimed responsibility for the attack on October 8 by posting a statement in Pashto on its website (shahamat.org), the statement was subsequently deleted from the site.

Why the Taliban or their advisers would have second thoughts about this claim is a question Afghan and Indian investigators are likely to be asking themselves.

Of some concern to Indian and Afghan officials was the ease with which the vehicle was able to enter the high security street where the Indian chancery is located. Other important offices, like the Afghan interior ministry, are also located there.

Afghan agencies are now likely to examine the possibility of the Taliban or Gulbuddin Hikmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami infiltrating a section of the Kabul security establishment.

Although India has no intention whatsoever of getting involved in Afghanistan militarily, officials here say India and like-minded countries in the region need to prepare themselves for the day that the U.S. withdraws from the country. In practical terms, this means working to strengthen the capabilities of the Afghan security forces — something U.S. President Barack Obama’s AfPak policy neglects — as well as greater consultation and cooperation with Afghanistan’s neighbours like Iran, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and Russia and China.

The officials said India’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting on Afghanistan in March and Dr. Singh’s decision to attend the SCO summit in Yekaterinburg in June had to be seen in this wider context.

Prime Minister’s delegation subjected to American profiling

U.S. rejection of visas for Muslim journalists nearly derailed Manmohan’s visit to G20...

10 October 2009
The Hindu

Prime Minister’s delegation subjected to American profiling

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: A potential crisis in bilateral relations with Washington was averted at the eleventh hour last month when the United States reversed a decision to deny visas to all Muslim journalists who were part of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s official media delegation to the G20 summit in Pittsburgh.

The visas, which were denied pending “additional administrative processing,” were only granted one day before the Prime Minister’s departure following a demarche – or diplomatic request — from the highest levels of government.

None of the Indian officials involved in the process wished to speak on record about the incident, which they said was a clear case of religious “profiling” by the U.S. embassy in Delhi.

As always happens during Prime Ministerial visits, the passports of the accompanying official media delegation were sent a few days in advance to the U.S. embassy for the necessary visas to be stamped. But when the passports were returned, three journalists – all of them Muslim – were handed yellow visa denial slips stating that they had been found “ineligible to receive a visa under Section 221(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”

The yellow slips said their application required “additional administrative processing before a final decision can be made.” But there was no indication of how long this could take. The embassy note tersely stated that applicants would be contacted “once this administrative processing has been completed.” U.S. diplomats informally said this process could take anywhere from four to eight weeks or longer.

With the Prime Minister set to fly out in less than two days, this ‘don’t call us, we’ll call you’ message sent alarm bells ringing in South Block. Officials were quick to realise the political consequences of the American side essentially disallowing the only Muslims in the Prime Minister’s delegation from travelling with him to Pittsburgh.

The three individuals concerned were senior and respected journalists who, like other members of the delegation, had been security cleared. One was an editor of a popular regional daily and two of them had travelled abroad with the Prime Minister before.

“No discrimination”

U.S. officials informally told this reporter that the names of three men had triggered a computerised alert for additional verification. But when The Hindu formally asked the U.S. embassy in Delhi whether it was a coincidence that all the Muslims in the delegation were so selected for additional visa screening and that none of the non-Muslims were, embassy officials said “the U.S. Government does not discriminate on the basis of race or religion.”

They added: “Since many applicants are subject to additional administrative processing, the U.S. Government urges all visa applicants to apply for visas as far in advance of the trip as possible. We also routinely expedite cases in which individuals require to travel urgently.”

Asked whether it was U.S. policy to subject visa requests by Indian Muslims to a lengthier process of background checking, they said consular officers “review each application and make a determination regarding whether an applicant … needs additional processing. These decisions are based on the review of each individual’s case.”

With Dr. Singh set to travel again to Washington on an official visit this November, The Hindu asked whether Muslim members of his official delegation could again experience delays in their visa applications. The embassy officials replied: “This question should be directed to the Government of India. They know the dates of the visit and who will be travelling with the Prime Minister. Have they already applied for visas?”

The Nobel and the audacity of hope-giving

The world is so accustomed to American presidents waging war that the first incumbent to promise diplomacy gets to win the Nobel peace prize regardless of what he does...



10 October 2009
The Hindu

The Nobel and the audacity of hope-giving

Siddharth Varadarajan

Whether it was a naïve, Nordic leap of faith in Obamamania or the burning desire to pre-empt the betrayal of hopes that the new U.S. president has aroused, the Nobel committee’s decision to give its coveted peace prize to Barack Obama is likely to leave the world at large – not to speak of the American people -- puzzled, bemused and more than a little sore.

The reason for this is not because the world dislikes or distrusts Mr. Obama. Many may or do, but global sentiment towards the new president of the United States still runs largely positive. What is upsetting, however, is the intellectual laziness and political timidity with which the Nobel committee appears to have gone about its exertions.

After eight years of George W. Bush as American president, the victory of Mr. Obama was widely welcomed across the world. And so far, he has done well to talk the right talk on virtually every major issue of war and peace. He has said he will shut down the notorious U.S. detention centre at Guantanamo, end the practice of torture and bring the war in Iraq to an end as soon as possible. On Iran, he has reiterated his campaign promise of dialogue and diplomacy and even followed through by authorising his officials to interact with their Iranian counterparts in Geneva earlier this month. He made a stirring speech in Cairo on the need for justice in the Middle East and another at Prague on a nuclear weapon free world. He is, of course, threatening to ramp up the Afghan war but his generals have said they will use force in a more intelligent way than the U.S. has so far done in that country.

Had Mr. Obama delivered on even a quarter of these promissory notes, the Nobel peace prize would have justly been his. But all the Norwegian committee seems to have gone by is the down payment of words. Nominations for this year’s prize apparently closed on the 12th day of Mr. Obama’s presidency. Those who nominated him clearly couldn’t be bothered to wait and see whether he came good. But the Nobel committee, in reaching its decision, should at least have factored in those elements of actual presidential policy that run counter to his stated agenda.

Take peace in the Middle East, for example. The Israeli government spared Mr. Obama the embarrassment of having to endorse its aggression in Gaza by ending the war just before the new president’s inauguration. This was a war in which the Israeli military and political leadership committed war crimes, according to the authoritative investigative report by Judge Richard Goldstone for the United Nations. But for Mr. Obama and his team, the report is irrelevant. Early in his presidency, Mr. Obama told the Israelis they would have to stop their illegal policy of expanding the presence of Jewish settlements on occupied Palestinian territory. But when Tel Aviv rejected the demand, our Nobel peace prize winner quietly went along.

On Iran, it is far from clear that Obama’s Washington has foreclosed the so-called military option. The Geneva meeting between Iran and the P5+1 went well, producing an interim confidence building measure that belies the Western hype about the imminence of Tehran’s nuclear threat. But the preparations for war are proceeding side by side. The administration has quietly sought and received funding for the proposed massive ordnance penetrator – the so-called ‘bunker buster’ that the Pentagon says it needs to destroy Iranian nuclear sites which have been buried underground.

As for the vital global issue of climate change where Mr. Obama promised radically to depart from the Bush administration’s ostrich-like approach, it is becoming increasingly clear that diplomatic engagement is merely a different means to achieving the same end: evasion of America’s historical responsibility drastically to cut its emission of greenhouse gases.

The problem with the Nobel committee awarding Mr. Obama the peace prize is that it sends out an entirely negative signal: that it is all right for a U.S. president to ignore global concerns on the environment, take the side of a regime like Israel that is accused of serious war crimes or to consider coercive or even military means for the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue.

Mr. Obama still has time to come around to a more “pacific” course on these and other issues. The urge to live up to the international recognition he has received might be an incentive. But with the Nobel peace prize already under his belt and the weight of well-entrenched lobbies, interests and policies bearing down on his worthy shoulders, the chances of him actually doing so probably just got narrower.

A harsh reminder of India’s burden and stake in Afghanistan

With the Indian embassy being targeted for the second time despite India playing no role in the war in Afghanistan, it is clear that geopolitics rather than the aspiration of "freedom-loving nationalist and Islamist forces" (as the Taliban call themselves) is the driving force...



8 October 2009
The Hindu

NEWS ANALYSIS
A harsh reminder of India’s burden - and stake - in Afghanistan

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: The suicide attack on the Indian embassy compound in Kabul underlines a curious irony about the situation in Afghanistan: Despite playing no direct role in the American-led war against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, India is rapidly becoming one of the most highly favoured targets of terrorists in that country.

In 2008, a suicide bomber believed to be linked to the Haqqani network blew himself up outside the embassy, killing 58 people, including three Indian officials. And workers and engineers on Indian-led projects have been kidnapped and killed by the Taliban in the past, forcing India to limit its assistance to projects not involving its own manpower.

Barely 24 hours before Thursday’s deadly attack in Kabul, Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao had expressed her government’s frustration at the “sense of defeatism” which has begun to overwhelm international public opinion about the situation in Afghanistan and which serves no purpose other than to encourage insurgent groups to step up their activities. She also warned against “facile attempts to strike Faustian bargains with terrorists,” a thinly veiled message to those in the United States who might find a quick pullout linked to a Pakistani-brokered political settlement with the Taliban a viable or tempting option.

The timing of the embassy bombing was obviously a coincidence but the Taliban – which has claimed responsibility in a statement on its website, shahamat.org – would like nothing better than to have the same defeatist spirit take hold of New Delhi, one of the largest providers of development assistance to the Afghan government.

Last year, India was told by U.S. officials that the embassy bombing had been sanctioned at the highest levels of the Pakistani intelligence establishment. This time, too, the Indian government is likely to conclude the suicide attack was scripted in Rawalpindi, presumably as a part of the “countermeasures” America’s top military commander in Afghanistan recently warned India about.

General Stanley A. McChrystal’s assessment, contained in an official report prepared by him a month ago, was schizophrenic. He said India was “exacerbating regional tensions” and encouraging “Pakistani countermeasures” by its increasing political and economic influence in the beleaguered country. But he also said Indian activities “largely benefit the Afghan people.”

At the root of this American ambiguity about the Indian role in Afghanistan is the division within Washington about virtually every aspect of the Obama administration’s AfPak policy. Should more U.S. soldiers be sent to Afghanistan, as Gen. McChrystal has demanded, or not? Should the war be expanded to Pakistani territory or not? Is it possible to reach an understanding with the Taliban if the latter breaks its ties with the Al-Qaeda? Is the Pakistani military part of the problem or the solution?

On the last question, Gen. McChrystal minced his words. Senator John Kerry was a little more direct, noting in Senate hearings earlier this month that “it has been difficult to build trust with Pakistan’s military and intelligence services over the years because our interests have not always been aligned and because ties between the ISI and Taliban remain troubling.”

Ms. Rao drew attention to those ties when she told a seminar here on Wednesday that the international community needs to put “effective pressure on Pakistan to implement its stated commitment to deal with terrorist groups within its territory, including the members of the Al-Qaeda, Taliban’s Quetta Shura, Hizb-e-Islami, Lashkar-e-Taiba and other like-minded terrorist groups.” Without this, she said, it would be “difficult to forestall the restoration of status quo ante, to a situation similar to what prevailed prior to 11 September 2001.”

Unfortunately for India, none of the options currently being considered by the U.S. is very palatable. Much as New Delhi fears American defeatism, it also knows any expansion in U.S. military operations in Afghanistan will likely make the situation worse, not better. Both scenarios, in any case, will increase American dependence on the Pakistani military, something India sees as fundamentally wrong-headed.

Preoccupied with finding the optimal military strategy, President Obama has done little to take forward his promise of seeking a regional solution. As a target of terror in Afghanistan, India has a right and an obligation to be more assertive in the quest for a more rational approach to the Afghan problem.

ElBaradei: The reality is that India will remain outside the NPT

Nuclear weapon states must recognise the inextricable link between nonproliferation and disarmament, says IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei...

7 October 2009
The Hindu

'The reality is that India will remain outside the NPT'

Siddharth Varadarajan

In the second and concluding part of his interview to The Hindu , International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei speaks about the prospects for nuclear disarmament and the logic behind the international community’s decision to lift restrictions on nuclear sales to India.

The recent U.N. Security Council resolution on nonproliferation (UNSCR 1887) is being seen as a new commitment by the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to disarm. But while the text talks of ridding the world of nuclear weapons, it is short on the specific steps needed to get there — like no first use, and a Convention prohibiting the use of such weapons. In your opinion, how genuine a step forward is it?

I think there is definitely a new environment that dawned with President Obama coming to power. He has made it clear that his major commitment is to see that we start working towards a world free of nuclear weapons. This is a new environment, but it is coming after two wasted decades when the NWS made no significant effort to move towards nuclear disarmament in fulfilment of their [commitment] under the NPT.

There are obviously still a lot of questions, different approaches. I am not sure all the weapon states have the same view of how to go about it. You are right, how exactly we go about it is not yet [clear]. Do we start with a convention, with no first use, or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)? There are lots of different approaches. And of course, each NWS sees things from its own strategic perspective. But one this is clear. The U.S. and Russia, which have 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world, have committed to slash their arsenal by at least a third and hopefully that will come before December, before the START treaty lapses. There is also an agreement that the FMCT will be negotiated in Geneva. There is a commitment by Obama that he will take the CTBT to Congress for ratification, and again the hope that once the Americans join or ratify, the rest of the world will follow. All this would be a significant step in the right direction. That’s not the end of the road by any chance. There are a lot of confidence-building measures no first-use is one. I think a Convention will obviously come at the end, when we are really clear what kind of security system we will have. That remains a major challenge. We can still go to hundreds of weapons, but once we decide to go to zero, we have to have in place a new security system that assures every country its security is not diminished, that it is protected and that it has built in a very strong mechanism for detecting and deterring any country that might think of violating that. That’s why I continue to argue that we need to start working on that alternative security system in parallel now. That obviously requires a different Security Council, a different security paradigm, a very robust verification system, a very transparent international community in so far as making sure they are in full compliance. It is a lot of work. But hopefully the new resolution ushers in a new era. How fast we go, how committed the weapons states are we will have to see in the next few months.

The NPT’s core bargain was that the NWS are obliged to disarm. Yet, the latest resolution seems to present that obligation as a trade-off for the non-nuclear states conceding even more. Do you think they will succeed in this?

I don’t think they can. Quite frankly, the NNWS are also alert, are aware of the bargain that was struck in the NPT. The fact that the NWS did not really make good on their commitment by significantly moving to nuclear disarmament does not mean we need to have a new bargain. The bargain is there. They have to accelerate the implementation of their commitment. It has to be a parallel process. I don’t think the NNWS will move forward very much to tighten the nonproliferation regime except in sync with the NWS making good on their commitments. Only if the weapon states demonstrate that they are moving irreversibly towards disarmament through concrete [steps] can they have the moral authority to call on the rest of the world to tighten the nonproliferation regime. The shortcomings in the system will not be [remedied] unless the NWS understand the inextricable link between disarmament and non-proliferation.

As a strong backer of the India-U.S. nuclear agreement and the exception India won from some of the restrictions of the nonproliferation regime last year, do you feel there is a disconnect between the IAEA and NSG decisions on India and the latest U.N. resolution which essentially calls on India to sign the NPT?

I am not sure there is a disconnect. There are three countries outside the NPT. In the Middle East, Israel is the only country with nuclear weapons, the rest are all in the NPT, and there is a perception of security imbalance there. India and Pakistan are different because both possess nuclear weapons and there is a balance of power if you like. There are countries very insistent that Israel should join the NPT and there is lot of frustration in the Middle East as the result of what they perceive to be a security imbalance. Now, whether the UNSC language was targeting the three or just the one, in reality I don’t see them joining the NPT any time soon. India and Pakistan have said a number of times that they can only come into the arms control system in the context of global nuclear arms control agreement. And as much as the region wants Israel to join NPT, I can see the realistic possibility of that happening [only] in the context of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East and the context of peace and security.

So as DG, IAEA, your stand would be that this resolution really has no bearing on the obligations that India and IAEA have entered into.

I believe so. These are two different things. The India-U.S. deal did not make any judgment nor has the IAEA made any judgment they neither blessed nor condemned India being outside the NPT or having nuclear weapons. They accepted as a reality for the time being that India is outside the NPT and has its military nuclear component but the deal in my view has been much more forward looking, much more strategic ... It brought India as a partner in the whole nuclear order, and was the only way to bring India on board in preparation for nuclear disarmament — you cannot think of nuclear arms control agreement without India being part of it. The agreement also does not add or diminish from the fact that India has military components for its programme but it focuses on how much this nuclear trade will help India’s development and energy needs. And I am very glad the NSG accepted this and India has already started to make use of this, signing agreements with Russia, France, Namibia, Kazakhstan and Mongolia.

And, of course, India is also looking at nuclear exports.

Yes, looking at India’s fantastic base of scientists, R&D in the nuclear field, India could be a hub for support to all developing countries that are looking for nuclear power for development.

Do you think at some point in the future, once Pakistan allays the international community’s concerns about its proliferation record, the world may have to find some way of bringing Pakistan in to the regime?

Pakistan has been frustrated that India got a nuclear deal while it did not and in the beginning they were opposed to it. My advice to them was that you really need to support the deal because it creates a good precedent for you, that once you put your nuclear activities in order — particularly in the aftermath of the AQ Khan network and all that — you should be able to get a similar deal and I would support a similar deal for Pakistan under appropriate circumstances because again Pakistan needs energy. Sometimes, the international community needs to be pragmatic. It is ideal that we have the NPT universalised but we know this won’t happen. These three countries have a complex security perception and we should not just stick to ideology but see how pragmatically we can move step by step.

( The first part of this interview appeared on October 3.)

The road ahead for India and Pakistan

If terrorism will not compel India to settle outstanding disputes with Pakistan, keeping the dialogue process suspended indefinitely is not going to force Islamabad to be more mindful of New Delhi's concerns either. Both strategies have failed; it is time the two countries moved beyond them ...


5 October 2009
The Hindu

The road ahead for India and Pakistan

Siddharth Varadarajan

There is a story senior journalist A.S. Panneerselvan tells of the experience of the first group of Tamil Tigers who were brought to a remote camp in Uttar Pradesh for arms training by the Indian government in the early 1980s. Every evening, the camp’s Tibetan cook would look at the group of Sri Lankan Tamils and start laughing. Eventually, one of the Tamils learnt enough Hindi to ask the cook what was so funny. “Thirty years ago,” the old man said, “I was in this camp with other Tibetans getting trained and there was somebody else to cook for us. Now you are here and I am cooking for you!” “That may be so,” the LTTE man said, “but I still don’t see what’s so funny.” Prompt came the reply: “You see, I’m wondering who you will be cooking for 20 years from now ? I think it may be the Chakmas!”

Unfortunately for the Indian establishment, the LTTE story did not end so tamely, over cooking pots and a camp fire. Well before the terrorist group eventually met its end in the Vanni earlier this year, the Tigers assassinated a former Prime Minister of India and were responsible for the death of countless Indian soldiers.

I am recalling this story in an article about India and Pakistan because it reminds us of three processes that are an essential part of modern South Asian statecraft and which help define the contours of the current crisis in the bilateral relationship. First, that every state in the region has, at one time or another, patronised extremist groups or tolerated their violent activities in order to advance its domestic political or regional strategic interests. Second, the activities of these groups invariably “overshoot” their target and begin to undermine the core interests of their original patrons. Third, there comes a time in the life of all such groups when the nature and extent of their violence reach a “tipping point” as far as the same state is concerned.

A mature, well-developed state is one which is able to read the early warning signs and effect a course correction in official policy well before that tipping point is reached. In the absence of this maturity, states respond in one of two ways. States with a tendency to stability are at least able to recognise when a tipping point has been reached and act accordingly. But states which are unable to recognise either the early warning signs or the tipping point itself and which continue to pretend that the non-state actors they have patronised can be subordinated to an official command structure despite evidence to the contrary run the risk of destabilising themselves.

The Congress party leader in Bombay, S.K. Patil, encouraged the rise of the Shiv Sena in the 1960s in order to undermine the city’s communist-led trade union movement. The Sena overshot its target and eventually became a political rival to the Congress. By the time the Sena revealed its true self in the communal violence it helped orchestrate in Bombay in 1992, it was too late for anyone to act against it. The Sena had already become a part of the establishment, its violence normalised, its leaders insulated from police action and proper judicial sanction.

A second example of the same phenomenon, but with a different ending, emerged in Punjab in the 1980s. Indira Gandhi welcomed the rise of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his extremist politics because she saw in him an effective counter to the Akali Dal in Punjab. The Khalistani ideologue’s violence was tolerated for some time; the tipping point for the establishment should arguably have come when a senior police officer, A.S. Atwal, was gunned down by Bhindranwale’s men in April 1983. But New Delhi waited and waited, acting against the ‘Sant’ only in June 1984.

The trouble with acting against extremist groups after the tipping point is reached is that the process can be long drawn out and costly, especially in terms of human life. Successive governments at the Centre pacified Punjab but not before nearly 20,000 people lost their lives in Operation Bluestar, the November 1984 massacres, and the brutal police campaigns in the Punjab.

In Pakistan, the military-cum-intelligence establishment has had a long-term policy of creating, cultivating and using extremist groups both as a lever against mainstream political parties within the country and as a tool of foreign and military policy against India and Afghanistan. Some of these groups very rapidly ‘overshot’ their initial targets, especially domestically. The state responded by targeting particularly wayward terrorist leaders but did not abandon the overall structures of official permissiveness. External pressure following 9/11 led to the temporary course correction of abandoning the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Lal Masjid situation in Islamabad was another potential tipping point but its lessons were ignored, leading to the growth of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Then came Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, but the nexus between extremism and a military establishment keen to subvert the return of democracy muddied the waters. Sufi Mohammad’s folly in openly defying the Pakistani state soon after the Nizam-e-Adl fiasco in Swat brought about a more decisive point of inflection, which is today still being played out in the Malakand division.

But even if the Pakistani army has joined the battle against terrorism in the frontier regions bordering Afghanistan in earnest, there is no question of the military establishment recognising the danger that anti-India terrorist groups have started to pose to Pakistan itself. A section of the Pakistani political leadership saw in the terrorist attack on Mumbai in November 2008 the grave threat that groups like the Lashkar-e-Taiba pose to the stability of the region. Nudged along by the United States and by a non-confrontationist Indian approach, an unprecedented criminal investigation was launched against a section of LeT operatives. Since the LeT has never launched a terrorist attack inside Pakistan, however, it is easy for sceptics there to argue that the group does not pose a threat. That is why the establishment there is reluctant to act against Lashkar chief Hafiz Saeed. But wise statecraft is about recognising the early warning signs, not waiting for the tipping point. Imtiaz Gul’s book, The Al-Qaeda Connection, provides plenty of evidence on the deep links which exist between the LeT, the Jaish-e-Mohammed and even the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, on the one hand, and the TTP in Pakistan’s tribal areas, on the other.

Given these political realities, what can India do to encourage Pakistan to recognise that the terrorist groups operating on its soil are an undifferentiated syndicate and pose a common threat to both countries? Of all the forms of encouragement, refusing to talk is the least effective. It is not a coincidence that those sections of the Pakistani establishment which continue to see the jihadi terror groups as future assets are the very sections least anxious to see the resumption of the bilateral dialogue. Exchanging rhetoric and putting pressure via public statements are also not likely to pay dividends. Nor is there any point in messing up the strong case India has in Mumbai with overkill. Pakistani officials have pointed out, for example, that the salutation “Major General sahab” — one of the co-conspirators allegedly identified by Ajmal ‘Kasab’ and seen by the Indians as proof of Islamabad’s official complicity in 26/11 — is never used in the subcontinent; the preferred greeting is ‘General sahab’.

At a recent Track-II meeting of Indian and Pakistani analysts, former ambassadors, military officers and intelligence chiefs organised by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in Bangkok, there was consensus on the grave threat terrorism poses to Pakistan and to India. Specifically, the need for India and Pakistan to open a back channel on counter-terrorism was recognised, with the participation of intelligence agencies from the two countries. This would supplement the back channel on Jammu and Kashmir which worked effectively till 2006 and which, the Track-II meeting felt, needs to be revived at an early date. The Composite Dialogue process, too, was seen as having served a useful purpose in the past.

With last month’s meeting in New York between the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan yielding little in terms of forward movement by either side, there is a danger of the bilateral relationship getting stuck into one of those ruts that finally require the mediation of extra hands in order to be rescued. Rather than wait for that, the first available improvement in optics — the start of the Mumbai trial in Pakistan, for example — should be seized upon to move ahead on the back channel, with the front channel being revived in a calibrated manner as confidence increases. Indefinitely postponing talks will not help protect India from future terrorist attacks. And talking will not make it more vulnerable. India should stop confusing hard line diplomatic strategy for effective counter-terrorism.

If terrorism will not compel India to settle outstanding disputes with Pakistan, keeping the dialogue process suspended indefinitely is not going to force Islamabad to be more mindful of New Delhi’s concerns either. Both strategies have failed; it is time the two countries moved beyond them.

The ElBaradei interview: ‘Language of force is not helpful on Iran issue’

Tehran should be more transparent but its nuclear programme does not pose a threat that is imminent, says IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei....




3 October 2009
The Hindu

‘Language of force is not helpful on Iran issue’

Siddharth Varadarajan

As Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei is the world’s top nuclear policeman as well as its most valuable diplomatic asset in the struggle for disarmament and nonproliferation. A voice of sanity in a field otherwise dominated by irrational and sometimes violent rhetoric, Dr. ElBaradei strongly backed the lifting of nuclear sanctions on India and has helped prevent the escalation of the Iran nuclear crisis. In an interview with The Hindu during a visit to New Delhi this week, he spoke at length about the Iranian issue.Excerpts:

What do you think prompted the Iranian authorities to make the declaration on September 21 about a new enrichment facility?

I don’t know. We are yet to go and inspect and verify that new facility. The western countries say this was meant to be a secret facility, that it was declared by Tehran because it was compromised and the Iranians knew they would be discovered. The Iranians insist this is not the case, that they had to delay informing the agency because they wanted to build the facility underground to protect their technology in case of an attack on their nuclear facility. And they have been hearing about the threat of attacks over the past four or five years. Nonetheless, Iran, of course, has not complied with the requirement of the IAEA that they should have told us once they decided to construct the facility. I understand they have been working on it for a number of years.

How many years? What has the U.S. told the IAEA about it?

I think they said the work has been on since about 2005 and we have to go to Iran and verify but Iran should have informed us. This is clearly a setback because we have been trying to get Iran to be more transparent and cooperate more with the IAEA to clarify the issues that are still remaining for us to be able to verify the peaceful nature of the programme. But I also call on those who continue to say that we should use force, to attack Iran — that this is absolutely counterproductive. We need to create a different environment based not on confrontation but cooperation. For the first time, there is hope this could happen with Barack Obama talking about engaging Iran without preconditions, unlike the previous administration. Even after discovery of the [new] facility, he repeated that they are willing to engage Iran and I hope Iran will respond to that offer and I am not sure that offer is going to last forever. They better make use of that offer. It is only through engagement that we can verify the past and present Iranian nuclear activities. In the past, there were some claims that had done some military studies…

In fact, I want to come specifically to that. Your report as DG, on the basis of which the IAEA Board voted in September 2005 to find Iran in non-compliance, listed a set of outstanding issues. All of those issues have since been clarified. In some sense, isn’t that proof of considerable progress?

There is no question we have made considerable progress. At the time Iran was referred to the Security Council, the major concern was about the nature of its enrichment programme and that has been clarified. That is a major achievement. People seem to forget we have through systematic inspection made a considerable advance in understanding the nature of the Iranian programme. Then came these alleged studies.

Now, the first time the U.S. spoke of these alleged military studies was in the summer of 2005, when they briefed the IAEA and some countries about the contents of a laptop computer. Yet, this issue never figured in your September 2005 report.

Information about the alleged studies came over time to the agency. Iran says this information is fake. U.S. intelligence says Iran had weaponisation studies that stopped in 2003, other [Western agencies] claim Iran continued after that. Obviously, this is not very helpful — all agencies should get their act together and come to one conclusion. The IAEA is not making any judgment at all whether Iran even had weaponisation studies before because there is a major question of authenticity of the documents.

But clearly there were enough doubts in 2005 that you did not mention it then.

If I recall, the issue had not yet materialised in 2005.

No sir, the U.S. had done a briefing in the summer of 2005 with the so-called laptop. Your reports begin to flag alleged studies only in 2006. But not in 2005 when Iran was found in non-compliance.

Probably because in 2005, we did not go through the vetting process. We receive information all the time. It is not automatically referred to in our reports. Information continued to come to us. As I have said, if this information is correct, there is a strong likelihood that Iran has engaged in weaponisation studies. But if authentic. And I underlined if three times! That’s why I continue to urge Iran, they are the ones who continue to say it is fake….

But how does Iran prove a negative? This is like the run up to Iraq war, when Baghdad was asked to prove it did not have WMD. Iran says the documents are fake, they have no markings, no seals. The U.S. says they are genuine but the supposed originals are not being given, which you said should be.

Sure.

So how does one square the circle? It seems impossible to resolve.

Well, there is a lot of information in these documents that Iran said is authentic, but in different contexts, done for non-nuclear activities, while some of it is fake. What we want is for Iran to engage in substantive discussions with us, tell us what is authentic, what is not. We need to talk to some of the scientists involved. But I agree with you – this is one of the most difficult questions to deal with. We are very good when we are dealing with nuclear material, we can take measurements and do environmental sampling. When we work with papers, it very difficult because it is one’s word against the other. That is why I continue to call on those who supplied us the information to give us the originals, some copies, to be able to move the discussion with Iran. And I call on Iran to help us clarify the wheat from the chaff. And that’s not happening. And that is why we have this issue still hanging.

But your reports say there has been no use of nuclear material connected with these studies.

That’s right.

Surely this reduces the gravity of the issue. Clearly Iran has not diverted nuclear material for prohibited purposes.

The only time we found Iran in breach of its obligations not to use undeclared nuclear material was when they had experimented in 2003 and 2004 at Kalaye. Those were experiments. And I have been making it very clear that with regard to these alleged studies, we have not seen any use of nuclear material, we have not received any information that Iran has manufactured any part of a nuclear weapon or component. That’s why I say, to present the Iran threat as imminent is hype.

In a sense, this one outstanding issue is far less serious than the issues which prompted Iran’s referral to the Security Council!

It is a serious concern but I am not going to panic, to say it is an imminent threat that we are going to wake up and see Iran with nuclear weapons. Our job is to make sure we do not overstate or understate a case. There are enough people around to use or abuse what we say. The judgment call is very difficult, but based on what we have seen so far — we are concerned, we need to clarify this issue, we need to build confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s programme, we need Iran to adhere to the Additional Protocol because that will help me build confidence. But I am not going to sound an alarm and say that Iran is on the verge of developing nuclear weapons.

You are right that the Security Council referral was based on issues that have since been settled. So if Iran were to continue to cooperate with us, help us to clarify these alleged studies and also if the suppliers [of the documents] should help in that process, we would move quite forward.

Has the world benefited from the Iran file being referred to the Security Council? Or have the costs outweighed the benefits? We’ve lost Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol, to the latest Subsidiary Arrangements, it hasn’t stopped enrichment.

The IAEA remains seized of the matter but the Security Council referral was to get Iran to suspend enrichment and apply sanctions. I leave it to those who decided to refer them to make that judgment. I always believe the more we use carrots rather than sticks in such complex situations, the better is the prospect of finding a solution. As you can see now, after three or four years of referral, the focus is not on the Security Council but on engaging Iran! So the focus right now is on dialogue, engagement, incentives and not on the stick. The stick is always there, you can always use it. But first exhaust every possibility of trying to understand where the other party is coming from.

Coming back to Iran’s latest disclosure, the IAEA legal adviser has acknowledged there is a grey area in the implementation of the Subsidiary Arrangements.

Subsidiary Arrangements are a technical requirement but the more important issue is transparency and confidence and Iran lost on confidence with this action, no matter what they said about the need to protect their technology, human resources, passive security. I don’t look only at the legal issue but the political implication.

Even if Tehran failed to report to you on time, don’t you think it was reasonable for them to be secretive given the open threats Israel and the U.S. have made of a military attack on their nuclear facilities?

That’s why I said using the language of force is not helpful. It leads to confrontation, to the other country taking counteraction. It is better to forget the language of coercion and focus on trying to engage in dialogue.

Delhi upset over separate Chinese visas for Kashmiris

The message as seen by the Indian side: China does not believe Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India and is, in a sense, reiterating its intent to make territorial claims there...








30 September 2009
The Hindu

Delhi upset over separate Chinese visas for Kashmiris

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: In a move that has puzzled and annoyed South Block, the Chinese embassy in New Delhi has begun issuing visas to Indian passport holders from Jammu and Kashmir on a separate sheet of paper rather than stamping them in their passports as is the norm with other Indian citizens. Though it is not clear when the new Chinese policy started or what prompted Beijing to adopt it, immigration authorities at Delhi airport first started noticing the standalone visas a few weeks ago. The Bureau of Immigration, which is run by the Ministry of Home Affairs, initially assumed these visas to be fake and turned the unfortunate travellers – all of them Kashmiri students or businessmen – away. But when some of them returned with letters from the Chinese embassy declaring the visas to be genuine, the matter was referred to the Ministry of External Affairs.

With the Chinese issuing “stapled visas” to the handful of Indian passport holders from Arunachal Pradesh who have travelled to China since 2007, the MEA saw in Beijing’s latest move an attempt to question the status of Jammu and Kashmir. The immigration authorities were told to treat any visa that is not stamped on a passport as invalid for the purposes of travel. Simultaneously, the issue was taken up with the Chinese authorities, MEA officials told The Hindu.

Although the People’s Republic of China embassy in Delhi said it would not officially comment on the matter, Chinese diplomats told The Hindu that the practice of issuing visas on a separate piece of paper is not new. “This kind of visa is one category of Chinese visa. It is valid. This has been practised for many years. Upon the implementation of this, a note was sent to your immigration authorities. All the visa holders of this kind have not met any problem in the past in your custom/border control,” an embassy official said on condition of anonymity.

The MEA denies the contention that India has only now started objecting to some pre-existing Chinese practice of issuing Kashmiri domicile passport holders visas on a separate sheet of paper. “What the Chinese are doing is definitely new and we have taken a serious view of it,” an MEA official said.

Visa standoff leaves Kashmiri students in limbo

India will not accept China travel document that is not stamped in passport ...

30 September 2009
The Hindu

Visa standoff leaves Kashmiri students in limbo

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: Chinese diplomats may insist their policy of issuing a loose visa to Indian passport holders from Kashmir is not new but the fact is that scores of Kashmiris have travelled to China before on visas that were stamped in their passports rather than stapled to it. “I have travelled to China three times,” the former Water Resources Minister Saifuddin Soz told The Hindu. “My passport shows my address in Baramulla, Kashmir but each time I have travelled with a visa stamped inside.” Mr. Soz said the new policy of issuing Chinese visas on a separate sheet was “completely unacceptable.”

“We knew they were doing this for passport holders from Arunachal Pradesh but until recently, Kashmiris, like other Indians travelling to China, were always issued regular visas stamped on a passport page,” a senior official from the Ministry of External Affairs said. “That now appears to have changed.”

At the same time, the Chinese embassy appears to be correct in noting that travellers with a stapled rather than stamped visa sheet have not been stopped in the past, though the number of such travellers — presumably all of them from Arunachal Pradesh — was itself very small. In 2007, Professor Marpe Sora from Itanagar, apparently the first Arunachali to visit China, did so with a visa that was not stamped in his passport. He was not stopped by airport authorities in India.

The issue has cropped up now, a Chinese diplomat told The Hindu, “purely because of the change of mind of your authorities. They know much better than anybody else.”

Indian officials deny this. “If an Indian citizen left the country in the past with a loose leaf visa, this has more to do with our lax border control systems. That doesn’t mean the Government of India has accepted the validity of this kind of visa.” Until recently, the number of people from Arunachal Pradesh or Jammu and Kashmir visiting China was very low. So it was possible such Chinese visas passed under the radar, the officials said. “But now that this has been brought to our notice, we cannot accept it.”

Whatever the compulsions of grand strategy and politics, however, the new visa policy has been a calamity for those Kashmiri students who were hoping to go to China for higher education, many of them on full scholarships. In the case of one Srinagar-based student, who sought The Hindu’s assistance in the matter after being turned back from Delhi airport twice, the Chinese university where he was to be enrolled informed him that it could no longer hold his place and that he would have to re-apply for admission again next year.

Though several Kashmiris have been stranded as a result, the new Chinese policy is not without its wrinkles. A Kashmiri student domiciled in Srinagar, who applied for a visa to study at the same university as his friend who had received a stapled visa three days earlier, was given a stamped visa. Asked about this and other examples from the past of Kashmiris receiving stamped visas, the Chinese diplomat said this was “not possible.”

In the case of Arunachalis, too, there are idiosyncrasies. A former Member of Parliament from Arunachal Pradesh, Kiran Rijju, got a visa to visit China in 2008 after he surrendered his diplomatic visa for a normal Indian one. His visa was stamped inside his passport, perhaps because it gave a Delhi permanent address and his birthplace was listed only as ‘Nakhu, A.P.’ “I think the fact that the State’s name was left abbreviated may have made the granting of the visa easier,” Mr. Rijju told The Hindu.

In the case of three Kashmiri students, whose story was reported recently in the Srinagar-based Greater Kashmir, two received loose visas and were not allowed to leave Delhi while a third got a stamped visa because he was settled in Delhi. “When we have the same Indian passport, why [is] a different visa issued to other Indian citizens?,” one of the students who was unable to fly was quoted as saying.

While the new visa policy has left dozens of Kashmiri students in India frustrated, there is worry about what will happen to those already pursuing their studies in Chinese universities. Though all of them are on stamped visas, many fear being given a loose visa when they return home and apply for their annual extension, thereby getting stranded mid-course.

Countries issue separate paper visas for one reason alone: so that no trace of the traveller having visited is left behind. Sometimes, as in the case of Israel, this is done to protect the traveller from being denied entry to a country which regards a prior visit to the Zionist state as a disqualification. But the absence of an official seal in a passport also helps one country with a territorial claim or dispute on another to avoid extending legal recognition to the latter’s possession of the territory under question.