04 May 2003

Cluster bomb use may be war crime

4 May 2003
The Times of India

Cluster bomb use may be war crime

By Siddharth Varadarajan
Times News Network

New Delhi: There are bombs that simply kill and then
there are bombs which subdivide into hundreds of
bomblets, which linger on the 'battlefield', literally
shredding their unsuspecting victims to pieces. Mixed in
with the thousands of tonnes of massively destructive
ordnance being dropped on Iraq since the US-UK attack
began two weeks ago are cluster bombs, easily among the
most vicious weapons in the US and British arsenal.
Already, more than 200 civilians have been killed by
these munitions alone in separate bombing runs in Basra,
Hilla and Baghdad.

The US extensively used cluster bombs in its war in
Afghanistan in 2001 and also against Yugoslavia in 1999,
to devastating effect in terms of civilian casualties.

Though it seems futile to employ the discourse of
international humanitarian law in a war where all legal
considerations appear to have been thrown to the wind,
human rights groups say cluster bombs are definitely on
the margins of legality. Indeed, their use in situations
where it is impossible to discriminate between combatants
and civilians almost certainly constitutes a war crime.

The Geneva Conventions which US defence secretary Donald
Rumsefld famously invoked when US prisoners of war were
shown on TV screens ban indiscriminate attacks that
strike military objects and civilians or civilian objects
without distinction. ''While not entirely
indiscriminate'', says Human Rights Watch, ''cluster
bombs are prone to be indiscriminate''. They also fail
another Geneva Conventions test by being impossible to
properly target.

The indiscriminate nature of cluster bombs is exemplified
by the high 'failure' rate, i.e. the number of bomblets
that do not immediately explode but detonate later when
civilians step over them. A Pentagon study has estimated
the failure rate to be as high as 16 per cent. Since
these dud bomblets certainly do not differentiate between
combatants and civilians, the weapon clearly falls foul
of the laws of war.

Though no war crimes prosecutions have ever been moved
over the use of cluster bombs, the emergence of the
International Criminal Court does provide at least a
theoretical possibility for individual Iraqi victims to
seek justice. Entire families in Hilla, near Baghdad,
were wiped out by these bombs on Tuesday. The US is not a
signatory to the ICC and has threatened military action
against any country that attempts to detain and hand over
American military personnel to the international court.
Britain and Australia, however, have signed up to the
ICC, so their soldiers, commanding officers and political
leaderships could well be held accountable for war crimes
committed in Iraq.

30 April 2003

Yes, But Where Are the Saddam Look-Alikes?

The Times of India, April 30, 2003

Yes, but where are the Saddam look-alikes?

By Siddharth Varadarajan

Ever since the fall of Baghdad, everyone's been asking where's Saddam and where are the weapons of mass destruction he allegedly had. Fair enough. But the question that intrigues me the most is this: Where on earth are his famed look-alikes? If Saddam is dead, did they all, to the last man, die with him? And if he's slipped out of the country -- to Syria, Belarus, wherever -- did he manage to take each and every one of his replicas with him? Are there, even as we speak, a dozen Saddams sadly sipping vodka (doubles, no doubt) in some seedy bar in Minsk or Vitebsk?

From the first day, Iraqi television began broadcasting footage of a defiant Saddam untouched by the US `decapitation strike' against him, the American and British media have been telling us not to trust our own eyes. Even though you think you're seeing Saddam, reporters told us breathlessly, you can't be sure because the Iraqi leader is known to use a series of body doubles for his public appearances. This claim was often simply asserted as fact, or at best sourced to "Iraqi exiles" and "Western intelligence agencies".

To tell you the truth, I was always a bit skeptical about this explanation. First of all, in the 38 years I've been around on this planet, I've yet to see any human being with an exact body double, let alone several such human replicas so perfect in every manner as Saddam's were said to be.

And then there was the administrative aspect which bothered me. Was there a special department of the Iraqi government which kept track of the look-alikes, graded them according to quality and reliability, and decided whether Saddam 1, 4 or 8 should be used for such and such appearance? Finally, what would happen if one of the look-alikes - or his handlers - were to assert that the real Saddam was actually an impostor and order his summary execution? Was there a procedure laid down conclusively to identify the real McCoy? DNA tests, blood groups, perhaps a conveniently inflicted scar on the derriere?

On my part, I'm willing to bet that the failure of the US occupiers to locate and capture even one of the alleged Saddam doubles strongly suggests the Iraqi leader never had any. I reckon the story about body doubles is a classic psy-op, a theory probably floated by the Pentagon's erstwhile Office of Strategic Influence in order to demoralize and disorient the enemy. I don't know who or how this bit of information warfare was first foisted on the media but once it was out there, there was no shortage of journalists and editors gullible enough to retail an obviously suspect, nonfalsifiable theory.

But the psy-ops didn't end there. Throughout the war, the Pentagon used the media to spread disinformation about the course of the fighting, inventing civilian uprisings where there were none (Basra), chemical weapons factories where there were none (near Najaf), Iraqi anti-aircraft fire falling back onto earth to kill civilians (rather than US missiles being responsible), and bizarre claims about Iraqi soldiers "pushing women and children on to the street" and firing at "coalition forces" from behind these "human shields." Though the last claim has by now entered war lore, there is not even one credible eyewitness account from an embedded journalist to substantiate this charge, let alone establish that this was a widespread, pervasive Iraqi tactic. What the claim did, however, was to shift the blame for civilian deaths away from the invading army and on to the defenders.

The most impressive psy-op of the war, however, occurred on its last day, when US soldiers toppled a statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdous Square, Baghdad. The square is right opposite the Palestine Hotel where foreign journalists were staying. All US TV stations showed carefully framed, close-up footage of what seemed like a largish crowd toppling the statue with the assistance of a US army vehicle. The footage was shown live for hours, repeatedly broadcast throughout the day, especially by CNN and BBC, and cited by US leaders as proof of the 'legitimacy' of the war.

While most Iraqis were glad to be rid of Saddam, they had been reluctant to perform in large numbers for the invading army. With the blood of 2,000 Iraqi civilians and 10,000 soldiers on their hands, Bush and Rumsfeld needed cathartic footage of the oppressed masses surging forward towards freedom. The Firdous Square statue toppling was conceived for this purpose and executed brilliantly.

Had TV cameras shown a long shot of Firdous Square, the impression the toppling would have created would be very different. There is a long shot posted on the web (http://nyc.indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=55384&group=webcast) which shows a largely empty square cordoned off by US tanks. Small clusters of Iraqis outside the square can be seen watching the toppling of the statue, as silent spectators rather than active participants.

Now, the question is, who were the few dozen Iraqis trying to bring the statue down? Obviously people the Americans trusted because the footage clearly shows some two dozen boisterous men clambering on top of the US army vehicle and charging at the statue. Remember, this was barely ten days after the suicide attack in central Iraq which claimed the lives of four US soldiers and a few days after nervous, trigger happy marines had mowed down a whole family when their car didn't slow down at a checkpost.

But even if the statue topplers were men the Americans could trust, who were they? Photographs doing the rounds on the Net strongly suggest they were members of Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress militia who had been flown into Nasiriya on April 6. One INC man in uniform shown with Chalabi at Nasiriya reappears in civilian clothes in a Reuters photograph from Baghdad on April 9, the day the statue is toppled, celebrating the entry of US soldiers. Readers can view and compare the two photographs at the same website mentioned above.

The only explanation for the coincidence is that like Saddam, the Chalabi supporter also has a body double. Wily aren't they, these Iraqis?

25 April 2003

Ungrateful Ali: The Painful Paradox of Embedded Freedom

25 April 2003
The Times of India


Ungrateful Ali
The Painful Paradox of Embedded Freedom


By Siddharth Varadarajan

As he ran his tank deep into Iraq three weeks ago, Sgt Sprague from White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, took time off momentarily to reflect upon the noble campaign he was part of. "These people got nothing," he told the Guardian's James Meek. "We've been all the way from Basra to here and I ain't seen one shopping mall or fast food restaurant. Even in a little town like ours, you got a McDonald's at one end and a Hardee's at the other." The victors of every war produce their own narratives -- some epochal, some ephemeral -- to chronicle or celebrate, criticize, rationalize or exorcise the furies of armed conflict. But as the nature of the battlefield changes, so too must its literature. If Sgt Sprague's observations seem slender compared to, say, Thucydides, this is perhaps because the historian of the Peloponnessian War had 27 years of fighting to reflect upon. And though shorter, the Mahabharata war -- chronicled by Sanjaya, perhaps the world's first "embedded journalist" -- took so many complex twists that the story perforce ran into several volumes.

In any case, how does one chronicle a war where we are told both sides emerged victorious? There is no doubt that the U.S. won. But having proclaimed victory -- crowning its triumph with the staged, spectatorial toppling of a Saddam statue -- and installed a retired American general as viceroy, the Bush administration says the real victors are the Iraqis themselves. Iraqis who are now free, as Donald Rumsfeld put it generously, "to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things." Even loot museums and burn libraries. "Freedom's untidy," the U.S. defence secretary told CNN. "Stuff happens." Fortunately for the Iraqi people, the untidiness of Rumsfeldian freedom did not extend to the country's oil wealth. As Baghdad descended into chaos last week, the one building U.S. troops secured -- by coincidence, presumably -- was the oil ministry.

Unlike the Mahabharata, the chroniclers of Operation Iraqi Freedom have not been tormented by moral dilemmas, self-doubt or remorse. Consider this uplifting performance by CNN's Kyra Phillips last week. Phillips was interviewing Dr Imad al-Najada, the Kuwaiti surgeon treating a 12-year-old Iraqi child, Ali, who lost his arms -- and his entire family -- in the U.S. bombing.

CNN: Doctor, Tell us what this little boy has been saying to you.

Dr al-Najada: Actually, today he was in good condition... and started speaking with a journalist. The thing which he (asked Ali was) what message he wants to reflect from the war. He said, first of all, thank you for the attention they're giving to him, but he hopes nobody from the children in the war will suffer like what he suffer.

CNN: Doctor, does he understand why this war took place? Has he talked about Iraqi freedom and the meaning? Does he understand it?

I didn't see the live interview, and the transcript on CNN's website provides no hint of how the doctor reacted to Ms Phillips' touching belief that little Ali -- "free" at last but orphaned, burned and bereft of limbs -- would actually be grateful to the U.S.. The transcript merely records the doctor replying that he hadn't discussed this issue with Ali because "he's in very bad psychological trauma." "But," he added, "we discussed this issue with his uncle and the message we got from his family, they said they are living far away from the American troops, from the military of Saddam...and they don't know how they (i.e. the U.S.) hit them by missiles."
After insisting for years that sanctions imposed to force Iraq to give up weapons of mass destruction did not affect ordinary Iraqis, the U.S. is now citing their plight to demand sanctions end immediately. The only problem is that the thousands of litres of anthrax and nerve agents that the U.S. insisted Iraq has have not yet been found.

If sanctions are lifted today without these WMD being accounted for, they could just as easily have been lifted before the war started, or even many years earlier, before the blood of the half a million Iraqi children UNICEF says died as a result was spilt.

The U.S. wants sanctions to be lifted so that Iraqi oil can be exported, the revenues used to defray the costs of military occupation and U.S. oil companies can take lucrative upstream positions there. The UN must not cooperate. Until the WMD are fully accounted for by UN weapons inspectors or the Iraqi people manage to end the U.S. occupation, Iraqi oil revenues must go only into a UN-run account. Here, their use can be regulated to ensure companies from the U.S. -- which defied the UN in invading Iraq -- do not benefit from the aggression.

The embargo on non-military imports can immediately be suspended without the WMD being accounted for, provided the U.S. acknowledges in the Security Council that its stated rationale for invading Iraq -- to destroy prohibited weapons it finally never found -- had no legal basis. The U.S. must also agree to submit its political and military leadership to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court for the Prosecutor to establish the extent of their liability for war crimes and the crime of aggression.

Finally, Ali and other victims of the U.S. invasion -- and of the economic sanctions kept in place all these years by Washington -- should be allowed to sue the U.S. government. The money for Iraq's reconstruction should come from these reparations, and not from the oil resources of a people who have already suffered so much.

06 April 2003

US may not be able to treat Iraqi fighters as terrorists

6 April 2003
The Times of India

US may not be able to treat Iraqi fighters as terrorists

By SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
Times News Network

NEW DELHI: Can the irregular Iraqi fighters who launch suicide attacks
on the occupying US and British armies be called terrorists because
they are not wearing uniforms? Pentagon commanders say they can and US
President George W Bush has threatened to put the Iraqi leadership on
trial for war crimes for instigating this form of resistance.


However, US troops in Afghanistan have been operating in civilian
clothes for more than a year without anyone in Washington remembering
to invoke the Geneva Conventions. This, despite the fact that the US
tactic has created problems for aid workers as well as international
peacekeepers.


On February 19, 2003, the Christian Science Monitor's correspondent in
Kabul reported an incident in which Dutch soldiers surrounded a Toyota
pick-up full of heavily armed men, wearing civilian clothes and bushy
beards. The men turned out to be US soldiers. Last January, the
Guardian published an article by two volunteers from Medecins Sans
Frontieres who complained that the US policy of operating
out-of-uniform led many Afghans to suspect aid workers were actually
soldiers.


Unmindful of this double standard, the Pentagon says Iraqi fighters
found operating in civilian clothes would be deemed illegal combatants
or terrorists rather than POWs and could be incarcerated at the US
naval base at Guantanamo, Cuba.


Several hundred Iraqi civilians have already been arrested by the US
and British occupying forces on suspicion of being members of the
Saddam Fidayeen. CNN on Saturday showed footage of the British 1st
Fusiliers brutally arresting Iraqi civilians from their homes near
Basra, forcing them to squat in the open sun with canvas and even
plastic bags tied around their heads. The right of a people to resist
foreign occupation on their own territory is considered almost
absolute in international law.


Indeed, attempts by the US and Israel to brand armed action by
irregular forces against an occupying power as terrorism in the
ongoing UN negotiations over an International Convention on Terrorism
have proved unsuccessful so far. Leaving aside the irony of labeling
as terrorism a suicide attack on Iraqi soil by Iraqi nationals against
occupying soldiers when more than 1,000 civilians have already been
killed by invisible US and British bombs, the Pentagon plan for
deporting Iraqis to Guantanamo is most certainly barred by the Geneva
Conventions.


Article 49 of the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, states: "Deportations from occupied
territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any
other country are prohibited regardless of motive." And Article 76
states: "Protected persons accused of offences shall be detained in
the occupied country, and if convicted, they shall serve their
sentences therein."

26 March 2003

America's Endless War: The World is Not Enough

26 March 2003
The Times of India

America's Endless War
The World is Not Enough

By Siddharth Varadarajan

Forget the shock and awe-inspiring pornography of massive explosions filmed from the sky, the plaintive faces of civilians being bombed into liberation or even the plucky resistance of Iraqi partisans. For me, the most compelling image of the US-led aggression against Iraq was what happened in Umm Qasr on the first day of the ground invasion. A spokesman for the invaders declared that the port had been secured. And to emphasise the reality of American conquest, the Iraqi flag was torn down from the docks and the Stars and Stripes hastily hoisted in its place.

For a war officially meant to be about Iraqi Freedom, not occupation, that rudely fluttering American flag was an unsettling intimation of what the future really has in store. Anxious that the illusion of piety surrounding Anglo-American intentions be maintained, British defence secretary Geoff Hoon counselled his US counterpart that the dockyard spectacle not be repeated in a hurry.

The offending flag was removed because it was a naive and unnecessary expression of war aims. The Bush administration knows that once it succeeds in bombing president Saddam Hussein out of power and installing an administrative arrangement of its own choosing — i.e. when it switches from rule by ordnance to rule by ordinance — US interests will be well looked after. Already, reconstruction contracts are being earmarked for politi-cally well-connected American corporations like Halli-burton and Bechtel, and oilmen from Texas have begun making their first forays into Iraq's Rumaila oil field.

Apart from the strategic pay-off in getting to decide how much Iraqi oil is produced and to whom it is sold, there's serious money to be made for American companies. The Iraqi oil industry will need some capital investment but given the high quality of the oil and the relatively low extraction costs, profits will be enormous. Nationalisation of the oil industry in most Arab countries over the years has led to US oil companies being restricted to downstream, i.e. refining and marketing, activities. But the real profits are in upstream, i.e. extraction, operations.

If Saddam Hussein is overthrown, US oil companies would be well placed to gain control of Iraqi reserves from the extraction to marketing stage. The US could also block Russian, French and Chinese oil majors from benefiting. Finally, control over the international oil trade will help to protect the dollar's dominant position vis-a-vis long-term rivals like the euro.

But this war is about more than just oil: It is about cementing the domination of the US in a world that is likely to undergo fundamental economic and strategic changes in the next few decades. This strategy goes back to the 1990s, when the Clinton administration adopted a national security document explicitly built around the objective of preventing the emergence of rival powers. Through a combination of containment, co-optation and IMF condi-tionalities, China, Russia, France-Germany, India, Japan, Korea and Indonesia have all been kept in check thus far.

Faced with the prospects of a multipolar world, the first preoccupation of the Clinton presidency was to ensure that the US remained indispensable for European security. The expansion of NATO, the intervention in Bosnia and, finally, the illegal attack on Yugoslavia in 1999, were all aimed at discouraging Europe from entertaining the idea that it could get by without the US. Washington achieved its objectives, but only in part.

Today, as the Franco-German axis of opposition to the Iraq war demonstrates, the fissures between Europe and the US run deep. It is no mere coincidence that the continent of Asia, whose economy is set to grow the fastest in the coming years, is also where all of America's 'rogue states' or potential 'rogue states' are. The terrorists who executed 9/11 gave the US the opportunity to insert itself militarily into the very heart of Central Asia, where oil and gas reserves rival those of West Asia.

Under the 'axis of evil' thesis and the illegal doctrines of pre-emptive war and regime change, the US is preparing the ground for military intervention elsewhere in Asia. Iran and North Korea have already been given notice, but Syria, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan could also end up feeling the heat. In both the oil surplus regions of West and Central Asia and the oil deficient regions of East and South Asia, the US aim is to use its overwhelming military might to control and manage the flow of energy resources. This is what Mr Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney's promised 'endless war' against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction is all about.

For a country like India, the choice is clear: It must join hands with others in Asia and elsewhere to resist this growing US intervention. Unfortunately, the Vajpayee government is in a myopic mode. A very senior government source told an off-the-record briefing last week that India's policy was not to alienate the US over Iraq for fear of what Washington might do in the UN over Kashmir. But if the US is allowed to get away with aggression in Iraq, this will increase the likelihood of it using Kashmir as a lever to ensure Indian compliance. Security can never be bought by meekly watching the schoolyard bully attack others in the hope that he will forget about you.

24 March 2003

U.S. remembers the law on POWs, belatedly

24 March 2003
The Times of India

U.S. Remembers the Law on PoWs, Belatedly

By Siddharth Varadarajan
Times News Network

New Delhi: For a televised war which began with triumphant and sometimes seemingly staged footage of Iraqi soldiers surrendering and being taken into custody, the images of American soldiers in Iraqi captivity were a shocking and unwelcome intrusion.

Less than eight hours after a U.S. marines spokesman in Qatar dismissed as "Iraqi lies" reports of American soldiers being captured, Al-Jazeera incensed the Pentagon by broadcasting footage of five U.S. prisoners of war in Iraqi custody. U.S. defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared that Iraq was violating the Geneva Conventions by putting American PoWs on show.

Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention mandates that war prisoners be protected against "insult and public curiosity." "The showing of these pictures is absolutely unacceptable," declared U.S. Lt Gen John Abizaid in Qatar, condemning Al-Jazeera for its PoW broadcast. As if on cue, U.S. television networks refrained from showing the images, and at least one major U.S. daily, the Los Angeles Times, immediately withdrew the images from its website.

This unofficial censorship extended into cyberspace as well. Yellowtimes.org, an anti-war "guerrilla" webpage, posted photographs of the U.S. PoWs only to find its hosting provider shutting down its site for displaying "inappropriate graphic material."

Ironically, most U.S. channels and newspapers had no compunctions running images of Iraqi soldiers and combatants surrendering or being held in captivity.

Prior to Sunday, the last time Rumsfeld used the words "Geneva Convention" was when he declared that prisoners taken by the U.S. in Afghanistan would not be accorded the protection of the Conventions. The suspected al-Qaeda captives, he declared, were "unlawful combatants"; and the U.S. had the right to do with them what it wished. On the day the al-Qaeda prisoners were brought to Guantanamo Bay, Amnesty International declared the U.S. in violation of the Geneva Conventions.

Article 5 of the Third Convention declares that if doubts should arise about the precise status of captives, "such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal." No competent tribunal has adjudicated on the matter, said Amnesty.

As for the Iraq war, more problematic than the PoWs issue is the use of heavy firepower by the U.S. in civilian areas. The Fourth Geneva Convention mandates that civilians be protected in times of war but the U.S. has been dropping missiles and cluster bombs in urban areas. Already, some 200 Iraqi civilians have been killed since the U.S. invasion began.

21 March 2003

Firm linked to Cheney may net Iraq deals

21 March 2003
The Times of India

Firm linked to Cheney may net Iraq deals

SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
TIMES NEWS NETWORK

NEW DELHI: US ambassador Robert Blackwill may have dangled the carrot of Indian companies taking part in the "reconstruction" of Iraq after the war is over, but the Bush administration has already made it clear that the lion’s share will go to US companies.

Among a select set of US corporates invited to submit hush-hush bids for $900 million worth of reconstruction contracts are Kellog Brown and Root, a subsidiary of the Houston-based Halliburton Co, and the San Francisco-based Bechtel Group Inc Halliburton, a company with extensive interests in civilian construction and oil equipment, was headed by Dick Cheney till 2000, when he sold his stock and quit to run for vice-president as George W Bush’s partner.

Bechtel has also had close associations with power, having employed former secretary of state George Schulz, former defence secretary Caspar Weinberger and former CIA chief William Casey.

The Wall Street Journal reported last week about the existence of a secret 13-page document put out by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) titled "Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq".

USAID sent a detailed "request for proposals" to five top US construction firms. The other three are Fluor Corp and Parsons Corp of California, and the Louis Berger group of New Jersey.

The contract is for repairing and rebuilding roads, water systems, bridges, schools and hospitals and is likely to be a very small part of a much more substantial pork barrel.

"The maximum value of just the initial contract would be more than double what the US is spending in 2002-4 to rebuild Afghanistan," the Wall street Journal reported.

What is in the pipeline is "the largest government reconstruction effort since Americans helped to rebuild Germany and Japan after World War II".

23 February 2003

A sad story of hatred

23 February 2003
Dawn


A sad story of hatred

Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy
Edited by Siddharth Varadarajan
Penguin, 2002.

Reviewed by Sidharth Bhatia

<http://www.dawn.com/weekly/books/images/bk23-11.jpg>

Gujarat state in India was so far known for the leaders who came from
there - Gandhi, Jinnah and Patel among them, for the enteprenuerial
spirit of its natives and for its high growth rate. Since exactly a
year ago, the name of the state has become synonymous with possibly
the worst example of communal riots in independent India.

Not that India has not seen religious troubles and anti-minority
violence. But the 2002 riots were different. They were executed with
clinical precision and moreover, the state and its arms emerged as
actors in the violence. The riots, which have also been called
genocide and a pogrom, were the result of not merely state
inefficiency, but worse, state complicity.

There has been enough documentation to show that top functionaries of
the state, whose task it was to protect the lives of citizens,
instead, through their acts of omission and commission, allowed the
violence to proceed unabated. Not surprisingly they resulted in the
death of between 1000 and 2000 innocent people, depending on whose
version you believe. The report of Human Rights Watch, called "we have
no orders to save you", which is apparently a quote of a police
officer, has done a fine job of documenting the killings.

Now comes a book, Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy, which provides not
only a record of sorts of the events leading upto the week long danse
macabre, but also contextualizes the entire episode by looking at the
socio-cultural profile of a province which till the other day was
being held out as an example of model growth.

Edited by journalist Siddharth Varadarajan, whose paper The Times of
India , like many others, did a fine job of covering the entire story,
the book is divided into three broad sections: The violence, the
aftermath and general essays and analyses which range from the
romantic to the quasi-academic.

All the pieces add up together to a horrific tragedy which in a sense
was almost inevitable, given the breakdown of the old social orders in
Gujarat accompanied by the unchecked, indeed, encouraged, emergence of
the forces of hatred and divisiveness.

But it is also a sad story of the collapse of simple law and order, of
a state which simply decided to abdicate its most fundamental
responsibility, namely, the protection of all its citizens, especially
the minorities. The brutal killings, lootings, rape and even hacking
of children make for horrific reading and cannot be justified on any
grounds.

This comes through over and over again. In "License to Kill: Patterns
of Violence in Gujarat", academic Nandini Sundar examines many cases
of violence which show that the police simply failed to, or worse,
neglected to perform their duties. It is axiomatic, she writes, that
the mass violence perpetrated by the Sangh Parivar (the common name by
which forces of Hindutva are called) could not have been perpetrated
on Muslims without the indulgence or even active support of the
police.

She also writes about a fascinating new trend, which this reviewer had
seen in an incipient stage a decade ago in Mumbai. That was the
emergence of well-heeled looters and rioters who come out to "join the
fun"; they are a kind of lumpen bourgeoisie, materially comfortable
but sans any cultural moorings, who seem to lose their values and
civic sense in such moments.

Jyoti Punwani has done an excellent job of reporting on the burning of
the train in Godhra, in which 58 Hindus died, and which lit the spark
of "revenge" among "ordinary" Hindus who then went out to kill
Muslims. But, as Sundar has shown, the reprisals were hardly
spontaneous, given that the perpetrators had lists of Muslim homes and
businesses and erupted in more than one city.

Another interesting development was the participation of tribals and
dalits in the violence, often in rural areas, where social bonds are
somewhat deeper. For this, one ought to read the essay by G.N. Devy of
the Tribal Academy of Gujarat who writes about how tribals, who do not
belong to any organized mainstream religion, have succumbed to
Hindutva propagandists who have slowly made inroads into villages.

Sociologist Ghanshyam Shah in an insightful essay makes much the same
point in regard to upper caste Hindu efforts to co-opt lower caste
Hindus into the anti-minority agenda, without disturbing the status
quo casteist structure. All these "experiments" have been carried out
in Gujarat, aided and abetted by massive funding from overseas
Gujaratis, who, like most expatriates, feel out of place in their new
homes and are guilt-ridden about the homelands they left behind.

Fundamentalist religion - in this case Hinduism - then becomes a kind
of security blanket for such non-residents. The Gujarati diaspora and
its financial contribution to Hindutva organizations certainly
deserved a closer look in this book and this analysis is regrettably
missing.

The role of the media in Gujarat is another factor that has been
covered but not completely. While the "elite" English media has been
criticized by the BJP and others for allegedly fanning communal
flames, (and there is a fitting reply to that in this book), sections
of the Gujarati media raised passions by lurid banner headlines and
uncorroborated stories, all designed to instil fear and insecurity
among Hindus about the dreaded "other". Perhaps one of those papers
should have been allowed to give their defence of why they covered the
story in the way they did.

The book came out before the Gujarat elections, which have shown that
the Gujarat experiment has succeeded beyond the wildest dreams of the
Hindutva brigade. After losing the elections galore, the Bharatiya
Janata Party scored handsomely in Gujarat in elections held a few
months after the pogrom.

Narendra Modi, the chief minister of Gujarat when it was burning, has
emerged as a new vote catcher for his party; his election formula was
based on painting domestic Muslims as a kind of fifth column for
outside powers and to warn insecure Hindus that their lives were in
danger if they did not vote him in. Proof indeed that Goebbelsian
tactics work even in these times of instant communications and
saturation media. Will this formula work in the rest of India? The
next few months are crucial.

For anyone interested in contemporary India and perhaps even in the
pathology of hate mongering, this is an invaluable book. It takes a
look at this shameful episode in Indian history from all sides and
should even serve as a warning to all right thinking secularists - and
not merely Indian ones - that secularism cannot be taken for granted,
it must be fought for all the time to ensure that the forces of hatred
do not dominate. In India, the liberal elites had fallen into the trap
of thinking that secularism was non-negotiable; as the popularity of
the fundamentalists among the middle classes shows, the enemy lies
within.

Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy

Edited by Siddharth Varadarajan

Penguin India.

For more information log on to www.penguinbooksindia.com

ISBN 043029010

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16 February 2003

Nothing but dismay


16 February 2003
The Hindu



Nothing but dismay

Instead of being based on sensational headlines and unsubstantiated conjuctures, Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy is the product of painstaking research, says SOHAIL HASHMI.


THE speed with which books can be put together these days makes one a little dizzy and one approaches any text on unfolding events with some trepidation. Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy came, therefore, as a bit of a surprise. This is a book, that in spite of the speed with which it has been put together, seems not to have suffered the consequences of haste.

Instead of sensational headlines, and unsubstantiated conjuctures, there is painstaking research. Every fact checked and rechecked, every source quoted. The authors are either people who have been there and have recorded what they have seen or are academicians, researchers, social workers or activists. In short, the authors are people who are generally respected in their chosen fields. Some of the pieces are based on reports put together by fact-finding teams; here again one finds that any generalisations made have a basis in hard facts.

Yes there is anger and there well might be. The terrible pogrom and carnage can hardly provoke any other sentiment but rage, a deep-seated hurt that wrenches your insides, occasioning dismay, utter and absolute, at the abysmal depths to which the human animal can reduce itself.

If you want to learn about the capabilities of myopic politicians and born again fanatics riding on the shoulders of packaged and encapsulated religion, read this book.

It will tell you about Juned, a little boy who gets up in his sleep and runs screaming: he is trying to escape those who chopped half his family to pieces including a 11/2-year-old cousin. Where can he run and for how long?

Read also about the planning that went into organising the "Spontaneous Reaction" to the "Conspiracy of Godhra". The surveys that were conducted, the sources that supplied the household bomb — the cooking gas cylinder — and the mobilisation of the tribals.

Read also about the slender threads by which hangs hope and about Geetaben killed for the rime of marrying a Muslim. Read all this and decide if these are only biased rantings of pseudo-secularists, as the mini sardars and their leaders will have us believe, or is there more to it?

This is a document not only of Gujarat; it is, in the words of the editor, also a "Chronicle of a Tragedy Foretold" and more. Siddharth Vardarajan, Nandini Sundar, Teesta Setalvad, Vibhuti Narain Rai, Barkha Dutt, The Women's Panel, The PUDR Report and Vrinda Grover, all point to the role of the police and the administration either in abetment or direct involvement, both in the pogroms and then in the efforts to shield the criminals. If such things were possible in this land, this book could become the basis of a Nuremberg.

The book is however not a mere catalogue of dates, incidents, numbers killed and such like. It is like the surgical knife that Manto used in his stories of Partition to slice through the façade of decency of the middle class to expose the festering sores of bigotry and intolerance. The difference is Manto was writing fiction.

The perpetrators of the violence in Gujarat — the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the Bajrang Dal and their cohorts — swear by Golwalkar, known also as Guruji. This revered teacher wrote in 1939 "... Germany has also shown how well nigh impossible it is for races and cultures, having differences going to the root, to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindusthan to learn and profit by."

The Nazi Black Shirts put the Star of David on each house where Jews lived, so that no mistakes were made. The saffron scarved and black savarkar capped disciples of guruji put posters of Hanuman outside every Hindu house with the same objective.

The Khaki shorts have learnt their lesson well. This book is not for them: it may help others to prevent another Gujarat.

Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy, edited by Siddharth Varadarajan,

Penguin Books India 2002, p. 460, Rs. 295

Sohail Hashmi is into documentary filmmaking.

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu


04 February 2003

US Testing Use of 'Small Nukes'

4 February 2003
The Times of India

"If the computer tests suggest an "acceptable" civilian casualty rate, Washington would presumably not be squeamish about using bunker-busting nukes."

US Testing Use of 'Small Nukes'

Siddharth Varadarajan
Times News Network

New Delhi: The Bush administration is actively researching the implications of a nuclear attack on deep underground bunkers using computers to test the 'kill and spill' levels of bunker-busting 'small' nuclear weapons.

The program details of which were reported in the Los Angeles Times on Monday provides further evidence that the US is seriously contemplating the use of nucle ar weapons against Iraq, and possibly other potential adversaries such as North Korea. According to the LAT, the Pentagon "has launched a fast-track program to develop computers that would help decide when nuclear weapons might be used to destroy underground bunkers harbouring weapons of mass destruction".

Apart from determining the amount of force needed, the system "would asses the potential for killing nearby civilians and inflicting other collateral damage, including the spread of radioactive dust thrown into the air by the nuclear device and the dispersal of toxic chemicals from weapons in the bunker".

If the computer tests suggest an "acceptable" civilian casualty rate, Washington would presumably not be squeamish about using bunker-busting nukes.

Whatever the military necessity for such weapons, say critics, the Bush administration's political motivation is to produce nuclear weapons that are 'small' enough to use or 'credibly' threaten an adversary. Pentagon planners feel the destructive potential of regular nuclear weapons is so enormous as to render them politically unusable, especially against a non-nuclear adversary like Iraq.

Though the US has been working for some time to develop a nuclear weapon capability designed to defeat 'Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets' (HBDTs), the programme has received a considerable boost since the election of George W Bush as president.

"This so-called Robust Nuclear Earth penetrator (RNEP) program is part of an overall effort ... called the 'Advanced Concepts Initiative' to look at a variety of new or modified nuclear weapons capabilities", Kathryn randall, a researcher with the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), told The Times of India.

She said the initiative is "certainly very troubling... because it pushes new nuclear designs or modifications that develop new capabilities."

Even though these designs may be validated without any resort to full-scale underground tests, Crandall said they "may still undermine the spirit of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the goal of which has been to curtail development of advanced, new nuclear weapons capabilities".

In a report to the US Congress in 2001, the Pentagon estimated that there are over 10,000 HBDTs worldwide. While very few are of strategic significance, the Pentagon believes the number will increase significantly in the next decade. The onset of lower yield nuclear weapons, says a BASIC report, is shifting the force structure of the US "towards giving nuclear weapons a more prominent role as usable weapons".


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27 January 2003

Dateline Jeddah: Saudis eye India, but Gujarat scares them

27 January 2003
The Times of India

Dateline Jeddah
Saudis eye India, but Gujarat scares them

SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
TIMES NEWS NETWORK

JEDDAH: With Saudi-US relations mired in distrust following 9/11 and
the freezing of bank accounts thought to be linked to terrorist
activity, an increasing number of Saudi businessmen are asking whether
their investments in the US are really secure.

When last year, the wife of the Saudi ambassador in the US was
investigated for having donated money to an individual whose relatives
might have known one of the 9/11 hijackers, the business elite here
kept their fingers crossed. "You never know, your family name shows up
on some list somewhere and, boom, all your money is the US could end
up frozen for nothing," a leading Saudi businessman said.

The stakes are enormous — for both Saudi Arabia and the US. Though
there are no firm statistics, Saudi citizens are estimated to have
parked as much as one trillion dollars in the US. The market rumour is
that $200 billion of that has been pulled out in the past year or so
but Saudi officials and businessmen insist this is highly unlikely.

"As a general rule," said Khalid al-Shelail, deputy director general
of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, "we do not feel our
money there is threatened." For example, Walid bin Talal, the richest
Saudi investor, has said he is not afraid and is not considering
withdrawing any funds.

If there is a financial exodus, say officials, this is likely to be
very, very low-key. Pulling out money in an open way would itself make
the US authorities suspicious, they say.

However, two trends are discernible. Property prices here have begun
to rise as Saudi money returns home; and Saudi investors have begun
actively looking for investment opportunities outside the US,
particularly in Asia. China, Korea, Malaysia and India are considered
attractive destinations.

Last December, the first Saudi business delegation in 25 years visited
India. "We were really impressed with what we saw in Hyderabad, Delhi
and Mumbai," said Walid Fitaihi, a US-returned doctor and businessman
who is building Saudi Arabia's first paperless hospital. Fitaihi even
published a laudatory article on the Indian economy in influential
Arabic daily Okaz.

But even as they wax lyrical about the Indian IT and pharma sectors
and express keenness to do business, Saudi businessmen say they are
troubled by what happened in Gujarat.

"As businessmen, we will go where there is profit and stability," said
Ziad al-Bassam, who headed the Saudi delegation. "And so when we read
about Gujarat, this worries us. What would have happened if I had
built a factory there and it had been burned down because I am a
Muslim?"

"You cannot separate economics and politics," said Fitaihi. "If India
wants money from here, it should simply be true to its own democracy
and treat its Muslims as equal citizens. You should use the Muslims of
India as ambassadors to help bring Arab money in for the development
of the country rather than pushing them aside."

25 January 2003

Dateline Riyadh: Stung by 9/11, Saudis turning their backs on U.S.

January 25, 2003
The Times of India

Dateline Riyadh
Stung by 9/11 response, Saudis turning backs on US

SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
TIMES NEWS NETWORK

Riyadh: Hussein Al-Athel, secretary-general of the Riyadh Chambers of Commerce and Industry, has visited the US every year since Last year, like thousands of other influential Saudi citizens, he decided not to. “Why should I take the risk of being accused of some wrongdoing? They may even misunderstand my name. A tribal name like many of the 9/11 hijackers had can be shared by up to 250,000 Saudis, and then there are thousands of Alis and Mohammeds,” he said.

“There is a feeling here of not wanting to always prove you're innocent.”

A suspicious' name or the whim of the immigration authorities can lead to a Saudi visitor at a US airport being fingerprinted and photographed on arrival. “It's really quite random”, said a Saudi businessman.

“One prince that I know sailed through immigration. Another was taken aside and photographed like a criminal.”

With 15 of the 19 hijackers hailing from Saudi Arabia, the Bush administration seems keen to place obstacles in the way of Saudis visiting the US.

It put pressure on Canada to end its visa free entry for Saudi citizens and even got its southern neighbour, Mexico, to shut down its embassy in August 2002.

So obsessed is Washington with the idea that Al Qaida works on tribal lines that it has introduced a form where visa seekers must spell out the full details of their family, clan and tribal affiliations.

“For us Saudis, that can be complicated,” joked Farooq Luqman, editor of the Jeddah-based daily, Malayalam News, and an Indophile of long standing. “It's much better to just be a Malhotra!”

A senior Saudi official who asked not to be named said Washington's response to 9/11 has undermined an alliance that provided stability to the entire region.

“We have had a long relationship with the US for so many years and look how they treat us now,” he said. Wallahi (By God), I will never visit the US again unless I am required to do so for my work,” the editor of a top-circulating Arabic daily declared at a dinner in a smart restaurant on Jeddah's corniche. “We have all studied in the US and loved that country. But this is the feeling we have today.”

“The way the US is treating Saudis shows that civilised, democratic values are not deep-rooted there,” a businessman said. “Once they are finished with the foreigners, they will start targeting their own people”.

22 January 2003

Dateline Riyadh: In Arab heartland, no appetite for US war on Iraq

22 January 2003
The Times of India

Dateline Riyadh
In Arab heartland, no appetite for US war on Iraq

SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
TIMES NEWS NETWORK

RIYADH: As the build-up of US troops in and around Iraq continues relentlessly and the region waits uneasily for the inevitable, it is clear that Saudi Arabia wants no part in any war against its Arab neighbour.

Saudi Arabia was once considered Washington's most dependable ally, but public opinion here is strongly ranged against the idea of an American attack.

Even members of the ruling elite are emphatic that if and when Iraq is invaded, US forces should not be allowed to use Saudi territory or even airspace for their operations.

"We are very firm that our stand is against war," said Badr Korayme, a ranking member of the Majlis-e-Shoura, the nominated body that is often described as the kingdom's parliament. "We are for change in Iraq provided it is from within. No external attempt to change the regime there is acceptable. Hence, we have very clearly told the US our territories cannot be used against Iraq in any way."

Korayme said that Riyadh would not even allow US bombers from Diego Garcia to overfly Saudi airspace on their way to Iraq.

A senior Saudi economic official, who did not wish to be identified, said that the situation today was "totally different" from the Kuwait crisis of 1991 when Riyadh backed Washington.

"This war is not about Saddam", he said. "After Iraq, the US will turn to Iran. It is all about oil. Wallahi (By God), I worry about the future of Saudi Arabia. You even have people in Washington who talk about the break-up of my country... After 10 years, everything will be against Saudi Arabia. That is why we are concerned, we have to take care of stability in our region."

Saudi apprehensions are largely fuelled by the manner in which the US seems to have turned against the kingdom in the aftermath of 9/11. Stringent visa restrictions - including the finger-printing of many Saudi male visitors to the US - as well as the suspicion that the strategic map of the entire region is somehow being redrawn have rung alarm bells within the Americanised elite.

The leaked Rand Corporation report presented by Laurent Murawiec to a Pentagon panel last August envisaging the "targeting of Saudi oil and financial assets abroad" is seen by Saudis as an augury of the tough times that lie ahead.

Officially, therefore, the normally reticent Saudi government has staked out a fairly rigid public position on the question of a war against Iraq.

Crown Prince Abdullah has said that even if the United Nations were to approve the US plans, diplomacy must be given time to work. Other ministers have said that Riyadh would deny all military and logistics facilities, including overflight rights.

On Thursday, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal will travel to Ankara for a six-nation meeting called by Turkey to explore ways of averting war. Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iran will also participate in the meet.

Though a number of Riyadh-based Western military attaches told Times News Network that the Ankara meeting and the Saudi stand were mere "posturing", it does seem as if this public display of opposition to the US approach has worked to limit Washington's options.

In the absence of explicit authorisation from the UN Security Council, Saudi Arabia and possibly even Turkey would find it difficult to go along with any invasion of Iraq.

Militarily, this means that were the US and Britain to go it alone, the only guaranteed frontage they would have access to for a ground invasion would be the 240-km Kuwaiti border with Iraq. And for that, military experts felt, the US still needed to augment its already fearsome presence in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Persian Gulf.

The alternative would be to push for explicit UN authorisation, something that would be difficult to secure in the absence of a dramatically adverse report by the UN weapons inspectors on January 27.

21 December 2002

State actors in a pogrom


December 21, 2002 - January 3, 2003
Frontline
Volume:19 Issue:26


BOOKS

State actors in a pogrom

NAUNIDHI KAUR

Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy edited by Siddharth Varadarajan; Penguin Books India, New Delhi, 2002; pages 459, Rs.295.


THE complicity of state actors in violence inevitably leads to two kinds of literature on all riots. The first is the official account, in which the nature of the violence is reported to be sporadic and the count of dead is lower than that in most unofficial accounts. The role of the state actors in supporting the riots is either overlooked or taken up in a cursory manner. Such accounts are commonly found in official inquiries. The lack of adequate government documentation leads to the creation of a second set of literature on riots - unofficial investigations, which look into direct and indirect violations by government institutions during the days of violence.

In the case of the Gujarat riots where the issue is of the massacre of a minority community, the implications of the second set of literature assume vital proportions. The Gujarat riots raise questions that trouble sociologists, anthropologists and political theorists.

The volume under review belongs to the second set of literature. It is a compilation of published and unpublished articles by journalists, anthropologists and members of civil networks that are active in Gujarat and elsewhere. It is obvious that the contributors and the editor of the volume have set themselves to the task of recording the horrors of the post-Godhra riots lest they should remain ignored in official records and inquiries.

The volume has three sections - the violence, its aftermath, and essays and analyses. The articles are based on both original and secondary sources, including the writings of scholars, the reports of official and unofficial commissions of inquiry, newspaper columns and magazine articles, and personal research. All these in one form or the other have been arranged and structured according to categories and formats consciously or unconsciously employed by the authors.

The section on violence is a detailed and rounded documentation of what `exactly' happened during the riots. The pattern that the seven chapters share is in interpretive reading of news and other reports published by organisations such as the People's Union of Civil Liberties. This section gives details of the riots - their duration and phases, the identity of the participants and victims, the nature of the violence, the extent to which they were planned, and the actions of State government officials. Some of these topics are comprehensively dealt with by anthropologist Nandini Sunder in her article on the pattern of the violence. The chapter goes into the aspects of police collusion, hate mobilisation and the demography of the violence. In subsequent chapters, some of these topics have been touched upon by other contributors.

A very interesting point often cited, but not elaborated on by Nandini Sunder or any of the other writers, is the role of non-participants in the riots. Nandini Sunder writes that in areas where the riots did not take place, BJP activists sent boxes of bangles to its local party leaders. Although it helped to activate non-participants to join the rioting in some places, at others it did not achieve its objective. So how can the silence of the non-participants be interpreted in Gujarat? Was their silence an approval or a disapproval of the riots? This question is especially relevant in the case of Gujarat where riots followed one another in waves, with some localities reporting a few days of violence followed by peace and then riots.

Also of interest is the chapter `Adivasis and Dalits', written by the Director of the Tribal Academy in Gujarat, Ganesh N. Devy. It examines the persecution of Muslims in the tribal areas of Gujarat and questions how much of it was a measure of the BJP's success. The answer lies in the financial incentives and the local political issues that were used to instigate Adivasis to participate in the rioting, more than their belief in Hinduism as a religion, says Devy.

In the chapter on the role of the media in the riots Siddharth Varadarajan makes an interesting point. He highlights the need to identify the victims of riots by their religion, as "Hindus" and "Muslims", in news reports so that it can be seen which community is being targeted. At the same time, he emphasises that "care should be used to describe the identity of the attackers in news reports". He rightly asks: "By what logic can a politically instigated mob that enjoys the tacit backing of the State law enforcement machinery be labelled as a `Hindu mob'?" In the same section, Rajdeep Sardesai, who extensively covered the 1992-93 Mumbai riots, takes on the Gujarat government's charges against the media and says that the media did not ransack shops or participate in the rioting in Gujarat.

Legal researcher Vrinda Grover shifts the focus to the First Information Reports (FIR) filed during the riots. She exposes how the law-enforcers not only tacitly supported the riots by `looking away' but also ensured the dismissal of riot-related cases at the trial stage by recording inexact FIRs. She has collected details of omnibus FIRs registered by the Gujarat police, where instead of registering separate FIRs, the police recorded a single FIR for several cases. In others, they have deliberately omitted the names of the accused persons. Yet another common feature in the FIRs is that they are prefaced by a detailed account of the burning of the Sabarmati Express at Godhra.

The importance of this volume is that it has accomplished the task of bringing across eyewitnesses who have compiled reports on the riots. Where news reports have been used, their texts have been supplemented by interpretive analysis. In the entire book, the emphasis is on recording events as they took place. In doing this an attempt has been made to place the tragedy of Gujarat beyond the personal, and in a wider explanatory framework. There is a need for as many such accounts as possible, not only to help understand Gujarat better, but also to address the challenge of curbing communal riots in India.

18 December 2002

Beyond the Ballot: The issue in Gujarat is Justice

18 December 2002
The Times of India

Beyond the Ballot
The Issue in Gujarat is Justice

SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN

Moral philosophers may shake their heads in bewilderment but future historians looking back at the spectacular victory recorded by the Bharatiya Janata Party in the Gujarat elections of 2002 will see striking parallels between the triumph of Narendra Modi and the manner in which the Congress under Rajiv Gandhi swept the polls in December 1984.

In both cases, the victorious party won decisively despite being accused of allowing, or even instigating, the massacre of innocent citizens. In 1984, the victims were Sikhs, in 2002, Muslims. In both cases, nearly 40 per cent of the electorate decided to abstain. Of the remaining 60 per cent, half evidently did not see the taint of complicity as a disqualification. They either decided to vote on the basis of other factors, did not know the full facts, went into denial, or — as in Panchmahals, Dahod and Vadodara districts, where the BJP won every riot-hit seat — got overwhelmed by the high-decibel communal propaganda.

In 1984, the Congress dismissed the mass killing of Sikhs as a regrettable "public reaction" to the assassination of Indira Gandhi and then fought a campaign in which her martyrdom and the pro-mise of saving the country from the menace of "Sikh extremism" were strong components. Taking a leaf out of this strategy, Mr Modi and the BJP played down the carnage that followed Godhra as "unfortunate" and built their election strategy around the spurious slogan of saving Gujarat from "Islamic terrorism".

Before the assassination of Indira Gandhi and before Godhra, the Congress nationally and the BJP in Gujarat had hit rock bottom in political terms. Staring defeat in the face and with no real accomplishments to point to, the ruling party in each situation was forced to divert the attention of voters with violence. In a perverse way, that violence was then marketed as an accomplishment, a sign that the ruling party could be counted upon to teach the supposed 'enemies' of the nation 'a lesson they would never forget'. But if 1984 saw subtle appeals by the Congress to a 'Hindu' identity that was still in the process of being created, the BJP-VHP appeals to religion were more direct. In both cases, however, an attempt was made to legitimise the mass-acres by turning the public at large into accomplices — and to close, through the ballot box, a chapter that belonged not to the realm of politics but to that of law and justice.

Morally and legally speaking, however, a dramatic election victory cannot imbue a crime with legitimacy. According to the Indian theory of kingship, a ruler has legitimacy only when he provides security to his people. And without dharma and justice, there can be no security. Just as 415 seats in the Lok Sabha could not cleanse the stain of 1984 from the Congress, the Gujarat violence is destined to become a part of the BJP's past that will not pass.

As on election eve, the biggest question confronting India today is not the sterile debate over 'Hindutva' and 'secularism' but the future of the rule of law. The fate of our democracy revolves around whether those responsible for the violence in Gujarat — from the perpetrators of the Godhra train attack on kar sevaks to those who killed more than 1,000 Muslims across the state — get away scot-free or are punished regardless of their official rank or political affiliation.

In any democracy, it is a frightening thought that a whole coachload of train passengers can be set alight and that 1,000 people can be eliminated in a matter of 72 hours without the law coming down heavily on the perpetrators. How can any civilised society tolerate such anarchy? 'Justice to all, appeasement to none' is what Mr Modi said he stands for. Why is it, then, that his administration has done nothing but appease those among his political supporters who put Gujarat to the torch?

Many would argue that Mr Modi is not bothered about punishing the guilty for obvious reasons. But from the experience of Maharashtra — where the Srikrishna Commission recommendations on the Mumbai riots of 1992-93 remain unimplemented — and the way the Congress ran its campaign in Gujarat, it was clear that a Congress-led government in Gandhinagar would have also swept the issue of justice under the carpet.

It is a bitter lesson but the victims of Gujarat are realising today what the victims of 1984 realised some years ago: In India, if you are a victim of mass violence, votes will be sought in your name and any number of inquiry commissions set up. But justice will never be done and you will never be compensated or rehabilitated. Just ask the Kashmiri Pandit refugees still living in squalid camps in Jammu 12 years after fleeing their homes.

Today, BJP supporters will be jubilant at Mr Modi's victory and Congress supporters despondent. But from the point of view of the victims, the struggle for justice and rehabilitation was always an uphill one anyway and that struggle needs the widest possible support. We need to ask ourselves whether we want to live in a society where the police can turn against the victims of violence, and killers capable of the most heinous crimes are free to roam the streets.

Whether we support the BJP, Congress or any other party, this is a question we all have to answer.

07 December 2002

Times of India review of Gujarat: The Making of a Tragedy, (Ed.) Siddharth Varadarajan

December 7, 2002
The Times of India

Best Reads

Reviewed by Vrinda Nabar

GUJARAT: THE MAKING OF A TRAGEDY

Editor: Siddharth Varadarajan
Publisher: Penguin India


Rating: ****

The book is a collection of articles in three parts ('The Violence', 'The Aftermath', and 'Essays and Analyses') that add up to a numbing dissection of the Gujarat experience.
The single common detail emerging from the whole is that no easy answers can explain what triggered off Godhra, that it was a complex act which shames India's claim to be a secular democracy. As Siddharth Varadarajan says in his excellent and well-researched introduction, 'Chronicle of a tragedy foretold': "For the sake of its soul as a nation, India must reject this corrosive notion of morality which sees in the condemnation of the Gujarat pogrom the diminution of the suffering of the victims of the Godhra carnage, or of other victims of other tragedies."

Recounting the events leading to Godhra, Jyoti Punwani asks a series of troubling questions about the failure of the system as a whole. Her moving account of those who lost their dear ones in 'The carnage at Godhra' is given an added dimension by Nandini Sundar's 'A license to kill' and Teesta Setalvad's 'When guardians betray', both of which expose the collusion of the State administration and the police.

'Nothing new?' takes off on George Fernandes's infamous defence of gender abuse by referring to the events of 1984, and contains contributions by seasoned mediapersons like Barkha Dutt, the evidence of eyewitnesses and the findings of independent teams that visited Gujarat. The horror of this section finds a chilling match in 'Narratives from the killing fields', which also draws on the studies of various citizens groups.

It becomes clear from the other parts of this collection that there has been little significant effort at relief and rehabilitation, that ghettoisation has accelerated, and that February 27 was a turning point in the fragile pluralism of post-Independence India. The last section of the book, which contains brief responses from intellectuals, reaffirms another, liberal tradition that rabid fulminators, our upcoming self-styled nationalists, appear to have erased from memory.

Over the past few months, the Gujarat nightmare has dominated the national consciousness, dividing people along seemingly impenetrable lines. As the debate goes on and the rhetoric of jingoism dogs the forthcoming elections in that State, we are, sadly, no nearer to understanding the tragedy of Godhra and after. This is a disturbing book that I would recommend to every concerned Indian who wishes to ensure that history won't repeat itself.

08 October 2002

POTA's First Trial: An Interview with Prof Rajni Kothari

October 8, 2002
The Times of India

POTA's First Trial
An interview with Prof Rajni Kothari of the S.A.R. Geelani Defence Committee

Rajni Kothari with his grandchildren
Rajni Kothari with his grandchildren

New Delhi: The December 13 Parliament attack trial currently underway in Delhi is the first to be conducted under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). While four persons are in the dock for conspiring with the actual terrorists, a number of prominent citizens have come together to defend one of the accused, Prof S A R Geelani of Delhi University. Prof Rajni Kothari , arguably India’s best-known political scientist, is chairperson of the All-India Defence Committee for Geelani. In an interview with Siddharth Varadarajan he says it is his concern for justice that led him to get involved:

By coming to the defence of one of the accused in the December 13 case, are you not giving ammunition to those who say human rights campaigners don’t care about terrorism?

While fighting terrorism, the state pays scant respect to the law of the land, even POTA. In this situation, it is the duty of a human rights activist to unravel the mix between the legally defensible and illegally imposed charges and to go to the defence of those who have been fraudulently implicated. Our demand for a fair trial of Prof Geelani and the other co-accused is to ensure that real norms of justice are followed.

— Photo: Shanker Chakravarty

OUT OF HOSPITAL: College lecturer S.A.R. Geelani, who was shot at on February 8 in New Delhi, comes out of the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences in the capital on Tuesday.


The police say they have a transcript of a phone conversation between Prof Geelani and his brother in Srinagar which allegedly proves he was involved in the December 13 plot. What is your explanation of the conversation?


The recorded conversation is the only piece of evidence against Geelani. Yet, in spite of repeated requests from the accused and his defence counsel, the court has not allowed the tape to be played in the court. The translation of the Kashmiri conversation has been disputed, as the police did not even bother to get it translated by a competent authority. Instead, they chose a fruit seller who is ‘‘a 5th or 6th standard pass’’, cannot write Hindi, and did not sign the final transcript of the translation as the police did not show it to him.

Such disregard is only compounded by the lack of attention paid to the provisions of POTA in collecting the evidence. Section 44 of POTA lays down three conditions for an interception to be admissible as evidence.

First, that the police should have applied in writing to a senior bureaucrat designated as competent authority by POTA. Second, the competent authority should have authorised the interception (in an emergency, such authorisation can be post facto). And third, copies of the application and the authorisation should be furnished to each of the accused at least 10 days before the commencement of trial. None of this was followed.

Some would say this is legal nit-picking

I would not agree. Isn’t it illogical to assume that law and order can be maintained by permitting the state and its agency to violate the law? If the situation were to come to such a pass, it will adversely affect the civil liberties of every citizen. Already, the judiciary is expressing concern over such arbitrariness. In a recent judgment in The State of Maharashtra vs Jaysingh Wadhu Singh (a case under MCOCA), the judge, while commenting on an illegal telephonic interception, said, ‘‘The plea to consider the evidence obtained by grossly violating the provisions of law on the ground that ‘it is relevant’, or that, ‘in any case, the accused did it’, cannot be accepted. No reason has been suggested for the investigating agency not following the procedural safeguards in the matter of interceptions of the communication in question. That the criminals would escape from punishment due to technicalities and that it is not desirable — as felt in some quarters — cannot result in the court allowing the evidence obtained by unconscionable violation of law to be given or considered against an accused.’’

It is said by advocates of POTA that extraordinary acts of terror like December 13 and the Akshardham temple attack require extraordinary laws.


I am also saddened by the terrorist attacks on Parliament and the Akshardham temple. And one can understand the security concerns they raise. My experience as a human rights activist has convinced me that even though extraordinary laws severely trespass on the civil liberties of the people, they are incapable of checking terror. The now infamous TADA, in spite of its unfettered powers, failed miserably in securing the conviction of those arrested under its provisions.
I, therefore, believe that ‘‘extraordinary laws’’ are not required. The Constitution and existing laws are quite capable of dealing with terrorism.

It takes courage to defend a man you perhaps did not even know before this. Are you absolutely convinced Geelani is innocent?

Till date, the police have presented more than 80 witnesses, most of them from the police department. However, none has accused Geelani of being a member of any terrorist organisation.

The shoddy investigation and the blatant violation of rules and regulations by the police while gathering evidence demonstrate that the charge is not based on any concrete enquiry or investigation. So rather than asking me if I find Geelani innocent, one should ask the police the reasons why they found him guilty.

01 October 2002

A 'regime change' in international affairs

Seminar, October 2002
URL: http://www.india-seminar.com/2002/518/518%20siddharth%20varadarajan.htm

A ‘regime change’ in international affairs

SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN


In the 1990s, it became fashionable to think and talk about ‘exit strategies’. There can be no exit strategy in the war against terrorism. It is a war that will persist. There is unlikely to be…a decisive battle in this war. An exit strategy, therefore, will do us no good. What we need is an endurance strategy.

Richard Haass,

Director, Policy Planning Staff,

US Department of State, 13 September 2002.1

SOMETIMES, the humblest of press releases can tell us more about the true nature of the world we live in than learned disquisitions on international politics. On 21 August 2002, some three weeks before the first anniversary of 9/11, the United States Embassy in New Delhi issued a ‘backgrounder’ titled ‘White House Criticizes Attack on Iraqi Embassy in Berlin’. An armed group of Iraqis in the German capital claiming to represent a hitherto unknown group, the Democratic Iraqi Opposition of Germany, had attempted to take control of the Iraqi embassy there. ‘Actions like this takeover are unacceptable,’ White House press secretary Ari Fleischer was quoted as saying. His concern was that ‘legitimate efforts’ to bring ‘regime change to Iraq’ were being ‘undermined’ by actions like these. ‘At all times the American position is to support the rule of law, the rule of international law… It is not acceptable to have takeovers of other nations’ embassies’ (emphasis added).

Unmindful of the irony, Fleischer was asserting one of the defining principles of global order the way Washington sees it: That in the post 9/11 world, the US intends to establish a monopoly over the use of force internationally and that all other violence perpetrated by states or individuals is illegitimate so long as it does not fit in with US interests. Hence, the attempted takeover of one Iraqi embassy is not acceptable but the take-over of the whole of Iraq (under the euphemism of ‘regime change’) by the Bush administration is considered consistent with the rule of international law.

The catastrophe that occurred on 9/11 has accentuated certain features of US policy already in evidence in the past decade and has also given rise to new and disturbing military doctrines which pose a great threat to international peace and security. However, the underlying thrust of US strategy remains that which was articulated in the early years of the first Clinton administration, namely to prevent the rise of global rivals.

The doctrine of ‘humanitarian intervention’, the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation under a new strategic concept envisaging ‘out of area’ operations, the idea of ‘full spectrum dominance’, including the development of new and more lethal weapons of mass destruction and missile defence, the aggressive promotion of US business interests abroad, the insertion of Washington as a ‘balancer’ in newer areas such as South Asia even as autonomous efforts at peacebuilding elsewhere (such as in the Koreas) are undermined by it – have all served to strengthen the projection of political, economic and military power by the US around the world.

With the collapse of the ‘borderless’ new economy bubble in the last years of the second Clinton administration bringing latent contradictions between the ‘old economy’ industries in the advanced capitalist countries to the fore, American big business – especially in the energy and weapons sector – put its money behind the ‘isolationist’ approach of George W. Bush. What 9/11 did was to resolve the tension between the ‘isolationism’ of the Bush administration and the economic and strategic need of the US to project power globally. The circle was squared by aggressive unilateralism on every front – from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and Missile Defence, to the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, steel tariffs and the International Criminal Court. 9/11 created the political space for Bush to declare that the US would do exactly as it pleased.

So overwhelming is the strength and influence of the US today that other big countries find their ability to exert countervailing power severely curtailed. Russia was forced to acquiesce to Nato’s aggression against Yugoslavia in 1999, Russia and China are helpless spectators of the expanding US presence in Central Asia, and the entire world is being corralled into supporting US aggression against Iraq despite knowing that the reasoning put forward by the Bush administration is fraudulent, mendacious and self-serving. Multilateral bodies like the United Nations are today at best able temporarily to stay the hand of the US, only to end up providing a ‘multilateral’ cover to the unilateral exercise of US power.

It is against this backdrop that President Bush and his advisors have unveiled their doctrine of ‘pre-emptive war’. It is instructive to see how the arguments in favour of the use of force have evolved since 9/11, with the standard claim of the right to individual and collective self-defence (invoked to justify the bombing of Afghanistan) giving way to a more expansive concept based on future threats arising from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In a speech delivered to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London on 13 September 2002, Richard Haass elaborated on this new doctrine:

‘9/11 and its aftermath accelerated new thinking that had already begun about the limits of sovereignty… Today we are on the cusp of a third adjustment to our thinking about sovereignty (after Rwanda and Kosovo). Classical notions of deterrence have little relevance for groups like Al Qaida, which have no constituencies to defend, no borders to protect, and no traditional national assets to preserve. We need to act against these threats.

Similarly, deterrence and containment may well prove inadequate for dealing with Saddam Hussein, someone who has repeatedly violated his international obligations and who is doing everything in his power to develop and conceal weapons of mass destruction. In this new international environment where terrorism and WMD are intersecting, we cannot allow a regime like Saddam’s to flout the demands of the international community… (T)he dangers of inaction outweigh the costs of action. In these extreme circumstances, a strong case can be made for preventive military action.’2

Another senior State Department official, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., told a conference on the ‘War on Terrorism’ in Paris on 11 September 2002, that European military institutions had to join the US in being ‘more focused on a new kind of role, further from home and more expeditionary in nature. We could call this concept ‘projecting security’, since the key to reducing the threat of terror attacks on our homeland is to suppress the sources of the threat in the places far from home where terrorists plan and train.’3

This doctrine is sought to be legitimised by references to the danger posed by terrorists acquiring or using WMD, but the main targets are those states outside the US sphere of influence which have – or are alleged to have – weapons capabilities in excess of what Washington believes they should possess. President Bush identified these countries in his State of the Union speech in January 2002 when he referred to Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil’.

Since Iraq presents the easiest target of the three – both in political and military terms – the Bush administration and his apologists have begun a carefully orchestrated campaign to go to war against Baghdad. Though the international community remains firmly opposed to any attack on Iraq, the US is likely eventually to have its way, with, of course, disastrous consequences for Asia and the world.

The one region where US policy is in deep crisis is West Asia. The determination of the Palestinians to build a genuinely independent state has held firm despite all attempts by Israel and the US to force a dishonourable compromise. And in the Persian Gulf, the policy of ‘dual containment’ – which the US hoped would undermine Iran and Iraq and help it to reassert full control over the oil resources of the region – has been a signal failure. In a remarkably frank and incisive assessment of ‘dual containment’, Stephen C. Pelletiere of the US Army War College has argued that the policy failed because ‘it does not respect the principle of power balancing.’ The idea of balance was intrinsic to George Kennan’s notion of containment.

Pelletiere writes: ‘Kennan argued that the Soviet Union and the United States, inasmuch as both were superpowers, had everything to lose and nothing to gain by going to war with each other… What Kennan was expressing was the concept of balancing – the idea that, in the world of international politics, a proper balance could be struck between potential adversaries and this would produce a stable situation which could be prolonged for an indefinite period.’ In the case of the Gulf, however, the US ‘confronted hostile states Iran and Iraq with what amounted to a diktat – the two either give in completely to America’s desires, remaking themselves as the United States required, or Washington would simply keep up the sanctions until they did.’4

Despite ensuring the continuance of crippling economic sanctions on Iraq for more than a decade and trying its best to weaken Iran’s oil industry, the US has not managed to have its way with either country. Instead of abandoning the failed policy of containment, the US administration is using the opportunity provided to it by 9/11 to up the ante. Where Bush Sr. cavilled at marching on to Baghdad, ‘regime change’ is now part of the explicit military goal of his son’s presidency.

It is clear that the Persian Gulf will soon be home to an enormous, permanent garrison and there is even talk of shifting the US military’s Central Command (Centcom) from Florida to its ‘natural home’ on the Arabian peninsula. If Washington has its way in Iraq, Iran will be the next target for ‘regime change’. Other countries which either seek to develop better weapons to defend themselves or are accused by the US of trying to do so could come into firing range. In the event of political instability in Saudi Arabia, that country too could become a frontline state in the shifting ‘war on terror’.

At the same time, the doctrine of preventive war need not be applicable only to situations created by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Anything, anywhere in the world which has a potential to impact negatively on US national security, can see diktats and ultimatums being issued. ‘In the wake of 9/11,’ says Haass, ‘Americans recognise that what happens "out there" can have a major effect on their lives. A failed state in Central Asia, the curriculum in religious schools in Pakistan, lawlessness in the Andes, drug trafficking in Central Asia, instability in Africa – all have the potential to affect US national security. We now understand that even if we choose not to engage with the world, it will engage with us, and not always in welcome ways. As a result, there is much greater American willingness to commit resources to national security and to use them.’

Armed with a greater ‘willingness to commit resources to national security’ and ‘full spectrum dominance’ in military technology, the US is now giving itself a full spectrum of potential situations in which it can use its enormous power. This is, after all, going to be a war that Haass assures us will persist forever, and from which the US intends to have no exit strategy. Unless, of course, the American people succeed in bringing about regime change.

Footnotes:

1. Richard N. Haass, ‘Reflections a Year After September 11’. Reproduced in ‘State’s Haass says none should be complacent about terrorist threat’, U.S. Embassy press release, New Delhi, 16 September 2002.

2. Ibid.

3. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., ‘Challenges in the Post-9/11 World’. Reproduced in ‘State’s Bloomfield says terror attacks changed security focus’, U.S. Embassy press release, New Delhi, 16 September 2002.

4. Stephen C. Pelletiere, ‘Landpower and Dual Containment: Rethinking America’s Policy in the Gulf’. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, November 1999.