Barack Obama’s myopic Iran policy

By giving Israel veto rights and threatening more sanctions, the U.S. is squandering the best chance we have for a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue...





30 November 2009
The Hindu

Barack Obama’s myopic Iran policy
Siddharth Varadarajan

Ordinarily, it would have been easy to dismiss the latest resolution of the International Atomic Energy Agency [PDF] censuring Iran as a text, drafted by idiots, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.

But context is everything. Whether by design or default, the unhelpful resolution comes at a time when the Iranians are still in the process of working out the terms of a landmark agreement on a nuclear fuel swap. If implemented, this would represent the first genuine breakthrough in the nuclear arena since the present standoff between Iran and the West began in 2005. Under the terms of the original proposal made last month by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany (known collectively as the P5+1), Iran is to send to Russia most of its stocks of 3.5 per cent low enriched uranium (LEU) produced under safeguards at Natanz. There, the LEU would be enriched to 20 per cent and sent on to France for fabrication into fuel rods for eventual use at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).

The TRR was set up in 1967 with U.S. support and is used by the Iranians for the production of medical isotopes for cancer diagnostics. With the TRR’s fuel set to run out next year, Iran had asked the IAEA for help in procuring new supplies, failing which it would be obliged to up the level of its own enrichment activities so as to fuel the TRR domestically. The IAEA, in consultation with the United States, came up with the 3.5-for-20 per cent fuel swap idea. The proposal was, and remains, win-win as far as the U.S. and Iran are concerned. Washington, which worries about the possibility of Iran using its LEU stocks to bust out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, buys time. And the Iranians, who do not as yet have any domestic use for their LEU stocks, get fuel for the TRR and also reassure the international community about the peaceful nature of their nuclear programme. Most importantly, the TRR fuel deal represents a political victory for Iran because it shows the U.S. and its allies are willing to engage in dialogue and deal-making despite Tehran not suspending enrichment — something Washington has been insisting on since 2005.

Despite these benefits, the proposal ran into trouble in Tehran for two reasons. First, ever since the controversial re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad earlier this year, the Islamic Republic has been buffeted by deep political schisms that have reduced the president’s room for manoeuvre internationally and also, perhaps, his appetite for compromise. Second, Iran’s establishment is distrustful of France and, to a lesser extent, Russia, and fears the deal may not be honoured once its LEU is exported. The fact that IAEA director general Mohammed ElBaradei, who has generally played straight with Iran, retires December 1 is a further source of unease in Tehran. His successor, Yukio Amano, is an unknown quantity. Would he, for example, insist on upholding the Western side of the bargain if France declares, sometime next year, that it will not supply fuel for the TRR after all? No gambling man would be willing to wager a large sum on Mr. Amano defying the West.

In order to cover for all contingencies, Iran modified the original proposal. In an interview to The Hindu earlier this month, Foreign Minister Manochechr Mottaki said the swap should take place on Iranian territory. This condition would not alter the essential structure of the deal. At a certain date, when French fabrication of the TRR fuel starts, the IAEA could take into its custody an equivalent amount of Iranian LEU and hold it, in escrow, inside Iran. When the TRR fuel is ready, the Iranian LEU can be loaded onto a plane, which would take off once the French fuel lands inside Iran. At the end of the day, the outcome for the U.S. from a simultaneous swap would be the same as from a sequential swap: Iranian LEU stocks would have been depleted.

For reasons best known to itself, however, Washington declared the original proposal could not be modified. Rather than using Mr. Mottaki’s comments on a swap inside Iranian territory as a means of swiftly closing the TRR deal, President Barack Obama expressed disappointment in Iran’s response and said the Security Council would soon have to consider fresh sanctions. It is in this context that last week’s IAEA resolution must be seen. According to the Washington Post, the U.S. won Chinese backing for it by sending Dennis Ross, arguably the most pro-Israeli official in the White House, to Beijing with the message that the Zionist state was likely to attack Iran if the IAEA and UNSC did not act against Tehran.

President Obama’s refusal to find creative ways of reaching a settlement is of a piece with the approach of his predecessor. In early 2005, the Bush administration leaned on the European troika of Britain, France and Germany to ensure the package they proposed to Iran included the insulting condition that Tehran should abandon enrichment altogether. And now, once again, by turning the P5+1 into a U1+5 — a body driven by U.S. interests and considerations — Washington is sabotaging the prospects of a diplomatic solution.

The proximate trigger for the latest IAEA resolution is Iran’s recent disclosure that it is constructing a second enrichment facility. This facility, at Fordo near Qom, is fortified and designed to withstand the kind of military attack that Washington and Tel Aviv have been threatening. Legally, Iran insists it was obliged to inform the IAEA about Fordo only six months prior to the introduction of nuclear material. It says it started construction in late 2007, after it had declared it would no longer abide by new rules of early disclosure it had provisionally accepted. The U.S. initially claimed the work on Fordo began in 2002 or 2003, but satellite imagery from late 2006 shows no construction work there. As Gareth Porter has argued, the Iranian timeline is consistent with the findings of the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate of 2007, which said “covert” enrichment work had probably ended in 2003, and with the U.S. military build-up which took place around Iran two years back.

Last month, I asked Dr. ElBaradei if he thought it reasonable for Tehran to be secretive given the threats Israel and the U.S. have made of a military attack on their nuclear facilities. He avoided a direct answer but said: “That’s why I say using the language of force is not helpful. It leads to confrontation, to the other country taking counteraction. It is better to forget the language of coercion and focus on trying to engage in dialogue”.

Sadly, the U.S. has now further undermined the prospects for dialogue. Iran has responded to the latest IAEA vote by threatening to further downgrade the level of its cooperation with the Agency. It knows the purpose behind the IAEA vote is to prepare the ground for more sanctions. Russia and China went along because they have a veto in the UNSC and were willing to kick the can down. India, which voted against Iran, naively stated that the latest resolution “cannot be the basis of a renewed punitive approach or new sanctions”. But Brazil, which abstained, demonstrated a clearer understanding of international politics. “The resolution clear the way for sanctions... and sanctions don’t lead to anything,” its ambassador to the IAEA said.

Ever since Iran was referred to the UNSC, Tehran has withdrawn its voluntary adherence to the Additional Protocol and to the modified Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement requiring early disclosure of nuclear-related construction. Despite losing these windows of access, the IAEA has managed to close the file on all the outstanding issues which led the Board of Governors to find Iran in violation of its safeguards obligations in September 2005. The only issue which remains pertains to alleged studies Iran is supposed to have conducted on nuclear weaponisation. But although Western intelligence agencies have shared some documents pertaining to these alleged studies with the IAEA, they have not allowed these to be shown to the Iranians. Iran cites this refusal as proof that the documents are forgeries and says that the purpose of sanctions is to ensure it abandons its enrichment programme.

Since existing sanctions — and the impending threat of more punitive measures — have had little impact on Iran, the U1+5 need to seriously rethink their approach. One way out of the current impasse is for the UNSC to suspend sanctions for a finite period, to begin with, during which time the Iranians once again voluntarily abide by the AP and step up cooperation with the IAEA over the alleged weaponisation studies. This mechanism would allow the agency to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, following which U.N. sanctions could be lifted. While the world would welcome such an outcome, Israel wouldn’t, since it is not prepared to accept a safeguarded Iranian enrichment programme under any circumstances. Mr. Obama’s inability to press ahead with his campaign promise of engaging Iran is of a piece with his failure to play the honest broker on the Israel-Palestine issue and can only lead to confrontation and conflict. Sooner rather than later, the world, and America, will come to regret this abject failure of leadership.

Searing indictment of RSS, BJP, but action to be taken: Nothing

Hard conclusions, soft recommendations let sangh parivar, Centre off the hook






25 November 2009
The Hindu

NEWS ANALYSIS
Searing indictment of RSS, BJP, but action to be taken: Nothing

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: There is a phrase in Hindustani – khoda pahad, nikli chuhiya – to describe the underwhelming outcome of an exercise over which one has laboured long and hard.

Justice M.S. Liberhan worked diligently for 17 years through more than 40 extensions of his initial three-month brief to produce a 1029 page report full of facts and details about the events and circumstances leading up to the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 1992. His conclusion is unsurprising but unequivocal and bold: the demolition was part of a well-thought out plan -- a “joint common enterprise” -- hatched by the top leadership of the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Shiv Sena and Bharatiya Janata Party, the last organisation correctly described as a “front organisation” of the RSS.

Unfortunately, the recommendations which emerge out of his daring excavations are so mousy that they bear no resemblance whatsoever to the forthright conclusions which precede them. After having indicted 68 individuals for bringing the country to the brink of communal disaster, Mr. Liberhan doesn’t call for the filing of charges against those that have escaped being arraigned so far in the demolition case, nor does he speak of expedited criminal proceedings.

This is surprising given his repeated use of the phrase “joint common enterprise” to describe the conspiracy. Ever since the 1999 Tadic judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, international criminal law has developed the notion of ascribing liability for mass crimes to those who might not have been direct participants but who willingly facilitated the commission of criminal acts through the positions they occupied in the hierarchy of the organisation involved.

Had Mr. Liberhan developed the concept in his recommendations and pushed for an end to the pervasive impunity enjoyed by politicians, police officers and bureaucrats, he would have earned the gratitude of the nation. But he has done nothing of the sort. Other than calling for the separation of religion and politics and making some other tepid suggestions, the report steers clear of recommending either short-term steps to ensure justice in the demolition case or long-term measures to protect the country from a repeat of the tragedy.

Perhaps the fault lies not so much with Mr. Liberhan and his commission but with the inability of the police and justice delivery system in India to reach the same conclusions he did and then to act upon them with speed and impartiality.

In Chapter 10, Justice Liberhan makes a definitive statement about culpability: “It stood established before me beyond reasonable doubt that the Joint Common Enterprise was a preplanned act for demolition under the immediate leadership of Vinay Katiyar, Paramhans Ramchander Dass, Ashok Singhal, Champat Rai, Swami Chinmayanand, S.C. Dixit, B.P> Singhal and Acharya Giriraj. They were the local leaders on the spot and the executors of the plan conceived by the RSS. The other leaders [L.K. Advani, Murli Manohar Joshi and others] cannot be absolved of their vicarious liability and were willing collaborators playing the roles assigned to them by the RSS. Their informed support for the Ayodhya campaign, fortified by their physical presence during the grand finale of the prolonged campaign is irrefutably established.

“I conclude that the RSS, BJP, VHP, Shiv Sena and their office bearers as named in this report, in connivance with Kalyan Singh, the then Chief Minister of UP, entered into a Joint Common Enterprise for the purpose of demolition of the disputed structure and the construction of the temple in its place. They practiced intermingling of religion with politics as a well thought out act to subvert democracy.”

The demolition of the mosque was the “zenith of a concerted and well laid-out plan which encompasses an entire pantheon of religious, political and mob leadership”. Justice Liberhan noted, correctly, that “some leaders were consciously kept out of the operational area or planning in order to protect them and preserve their secular credentials for later political use”. Mr. Advani and Mr. Joshi may have been part of the second tier in this joint common enterprise but they cannot escape political or legal liability despite the “plausible deniability” the sangh parivar gave them as a shield.

Seventeen years later, many of the criminals involved in this joint common enterprise are dead. But many flourished, secure in the knowledge that they were above the law. No matter how much the country will now vilify Mr. Liberhan for the little mouse he has produced by way of recommendations, the body of his report provides a wealth of material that any investigating agency worth its name ought to be able to spin a water-tight conspiracy case out of it. Many of the dramatis personae who had memory lapses before the commission would find it harder to resist the interrogation techniques our police force now excels in, including narco analysis. If the UPA government is serious, it can do no better than to file supplementary chargesheets and fast-track the Babri Masjid demolition case so that justice is finally done.

Proof of planning, conspiracy a big blow to BJP, RSS

Forget the question of who leaked what, let's concentrate on the Liberhan report's findings...

24 November 2009
The Hindu

NEWS ANALYSIS
Proof of planning, conspiracy a big blow to BJP, RSS

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: Once the dust from the unnecessary debate over who leaked the Liberhan Commission’s findings settles down, the country will be in a better position to reflect upon the political consequences of the enquiry report into one of independent India’s most sinister mass crimes: the demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya on December 6, 1992.

Though it is not yet clear whether Mr. Liberhan has fixed criminal or merely political responsibility on top Bharatiya Janata party leaders like Atal Bihari Vajpayee, L.K. Advani and Murli Manohar Joshi, the commission report seems to have concluded that the demolition was no act of spontaneous vandalism but a pre-planned conspiracy. The circle of conspirators may well have been small but it is impossible to imagine leaders like Mr. Advani were completely unaware of what was underfoot. Either way, the Manmohan Singh government is duty-bound to get to the bottom of the matter and to do so without any further delay.

For years, the BJP walked a fine line on the demolition. Senior leaders like Advani sought to avoid direct culpability for what was, after all, a criminal act, while also exploiting the communal polarisation the masjid/mandir issue caused for political gain. The strategy worked fine at first. The demolition was used by the BJP, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Vishwa Hindu Parishad to spread the sangh parivar’s influence beyond the Gangetic plains and into Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Gujarat. By the time the BJP come to power in Delhi as part of the National Democratic Alliance, however, the signs of mandir fatigue were already apparent, especially in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. As the communal virus of the 1990s slowly exhausted itself and robbed Ayodhya of its political potency, the BJP moved on to other issues. With Mr. Liberhan content to drag out his enquiry, the legal fall-out from the demolition was managed by petty clerical fiddles at the Central Bureau of Investigation and U.P. bureaucracy. The end result: many senior leaders of the party, including Mr. Advani, extricated themselves from the demolition cases which were, in any case, progressing at a snail’s pace.

Two-fold problem

The problem for the BJP today is two-fold: First, that Mr. Liberhan chose to complete his labours and that too during the tenure of a Congress-led government; and second, that the scope for whipping up religious sentiments and rallying Hindus around the prospective martyrdom of leaders like Mr. Advani is extremely limited. Indeed, ordinary Hindus know that the Babri Masjid’s demolition, like the Gujarat massacres of 2002, is part of the backstory of urban terrorism, including the rise of homegrown terrorist outfits like the Indian Mujahideen. They also know instinctively that religious polarisation of the kind the sangh parivar has sought to engineer has made India a more dangerous and violent place. Any campaign the BJP mounts now will be marked by the desperate search for legal loopholes, alibis and fixes, not defiance and bravado in the service of Lord Rama.

Ironically, the best hope for the BJP lies in the Congress’s reluctance to press ahead its political advantage. At the best of times, the party has never been too enthusiastic about ensuring the punishment of those involved in communal crimes. The findings of the Srikrishna Commission of Enquiry into the 1992-1993 communal killings in Bombay, for example, have remained largely unimplemented. Going by the law of probability — since the probability of law is so low — there are good reasons to believe the Liberhan findings will also meet the same fate.

Iran wants nuclear fuel swap to take place on its own soil

In the first official confirmation that Iran is leaning towards accepting some version of the US-backed proposal for a nuclear fuel swap, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki told The Hindu the proposed exchange of low enriched uranium would have to take place inside Iran, meaning the Islamic Republic will make no prior shipment of 3.5 per cent LEU to Russia before some part of the 20 per cent LEU needed for the Tehran Research Reactor lands on its own territory...

17 November 2009
The Hindu

Iran wants nuclear fuel swap to take place on its own soil

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: In the clearest statement to date of Tehran’s attitude to the U.S.-backed proposal for a nuclear fuel swap as a step towards building trust with Washington, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has said his government takes a positive view of the plan provided the exchange of enriched uranium takes place inside Iran.

Mr. Mottaki told The Hindu in an exclusive interview on Monday that Iran is not keen to send its own nuclear fuel out of the country before the fuel it is to receive for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) arrives on its territory.

Under the original proposal made last month by the U.S. and its partners, Iran is supposed to ship 1200 kg of 3.5 per cent low enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia, where it would be further enriched to 20 per cent. The 20 per cent LEU would then be sent to France for fabrication into fuel rods. Eventually, the rods would be shipped to Iran for use in the TRR, which produces medical isotopes.

Mr. Mottaki said Iran and was in the process of sending and receiving suggestions to the other side. With a positive view regarding the essence and nature of the proposal, we are reviewing the possibility of exchanging this fuel inside Iran.

Asked whether the insistence on exchange inside Iran meant the TRR fuel must come first, Mr. Mottaki replied: Well, if there is going to be any exchange of fuel inside Iran, this must mean one side of the fuel exists in Iran and the other side should come, the 20 per cent.

The U.S. says its main interest in the original proposal of Iran shipping out virtually its entire stockpile of LEU is to buy time, since the fuel would no longer be available for weaponisation should Tehran choose to break out of the NPT.

Interview: ‘Iran hopes President Obama can deliver on his promises’

If diplomacy continues, it is possible to reach an agreement on the U.S.-led proposal for the exchange of nuclear fuel, says Iran’s Foreign Minister...

17 November 2009
The Hindu

‘Iran hopes President Obama can deliver on his promises’

Siddharth Varadarajan

In an exclusive interview to The Hindu during a two-day visit to Delhi, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki talks about the latest western proposal on the nuclear issue, the reasons behind the recent disclosure of a new enrichment facility at Fardoo and the current state of Indo-Iranian relations. Excerpts.

Iran has yet to respond to the proposal of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (the P5+1) for fuelling the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). The proposal, which involves Iran shipping out some of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) in return for 20 per cent enriched uranium, seems good for both sides. It shows the P5+1 is dropping its insistence on Iran suspending all enrichment, and also allows Tehran to build confidence with the U.S. and its allies. What will Iran’s stand be?

In order to provide fuel for the TRR, there are three options in front of us. The first is producing the fuel ourselves, i.e. enriching LEU up to 20 per cent; second, purchasing the fuel from other countries as in the past; or third, considering the proposal which has been made by the other side. And we have taken this proposal into consideration and provided an initial response - that we are ready to discuss that option. We have some technical and economical observations here but in principle, this option could be taken into consideration and put on the agenda. We believe that with the continuation of the diplomacy going on now, it is possible to reach an agreement and compromise. Complementary suggestions and proposals are being sent and received by both sides, and by [International Atomic Energy Agency head Mohammed] ElBaradei.

One of the proposals is to involve Turkey as a staging post for the swap, or for Iran to buy half its requirement for the TRR and export only half of its own LEU. Are these some of the ideas being actively considered by your government?

One part of the discussion is the exchange of Iran’s 3.5 per cent LEU with 20 per cent enriched uranium of the other side. There’s some talk regarding the exchange of these two fuels inside Iran. With a positive view regarding the essence and nature of the proposal, we are reviewing the possibility of exchanging this fuel inside Iran. We have studied this proposal in order to open a new door for the other side. And the truth of the matter is their interaction could somehow build confidence among the Iranians.

When you say “exchange inside Iran”, are you saying the 20 per cent enriched fuel for the TRR must come first?

Well, if there is going to be any exchange of fuel inside Iran, this must mean one side of the fuel exists in Iran and the other side should come, the 20 per cent.

Is it that Iran doesn’t trust some of the countries involved? Are you afraid, for example, that the French may cheat you?

That is not what we are saying. We need fuel for the TRR. May be in exchange for one portion of this fuel, we hand over some of our fuel. Therefore, it is quite natural to see this happen inside Iran.

From what I gather, you are looking to modify the basic P5+1 proposal but U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said this is a ‘take it or leave it’ offer.

In diplomacy, we do not have zero or hundred. Therefore, flexibility is considered the essence of diplomacy. I believe this, and I guess the American side will understand this point as well…. Earlier, when they wanted to talk to us, they put some preconditions [like suspension of enrichment].But today they are talking and participating in talks without any preconditions.

The IAEA has now visited the proposed nuclear facility you recently declared at Fardoo near Qom. What is the purpose of the facility and why did Iran inform the agency about it only recently?

The reason for nuclear activity in Iran is producing fuel for generating power. The Fardoo facility is a site designed to take into account the use of new and updated centrifuges and the [need for] security. According to the laws we have ratified in Iran, we had to inform the IAEA only18 months before injecting fuel into the centrifuges. But we have done so before that time.

The U.S. claims Iran told the IAEA about Fardoo because it realised the CIA knew about the site and was likely to go public. Is this true?

Whenever they have any information, they highlight it ten times more for the benefit of the world’s public. So how come the CIA was so humble that it did not announce this site to the public! No matter when we announced it, they were going to say something else.

Do you feel President Obama is sincere when he says he wants to build new relations with Iran? Do you feel he represents a change from George W. Bush?

We consider the new administration different from the earlier one, which was a total warmonger administration that sullied the reputation of the U.S. The failure of the Bush policies has been confirmed by the American people, who showed this with their votes in the presidential election. Today, everyone around the world knows Obama is a chance for the U.S. And the experts there should not allow this opportunity to lead to failure. We want to believe what President Obama is saying. We hope he can operationalise what he says. To the extent to which President Obama is serious in his approach, Iran is ready to help.

There is a feeling in the aftermath of your recent presidential election that divisions within the Iranian establishment might make it hard for Tehran to take advantage of the opportunities for dialogue presented by Mr. Obama and the latest P5+1 proposal.

The incidents after the elections ended a long time ago. It was a miscalculation by those who lost. I think the presidential election strengthened the capability of Iran. It was unique in our history that the difference between the president and his nearest rival was 11 million votes. Therefore, the decision-makers of the Islamic Republic of Iran are moving forward with more energy and power. We have received the messages of President Obama and are studying those messages. When we assess that the administration’s actions and deeds go along with one another, certainly they are going to have our help.

Indian officials say they are keen to expand relations with Iran. What are the specific areas of cooperation you discussed with External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna?

In my meetings with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Mr. Krishna, we reviewed all dimensions of our relations. I agree they are interested and keen on developing and enhancing relations with Iran. We found our Indian friends serious and believe a new chapter has been opened for cooperation.

But the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline remains dead?

We voiced our full readiness that after finalisation of the issue by the Indian side we can add India to the project. Both the EAM and PM reiterated and raised this issue.

Among well-wishers of Iran in India, there is concern about the recent secret trial of the Iranian scholar, Kian Tajbakhsh, for his alleged involvement in the post-election protests. Now he has been sentenced to 12-15 years. We hope his case can be reviewed because he is a scholar and not someone involved in subversion.

All judicial verdicts can be reviewed and the opportunity of appeal is there for him. I am not aware of the details of his case. But our great effort is to see that those entering court can use all their rights, including appeal or using the capacity and potentiality of pardon.

India after Indira, 25 years on

She didn't have time to learn from our mistakes. What's our excuse?...




1 November 2009
The Hindu

India after Indira, 25 years on

Siddharth Varadarajan

Indira Gandhi was not responsible for the massacre of some 4,000 Sikhs in Delhi, Kanpur, Bokaro and other Indian cities which began on this day 25 years ago. But the fact that the influential culprits were able to get away with mass murder — and to get away with it in style, despite several changes of government at the Centre since then — is an indivisible part of the complex legacy she left behind.

A legacy of a strong nation unbroken by ‘fissiparous’ tendencies despite the dire predictions of foreign observers; a nation armed with nuclear weapons and missiles; a nation with the ability to assert an independent foreign policy and independent path of capitalist development, in the main, fully capable of holding its head high in the international community and world economic stage. But her bequest is also a nation with a democratic culture built on the proliferating quicksand of personalised, dynastic politics and money power, of weak and ineffective institutions easily subverted by the individuals carefully chosen to lead them. A nation where the rule of law is a plastic, contingent concept which rarely makes demands on those in authority.

Earlier this year, it took an act of individual caprice — the hurling, in desperate anger, of a shoe at the Home Minister — to effect a small but symbolic dent in the edifice of impunity that all Indians now take for granted. The Congress (Indira) finally decided not to allow Sajjan Kumar and Jagdish Tytler to contest the elections on a party ticket.

But even this concession came infected with a pathology caused by decades of valueless machine politics: one of the two tainted politicians was able to dictate that his brother replaces him as candidate.

What is it that allowed a local-level leader to wield such embarrassing influence on a national party? The Congress was not always like this. In a remarkably perceptive assessment of Indira Gandhi’s career as Prime Minister penned barely two years after death, Sudipta Kaviraj traced the decline of ideology and of a robust party apparatus within the Congress to the populistic transformation of party politics. That, in turn, was the product of Indira’s need to overwhelm established party interests, especially at the State level, with top-down campaigns centred around her own personality and the loyalty of a new breed of politicians who could use “resources” rather than “arguments” to deliver votes. “People who were pressed into political service were more in the nature of political contractors who were willing to go to any length to dragoon votes, systematically replacing discursive techniques with money and subtle forms of coercion. Thus, out of the logic of the technique Indira Gandhi brought in, Congress started becoming gradually depoliticised. Even earlier, people had regretted that arguments were being replaced by resources as the primary political asset; now the only arguments used were resources.” (‘Indira Gandhi and Indian Politics’, Economic and Political Weekly, September 20-27, 1986).

Political contractors

Kaviraj does not say so but when Indira Gandhi died, it was these ‘political contractors’ who got mobilised to deliver a headcount of a different kind. And they went about their task with great efficiency.

Their success, however, depended on another factor, which Indira’s India was particularly well-equipped to deliver: the willingness of the police and administration to turn a blind eye to the arson and murder which was taking place. The last essential ingredient in the production of the 1984 massacres was the ability to manage the aftermath by ensuring impunity for the guilty. A sitting judge of the Supreme Court, Ranganath Mishra, was handpicked to head a commission of inquiry which, predictably, found no systemic lapses and assigned no culpability to the ruling establishment. In the best tradition of suborned institutions, Mishra went on to become the first head of the National Human Rights Commission when it was set up and, later, a member of the Rajya Sabha. Proof of the commitment with which he went about his initial brief is provided by the fact that another commission established 15 years later managed to unearth far more details about the violence than he had.

Market economies need institutions in order to function in a stable, predictable and rational manner. Robust institutions function well regardless of the individuals in them; in India, everything hinges on the choice of the individual. Mishra delivered a vapid report but he did so with speed. Others labour for years to produce a similar outcome. When a rare individual like Justice Srikrishna produces a report which indicts the system, as he did in the case of the 1993 Bombay riots, the same system has a hundred ways of consigning his recommendations to the dustbin.

The reality

It is tempting to link this very Indian disregard for the norms of ‘bourgeois’ democracy to the residual pull of feudal impulses in our political and social life. But the reality is that the consolidation of capitalism and the growing power of industrial, trading and mining elites have not led to any emphasis on institution building. If anything, the situation might actually be getting worse.

Indeed, over time, the style of politics the Congress adopted during Indira Gandhi’s time has become the norm for virtually all parties, right down to the induction of sons, daughters, wives and brothers at every level of political power. With the growing salience of ‘resources’ in elections, it was only a matter of time before the alliance between party leaders, kinsmen and affluent regional elites got transformed into the rise of the Seriously Wealthy Politician — leaders like the late Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy and his son, Jaganmohan, Sharad Pawar and the BJP’s ‘Bellary Brothers’ in Karnataka.

‘Fissiparousness’, in the final analysis, even in the Punjab, was ended not by the security forces but by letting a hundred sons bloom.

And yet, it would be unfair to lay the blame for the current decline of politics and institutions and the rule of law entirely at the door of Indira Gandhi, even if the trend began with her. But the responsibility for fixing things lies with the present. Just as one sin, if unrepented, begets the next, 1984 led ineluctably to the 2002 massacre of Muslims in Gujarat. And there will be future killings too, unless the system is overhauled and impunity ended. Indira Gandhi made her mistakes — the Emergency, the opportunistic fomenting of religious extremism for electoral gains in Punjab — and some would argue she paid with her life for them. Had she lived, she might have chosen to chart a different course, though we owe the formal rise of dynasticism and the top-down politics of ‘nomination’ by supreme leaders and high commands to the last phase of her political career. Ironic, then, that the only politician today who seems to have grasped the corrosive nature of this aspect of her legacy is her grandson, Rahul Gandhi, with his emphasis on grass-root level elections in the Youth Congress — an organisation that, in the darkest days of the Emergency, was a metaphor for the worst possible values in politics.