31 August 2008
India, U.S. agree on amended NSG draft waiver
31 August 2008
The Hindu
India, U.S. agree on amended NSG draft waiver
Siddharth Varadarajan
New Delhi: After 24 hours of negotiations, India and the United States reached agreement on Friday night on the text of the revised American proposal seeking a waiver for India from the export guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The Hindu has learned that the final text of the revised proposal has been handed over to Germany — NSG chair for 2008 — and has already been made available to the club’s 45 countries.
Although the NSG tentatively set September 4-5 for its next meeting when it last met in Vienna on August 21-22, a handful of States are asking for more time to study the new proposal. However, with the Bush administration anxious to complete the NSG stage of the nuclear deal so that the ‘123 agreement’ with India can be handed over to Congress by September 8, Berlin is expected to announce the immediate convening of the cartel’s extraordinary plenary on Monday.
In keeping with the sensitivity of NSG members upset at the ‘premature’ leak of the draft waiver’s details last time around, American officials are anxious that the new proposal’s contents not be made public until member States have had a chance to assess the draft individually first.
In the previous meeting, the draft came under attack from several countries seeking stronger language reflecting their non-proliferation concerns. More than 50 amendments were proposed, and the U.S. undertook to evolve a new draft in consultation with India.
This time around, the U.S. and India are hoping for a smoother ride. In particular, they hope countries dissatisfied with the revised draft will settle for a compromise in which the waiver is adopted by consensus but their national concerns are reflected in a statement by the NSG chair.
Though the new draft is under wraps, the statements National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan made to the journalist Karan Thapar for CNN-IBN on Friday evening provide a glimpse into India’s stand as the draft was being finalised. In the interview, to be broadcast on Sunday, Mr. Narayanan said ways would be found around the demand for an explicit reference to nuclear testing as a condition for termination of cooperation by the NSG. “We have always made this point that testing is a word that we find difficult to adjust with ... So, we will find ways around it,” he said.
Asked about the demand by some countries for an NSG bar on the export of enrichment and reprocessing technology to India, Mr. Narayanan noted the group did not explicitly ban such exports for anybody. “Definitely, we don’t want ourselves to be singled out for this ... [If] any country does not wish to give us enrichment and reprocessing technologies and still wishes to have nuclear commerce, we’ll draw up our guidelines according to that. What we don’t want is each country’s individual predilections forming a huge package of items in the NSG exemptions.”
As for the demand for the NSG to make a periodic review of its India waiver, the NSA said this was “uncalled for.”
Mr. Narayanan indicated India had no objection to the NSG chair making a statement containing “prescriptive suggestions” so long as it did not affect the waiver. “If the Chairman is making a statement which reflects, to some extent, some of [the concerns of NSG states], may be. But as long as it does not inhibit us from what we believe is a clean and unconditional exemption,” he said.
30 August 2008
Transcript: NSA Narayanan on India's red lines at the NSG
According to the NSA, India won't accept in the revised Nuclear Suppliers Group draft waiver:
* an explicit reference to a nuclear test by India triggering adverse consequences
* a provision for periodic review
* a separate ban on enrichment and reprocessing equipment sales to India by the NSG
He also says India would have no great issue with the NSG chair making a statement outlining the issues and concerns some states may have on the waiver and on India in general, since this would not impinge on the decision per se.
Here's the transcript of Karan Thapar's interview in full. It will be broadcast on CNN-IBN on Sunday night....
Devil’s Advocate with National Security Advisor, M K Narayanan - Transcript of Segment 1 on Indo-US nuclear deal
CNN-IBN Do you believe that the last NSG meeting in Vienna represented a delay, a setback or a debacle for the Indo-Us nuclear deal?
M K Narayanan: Certainly not a debacle - that I think is very clear - nor do I think it was a setback. It was a pause, I think, in the programme. But I think we were prepared for this because we had been told that it might be necessary to have two rounds before we could finalise something which was mutually satisfactory.
CNN-IBN As you prepare for the second meeting on the September 4, which is just six days away, are you confident you can get clean exemption from the NSG, or have your confidence levels dipped somewhat?
M K Narayanan: You know, we have gone through these efforts many times. There are periods when you are highly elated (and then) sometimes you feel rather despondent. I think we have a good idea after the discussions - which took place in Vienna for the India-specific safeguard agreement – (as to) where many countries stood vis-a-vis India on this question. In the first round, I think many of the concerns were suitably dealt with, (but) some still remain. I think our problem with the NSG is primarily that we are not members of the NSG and therefore, we have to depend entirely on other countries to put forward our case. But I must say that countries like the United States, Russia, France, the UK and number of others have done herculean efforts and I think we are nearing the goal.
CNN-IBN Are you optimistic, you don't sound it by your tone?
M K Narayanan: No, I am optimistic but I don't want to allow my optimisim to override caution.
CNN-IBN Now we are speaking on Friday evening, you are six days away from the next NSG meeting. Has India been shown the new amended draft exemption?
M K Narayanan: This is work in progress. I can't you where exactly where we are on this question.
CNN-IBN Except for the fact that you are on Friday evening, there is weekend coming up, then it will be Monday and then just three days will be left. If you haven't been shown the draft exemption, isn't it running very close?
M K Narayanan: No. We are running close but I don't think we have much of a problem on that.
CNN-IBN So you are confident that your concerns will be taken care of even though you can't admit that you have seen or not seen the draft exemption?
M K Narayanan: There is a constant dialogue that is going on between Delhi and Washington and I think various people across. So, I think we are fully aware of what is going on.
CNN-IBN There are three principal concerns that have been flagged. The first is simply to do with how extensive will the rewrite of the exemption be, are you anticipating a very comprehensive (review), or are you hoping for cosmetic changes or something in between the two?
M K Narayanan: We have sort of already flagged our concerns. Those concerns are well known. I think most of the country recognised the validity of our concerns, there are some countries who, I think, are ideologically committed to the concepts or ideas of non-proliferation and hence tend to take a very hardline position. I think it is really a question of convincing them that India, with its impeccable record of non-proliferation has always stood - if necessary - for the universal nuclear disarmament (and) is the right candidate for universal nuclear commerce.
CNN-IBN That I fully understand. But are you saying that this means you will accept only cosmetic changes rather than anything more substantial?
M K Narayanan: There is no question of cosmetic or otherwise. What we are asking is that there are certain issues which have been drawn in red lines by us because those are the commitments which have been made by our Prime Minister.
CNN-IBN And, on those red lines you can't give way?
M K Narayanan: On those red lines we can't because that we have told Parliament. These are sacrosanct, if these are not met we cannot endorse the agreement.
CNN-IBN The press has highlighted three concerns. The first is the requirement that some NSG countries are talking about a condition that the exemption will terminate if India were to carry out further nuclear testing. Is there any way it could be reflected in the new, amended exemption or would it a deal breaker in any shape or form for India?
M K Narayanan: I think you should give some credit to creative diplomacy in these matters. I presume that we will find a way out it. This the time a deal is done, it is difficult to say yes but I think it should be possible for us to surmount some of these obstacles.
CNN-IBN You mentioned creative diplomacy, could you accept the form of language that is used in the 123 agreement if it were to be used in this new NSG draft. In the 123 (agreement), there is no actual mention of the specific word ‘nuclear testing’. Could that formulation suffice for you?
M K Narayanan: We have always made this point that testing is a word that we find difficult to adjust with. Not because of anything else but because Parliament has mandated us to do so. Testing would be difficult for us. So, we will find ways around it.
CNN-IBN Leave testing apart, but is the rest okay?
M K Narayanan: We are clear that whatever we finally agree to with the NSG countries will be something we can sell to Parliament.
CNN-IBN I think you have hinted a sort of formulation, the 123 language which doesn't mention testing could be acceptable provided it is acceptable to others.
M K Narayanan: I hope that we can move forward on some of these issues.
CNN-IBN Second condition mentioned by the NSG countries is that the exemption should exclude Enrichment and Reprocessing technologies. Given that India has its own ENR technologies, can you live with that exclusion or would that be a deal break?
M K Narayanan: In case of the US, they have certain conditions about allowing the Enrichment and Reprocessing technologies to the countries but in the case of NSG, our case is different. We say that what we are asking the NSG does not have a ban on Enrichment and Reprocessing technologies. There is a broad ban which the NSG has on many items with India which includes any kind of nuclear commerce and related matters. What we are saying is that if you are giving us exemption on those items please, give us exemption because unlike the laws in the US. None of the countries in the NSG have a ban imposed in their countries.
CNN-IBN Don't introduce a specific ban for India in this exemption?
M K Narayanan: Definitely, we don't want ourselves to be singled out for this. What we have made clear - and this is what all of us talked about - if any country does not wish to give us Enrichment and Reprocessing technologies and still wishes to have nuclear commerce, we'll draw up our guidelines according to that. What we don't want is each country's individual predilections forming a huge package of items in the NSG exemptions.
CNN-IBN Quite right, let the NSG not take a position on this issue, let individual countries approach them to do it. Finally, there is also a demand for what is called a periodic review of India's compliance in India's behaviour. Is that acceptable to you in any shape or form?
M K Narayanan: No, we believe this is uncalled for. We have put all our cards on the table, we have been as transparent as anyone else, we are willing to make our case before the NSG, we don't understand what is the need of a review. Principally not because of anything else, but this is a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, it involves commerce, it involves people investing money, countries investing money, it is a long-term agreement. They are putting money for 30 to 40 years so if you have a review at the end of three years and somebody says that oh well this shouldn't be done then nobody is going to invest in this agreement.
CNN-IBN I understand, you make your position very clear on the testing issue, the ENR technology issue and the periodic review concern, does America agree with your positions or do they have question marks or still do they have doubts about your positions?
M K Narayanan: This question should be probably addressed to the US but we have carried conviction to them, to the extent possible. They understand where we come from and that they would help us in the matter.
CNN-IBN Lets focus little on the US' role, do you believe that Washington did enough to prevent the naysayers from pushing amendments or do you think that in fact Washington did not take as hard line as you would have liked it to have taken?
M K Narayanan: This is a dangerous question you have asked me but make me the point. When we were negotiating with the US it was easier because the US knew what it could give and what it could not give. We recognised that the US is the world power, it is both militarily and economically it is one of the dominating countries in the world but even they have some limits. There is always a case of doing better, it is like preparing for examinations. Somebody could always say that you could have prepared more. I personally think that tremendous effort has been made by the US to help us in this matter as have countries like France, Russia and others, where they could have done even more. But even after the first round is over, they are very actively involved. So frankly speaking, I have no complains to make.
CNN-IBN You are not criticising them, you are accepting that they made terrific efforts but you are holding up the possibility that they could have done more?
M K Narayanan: Like in everything else, could I have made a better case before all these people but I have just been cautious so that somebody would pick up (on it) and say x y and z. In as much as they have done in most other cases, they have done here.
CNN-IBN There is a view in the press that the American ambassador's repeated assertion that India's requirement or insistence on unconditional exemption is both inappropriate and provocative. There has also been a position taken about how would Berman..., the Chairman of the House Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee actually telling Condolezza Rice not to go ahead with exemptions that would in some way circumvent the Hyde Act. Has all of that been unhelpful?
M K Narayanan: No, I think the American ambassador in New Delhi has been an extremely positive factor.
CNN-IBN So, the press has wrongly picked on him?
M K Narayanan: I think they have a love-hate relationship with prominent US diplomats. I have interacted with Ambassador Mulford for the last four years very closely and I think he has done a tremendous job. Few ambassadors would have put as much effort as he has done. Yes, sometimes the statements he makes make people a little annoyed and upset but I think much the same can be said about me. So it's the part of the course.
CNN-IBN Let me put it like this, if the NSG were to grant you a clean exemption on September 4 or 5 but if the chairman of the NSG alongside were to make a statement listing a prescriptive list of suggestions, they are not conditions but suggestions. Could India live with that?
M K Narayanan: I presume it be the Chairman's prerogative to make of what he says and what he likes but as long as they are not laid down as conditions, we have talked in terms of a clean exemption, an unconditional exemption. We have not said that there should be no whisper about what anybody wishes to say. We are not behaving like 16-year-olds and recognise that countries have problems. If the Chairman is making a statement which reflects, to some extent, some of those points, may be. But as long as it does not inhibit us from what we believe is a clean and unconditional exemption, (it’s okay).
CNN-IBN Has India made it clear to countries like Austria, Switzerland, New Zealand, some of the Scandinavian countries (like) Ireland that if they insisted on imposing unacceptable conditions, it would have damaging impact on their bilateral relationships with New Delhi?
M K Narayanan: No, as far as I am aware, we have not done any arm-twisting in this. For that matter, several countries - Russia for instance - has actually offered to help us with Austria. So they are doing most of the talking. I don't think we have tried what I would call unscrupulous or underhand methods to pressurise.
CNN-IBN But you are not suggesting that the Austrians, the Irish or the Swiss could think they could impose conditions which you cannot accept and that there would be no damage to the bilateral relationships?
M K Narayanan: Then, you should ask them. But I don't think we are making that the touchstone for a relationship. It is important, I presume that if someone is friendly with us, they would certainly get a benefit over somebody who is less friendly with us.
India studying revised NSG draft
30 August 2008
The Hindu
[In the print edition of The Hindu, this story was split into two with the second part carried inside.]
India studying revised NSG draft
Siddharth Varadarajan
New Delhi: A revised version of the draft waiver that the United States circulated to the Nuclear Suppliers Group earlier this month was handed over to India on Thursday and was still being studied by a team of Indian officials till late Friday evening.
Among those involved in the exercise, which is being led by National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan, are Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Anil Kakodkar and other top officials from the Department of Atomic Energy, Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of External Affairs, including R.B. Grover and D.B. Venkatesh Varma who have been part of India’s negotiating team with the U.S. since 2005. On Friday evening, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was briefed on the issue by Mr. Narayanan.
Officials familiar with the issue refused to provide any information on the contents of the new draft, or the changes, if any, India was seeking to make. It is not clear, for example, if modified language is being exchanged back and forth between New Delhi and Washington or whether the entire drafting process might require one further iteration.
With the 45-nation NSG set to meet again in plenary session on September 4, time would appear to be running out for both the U.S. and India. “Member states will need at least five or six days to study the draft,” a European diplomat told The Hindu on Friday, adding that if the draft were not put into circulation by Saturday, the September 4-5 meeting of the nuclear club might have to be postponed by a week.
Another diplomat said that while smaller countries “may not need very much time to get high-level political decisions as we have smaller bureaucracies than others,” countries like Japan and China might well need more time.
While the Bush administration is keen to secure NSG clearance next week and send the 123 agreement for Congressional approval on September 8, Indian officials say their own principal priority is not speed but ensuring the soundness of the draft waiver.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group naysayers have more or less dropped their insistence on any prescriptive language requiring India’s future adherence to non-proliferation benchmarks such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, according to a range of European diplomatic sources familiar with the issue.
But the Group of Six likeminded nations — Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand and Switzerland — continue to press for language that could involve negative consequences for India in the event of Delhi abandoning its unilateral testing moratorium.
“Compromise formula”
A diplomat from the G-6 told The Hindu that the group had handed over on Friday morning a ‘compromise’ formula for a testing post-condition that “ought to satisfy India and us,” though he declined to provide details.
At the same time, there are signs of a possible thawing of the hardline attitudes seen within the NSG last week.
“Cosmetic changes”
Asked about the possibility of the G-6 accepting purely “cosmetic changes” to the original draft, something Indian officials say that is all they are prepared to accept, one diplomat from the group said “why not?”
Not the only forum
“Our countries wanted an expression of our strong views to come out but this does not mean the NSG is the only forum for this,” he said.
The diplomat added that the group was looking at the NSG waiver for India as a “political” rather than “technical” issue.
The diplomat said that while U.S. Ambassador David Mulford had “consulted” with Delhi-based ambassadors from the six countries on Thursday, the “real talking by the Americans is being done in Washington, Vienna and our capital cities, not here.”
28 August 2008
The American dilemma at the NSG
The nonproliferation agenda has been a part of the nuclear deal from the start, even as the wider strategic partnership was designed to be the principal goal. The U.S. also knew that some down payment on the foreign policy front might be necessary to guard against India's tendency to act independently. But getting the balance right has never been easy...28 August 2008
The Hindu
The American dilemma at the NSG
The nuclear deal is at its most decisive breaking point today. India has shown its willingness to abide by its commitments. Is the U.S. in a position to do the same?
Siddharth Varadarajan
In the face of evidence suggesting the underselling of India's case at the Nuclear Suppliers Group last week, it is worth asking why the United States invested three years of political capital in a deal only to see it brought to the edge of a precipice where the smallest of nonproliferation 'conditions' is likely to knock it over. The answer lies in the contradictory pursuit of strategic and tactical gains lying at the heart of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal.
The July 2005 nuclear agreement was the product of a strong strategic urge in Washington to do something dramatic to overcome the reticence the Indian political, bureaucratic and military elites have traditionally shown towards entering into a more profound strategic embrace with the U.S. This embrace was not about turning New Delhi into a military ally, something even the most optimistic advocates of the India relationship in Washington knew was unlikely ever to happen. But it was about allowing the U.S. to shape the strategic choices India was making and help the country become a "responsible stakeholder" of a regional and global system underpinned by American hegemony. The alternative was that India could emerge a spoiler who might bandwagon with other powers and make the exercise of that hegemony more difficult.
The brilliance of Philip Zelikow, who was Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's advisor in 2004 and 2005, lay in understanding the seductive potential civil nuclear cooperation held for the Indian elites. The U.S. had wasted five years following the 1998 nuclear tests trying to contain the Indian atomic genie. But as the strategists of the Bush administration surveyed the post-Iraq war world, they asked themselves whether this failure could somehow be turned into the pillar of a new approach. One where India's obvious military strengths were recognized, including the reality of its nuclear weapons, and an attempt made to harness its abilities so that they could further U.S. interests in the region. If the Iraq fiasco had demonstrated, inter alia, the limits of unilateralist hegemony, could the outsourcing of hegemony to countries like India help transcend those limits?
Not surprisingly, the first branch of U.S. government to realize the promise this new relationship held was the Pentagon. Even during the first four years of the Bush administration, Donald Rumsfeld and Douglas Feith had sought to deepen military-to-military ties with the Indians, with the stress first on exercises and interoperability leading eventually to the sale of equipment. But the weakness of this approach became apparent in the summer of 2003 when a determined American push to get India to send 'peacekeeping' troops to Iraq ran aground despite winning the backing of most 'pundits' in Delhi. A U.S. envoy made a final push with a top Indian official in early July that year. "Future generations of Americans will be grateful for India's help", he said. "But what can you do for us now? Are you prepared to lift the restrictions on our civil nuclear programme?" the official asked. The envoy had no answer. He returned empty handed, but the record of that conversation left its mark in the Beltway. And the effect was felt almost immediately. First up, the High Technology Cooperation Group, which had been set up in 2002, got a boost. Later that year, the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership took shape. The Pentagon was already a believer but it was now the Commerce Department's turn to test the waters. By September 2004, India had agreed to sign the End Use Verification Agreement that Commerce considered a key benchmark of India's willingness to accommodate American concerns. Somewhere within the State Department, a little light began to flash. And policymakers like Mr. Zelikow began to ask themselves: Could the sop of a nuclear deal become the cornerstone of a grand strategic bargain with India and pave the way for a vastly expanded relationship?
In January 2005, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, who was the French President's diplomatic advisor at the time, was asked to test the waters in New Delhi by presenting the Indians with a U.S.-France-U.K non-paper outlining a menu of possibilities, including separation of the civil and military programme. Brajesh Mishra as National Security Adviser in the erstwhile Vajpayee government had earlier broached the idea with the French of offering one or two reactors from among the 21 operating (or under construction) for international safeguards provided sanctions were lifted, with a commitment to safeguard all future reactors as well. That proposal was now dusted off and embellished. The Manmohan Singh government vetoed some suggestions but reacted positively to the idea. By March, the U.S. had made up its mind. Ironically, the immediate catalyst was the American decision to provide F-16s to Pakistan. Washington feared India would be offended. So Dr. Rice traveled to Delhi to tell the Prime Minister about the F-16s. And that the U.S. wanted to work towards the lifting of international restrictions on civil nuclear commerce with India. Dr. Singh assented.
So compelling was the logic of a nuclear deal with India that it appealed to the American establishment cutting across institutional, ideological, political and sectoral barriers. Thus, Defence, Commerce and State were fully on board. Neocons, realists and liberal internationalists thought it made sense. The Republicans and Democrats did so as well. And as for American capital, especially on the defence, agribusiness, retail and financial services side, no convincing was needed. One more intermediate but crucial step was still to be taken to focus the American mind, and that was the Defence Framework Agreement of June 2005 which foregrounded defence sales. From there to the historic joint statement of July 18, 2005 (J18) was just a matter of detail.
But details do matter and they did prove devilishly difficult. The game in Washington was still a very tightly held one because Dr. Rice knew so dramatic a policy change might not survive the pushes and pulls that came with the full inter-agency process. Though nonproliferation specialists were kept on the periphery of the drafting process, a generalist like Nicholas Burns knew enough of U.S. policies to try and strive for some tactical icing on the strategic cake. The nuclear deal was premised on Indian nuclear weapons not being seen as a threat (and perhaps even as an asset) by Washington as far as the global balance of power was concerned. But this was so only as long as the Indian weapons programme did not become too ambitious. Thus, Mr. Burns and his colleagues sought to make the nonproliferation agenda an essential part of the nuclear deal, even as the wider strategic partnership was designed to be the principal goal. They also knew that some down payment on the foreign policy front might be necessary to guard against India's tendency to act independently. But getting the balance right was never easy.
When the first draft of J18 was faxed to the Prime Minister's plane at Frankfurt en route to Washington, it was so full of nonproliferationism that Anil Kakodkar, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, saw red. A message was immediately sent to the Indian negotiators to stand down and not agree to anything until the PM arrived. What ensued was a bitter fight, first within the Indian camp, and then between the Indians and the Americans. In the end, Dr. Rice and President Bush had to intervene. The strategic goal was not to be sacrificed for tactical gains on the nonproliferation front. Those could always be pressed at a later date. Thus the Indians emerged with a reasonably balanced agreement in which some existing and some new nonproliferation commitments were reiterated or made. And in exchange, the U.S. agreed to lift its domestic restrictions and work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.
However, this tension between the pursuit of long-term strategic goals and tactical nonproliferation gains was to recur frequently during the next three years. Each time, the deal was taken to breaking point. Each time, it required President Bush's intervention to be salvaged. And each time, it required Prime Minister Manmohan to inform Mr. Bush of the gravity of the situation. Throughout these episodes, there were always sections of the Indian establishment that urged the path of least resistance. On foreign policy issues like Iran – where former Under Secretary Stephen J. Rademaker, has admitted India's vote at the IAEA was 'coerced' by the U.S. – the Government tended to lose its nerve. But as far as nonproliferation commitments were concerned, the PMO and the Department of Atomic Energy wanted no dilution of the reciprocal balance contained in J18. They had veto power and they never flinched from exercising it.
Thus it was that the separation talks went to the brink in March 2006 before fast breeder reactors and the damaging notion of 'grid connectivity' as a criterion for safeguarding reactors were kept out, and the linkage between safeguards, fuel supply and corrective measures brought in. The nonproliferation camp in Washington struck back with the Hyde Act, helped along by some poor Indian diplomacy which saw merit in hailing the passage of a Bill so riddled with extraneous agendas that it has haunted the nuclear deal ever since. In 2007, India recovered some ground in the 123 negotiations, but not without fighting another battle with the nonproliferationists over the question of reprocessing.
As the deal approached its penultimate but actually most decisive stage – the NSG – the nonproliferationists hoped to try their luck one last time. There is, in American football, a move known as a Hail Mary pass, a play so desperate and foolhardy that it is attempted only at the end of the game in order to score a few extra points. What we saw at the NSG and in the run-up to last week's meeting in Vienna was the diplomatic equivalent of a Hail Mary pass. But it is one in which the Americans seem to have lost control over the ball. Whatever Washington's internal view or assessment, it was impolitic for Ambassador David C. Mulford publicly and repeatedly to say the waiver would not be "unconditional". Did you say conditions, sir? Well, we've got plenty! New Zealand's disarmament minister said on Tuesday that NSG states have proposed around 50 amendments. What unfolded in Vienna was not some Machiavellian plot. The script for this farce was in the DNA of the deal.
The pursuit of immediate foreign policy and military payoffs by America over the past three years has made the nuclear deal so suspect in India that future governments will find it politically difficult if not impossible to meet U.S. expectations on a number of fronts. Even so, the Americans are likely to try and exploit divisions within India in furtherance of their strategic agenda. But when it comes to its nonproliferation agenda, Washington will find there is little or no dissonance within the establishment. Dr. Kakodkar said on Monday that India would not be pushed around. It wanted nuclear cooperation, "but not at any cost". He was speaking with full authority. The final whistle is about to be blown. If President Bush and his top advisers are not able to recover the ball quickly and honour the commitments made in J18, the deal is as good as over.
26 August 2008
Fifty amendments for the Indian draft waiver at the NSG
New Zealand Government
26 August, 2008
US-India civil nuclear agreement
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) discussions on the US-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement will resume in Vienna on 4 September, after two days of wide-ranging discussion on the Agreement at the end of last week, Disarmament and Arms Control Minister Phil Goff said today.
The Agreement requires an exemption to NSG guidelines. This would allow any interested country to supply India with nuclear materials and technology to expand its civil nuclear programme, despite the latter not being a signatory to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty.
“The discussions last week were robust and constructive and we look forward to continuing this dialogue around a revised draft exemption text at next month’s meeting,” Phil Goff said.
“Around 50 amendments have been proposed to the original text, with many countries speaking in favour of amendments.
“The key function of the NSG is to formulate guidelines for managing exports of nuclear material, equipment and technology to ensure that this trade does not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation.
“Discussions in Vienna focused on how to ensure compatibility of these objectives with the exemptions, sought for the US-India Civil Nuclear Co-operation Agreement.
“While New Zealand remains a strong advocate of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and would welcome India’s accession to these treaties, we have not included these elements in our package of proposals.
“New Zealand engaged constructively in the discussions, acknowledging potential benefits involved in the Agreement and its good relationship with both countries, while noting concerns and the need for consistency in pursuing the objective of non-proliferation.
“A large number of countries big and small expressed views similar to New Zealand’s that there needed to be compatibility between the US-India Agreement and the goals of the NSG, and indicated a willingness to engage positively to achieve that outcome,” Phil Goff said.
NSG statement by the 'Gang of Six'
At the NSG meeting, six countries worked together to moot amendments to the draft waiver circulated by the United States. These were Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland. I recently obtained a copy of their opening statement. Here it is in full...Agenda Item 3 “Questions of General Concern”
Statement on behalf of Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland
Mr. Chairman,
I take the floor on behalf of Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland.
For three years, since July 2005, our countries have been closely following discussions on NSG relations with India. We have raised many questions and concerns in this group, and in other fora, as well as with interested Governments. And we have consistently said that we wished to see all elements on the table before taking a final position.
We fully appreciate the enormous demands upon the Indian Government in seeking to alleviate poverty and promote development for its large country and vast population. We fully recognise India’s unique need for a secure and plentiful supply of energy in order to achieve those objectives. We also appreciate India’s recent commitments in relation to non-proliferation.
Mr. Chairman,
Our countries are particularly strong supporters and defenders of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), one of the most universal Treaties in the world today, and the most successful arms-control instrument the world has known. Our common goal is to uphold and strengthen that Treaty, which has served the world very well since 1970. We are also committed supporters of the work of the NSG, which seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear related exports.
Against this background, we have been examining the draft Statement before us today. Specific proposals will be made at this meeting, with a view to increasing the level of comfort with the proposed exemption. We have been guided in our consideration of these issues by the fundamental principles which underpin the NPT, the IAEA Safeguards system and the global security architecture.
Mr. Chairman,
The amendments to be proposed today are made in a constructive spirit. None of the amendments should impact in any way on the stated goal of peaceful civil nuclear cooperation with India. All of the substantive amendments are based on concepts already enshrined in UN Security Council Resolutions, in domestic legislation of NSG Participating Governments and in bilateral nuclear supply agreements which NSG Participating Governments have concluded over the years. We look forward to working with all NSG Participating Governments towards an exemption for India that meets our non-proliferation objectives, as well as the broader interests of the NSG and the nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament regime, as established by the NPT.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mulford seeks to reassure India
26 August 2008
The Hindu
Mulford seeks to reassure India
As G-6 talks conditions, U.S. for ‘clean’ NSG waiver
Siddharth Varadarajan
New Delhi: With the perception gaining ground in official circles here that the United States pulled its punches at last week’s meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, U.S. Ambassador David C. Mulford sought to clear the air by insisting Washington was committed to “working with India to rapidly complete the remaining steps” necessary to conclude the civil nuclear cooperation initiative.
“The U.S. and India stand shoulder-to-shoulder in their desire for a clean exception and we will continue to work with our Indian partners to persuade the NSG countries that such an exemption is in the international community’s best interest,” he said on Monday.
However, despite New Delhi’s misgivings about additional conditions — reiterated by Atomic Energy Commission chairman Anil Kakodkar in remarks to reporters in Mumbai on Sunday — Mr. Mulford did not promise that the waiver the U.S. must push through the NSG to allow nuclear commerce with India would be unconditional.
The Ambassador added that both the U.S. and India would “continue our vigorous joint advocacy for the initiative at the highest levels of NSG governments.”
Mr. Mulford’s assurance comes even as New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark reiterated at a press conference in Wellington on Monday her government’s intention of pressing for amendments to the draft discussed at the NSG last week. New Zealand is part of a group of six countries that acted in concert at the NSG meeting in Vienna last week demanding changes in the draft waiver. The other members of this group are Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland.
In their opening statement to the closed-door meeting on August 21 — a copy of which is with The Hindu — the six warned that they would move “substantive amendments ... with a view to increasing the level of comfort with the proposed exemption.” All of these amendments, they said, “are based on concepts already enshrined in U.N. Security Council Resolutions, in domestic legislation of NSG Participating Governments, and in bilateral nuclear supply agreements which NSG [states] have concluded over the years.”
The reference to U.N. resolutions is clearly to UNSCR 1172, passed after the nuclear tests of 1998, which called on India to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. And the ‘domestic legislation’ the six have in mind is the Hyde Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in December 2006, which sought to move the goalposts for nuclear cooperation envisaged by the July 2005 agreement in a manner unfavourable to India.
24 August 2008
Looking beyond the NSG debacle
America’s inability – or unwillingness - to pilot through the Nuclear Suppliers Group the waiver India needs to allow full civil nuclear cooperation undermines the basis of the July 2005 agreement. If the U.S. is not interested in honouring its commitment, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh must walk away...25 August 2008
The Hindu
Looking beyond the NSG debacle
America’s inability – or unwillingness - to pilot through the Nuclear Suppliers Group the waiver India needs to allow full civil nuclear cooperation undermines the basis of the July 2005 agreement. If the U.S. is not interested in honouring its commitment, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh must walk away.
Siddharth Varadarajan
A central premise of the civil nuclear energy cooperation initiative between New Delhi and Washington has been the assumption that the United States is the only major power with both the ability and the motivation to force a change in the discriminatory international rules governing nuclear commerce with India. Earlier Indian approaches to both France and Russia in 2003 and 2004 found the two countries eager to cooperate but unwilling to take the lead. Brajesh Mishra, who was the National Security Adviser at the time, was politely but firmly told to speak to Washington since it was the U.S. that held the keys to any relaxation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group rules prohibiting sales to India.
Mr. Mishra immediately broached the idea of an agreement with the U.S. but it was not until March 2005 that Washington reverted to New Delhi with a proposal that would eventually be signed by the two countries on July 18, 2005. It has not exactly been smooth sailing since then, but as an American-prepared draft seeking a waiver to the NSG guidelines for India ran aground at a special meeting of the 45-nation cartel on Friday, it is worth asking whether the U.S. over-reached itself three years ago in making a commitment to “adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear cooperation and trade” with the country. Or whether President George W. Bush has pulled a fast one on New Delhi, misleading Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with a false promise then and doing his utmost at the NSG to ensure that what prevails is not the solemn commitment contained in the July 2005 agreement but the extraneous non-proliferation agenda of the Hyde Act.
These are, broadly speaking, the only two ways of analyzing the implications of last week’s debacle in Vienna. While each scenario needs to be carefully assessed, the implications for what strategy India must adopt from now on are the same.
But first the facts. The U.S. and India spent three weeks negotiating the text of the draft waiver granting India an exemption from the NSG’s export rules. The draft took note of all the commitments India had made in July 2005 and stated that in the light of these, the full-scope safeguards requirement was being waived. To protect the concerns of those NSG countries doubting India’s willingness to abide by its commitments in the future, the waiver provided for members to “maintain contact and consult through regular channels on matters connected with the implementation of the Guidelines, taking into account relevant international commitments and bilateral agreements with India”. In other words, any purported violation by India could occasion the convening of a plenary meeting where a decision on how to react could always be taken by consensus.
In Vienna, this reasonable draft came under sustained attack from a small group of states. These included New Zealand, Ireland, Austria, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands, all of whom demanded substantive amendments. And then there was a second tier of countries who waded into what became a free for all with suggestions and changes of their own. Bilateral consultations the U.S. delegation held with officials from these countries on the morning of August 22 led not to the latter backing off but to the former agreeing to strive for an amended waiver that would take their misplaced demands on board and push for India’s concurrence with these. If accounts provided to me by European diplomats who were present in the last session of the NSG plenary are correct, the entire draft will now be reworked. On the menu are both ‘prescriptive’ suggestions on the desirability of India eventually acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and, more dangerously, ‘post-conditions’. The latter category consist of ‘periodic review’ and a list of actions by India which might trigger the immediate and automatic termination of nuclear supplies, thereby jeopardising the billions of dollars of investment New Delhi might already have made. There will be no need to meet again and go through the tiresome process of evolving a consensus on whether to end cooperation with India or not, a process which a major nuclear vendor like Russia could well block. In addition, an attempt will be made to limit the scope of cooperation with India to only certain aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle and exclude enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) altogether.
Some or all of these changes reflect the unilateral conditions and prescriptions of the Hyde Act, something the Indian negotiating team fought hard to keep out of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement (the ‘123 agreement’) finalized last July. India was also able to build in to its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency the tight linkage between continuity of fuel supplies and continuity of safeguards which was a cornerstone of the March 2006 separation plan and which Hyde sought to undo. Hawks like Congressman Howard Berman and officials from the State Department’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) were never very pleased with what they saw as an Indian attempt to do an end run around the requirements of Hyde and saw the NSG as the battleground where the issue had to be settled once and for all. Mr. Berman introduced a resolution in Congress last fall calling for conditionalities in the proposed NSG waiver. Written assurances to this effect were sought from the State Department and provided to the House Foreign Relations Committee in classified form. When the draft waiver text became known, Richard Stratford of the ISN told a seminar in D.C. that the language had been deliberately kept weak so that tougher provisions could be grafted on in consultation with U.S. allies. And Mr. Berman was reassured that all his concerns would be taken care of at Vienna.
There were three other bad omens which augured badly for India’s chances at the NSG. First, in the run-up to the Vienna meeting, it had become apparent that Washington had done little or no lobbying on behalf of the “clean and unconditional” waiver that New Delhi sought. Where India, which is not even an NSG member, had sent multiple delegations to all NSG capitals led, in each case, by officials of at least Secretary rank, the U.S. deployed officers of such low pay grade as to be almost inconsequential. When an envoy was sent at all, he or she invariably tended to be someone as low down the Foggy Bottom food chain as a principal deputy assistant secretary of state. Second, India’s principal ‘ally’ in the NSG game, U.S. ambassador David Mulford, kept encouraging the NSG naysayers by stating it was unwise for Indians to expect an unconditional waiver. Third, the fact that the U.S. deployed John D. Rood, acting under secretary at the ISN, and a known activist on the nonproliferation front, was the final indication that the meeting in Vienna was not going to go India’s way. Many of the Hyde Act’s provisions began life as declarations of intent in the testimonies to Congress of Robert Joseph, Mr. Rood’s predecessor at ISN. It was only to be expected, therefore, that the Bureau would launch a rearguard action at the NSG in defence of those provisions given half a chance.
While it is true that the U.S. simply lacks the power and authority to push through changes in the international system by itself, a closer examination of its failures suggests America tends to be most unsuccessful where one or more world powers dig their heels in and refuse to go along with Washington’s agenda. At the NSG, however, all world powers were active supporters of the India initiative (Russia, France, Britain), passive supporters (Japan, Germany and Canada) or neutral (China). With this degree of policy coherence at the great power level, there was no way a sincere American effort to deliver a clean and unconditional waiver for India would have run aground. What happened at Vienna, however, was a coordinated attack in which the smaller states were encouraged to do Washington’s business for it.
The Bush administration’s calculation is that with the vote of confidence behind him, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is now so politically committed to seeing the nuclear deal through that he will find it impossible to acknowledge that the Americans have double-crossed him. Indeed, a situation has now arisen where the U.S. may go ahead with the September 4-5 NSG meeting and press the adoption of a diluted, conditional waiver despite Indian pposition in the hope that Dr. Singh will have no option but to submit to this fait accompli.
Thanks to a number of strategic blunders he has made over the past three years – including abandoning the pan-Asian energy grid idea of Mani Shankar Aiyar, going slow on the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project and bowing to U.S. sensitivities in not inking the inter-governmental agreement on Koodankoolam for four additional reactors from Russia – the Prime Minister does not have a very strong hand from which to stare down the U.S. But stare he must. As soon as the Americans come to Delhi with new draft language, he must pick up the telephone and tell President Bush that if he cannot uphold his part of the July 2005 agreement, the deal is over. He must also tell Mr. Bush that on the eve of the next NSG meeting he will make a televised address to the nation explaining the betrayal of trust which has led to the collapse of the deal. If the U.S. ignores his appeal, so be it. No government or leader in India will ever be able to justify entering into any agreement with Washington for the foreseeable future. And that will be America’s loss, not India’s.
Nuclear deal fate is now uncertain
24 August 2008
The Hindu
Nuclear deal fate ‘uncertain’
Siddharth Varadarajan
Vienna: One day after the Nuclear Suppliers Group failed to take a decision on an American proposal to grant India a waiver from its export guidelines, Indian officials acknowledged that the expected push to amend the draft waiver made the future of the nuclear deal uncertain.
For the record, India is sticking to the line that it continues to work with friendly countries towards the granting of an exemption from the NSG’s rules. Sticking to this script, Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon told reporters on Friday evening that India had been informed that the group had had a “positive and constructive discussion” and would meet soon to resume its examination of the India proposal. But privately, Indian officials say there is litte chance of India being able to accept changes in the American draft waiver that are anything other than cosmetic.
The question, they say, boils down to whether those NSG members who spoke out against the current proposal were merely letting out steam or fully intended to follow through with the suggestions they made. “If it is the latter, and the Americans are not able to convince them otherwise, then the deal looks very difficult from now on,” one official told The Hindu.
23 August 2008
Dateline Vienna: India says NSG clearance is U.S. responsibility
The Hindu
India says NSG clearance is U.S. responsibility
Siddharth Varadarajan
Cartel to meet again in two weeks to consider amended waiver
Vienna: The United States’ inability to deliver a key part of its side of the July 2005 nuclear bargain with New Delhi became apparent on Friday as the Nuclear Suppliers Group ended an extraordinary plenary meeting without reaching agreement on a proposal to waive its restrictive export guidelines for India.
More crucially, the fact that India will now be asked to accept changes in the draft waiver that could conceivably limit the scope of nuclear cooperation or place conditions on it of one kind or another suggests the three-year-old nuclear deal could well be approaching its most serious break point to date.
Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon is now set to fly directly to Washington from Vienna to discuss the issues which arose in the NSG meeting and examine the American proposals, if any, for a change in the wording of the waiver. But it is apparent that there is little scope for India to accommodate the kind of demands a number of NSG countries made in the two-day meeting.
“Things are really very clear,” a senior Indian official told The Hindu when asked for his reaction to the NSG stalemate. “There was an agreement in 2005 in which we both made certain commitments. We have delivered on all of ours. Now the Americans have to deliver the NSG,” he said, “not us.” In the July 2005 statement, President George W. Bush committed himself to “work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.” Indian officials say securing NSG clearance by extracting further commitments from India or diluting the scope of cooperation was not part of the bargain.
The NSG, which consists of 45 countries and takes all its decisions by consensus, will now meet again here on September 4 and 5 to reconsider the India question on the basis of a new draft waiver that the U.S. has said it will bring to the group. The dates were informally agreed to but found no mention in the brief communiqué issued by the NSG, presumably because the U.S. needs to secure India’s concurrence to any language change before it is able to come before the suppliers group again.
“Participating governments exchanged views in a constructive manner, and agreed to meet again in the near future to continue their deliberations,” the NSG statement simply noted.
Asked what sort of amendments the American side was asked to make by those NSG countries that were critical of the original proposal, a European diplomat told The Hindu that a number of states had made suggestions on virtually every aspect of the draft. “I think the whole thing will be reformulated, but in a positive way,” he said, requesting that he and his country not be identified out of respect for the NSG’s rules of confidentiality.
Another diplomat said the NSG raised concerns on nuclear testing, adherence to NPT full-scope safeguards, the need for a review mechanism to assess Indian compliance, as well as restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing technology. “There was a reference in the earlier U.S. draft to the desirability of India eventually accepting the NPT and its safeguards that was more positive than what we have now,” the diplomat said. “So, I think America will have to come back to us with a new draft before any decision is possible.”
Speaking to reporters at the end of the meeting, acting U.S. Under Secretary for Arms Control John D. Rood said the U.S. was “pleased with the results of the discussion” and remained “very optimistic” about continuing to make progress “towards this important goal” of permitting civilian nuclear cooperation with India. He noted that “many delegations spoke about this important question” and said the India waiver would “remain something the group continues to work through in a serious manner.”
Dateline Vienna: Conditions mooted for Indian nuclear waiver
23 August 2008
The Hindu
Conditions mooted for Indian nuclear waiver
Siddharth Varadarajan
“We don’t want to scuttle deal,” say NSG diplomats
Vienna: Confronted with demands for amendments, the United States told the Nuclear Suppliers Group on Friday that it was confident of coming up with a new draft waiver for India from the cartel’s export rules which would respect both the non-proliferation concerns expressed by members as well as the red lines laid down by New Delhi.
But whether Washington will really be able to conjure up a magic formula of this type would depend crucially on whether there is in fact any political slack left in the position of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the United Progressive Alliance government, hanging on as they are to power by a slender thread of parliamentary support.
Main issues
Giving an account of the main issues which saw the NSG’s two-day meeting end inconclusively here on Friday, a diplomat from a participating government told The Hindu that these revolved around the fears expressed by many in the group of not being able to do anything in the event of India reneging on the non-proliferation commitments it was making in order to get the waiver in the first place.
NSG diplomats said they were unable to understand why India would want to object to the group restating its own belief in the desirability of all countries acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. “India is not a member of the NSG so any such statement of principle by us would clearly not be binding on them,” said a diplomat. At the same time, the diplomat said the NSG was aware of the sensitivity the issue had already raised in India following an earlier American attempt to incorporate this notion in the draft waiver. “I think this is one issue the NSG is likely to back away from if the U.S. comes back in September and says India will simply not agree to this,” one NSG official said.
On India’s testing moratorium, an NSG diplomat said nobody seriously expected India to sign the CTBT as a precondition for the waiver. “What needs to be looked at is how to deal with the new situation which would be created were India to test again.” Some countries wanted the NSG waiver to terminate nuclear cooperation immediately, while others wanted a more explicit consultation process going beyond that which was already envisaged in paragraph 16 of the guidelines.
The question of enrichment and reprocessing technology and equipment is also proving contentious, especially given the NSG’s failure to reach agreement among themselves about a general tightening of export rules. “We have been discussing this for years, even before the India issue came along, so some countries have suggested our ‘India decision’ postpone a waiver on ENR pending a final revision of the NSG’s guidelines on this,” an NSG country official said.
The final contentious issue at the NSG this week was whether to incorporate a ‘review’ provision in the proposed guideline waiver for India. “Some countries are suggesting having some kind of monitoring mechanism to assess the extent to which India is abiding by its non-proliferation commitments,” one diplomat said. But other countries favoured making their own national assessments on this question, rather than being tied down to an NSG-wide perception on Indian compliance.
Though virtually all of these suggestions and ideas are unlikely to find many takers in India, the U.S. delegation told the NSG they were confident of finding a compromise. “I think it also needs to be emphasised that none of the countries which raised these objections were saying, ‘No, we should not be doing this for India’,” a western European diplomat told The Hindu. “But they want some acknowledgment of the importance of their own commitment to the NPT and non-proliferation principles in general.” Asked to make a prediction about what would happen next, the diplomat said: “We know there are some demands which would effectively scuttle this deal as far as India is concerned. But I don’t think that is where anyone wants this process to end up.”
NSG Diary: Finding a way round the Code of Omerta
So how do reporters find out what the hell happened inside the fortress where the Nuclear Suppliers Group met for two days this week... And how will did India, and more importantly the United States, prepare for this meeting, which ended inconclusively on Friday...23 August 2008
The Hindu
Finding a fix to the NSG’s code of Omerta
Siddharth Varadarajan
Vienna: In keeping with its clubby, secretive character, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has a policy of strict confidentiality. Which means no official briefings or informal readouts of what transpires within, even by those unnamed “Western diplomats” who otherwise are quite happy to throw scraps of information to reporters.
However, with officials from 45 member countries moving in and out of the Japanese mission where the group is meeting, it was possible to glean some sense of the direction in which the cartel’s deliberations were headed. As diplomats made their way out of the building, many ducked aside at the sight of journalists but others proved amenable to being accosted and primed for information.
In general, officials from countries without a dog in the fight, whose governments did not have strong views in favour or against the American proposal to grant India a waiver from the supplier group’s export rules, seemed more inclined to chat with the press than others. And the juniors tended to be more forthcoming than their more seasoned colleagues. One young official from a country strongly opposed to the proposal was about to talk to The Hindu when he caught a glare from a senior colleague and backed off.
“I am sorry but you know the NSG’s proceedings are strictly confidential,” the senior official told this correspondent brusquely, before shepherding the junior diplomat away.
* * *
That India still has some lobbying to do to explain why any linkage to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is unacceptable to it became apparent to this correspondent when a group of diplomats from a country strongly in favour of the Indian exemption asked, at the end of an interview to The Hindu, whether it might not be possible for New Delhi to eventually sign the NPT. The diplomats, who had flown in to Vienna from their capital especially for the NSG meeting, actually missed Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon’s briefing for NSG members on Thursday. The NSG had adjourned shortly after 11 a.m. and the Indian briefing started at around 11.30 a.m. However, 30 minutes was obviously not enough for all officials to take the elevator down from the 27th floor of one building, where the Japanese mission is located, walk across to the Vienna International Centre (VIC), collect a pass, and make their way to the board room of the International Atomic Energy Agency that India had commandeered for its special briefing. “By the time we came in, the briefing was already over,” one diplomat lamented. “So could you please tell me what is India’s answer when some countries say you must commit to eventually signing the NPT?”
* * *
Insisting that India sign the NPT was the principal slogan raised by Ulrike Lunachek, a member of the Austrian parliament and prominent leader of the Greens, who staged a well-advertised but small protest demonstration outside the NSG meeting on Thursday morning. With two party activists holding a banner aloft and three activists forming her audience, Lunachek attacked the Austrian government for not being more vocal and firm in its opposition to the Indian deal. She accused the coalition government of Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer of currying favour with India in order to win Delhi’s backing for an Austrian bid for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Sadly for her, there were hardly any journalists to witness the protest, nor any NSG officials, since they had all already moved across to the VIC for the Indian briefing. With Gusenbauer’s government on the way out and fresh elections slated for September, it is evident that the Indian issue is getting reflected in the local politics of this strongly anti-nuclear country. Citizens here voted overwhelmingly in a referendum a few years ago to shut down Austria’s first reactor even before it was ever switched on.
* * *
So seriously did India take the NSG leg of the nuclear deal that it fielded one of its most powerful diplomatic delegations to date to hard sell the country’s case to countries that are still sitting on the fence and deal with any amendments the U.S. side might throw at them. Apart from Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon, the Indian officials here included R.B. Grover from the Department of Atomic Energy and D.B. Venkatesh Varma, both of whom were key negotiators during the earlier phases of the deal. Then there was the Prime Minister’s special envoy, Shyam Saran, Geetesh Sharma from the DAE, Naveen Srivastava, who is Director, Foreign Secretary’s Office, and Dr. Virander K. Paul, director in the Prime Minister’s Office. This on top of the multiple delegations that travelled to all the NSG country capitals in the run up to the Vienna meeting. But as the NSG’s deliberations ran aground here, it became apparent to the Indians that the Americans had not invested the same diplomatic energy in convincing their friends and allies across the world.
22 August 2008
Dateline Vienna: Naysayers set to delay India decision at NSG
It now seems almost certain that the NSG will have to meet again. And that the U.S. is going to come back to India for negotiations on changes to the draft waiver...22 August 2008
The Hindu
Naysayers set to delay India decision
Siddharth Varadarajan
U.S., India to examine ‘suggestions’
Vienna: The Nuclear Suppliers Group began formal deliberations here Thursday on whether to grant India a waiver from its export guidelines but it is looking increasing as if internal differences within the cartel will lead to any decision being deferred to a second sitting to be convened perhaps two weeks from now.
“The German chair is trying sincerely to do this by tomorrow [Friday],” one diplomat from an NSG member state told The Hindu at the end of discussions on the first day. “But to me it seems as if another round of discussions will be needed at a later date.” His assessment was shared by diplomats from a number of other countries.
The NSG plenary will resume at 1 p.m. on Friday, with member states using the morning to conduct “bilateral discussions.”
According to accounts provided by diplomats who took part in the meeting, a number of countries made statements offering “ideas and concepts” which they felt the United States needs to include in its waiver proposal. These ideas, said diplomats, did not take the form of “precise language” or concrete amendments but centred around finding ways in which the NSG could have “more confidence” in India standing by its non-proliferation commitments.
“What will happen now is that the U.S. will mull over these ideas, and come back to the NSG tomorrow afternoon,” said one diplomat. “And I presume they will spend tonight and tomorrow discussing how these ideas and suggestions could be incorporated, if at all, in the proposed waiver.”
While declining to go into the specific suggestions dissenting countries made, one diplomat hinted that some delegates were looking for an assurance from Delhi on nuclear testing going beyond reiteration of its moratorium.
“For example, if the other major nuclear countries which have to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in order for it to enter into force do so, then is it right that India should remain outside?” he asked. “So can we think of some way to say India will not stand in the way of the treaty entering into force?”
Among the dissidents were New Zealand, Austria and Ireland. But suggestions were made by many countries, including those that had come out in favour of the deal such as Canada and Japan, said one NSG member country diplomat. “Positive” and “constructive” were the two adjectives bandied about the most. “Look, I think you [India] will be happy with the outcome,” one East European official said. “Both sides will not be totally happy,” offered another, adding, “I think there is full awareness within the NSG of what are the Indian red lines and no one has any intention of crossing them.” The fact that not a single country opposed the principle of granting India an exemption, said an NSG official, was a very positive thing. “The rest is detail.”
The group began its meeting in the morning with opening statements from a number of countries and adjourned to attend a brief presentation by Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon. But it was in the post-lunch session that the debate over whether to approve the waiver or not began in right earnest.
American and Indian officials are expected to sit together late into Thursday night to see whether there is scope to reach common ground on the objections raised. It was presumably with such a scenario in mind that India sent a high-powered delegation of seven top officials to Vienna for this meeting.
Dateline Vienna: NSG critics focus on non-proliferation benchmarks
22 August 2008
The Hindu
NSG critics focus on non-proliferation benchmarks
Siddharth Varadarajan
Vienna: At the end of the first full day of deliberations on India at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, it was clear that the American proposal to exempt India from the cartel’s stringent export guidelines had produced plenty of heat but not enough light.
Speaking to reporters after the plenary dispersed for the day, the senior-most U.S. official at the NSG struck a noncommittal tone in saying the group had had “a very full discussion today” and that he remained optimistic that “we’re going to be successful in this process.”
John D. Rood, who is Under Secretary of State for Nonproliferation and who kicked off the discussion at the NSG in the morning as head of the U.S. delegation, also said the proposal to grant India a waiver “is a serious subject and it’s a room full of serious people who have taken it in that manner.” He said there would be “additional discussions” within the NSG on Friday “but for our part in the United States, we continue to believe this is a very important initiative, and we remain committed to achieving an outcome that is both a net benefit for the non-proliferation regime and it meets India’s energy needs.”
The U.S. has “an important emerging relationship with India that we continue to believe is critical and important for the United States,” he added.
The morning’s discussions began with the NSG’s German chair calling the special plenary to order and inviting opening comments on the American proposal that had already been circulated to members.
First off the bat was the U.S. According to an account provided to The Hindu by a participant from a former Eastern Bloc country, the U.S. urged the adoption of the waiver as it stood “in a nice but not so forceful way.” The diplomat divided NSG members into three groups based on their opening interventions. Those who strongly backed adoption of the text included the Czech Republic, Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine. A second group of “like-minded countries” said they wished to be “constructive” but wanted some additions and conditions included in the text. Among these were Austria, Ireland and New Zealand. Switzerland too expressed concerns, he said, as did the Nordic group. The third group consisted of those who came out in favour of the proposal but who did not appear overly enthusiastic.
This group, according to the diplomat, included Germany and Japan, as well as Canada and Australia.
Other diplomats described Thursday’s deliberations as “positive” and “constructive.” “There is nothing new that is being said. Every country’s position is well known. But the question is whether we can take a decision either way by tomorrow,” a diplomat who did not want her country to be identified told The Hindu. “If not, perhaps another meeting may be necessary.”
According to these diplomats, many interventions lamented the implications of the India exemption for the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the non-proliferation regime in general. Some delegations noted that an earlier reference to the desirability of India eventually accepting international safeguards over all its nuclear facilities — equivalent to New Delhi giving up the bomb and signing the NPT — had now been dropped.
Indeed, the issues of NPT, full-scope safeguards and non-proliferation concerns figured prominently in an informal briefing Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon held for NSG members at the UN complex on Wednesday night.
Both Austria and New Zealand attended that briefing and asked questions, diplomats said.
Indian officials say the raising of general non-proliferation objections by several countries may contain a silver lining because it shifts the terrain of discussion away from technical and legal nit-picking towards more “political considerations.”
One NSG country diplomat said most delegations concede that the bulk of their specific concerns have already been addressed by the Indian non-proliferation commitments listed in the draft waiver. “What some countries are looking for is tighter language tying the NSG’s waiver to those commitments.”
Asked for his assessment after Thursday’s more formal Indian presentation to NSG members, Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon said India and NSG had decided to maintain the confidentiality of their interactions. Speaking on condition of anonymity, however, other Indian officials acknowledged the battle was “tough” but said the overall atmosphere in Vienna was “positive.”
21 August 2008
Dateline Vienna: Eyes on NSG prize, India readies itself for big day
21 August 2008
The Hindu
(In the print edition of The Hindu, this story was split in twoo. The url of the second part, headlined 'U.S. officials feel NSG decision may take two sessions' can be found here.)
Eyes on NSG prize, India prepares for big day
Siddharth Varadarajan
Vienna: With less than 24 hours to go before the Nuclear Suppliers Group formally sits down to discuss granting India a waiver from its stringent export guidelines, Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon held a series of meetings here Wednesday with diplomats from member countries to press for the speedy adoption of the draft proposal without any changes.
Though the outcome of the August 21-22 NSG session is far from certain, the most important question the NSG needs to resolve for the moment, say Indian officials, is a procedural one. Will the plenary consultation involve the line-by-line parsing of the proposed exemption, as some countries appear to want? Or will the meeting encourage participants to address the totality of the proposal allowing nuclear commerce with India, air their reservations and concerns, but not seek to delay or derail the initiative by insisting on conditions? “Certainly this is the kind of political approach we favour,” a senior Indian official told The Hindu. “Every country places on the record its views but no one blocks the decision, and at the end, the Germans, as chair, declare the text adopted.”
In late evening confabulations India, the United States, Germany, the current chair of the NSG, and Hungary and South Africa, who make up the rest of the nuclear cartel’s ‘troika,’ were trying to resolve this issue.
The NSG will convene in the morning on Thursday but adjourn at 11 a.m. so that members can attend a special briefing by Mr. Menon. “We will make our presentation, explaining our policy, restating our bottom line and answering any questions,” the foreign secretary said.
Describing Wednesday’s series meetings with a range of “friendly” countries including existing and prospective suppliers like Russia and France as well as South Africa and Brazil as “productive,” Indian officials told The Hindu the picture that was emerging on the eve of the NSG’s plenary consultation was one of quiet support for the proposal.
Though some NSG states continue to have reservations about the implications of the exception for the non-proliferation regime, Indian officials said they did not detect any strong undercurrent of opposition, or the crystallisation of dissidence around the demand for specific changes.
If the high-powered Indian delegation — Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon is accompanied by no less than six senior officials, all experts in the field of nuclear diplomacy — continues to remain hopeful of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) reaching a consensus on the deal during the two days that have been set aside for this purpose, American officials are less upbeat about the speed with which the deal can be done. “While it would be good to do this in one sitting, in all likelihood there will probably have to be a second round of discussions,” a senior U.S. official told The Hindu. The official said the separate Indian briefing — set for 11 a.m. on Thursday — will eat into the time the NSG participants would have to deliberate on the proposal. “In effect, we only have a day and half now, and that may not be enough time.”
While some Indian officials see an upside to a two-step decision — “It is easier to work the political side of this deal than dealing with technical-level players, whose attitudes tend to be more rigid,” one official said — the delegation is wary that any delay other than procedural beyond August 22 or 23 is likely to generate changes to the waiver text.
“And, at the end of the day, that is not going to be acceptable to us,” one official said.
Underselling waiver?
Indeed, the American pessimism about the exemption being a one-shot affair is forcing India to ask itself whether the United States, the deal’s chief architect, is now underselling the waiver.
“We know the U.S. has been extensively consulting with a number of NSG members and probably has a sheet of paper with a bunch of conditions that it will say the others want,” said an Indian official. Some of those conditions may not necessarily be palatable to Washington, especially if they make U.S. executive authority subservient to NSG rules. “The U.S. likes to have its own rules and grant waiver authority to the President. So it will not want the NSG to adopt something which will make it mandatory for the U.S. to act in a particular way if something happens [between India and another supplier].” But in other areas where U.S. policy is clear-cut and there is no scope for any domestic carve-out, Washington will not want the NSG to adopt rules which might place its own firms at a disadvantage. “I think for them, the big fear is enrichment and reprocessing equipment,” said the official. “They have decided they will never give it to India. But if tomorrow the Russians or French throw in some ENR equipment as a sweetener for a reactor contract which U.S. suppliers won’t be able to do, they fear others will have a commercial advantage.”
Indian officials say that while the country is self-sufficient in ENR technology it would be unfair to deny equipment and components for the dedicated reprocessing plant the U.S. wants India to build in order to be able to reprocess American-origin spent fuel.
Dateline Vienna: Test ban treaty official urges India to sign CTBT
On the eve of the NSG meeting on India where several members are likely to press the country on the testing issue, Iraq has gone ahead and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, thereby becoming the 179th country to accede to it... 21 August 2008
The Hindu
Test ban treaty official urges India to sign CTBT
Siddharth Varadarajan
Vienna: The timing was pure coincidence but New Delhi is unlikely to relish the appeal, issued by a top disarmament official on the eve of Thursday’s Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting, for India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
At a previously scheduled press conference on Wednesday to unveil the largest ever ‘integrated field exercise’ to be undertaken by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO), the commission’s executive secretary, Tibor Toth, announced the “good news” that Iraq had just signed the CTBT, thereby becoming the 179th country to accede to the treaty. “I would like to urge all countries who have not yet signed the treaty, including India, Pakistan and DPRK [North Korea] to do so and for all others to ratify it as soon as they can.”
The “dreamer of this dream of a ban on all nuclear tests” was Nehru, said Mr. Toth and the treaty had been “very vigorously pursued by Indian diplomacy for many years.” He noted that despite having the maximum adherence in terms of signatories of any arms control treaty, the CTBT had not yet entered into force because all of the 44 countries listed in Annex II to the treaty had not yet signed and ratified it.
That list includes the five official nuclear weapon states, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, and 35 other countries with a significant nuclear capability. The U.S. and China have signed the CTBT but not ratified it. As of now, there are a total of nine ‘Annex II hold-outs,’ including India.
Catalyst for final push
In an interview to The Hindu, Ambassador Toth said the catalyst for a final push towards all Annex II countries coming on board could be the ratification of the treaty by the United States. “Of course, China should not wait to ratify, but from China’s point of view, U.S. ratification would be important.” North Korea’s accession might follow in due course as the Six Party Talks process continues, he said, and the Middle East hold-outs of Israel, Iran and Egypt could be persuaded to ratify once all the NPT-defined nuclear weapon states were parties. “That would leave India and Pakistan,” he said. The CTBTO head said India had reiterated its moratorium in the July 2005 joint statement with the U.S. and had also agreed to a bilateral moratorium with Pakistan. “And then there are the statements to the U.N. and the Indian Parliament by the [former] Prime Minister that India will not stand in the way of the CTBT entering into force.” Of course, it is entirely up to each country to decide if it is in their interest to join, he added.
Providing details about the field exercise to be held in the former Soviet testing range of Semiyaplatinsk in Kazakhstan later this month, Mr. Toth said on-site verification was one of the four pillars envisaged by the CTBT to ensure compliance with its provisions.
20 August 2008
India and the NSG: An interview
You can read the interview here.
Dateline Vienna: For nuclear club, it’s decision time on India
Proposal to bend rules brings angst, and the opportunity of business for some...20 August 2008
The Hindu
For nuclear club, it’s decision time on India
Proposal to bend rules brings angst, and the opportunity of business for some
Siddharth Varadarajan
Vienna: For a club with such strict rules of membership and forbidding guidelines of behaviour, the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s lack of a permanent address has always given the cartel something of a spectral character.
Set up under conditions of the greatest secrecy in London in April 1975 in order to deal with the consequences of India’s ’peaceful’ nuclear explosion at Pokhran in 1974, the seven founding members decided not to advertise the birth of their club. Three of them — France, West Germany and Japan — were not even members of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, though Bonn and Tokyo would deposit their instruments of ratification soon thereafter. One of them, the erstwhile Soviet Union, did not want developing countries to think it was ganging up with the West against them. The United States, Britain and Canada also preferred to be circumspect. Conscious of the fact that the rest of the world — including their closest allies — would see the cartel in a negative light, the seven decided that no minutes would be kept of their historic first meeting.
Predictably, when word of the secret meeting leaked out in the New York Times six weeks later, many European chanceries were enraged. The Netherlands, which saw itself as a pioneer of enrichment technology (as did an obscure Pakistani scientist named A.Q. Khan) petitioned for membership since it would be affected by the club’s decisions to restrict sensitive technologies. In 1976, it was admitted along with seven other countries from west and east Europe. According to an account by a former Swiss nuclear official, Alec Baer, Switzerland’s Claude Zangger — who headed a multilateral export control committee named after himself —“complained bitterly [but diplomatically] about not having been invited to the NSG discussions.” So the next year, Berne was also made a member of the club. After this initial burst of activity, however, the ‘London Club’ went into hibernation for 15 years and did not meet again in plenary until 1992.
Throughout this period, the group’s export rules did not prohibit nuclear sales to India despite the country refusing to place all its nuclear facilities under international safeguards. However, meeting in Warsaw that year after the end of the Cold War and the first Gulf War, the NSG adopted ‘full scope safeguards’ as a condition of supply for nuclear sales to any country. And that is when New Delhi found the door for nuclear imports — reactors, components and fuel — slammed in its face. Eighteen years after Pokhran-I, India had become off limits for nuclear commerce.
The fact that the NSG will take up for discussion on August 21 an American proposal to open that door once again is noteworthy enough. But were its two-day deliberations to conclude with a decision on lifting the embargo, this would represent one of the most dramatic policy reversals the world would have seen in recent years.
Batting for the exemption are the United States, Russia, France and Britain and a host of other countries with significant nuclear or nuclear-related interests. In announcements presumably timed to add wind to the sails of India’s supporters at the NSG, Indian nuclear officials are speaking of adding an additional 40 GWe of capacity through reactor imports. France, the U.S., Japan and Russia all expect to get a chunk of this business. But by far the most dramatic turnaround has been that of Canada. Ottawa joined the ‘London Club’ in 1975 mainly because it felt India had violated its ‘peaceful use’ commitments by allegedly employing Canadian-origin equipment for its 1974 explosion. After months of fence-sitting, the conservative government of Stephen Harper adopted a Cabinet decision late last month clearing the way for Canada to back the nuclear deal. Other countries that are expected to provide quiet backing for the exemption are Australia, Japan and Germany, though the last two continue to have reservations about certain aspects of the proposed waiver.
But if support is building up among the larger players, there are signs that several countries are preparing for a vigorous discussion here on Thursday.
Expresses concerns
New Zealand is the only one to have publicly articulated its concerns and Prime Minister Helen Clark said on Tuesday that Wellington was pursuing the matter diplomatically with “like-minded countries.”
“It would be no secret that we would like to see more conditionalities around the agreement,” she was quoted as saying by Fairfax Media.
Having held fast to the belief that India must be encouraged and cajoled into giving up its nuclear weapons, countries like New Zealand and Ireland who form part of the ‘New Agenda Coalition’ are reluctant to abandon the NSG’s trade embargo on New Delhi.
A question mark also surrounds the U.S. strategy on the eve of the NSG meeting. During the difficult negotiation process with Washington over the wording of the draft exemption, U.S. officials told their Indian counterparts that pushing the text through the cartel without changes would be difficult.
Some indication of what might be in store was provided by Richard Stratford, the State Department’s point-person for the technical talks with India in a recent pubic event in Washington.
“I heard Dick Stratford speak a couple of weeks ago, and during the Q&A session we hammered him pretty hard about the India deal and negotiations with the NSG,” a comment posted on the respected armcontrolwonk.com blog states. “From what he said, it seems pretty clear that the U.S. is going in with a “clean” exemption so they have a position to negotiate from with the other members. If they went in with a proposal that contained the limits of what India would accept, then there’d be no room for compromise. He has no expectations that the ‘clean’ draft will be the final version.”