Narayanan, Stephen Hadley likely to lead delegations but Indian officials warn there is no slack to cut on the Indian side.
30 June 2007
The Hindu
India, U.S. looking at mid-July for 123 talks
Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI: The next round of negotiations on the India-U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement — also known as the 123 Agreement — is slated for the middle of July with both sides seriously considering upgrading their delegations to the National Security Adviser level.
Though a final decision on the dates and composition of delegations will be taken over the next few days, it is likely that National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan and his United States counterpart, Stephen Hadley, will steer their teams when they meet in Washington two weeks from now to surmount the obstacles in the path of the nuclear deal.
The perception on both sides is that these obstacles cannot be resolved at the purely technical level and will require the involvement of politically-empowered officials. Indeed, India, which delayed sending several key members of its negotiating team to foreign postings in the expectation of a quick agreement, has now allowed them to rotate out. Hamid Ali Rao, Joint Secretary in the Disarmament Division of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), to Geneva as Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament and Santosh Jha, Director in MEA’s Americas Division, will take up a new assignment in Sri Lanka next week.
According to senior Indian officials, matters in the 123 Agreement remain more or less where they were when the two sides reached an impasse in Delhi earlier this month. In his meeting with Mr. Hadley at Heiligendamm on June 8, Mr. Narayanan sought to break the impasse by suggesting that India could place a purpose-built standalone reprocessing facility under IAEA safeguards for handling U.S.-origin spent fuel.
Imported reactors
Under the March 2006 separation plan, India had offered to place its existing Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing (PREFRE) facility at Tarapur under “campaign mode” safeguards, meaning it can be monitored or inspected only when safeguarded fuel is reprocessed there. But once several imported 1,000 MWe reactors are up and running, the quantum of safeguarded spent fuel would require a dedicated new reprocessing facility or even facilities, say officials. Nevertheless, the fact that India is willing to expand the number of its safeguarded fuel cycle facilities beyond what it agreed to do in 2006 is something the Bush administration can cite favourably on Capitol Hill, say Indian officials.
However, the officials also acknowledge that the Heiligendamm proposal was “ahead of the curve” in that it was basically suggesting a more palatable recipe for a dish the American side has so far said it is simply not interested in eating. “It’s not as if their answer to our request for reprocessing was ‘Yes, but’,” said an official. “If that were so, it makes sense to find ways of addressing that ‘but’. But unfortunately, their answer has simply been ‘no’.”
Though Mr. Narayanan may head India’s delegation to Washington, officials are clear that there is no slack on the Indian side as far as compromising on the right to reprocess or securing cast-iron fuel supply guarantees are concerned.
“Not dragging”
The Indian side also has no intention of negotiating to an artificial deadline, say officials. “First, we were told this must be finished by April, then end of May, then August. Now Condi [U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice] is talking about completing this by the end of the year,” said one official. “Please understand, we are not playing for time. The deal is stuck not because of delays but on the issue of implementing commitments that were made in July 2005 and March 2006.” He added that once the Bush administration decided it was willing to implement its commitments, the agreement could be “finished in hours.” “But if they decide not to, playing for time is hardly the answer.”
The fact that Ms. Rice — in her remarks to the U.S.-India Business Council in Washington on Thursday — stressed the importance of not just “the agreements that our leaders signed” but also “the legislation that we have passed” has also been taken note of by officials here.
The Bush administration maintains that in finalising the contours of the 123 Agreement, it cannot go beyond the provisions of the Hyde Act passed last December. However, nothing in U.S. law prevents the administration from allowing India the right to reprocess spent U.S.-origin or U.S.-obligated fuel.
30 June 2007
15 June 2007
An Indian campaign for an Iranian scholar
The Iranian scholar, Dr. Kian Tajbakhsh, who studied with me at Columbia University in New York in the 1990s, was arrested by the authorities last month in Tehran. Kian and I had stayed in touch over the years and I spent a pleasant evening with him in Tehran this February discussing everything under the sun but especially his ongoing work on urban local government in Iran and the danger posed to Iran and the Middle East by the Bush administration's policies and actions.Though his one-time affiliation with the Soros Foundation is likely being held against him, I can state with complete confidence that Dr. Tajbakhsh is an Iranian patriot and is as opposed to the U.S. policy of "regime change" as any self-respecting Iranian. Most of all, I find it impossible to believe he could be involved in any attempt to subvert the Islamic Republic of Iran.
A number of us in India who know him well had written to the Iranian ambassador in Delhi last month urging his release. Now that he has been in jail for over a month, we decided to hand over a letter with the signature of over 150 prominent Indian artists, writers, Shia clreics and public figures -- all friends and well-wishers of Iran -- calling for Dr. Tajbakhsh's release on humanitarian grounds.
15 June 2007
The Hindu
Prominent artists, intellectuals, public figures urge release of Iranian scholar
Special Correspondent
NEW DELHI: More than 150 prominent Indian artists, intellectuals and public figures have written to the Iranian authorities seeking immediate release of jailed scholar Kian Tajbakhsh.
Arrested on May 11, Dr. Tajbakhsh is one of the four Iranians with dual American nationality who have been charged with working to undermine the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
He lived in India in the 1990s and is well known in academic and cultural circles here.
In the letter, which was handed over to Iranian Charge d'Affaires Reza Alaei on Thursday, the signatories expressed deep concern at the incarceration of Dr. Tajbakhsh. While recognising Iran's "sovereign right to secure itself against any perceived threat to its welfare and safety," they described the imprisoned scholar as a "man of integrity and an Iranian patriot incapable of indulging in `espionage' against his country."
India a friend
India, the letter notes, is a friend of the Islamic Republic of Iran. "Those of us from India — academics, artists, intellectuals, journalists, professionals and the most respected Shia leaders — calling upon your Government to release Dr. Tajbakhsh are all friends of Iran and of the Iranian people. Many of us have taken public stand against the American-led `global war on terror' and against its hegemonic agenda of `regime change' in Iran or elsewhere," it says.
The signatories include Shia cleric Maulana Kalbe Sadiq; writers Khushwant Singh, Arundhati Roy, Dilip Chitre and Gulzar; journalists Saeed Naqvi, Tarun Tejpal, Farah Naqvi, Siddharth Varadarajan and Praful Bidwai; artists Tyeb Mehta and Jehangir Sabavala; filmmakers Saeed Mirza and Govind Nihalani and academics Achin Vanaik, Nivedita Menon and Anuradha Chenoy.
Personal plea
"Whatever be the nature of the questioning that Dr. Tajbakhsh must undergo, surely it can happen outside the prison walls," the letter states.
"We take this occasion to make a personal plea to your Government on humanitarian grounds. Dr. Tajbakhsh and his wife are expecting their first child a few months from now. The stress and strain of his imprisonment can only harm the health of both mother and child," it adds.
List of Signatories
1. Maulana Kalbe Sadiq, Lucknow
2. Khushwant Singh, Eminent Writer, Delhi
3. Saeed Naqvi, Senior Journalist, Delhi
4. Tarun J. Tejpal, Editor-in-chief, Tehelka, Delhi
5. Arundhati Roy, Eminent Writer, Delhi
6. Gulzar, writer, poet, filmmaker, Mumbai
7. Tyeb Mehta, eminent artist, Mumbai
8. Sakina Mehta, Mumbai
9. Jehangir Sabavala, eminent artist, Mumbai
10. Saeed Mirza, filmmaker, Mumbai
11. Siddharth Varadarajan, Associate Editor, The Hindu, New Delhi
12. Govind Nihalani, filmmaker, Mumbai
13. Jennifer Mirza, film producer, Mumbai
14. Dr. Achin Vanaik, Professor, International Relations & Global Politics, Delhi University
15. Dr. Aditya Nigam, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi
16. Dr. Anuradha Chenoy, Professor, School of International Studies, JNU, Delhi
17. Bina Sarkar Ellias, Editor, Gallerie Publishers, Mumbai
18. Dr. Deepak Mehta, Dept of Sociology, Delhi University
19. Farah Naqvi, Independent Writer, Delhi
20. Dr. Farida Khan, Professor, Jamia Milia Islamia University, Delhi
21. Harsh Sethi, Consulting Editor, Seminar, Delhi
22. Jamal Kidwai, Director, Aman Trust, Delhi
23. Kai Friese, Editor, Outlook Traveler Magazine, Delhi
24. Dr. Kamal Chenoy, Professor, School of International Studies, JNU, Delhi
25. Dr. Madhulika Banerjee, Dept of Political Science, Delhi University
26. Nandini Mehta, Features Editor, Outlook Magazine, Delhi
27. Dr. Nivedita Menon, Dept of Political Science, Delhi University
28. Praful Bidwai, Columnist, Frontline, Delhi
29. Dr. Radhika Chopra, Dept of Sociology, Delhi University
30. Rajan Prasad, Sahmat, Delhi
31. Yogendra Yadav, Professor, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi
32. Satyajit Mayor, Professor, National Centre for Biological Sciences, Bangalore
33. Dr. Nandini Sundar, Professor of Sociology, Delhi University
34. Narendra Kumar, Publisher and Educationist, Delhi
35. Mollica Dastidar, Independent Academic, Delhi
36. S.P Srivastava, former Indian Revenue Service Officer, Delhi
37. Shabnam Hashmi, Anhad, Delhi
38. Uma Chakravarti, Historian, Delhi University
39. Gautam Vohra, DRAG, Delhi
40. Dr. K.S Subramanian, IPS (retd), Delhi
41. K.B. Dayani, CEO Industrial Management Academy, Delhi
42. Girijesh Pant, Professor, JNU, Delhi
43. Jawed Naqvi, Columnist, Delhi
44. Rafeeq Ellias, Photographer/filmmaker, Mumbai
45. Shirin Sabavala, Mumbai
46. George Jose, consultant, Asia Society Centre in India, Mumbai
47. Madhushree Dutta, Executive Director, Majlis, Centre for Rights Discourse & Multicultural Art Initiatives, Mumbai
48. Prabodh Parekh, Director, Katha Centre for Film Studies, Mumbai
49. Sabrina Buckwalter, Correspondent, Times of India newspaper, Mumbai
50. Mona Seervai, Principal, Bombay International School, Mumbai
51. Ritu Menon, Publisher, Women Unlimited, New Delhi
52. Shobha Vishwanath, Publisher, Karadi, Chennai
53. Padmini Mirchandani, Publishing Director, India Book House, Mumbai
54. Mohammed Khan, Chairman, Bates Enterprise, Mumbai
55. Tom Alter, actor and writer, Mumbai
56. Kalpana Sharma, ex-bureau chief and writer, The Hindu, Mumbai
57. Arvind Krishnaswamy, Chief Executive, Bharat Petroleum, Mumbai
58. R. Sriram, co-founder of Crossword Books, Mumbai
59. K. Anita, co-founder of Crossword Books, Mumbai
60. Kalpana Shah, Director, Tao Art Gallery, Mumbai
61. Atul Dodiya, artist, Mumbai
62. Indira Chandrashekhar, Publisher, Tulika Publishers, New Delhi
63. Anju Dodiya, artist, Mumbai
64. Sudeep Sen, poet, New Delhi
65. Rekha Rodwittiya, artist, Baroda
66. Surendran Nair, artist, Baroda
67. Manisha Gera Baswani, artist, New Delhi
68. Sarnath Bannerji, graphic novelist and artist, New Delhi
69. Bani Abidi, artist, New Delhi
70. Manisha Parekh, artist, New Delhi
71. Anand Patwardhan, filmmaker, Mumbai
72. Rahul Baswani, YPO, New Delhi
73. Kahini Arte, painter, Mumbai
74. Visha Sushde Mehta, Producer, Music Productions, Mumbai
75. Richard Waswo, photographer & writer, Udaipur
76. Sharmishtha Ray, artist and writer, Mumbai
77. Sampurna Chatterji, poet, Mumbai
78. Manjari Chaturvedi, Kathak danceuse, New Delhi
79. Amit Mehra, photographer, New Delhi
80. Priya Sarukkai Chhabria, poet and writer, Pune
81. Nandini Bhaskaran Jal, writer, Mumbai
82. Brinda Chudassama, artist, Mumbai
83. Dilip Chitre, writer and poet, Pune
84. Ranjit Hoskote, writer and poet, Mumbai
85. Nancy Adajania, writer, Mumbai
86. Christopher Samuel, Managing Director, Madison Pr
87. Pranab K. Das, architect, Mumbai
88. Sen Kapadia, architect, Mumbai
89. Vaishaili Bannerji, CEO, Platinum, Mumbai
90. Sudhir Patwardhan, artist, Mumbai
91. Gieve Patel, artist, writer, poet, Mumbai
92. Mehlli Gobhai, artist, Mumbai
93. Meera Devidayal, artist, Mumbai
94. Mortimer Chatterji, gallerist and writer, Mumbai
95. , anthropologist, Mumbai
96. Dolly Thakore, theatre person, Mumbai
97. Tushar Joag, artist, Mumbai
98. Bhagwat Devidayal, Proprietory Business, Mumbai
99. Vinod Shetty, lawyer, Mumbai
100. Mahendra Sinh, photographer, Mumbai
101. Jeroo Mulla, head of department, Sophia Polytechnic College, Mumbai
102. Pallu Newatia, Icecube Film Productions, Mumbai
103. Kekoo Gandhi, gallerist, Mumbai
104. Khorshed Gandhi, gallerist, Mumbai
105. Puja Kshatriya, artist, Mumbai
106. Shireen Gandhi, gallerist, Mumbai
107. Jitish Kalat, artist, Mumbai
108. Reena Kalat, artist, Mumbai
109. Yuki Ellias, theatre actor, Mumbai
110. Shilpa Gupta, artist, Mumbai
111. Anu Tandon, theatreperson, Mumbai
112. Khushboo Mody, designer, Mumbai
113. James Fereira, designer, Mumbai
114. Anuradha Dev Benegal, architect, Mumbai
115. Dev Benegal, filmmaker, Mumbai
116. Khushro Patel, Proprietor, Jak Printers, Mumbai
117. Debjani Chatterji, teacher, Mumbai
118. Chiru Mazumdar, artist, Mumbai
119. Shivmeet Deol, student, Mumbai
120. Manisha Bhattacharya, studio potter, New Delhi
121. Baruna Bhattacharya, art writer, Kolkata
122. Leena Kejriwal, photographer, Kolkata
123. Pradip Raman, lawyer, Mumbai
124. Dr. Anuradha Krishnamurthy, Pathologist, Mumbai
125. Celine D’Cruz, Representative, Slum Development International, Mumbai
126. Namita Devidayal, Correspondent, Times of India
127. Meher Rafat, member of NGO, Cleanair, Mumbai
128. Sanjay Divecha, musician, Mumbai
129. Nishit Mehta, musician, Mumbai
130. Mohana Dutt, retd school teacher, Mumbai
131. Shanta Gokhale, writer, Mumbai
132. Neel Chatterji, film curator/writer Osian-Fest, New Delhi
133. Firdausi Jussawala, marketing & sales director, retd, Air India, Mumbai
134. Darryl D’Monte, environmentalist, Mumbai
and many others
Text of Letter
Mr. Reza Alaei
Charge d’Affaires
Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran
New Delhi
Date: June 14th, 2007
Ref: Continued Incarceration of Iranian scholar Dr. Kian Tajbakhsh
Dear Mr. Alaei:
This follows our earlier letter dated May 29, 2007, handed over to Mr. Saeid Asadi, Second Secretary (Press & Public Relations), expressing our deep concern at the incarceration of our friend and colleague Dr. Kian Tajbakhsh in Tehran and urging your government to release him. (A copy of that letter is attached)
Despite an assurance of communication given to us by Mr. Asadi, there has been no news or response from your Embassy regarding Dr. Tajbakhsh’s wellbeing or release.
We recognize that it is your Government’s sovereign right to secure itself against any perceived threat to its welfare and safety. We also respect the pressures under which the Islamic Republic of Iran is operating, for these are difficult times not only for your country but indeed, for all peace loving citizens of the world. And when global battle-lines are drawn in this manner, suspicion rather than trust becomes the prevailing norm. However, even in these difficult times we urge your Government to recognize the difference between friend and foe.
India is a friend of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Those of us from India - academics, artists, intellectuals, journalists, professionals and the most respected Shia leaders - calling upon your Government to release Dr. Tajbakhsh are all friends of Iran and of the Iranian people. Many of us have taken public stands against the American led ‘global war on terror’ and against its hegemonic agenda of ‘regime change’ in Iran or elsewhere.
When voices like ours throw themselves behind a campaign to release Dr. Tajbakhsh from an unjust incarceration, we do expect a favorable hearing. When people like us are willing to stake our credibility to vouch for Dr. Tajbakhsh as a man of integrity and an Iranian patriot incapable of indulging in ‘espionage’ against his country, our voices, the voices of friends, should count for something within higher echelons of the Iranian Government. We respectfully request you to communicate this to Tehran.
As you can see from the number of prominent Indians who have come forward to sign this letter, a campaign against the continued incarceration of Dr. Tajbakhsh is gaining momentum in India and in other parts of the world. While we are happy that this is so, we are also aware that the existence of such a campaign will become an effective tool of propaganda in the hands of those who do not wish Iran well. We certainly do not want this to happen any more than you do.
We urge you to release Dr. Tajbakhsh from incarceration. Whatever be the nature of the questioning that Dr. Tajbakhsh must undergo, surely it can happen outside prison walls. We take this occasion to make a personal plea to your Government on humanitarian grounds. Dr. Tajbakhsh and his wife are expecting their first child a few months from now. The stress and strain of Dr. Tajbakhsh’s imprisonment can only harm the health of both mother and child. We hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran will show itself to be a kind and caring nation and, on these grounds alone, allow Dr. Tajbakhsh to reunite with his wife and family at this time.
We once again look forward to an appropriate response from your Government.
Yours Sincerely,
14 June 2007
Four-power meeting drew Chinese démarche
Last month, India held a quiet meeting with Japan, Australia and the United States to discuss security issues. Each member of this new 'four power' initiative denies the aim is to gang up against China. But Beijing is wary of this new alignment.
14 June 2007
The Hindu
Four-power meeting drew Chinese démarche
U.S., Japan keen to rope in India in quadrilateral security cooperation
Siddharth Varadarajan
New Delhi: Days before the first-ever official-level security consultation between the United States, India, Japan and Australia last month, China issued démarches to each of the participants seeking to know the purpose behind their meeting.
A démarche is a formal diplomatic communication made with the purpose of, inter alia, eliciting information from another State and reflects the seriousness of the issue at stake.
Unlike India, Japan and Australia are close military allies of the U.S. and trilateral security cooperation between Washington, Tokyo and Canberra has been going on for some time. New Delhi -- which had been resisting the idea of a quadrilateral security meeting for more than a year because of its ‘encirclement of China’ connotations -- finally committed itself to a dialogue with Japan “and other like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific region on themes of mutual interest” during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Tokyo last December.
Concrete plans for this new quadrilateral dialogue process were firmed up after the visit to Delhi last month of Japan’s Vice-Foreign Minister, Shotaro Yachi. The first “exploratory meeting” at the level of senior officials took place on the sidelines of the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) security policy meeting in Manila on May 24-25. The U.S. was represented by Christopher Hill, Washington’s point man for the Six-Party talks on Korea, India by Additional Secretary K.C. Singh from the MEA, Japan by Chikao Kawai, deputy Vice Minister for foreign policy, and Australia by Jennifer Rawson from its Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Largely mindful of China’s concerns, however, the four countries decided to meet without any formal agenda and to not publicise the meeting itself or the subjects discussed. "In the run up, the Chinese had démarched all four of us to find out what was going on, and I suppose we were conscious of not trying to create the impression of a gang-up against them”, a senior official told The Hindu.
India, said the official, "certainly does not wish to send such a signal to China and I think at this time, none of the others wants to either”. On May 27, Ms. Rawson told an Australian parliamentary panel that the four countries were not seeking to create a new security alliance and were only "looking at issues of common interest”.
Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso has been pushing the idea of bringing New Delhi into the existing trilateral security process with Australia and the U.S. since his visit to Delhi in January 2006. For Japan, India is a key part of the ‘Arc of Prosperity and Freedom’ it is trying to build around the “outer rim of the Eurasian continent”. In practice, this ‘Arc’ -- which bears no resemblance to the actual geometrical shape -- skirts almost entirely along the borders of China and Russia.
India as ‘common strategic objective’
On its part, the U.S. has been quick to realize the value of a quadrilateral framework for dealing with strategic developments in Asia. In particular, the Bush administration has sought to build a patchwork of military and strategic partnerships around China with a view to “encouraging” Beijing to play the role of a “responsible stakeholder” in Asia.
Since 2005, the U.S. has officially begun to speak of India as part of this network of “values-based relationships” surrounding China. And this year’s U.S-Japan Security Consultative Committee joint statement made a direct reference to New Delhi, the first time this has happened at that forum.
The high-level statement -- issued on May 1 by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Defence Secretary Robert M. Gates, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso and Defence Minister Fumio Kyuma -- sets out as a “common strategic objective” the task of “continuing to build upon partnerships with India to advance areas of common interests and increase cooperation, recognizing that India's continued growth is inextricably tied to the prosperity, freedom, and security of the region.”
By meeting on the sidelines of the ARF, Indian officials hope the message went out that the new ‘quadrilateral’ sees itself as essentially an adjunct to Asean. “Just as the ARF itself is Asean-plus, the Quad is an ARF-plus arrangement. For example, anything we do on the maritime security front, or humanitarian front like tsunami relief, would have to involve the Asean countries”, an official said.
Asked what the logic of creating a ‘mini-ARF’ was, the official said that there were many overlapping structures in Asia and this did not mean they were competing with each other. “India, for example, is not part of APEC and the U.S., Japan and Australia are not part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)”, he said.
Given the explicit military dimension to the cooperation envisaged, however, it is unlikely that others in Asia -- least of all China -- will see the ‘Quad’ as just another “overlapping structure”.
The Indian, Japanese and Australian Navies worked together under U.S. “leadership” after the 2004 tsunami and in April this year, India, Japan and the U.S. staged trilateral naval exercises off Japan’s eastern coast.
Predictably, the latest “humanitarian” exercises did not go down well in Beijing. In a commentary on April 21, People’s Daily wrote: “It is absolutely not new for Japan and the U.S. to sit down and plot conspiracies together but it is rather intriguing to get India involved”. Unconvinced by the Indian Navy’s plans to have joint exercises with China and Russia, the official Chinese newspaper saw the trilateral exercises as “a signal for a new balance of force in the Asia region”. The U.S., it said, was “an old-brand power” but is “striving to win the support of Japan and India in a bid to prevent China and Russia from joining forces”.
Though no date has been fixed for the next quadrilateral meeting, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is expected to try and upgrade the process to the ministerial level when he visits New Delhi later this year. At that point, say officials, India will have to carefully evaluate the inevitable signals any enhancement of security cooperation between the ‘four powers’ will likely send to China and the rest of Asia.
14 June 2007
The Hindu
Four-power meeting drew Chinese démarche
U.S., Japan keen to rope in India in quadrilateral security cooperation
Siddharth Varadarajan
New Delhi: Days before the first-ever official-level security consultation between the United States, India, Japan and Australia last month, China issued démarches to each of the participants seeking to know the purpose behind their meeting.
A démarche is a formal diplomatic communication made with the purpose of, inter alia, eliciting information from another State and reflects the seriousness of the issue at stake.
Unlike India, Japan and Australia are close military allies of the U.S. and trilateral security cooperation between Washington, Tokyo and Canberra has been going on for some time. New Delhi -- which had been resisting the idea of a quadrilateral security meeting for more than a year because of its ‘encirclement of China’ connotations -- finally committed itself to a dialogue with Japan “and other like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific region on themes of mutual interest” during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Tokyo last December.
Concrete plans for this new quadrilateral dialogue process were firmed up after the visit to Delhi last month of Japan’s Vice-Foreign Minister, Shotaro Yachi. The first “exploratory meeting” at the level of senior officials took place on the sidelines of the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) security policy meeting in Manila on May 24-25. The U.S. was represented by Christopher Hill, Washington’s point man for the Six-Party talks on Korea, India by Additional Secretary K.C. Singh from the MEA, Japan by Chikao Kawai, deputy Vice Minister for foreign policy, and Australia by Jennifer Rawson from its Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
Largely mindful of China’s concerns, however, the four countries decided to meet without any formal agenda and to not publicise the meeting itself or the subjects discussed. "In the run up, the Chinese had démarched all four of us to find out what was going on, and I suppose we were conscious of not trying to create the impression of a gang-up against them”, a senior official told The Hindu.
India, said the official, "certainly does not wish to send such a signal to China and I think at this time, none of the others wants to either”. On May 27, Ms. Rawson told an Australian parliamentary panel that the four countries were not seeking to create a new security alliance and were only "looking at issues of common interest”.
Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso has been pushing the idea of bringing New Delhi into the existing trilateral security process with Australia and the U.S. since his visit to Delhi in January 2006. For Japan, India is a key part of the ‘Arc of Prosperity and Freedom’ it is trying to build around the “outer rim of the Eurasian continent”. In practice, this ‘Arc’ -- which bears no resemblance to the actual geometrical shape -- skirts almost entirely along the borders of China and Russia.
India as ‘common strategic objective’
On its part, the U.S. has been quick to realize the value of a quadrilateral framework for dealing with strategic developments in Asia. In particular, the Bush administration has sought to build a patchwork of military and strategic partnerships around China with a view to “encouraging” Beijing to play the role of a “responsible stakeholder” in Asia.
Since 2005, the U.S. has officially begun to speak of India as part of this network of “values-based relationships” surrounding China. And this year’s U.S-Japan Security Consultative Committee joint statement made a direct reference to New Delhi, the first time this has happened at that forum.
The high-level statement -- issued on May 1 by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Defence Secretary Robert M. Gates, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso and Defence Minister Fumio Kyuma -- sets out as a “common strategic objective” the task of “continuing to build upon partnerships with India to advance areas of common interests and increase cooperation, recognizing that India's continued growth is inextricably tied to the prosperity, freedom, and security of the region.”
By meeting on the sidelines of the ARF, Indian officials hope the message went out that the new ‘quadrilateral’ sees itself as essentially an adjunct to Asean. “Just as the ARF itself is Asean-plus, the Quad is an ARF-plus arrangement. For example, anything we do on the maritime security front, or humanitarian front like tsunami relief, would have to involve the Asean countries”, an official said.
Asked what the logic of creating a ‘mini-ARF’ was, the official said that there were many overlapping structures in Asia and this did not mean they were competing with each other. “India, for example, is not part of APEC and the U.S., Japan and Australia are not part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)”, he said.
Given the explicit military dimension to the cooperation envisaged, however, it is unlikely that others in Asia -- least of all China -- will see the ‘Quad’ as just another “overlapping structure”.
The Indian, Japanese and Australian Navies worked together under U.S. “leadership” after the 2004 tsunami and in April this year, India, Japan and the U.S. staged trilateral naval exercises off Japan’s eastern coast.
Predictably, the latest “humanitarian” exercises did not go down well in Beijing. In a commentary on April 21, People’s Daily wrote: “It is absolutely not new for Japan and the U.S. to sit down and plot conspiracies together but it is rather intriguing to get India involved”. Unconvinced by the Indian Navy’s plans to have joint exercises with China and Russia, the official Chinese newspaper saw the trilateral exercises as “a signal for a new balance of force in the Asia region”. The U.S., it said, was “an old-brand power” but is “striving to win the support of Japan and India in a bid to prevent China and Russia from joining forces”.
Though no date has been fixed for the next quadrilateral meeting, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is expected to try and upgrade the process to the ministerial level when he visits New Delhi later this year. At that point, say officials, India will have to carefully evaluate the inevitable signals any enhancement of security cooperation between the ‘four powers’ will likely send to China and the rest of Asia.
Labels:
Asian architecture,
China,
Indian Foreign Policy,
Japan
12 June 2007
A 'warts and all' view of Indian science

BOOK REVIEW: With interesting tidbits about the 1974 atomic test at Pokhran and the economics of India's nuclear energy programme, Ashok Parthasarathi's Technology at the Core provides a useful account of how the country's S&T policies and institutions were designed and evolved during the Indira Gandhi era.
12 June 2007
The Hindu
A 'warts and all' view of Indian science
TECHNOLOGY AT THE CORE — Science & Technology with Indira Gandhi
By Ashok Parthasarathi
New Delhi: Pearson-Longman, 2007. Rs. 695.
Siddharth Varadarajan
As a scientific advisor in the Prime Minister's Secretariat (PMS) during the Indira Gandhi years, Ashok Parthasarathi was witness to that momentous period in the development of the Indian economy when the foundations for the policy of "technological self-reliance" were laid.
Seconded into the Department of Atomic Energy by Vikram Sarabhai in 1967 after spending a year at MIT, Parthasarathi found himself in the PMS three years later at the instance of P.N. Haksar. It was from this vantage point that he helped Indira Gandhi shape the Government's thinking across a wide range of technologies, from atomic energy and space to electronics (his own field of specialisation), defence, agriculture and the environment. The account he provides is detailed — in some areas perhaps even too detailed for the lay reader — but frank and honest.
Atomic energy
In particular, he is quite unsparing in his criticism of the grandiose "profile" for atomic energy proposed by Sarabhai and later Homi Sethna in 1971 and 1972— the former envisaged 2700 MW of electricity generation capacity through nuclear power by 1980, the latter 4,500 MW by 1985. As the Prime Minister's scientific assistant, Parthasarathi had deconstructed both profiles and concluded neither was feasible. "My doubts were unfortunately vindicated later by the fact that the actual nuclear power capacity achieved in the year 2000 was only 2,800 MW!" he notes.
Predictably, given current interest in the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement, the most fascinating sections of the book are the ones dealing with the problems faced by the U.S.-built Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS). The denial of reprocessing rights has led to the accumulation of a vast acreage of dangerous spent fuel. Tracing the problem back to the flawed agreement on fuel supply with the U.S., he says the problem could have been resolved when the agreement expired in 1993. "With TAPS itself a serious radiation hazard, one would have thought ... [the government] which had to deal with the problems of radiation emission management from the spent fuel storage tanks would have had the courage to `bite the bullet' and at least shut down TAPS," he writes. He laments the fact that all Prime Ministers from Indira Gandhi onwards "have allowed the deadly reactor to continue to operate" and generate highly radioactive spent fuel.
Nuclear investment
The book also contains a fascinating discussion about the economics of nuclear power generation. Having done the math himself, Parthasarathi critiqued the DAE's sums for, inter alia, not treating the use of heavy water as an explicit cost and not factoring in the reduced capacity utilisation rates for its reactors or ultimate disposal and reactor entombment costs. When the Government was in the process of sanctioning the investment funds for a second reactor at Madras (MAPP-2), he sent a note detailing his objections on grounds of the irrational economics that were involved. He was overruled and Cabinet approved the plan in April 1971. "When I met Haksar after the Cabinet meeting, he said, `I hope you appreciate why the approval of MAPP-2 had to be accorded. As you are well aware there are larger objectives to our atomic programme than nuclear power and those objectives cannot be compromised at any cost'." [Original emphasis]
Parthasarathi was no babe in the wood. He knew exactly what Haksar was talking about but said that if nuclear investments continued to expand as an energy programme, "momentum would build up within the atomic energy community for an expanding nuclear power programme that the country really did not need and could not afford." In a sense, this is exactly what has happened.
Pokhran
This book also contains a fascinating account of Indira Gandhi's decision to test a nuclear weapon at Pokhran in May 1974. Though formally called a "peaceful nuclear explosion" (PNE) and justified to the world as such, nobody in the PMS had any illusions about the actual intent. He mentions how Indira casually informed him in September 1972 that the decision had been taken to go ahead with the PNE. He also writes about how a copy of a Top Secret letter written by the Prime Minister to the Army Chief of Staff on the subject in 1972 mysteriously ended up on his desk a few days after the 1974 test. "Dr. R. Ramanna, Director, BARC, needs to undertake some experiments in the Pokhran test range. Kindly give him all assistance," the note said. An investigation was launched into how the note had casually surfaced two years later but nothing came of it.
Lay readers are bound to wish that Parthasarathi had leavened his book with more such anecdotes and insights. However, his account of these years is likely to become a standard reference work for anyone interested in the history of India's science and technology policy.
11 June 2007
The Brics/Bicsam/G5 summit idea takes hold...
The G8 forum of rich countries has limited utility for the developing world.
11 June 2007
The Hindu
Brazil proposes G5 summit
Siddharth Varadarajan
New Delhi: Though largely overshadowed by the brief "pull aside" Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had with U.S. President George W. Bush, the most significant aspect of last week's G8 meetings was the new dialectic that emerged among the five countries which were invited to Germany as "outreach" partners.
Standalone agenda
At a meeting of the five — Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa — Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva took the lead in proposing that the group consider getting together again at a forum other than that of the G8 so that its own meetings are no longer incidental to the meetings and agenda of the eight most industrialised countries.
Welcome proposal
The proposal was welcomed by the other leaders, say Indian officials familiar with the June 7 deliberations of the "outreach," or O-5, in Berlin. China's President Hu Jintao noted that the five countries together accounted for 42 per cent of the world's population and Dr. Singh quoted an old statement of Jawaharlal Nehru that developing countries were partners and not petitioners before the chanceries of the world.
Though an actual decision on what shape future interaction at the summit level should take has been deferred, the five agreed to instruct their Foreign Ministers to meet this fall on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly to "coordinate their positions" on issues of common interest. The idea is not to stop engaging with the G8 but to explore the full range of issues that the G5 can work on itself.
Reservations
A senior Indian official told The Hindu that even before last week's meetings, at least one leader of the "outreach" privately expressed his reservations to India about the utility of going to Germany to meet the G8 when the five countries had more important business to transact with each other.
What gives the latest initiative by the five countries — known by the acronym BICSAM — added heft is the disarray that was so evident in the G8's ranks at Heiligendamm on issues ranging from climate change to arms control. The United States failed to convince its old ally, Germany, on global warming, while on missile defence, the U.S. delegation was blindsided by Russia's proposal to move American early-warning radars from eastern Europe to Azerbaijan.
Indeed, say Indian officials, the G8's failure underscores the fact that the international system is truly in a state of flux and that no single grouping of countries — even if they are the most powerful ones in economic terms — can presume to have a solution to the world's problems.
Pulling together
While the BICSAM countries all contend with distinct economic and strategic circumstances and sometimes differ from each other on a number of issues, each has realised the importance of pulling together on a number of global problems.
Climate change
On climate change, the five spoke with one voice before the G8, but the plan is to explore the possibility of other common positions on issues ranging from migration, the Doha `development' round of the trade negotiations, and the reform of global institutions such as the U.N., the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to better reflect the realities of today's world.
11 June 2007
The Hindu
Brazil proposes G5 summit
Siddharth Varadarajan
New Delhi: Though largely overshadowed by the brief "pull aside" Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had with U.S. President George W. Bush, the most significant aspect of last week's G8 meetings was the new dialectic that emerged among the five countries which were invited to Germany as "outreach" partners.
Standalone agenda
At a meeting of the five — Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa — Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva took the lead in proposing that the group consider getting together again at a forum other than that of the G8 so that its own meetings are no longer incidental to the meetings and agenda of the eight most industrialised countries.
Welcome proposal
The proposal was welcomed by the other leaders, say Indian officials familiar with the June 7 deliberations of the "outreach," or O-5, in Berlin. China's President Hu Jintao noted that the five countries together accounted for 42 per cent of the world's population and Dr. Singh quoted an old statement of Jawaharlal Nehru that developing countries were partners and not petitioners before the chanceries of the world.
Though an actual decision on what shape future interaction at the summit level should take has been deferred, the five agreed to instruct their Foreign Ministers to meet this fall on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly to "coordinate their positions" on issues of common interest. The idea is not to stop engaging with the G8 but to explore the full range of issues that the G5 can work on itself.
Reservations
A senior Indian official told The Hindu that even before last week's meetings, at least one leader of the "outreach" privately expressed his reservations to India about the utility of going to Germany to meet the G8 when the five countries had more important business to transact with each other.
What gives the latest initiative by the five countries — known by the acronym BICSAM — added heft is the disarray that was so evident in the G8's ranks at Heiligendamm on issues ranging from climate change to arms control. The United States failed to convince its old ally, Germany, on global warming, while on missile defence, the U.S. delegation was blindsided by Russia's proposal to move American early-warning radars from eastern Europe to Azerbaijan.
Indeed, say Indian officials, the G8's failure underscores the fact that the international system is truly in a state of flux and that no single grouping of countries — even if they are the most powerful ones in economic terms — can presume to have a solution to the world's problems.
Pulling together
While the BICSAM countries all contend with distinct economic and strategic circumstances and sometimes differ from each other on a number of issues, each has realised the importance of pulling together on a number of global problems.
Climate change
On climate change, the five spoke with one voice before the G8, but the plan is to explore the possibility of other common positions on issues ranging from migration, the Doha `development' round of the trade negotiations, and the reform of global institutions such as the U.N., the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to better reflect the realities of today's world.
09 June 2007
G8 statement ignores disarmament
There's loads of advice and fatwas for others but the Heiligendamm statement is silent on the nuclear weapons states' obligation to get rid of their arsenals and the new 'Cold War' that is threatening the security of the world thanks to the U.S. pursuit of missile defence.
9 June 2007
The Hindu
G8 statement ignores disarmament
Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI: Apart from a stray reference to the "three pillars" of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), one of which is disarmament, G8 leaders issued a declaration on non-proliferation that seeks to restrict the access of countries, including NPT members, to civil nuclear technology but contains not one word on the nuclear weapons states' treaty obligation to get rid of their arsenals.
Four of the G8's members — Britain, France, Russia and the United States — are nuclear weapon states. The U.S. is conducting research work on a new generation of nuclear bombs as well as on missile defence. Britain recently took a controversial decision to spend billions of dollars to retain its Trident nuclear weapon system without knowing which nuclear adversary it was trying to deter. Russia has responded to the U.S. missile defence challenge — including the proposed deployment of "early warning" radars in Poland and the Czech Republic with new missile tests and a threat to retarget Europe with its nuclear weapons.
Though the G8 leaders undoubtedly discussed these issues behind closed doors, the four-page "Heiligendamm statement on non-proliferation", issued Friday, remains silent on the new `Cold War' that is threatening the security of Europe, Asia and the world.
Instead, it repeats prescriptions aimed at tackling other dangers, real and notional, and threatens to consider "alternative strategies to reduce the proliferation risks associated with the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing goods and technologies" if the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the 45-nation cartel of the world's major nuclear technology-capable countries, fails to agree to tighter rules by next year.
The statement also repeats verbatim a paragraph on India from the 2006 G8 summit declaration in St. Petersburg, which begins by noting that the eight leaders look forward to reinforcing their partnership with India.
"We note the commitments India has made, and encourage India to take further steps towards integration into the mainstream of strengthening the non-proliferation regime so as to facilitate a more forthcoming approach towards nuclear cooperation to address its energy requirements, in a manner that enhances and reinforces the global non-proliferation regime," the statement says.
Indian officials say the roundabout formulation reflects the lack of a clear consensus within the G8 on how to view the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement of July 2005. However, insofar as the statement encourages India to implement the steps it committed and promises "a more forthcoming approach towards nuclear cooperation" in return, it is clear that the two G8 members most ambivalent about allowing nuclear trade with India — Japan and Germany — are ready to go along with the emerging consensus.
But the U.S.-led push to tighten the NSG's trading rules on reprocessing and enrichment could pose a challenge to New Delhi, especially if this is used to limit the proposed scope of nuclear cooperation with India as and when the cartel considers changing its rules.
On other non-proliferation issues, the G8 statement reiterates the group's well-known positions: urging all states to observe a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions, urging universal adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Model Additional Protocol, and supporting expedited negotiations on the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty.
While demands are made usually on Iran of full compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions to suspend all nuclear enrichment activity, the G8 statement this year adds two significant sentences. It wants the UNSC to fulfil its role as the "final arbiter of the consequences of non-compliance" and says the group is "committed to resolving regional proliferation challenges by diplomatic means."
Multilateral approaches
The G8 also stressed the importance of "developing and implementing mechanisms of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle as a possible alternative to pursuing national enrichment and reprocessing activities."
Among the models it endorsed were the Russian proposal on multinational centres providing fuel cycle services and the U.S.-led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).
However, in an attempt to allay the concern of many countries that the multinational approach would be used to make them give up national facilities, the G8 statement says participation in any multinational arrangement should be "voluntary."
9 June 2007
The Hindu
G8 statement ignores disarmament
Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI: Apart from a stray reference to the "three pillars" of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), one of which is disarmament, G8 leaders issued a declaration on non-proliferation that seeks to restrict the access of countries, including NPT members, to civil nuclear technology but contains not one word on the nuclear weapons states' treaty obligation to get rid of their arsenals.
Four of the G8's members — Britain, France, Russia and the United States — are nuclear weapon states. The U.S. is conducting research work on a new generation of nuclear bombs as well as on missile defence. Britain recently took a controversial decision to spend billions of dollars to retain its Trident nuclear weapon system without knowing which nuclear adversary it was trying to deter. Russia has responded to the U.S. missile defence challenge — including the proposed deployment of "early warning" radars in Poland and the Czech Republic with new missile tests and a threat to retarget Europe with its nuclear weapons.
Though the G8 leaders undoubtedly discussed these issues behind closed doors, the four-page "Heiligendamm statement on non-proliferation", issued Friday, remains silent on the new `Cold War' that is threatening the security of Europe, Asia and the world.
Instead, it repeats prescriptions aimed at tackling other dangers, real and notional, and threatens to consider "alternative strategies to reduce the proliferation risks associated with the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing goods and technologies" if the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the 45-nation cartel of the world's major nuclear technology-capable countries, fails to agree to tighter rules by next year.
The statement also repeats verbatim a paragraph on India from the 2006 G8 summit declaration in St. Petersburg, which begins by noting that the eight leaders look forward to reinforcing their partnership with India.
"We note the commitments India has made, and encourage India to take further steps towards integration into the mainstream of strengthening the non-proliferation regime so as to facilitate a more forthcoming approach towards nuclear cooperation to address its energy requirements, in a manner that enhances and reinforces the global non-proliferation regime," the statement says.
Indian officials say the roundabout formulation reflects the lack of a clear consensus within the G8 on how to view the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement of July 2005. However, insofar as the statement encourages India to implement the steps it committed and promises "a more forthcoming approach towards nuclear cooperation" in return, it is clear that the two G8 members most ambivalent about allowing nuclear trade with India — Japan and Germany — are ready to go along with the emerging consensus.
But the U.S.-led push to tighten the NSG's trading rules on reprocessing and enrichment could pose a challenge to New Delhi, especially if this is used to limit the proposed scope of nuclear cooperation with India as and when the cartel considers changing its rules.
On other non-proliferation issues, the G8 statement reiterates the group's well-known positions: urging all states to observe a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions, urging universal adherence to the International Atomic Energy Agency's Model Additional Protocol, and supporting expedited negotiations on the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty.
While demands are made usually on Iran of full compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions to suspend all nuclear enrichment activity, the G8 statement this year adds two significant sentences. It wants the UNSC to fulfil its role as the "final arbiter of the consequences of non-compliance" and says the group is "committed to resolving regional proliferation challenges by diplomatic means."
Multilateral approaches
The G8 also stressed the importance of "developing and implementing mechanisms of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle as a possible alternative to pursuing national enrichment and reprocessing activities."
Among the models it endorsed were the Russian proposal on multinational centres providing fuel cycle services and the U.S.-led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).
However, in an attempt to allay the concern of many countries that the multinational approach would be used to make them give up national facilities, the G8 statement says participation in any multinational arrangement should be "voluntary."
Labels:
International Security,
Nuclear Issues
06 June 2007
Nuclear talks: 'Manmohan sent strong message through Burns'
If a deadlock is to be avoided over the proposed bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, aka 123 agreement, the U.S. side will have to come up with an overall package that is consistent with the promise held out in the July 2005 agreement for full civil nuclear cooperation. Any halfway house will not pass muster, say Indian officials.
6 June 2007
The Hindu
'Manmohan sent strong message through Burns'
Parliament, people expect `Tarapur legacy' on fuel disruption, reprocessing to be overcome
Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh used the "courtesy call" Washington's top nuclear negotiator made on him on Saturday night to convey to the United States "in the clearest manner possible" that the nuclear deal would not be acceptable to either Parliament or people if it did not insulate India's nuclear facilities from supply disruptions and grant the right to reprocess spent fuel.
Giving an account of the "brisk and businesslike" meeting, which was scheduled only after it became clear that negotiations on the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement were going nowhere, senior Indian officials said the Prime Minister's message was intended to convey the fact that the Government had no intention of backing off on these and other red lines drawn by him in Parliament in August 2006.
Together with the "extremely intensive" technical discussions stretching over three days, Indian officials say the Prime Minister's brief meeting with U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns "hopefully" drove home the point that India's insistence on reprocessing and fuel assurances was not a "negotiating tactic" but a reflection of domestic political realities.
"No Prime Minister of India can stand up and tell Parliament that he is going ahead with this deal even though we haven't got reprocessing rights and there is no security of fuel supplies," a senior official told The Hindu. "This is frankly not saleable politically."
Asked for his assessment of how Mr. Burns reacted to the Indian message, an official said the feeling on the U.S. side has been that "We are doing such a big deal for India, why the hell are you not taking it? Why are you making such a big deal about reprocessing and strategic reserves?" "But now, for the first time, there seems to have been an appreciation from the Americans that there is a political issue which has to be resolved, and that we are not bluffing," said the official.
He added: "I can't say the issue will be resolved, but if as a result of this last meeting we are now on the same wavelength, there is a better chance."
For India, said the officials, "full civil nuclear energy cooperation" includes four separate spheres: reactors, fuel, reprocessing rights and fuel cycle equipment and technology. "It is very important to get this principle incorporated into the 123 agreement," said an official. "The fact that the [Bush] administration did not take the trouble to inform the U.S. Congress that reprocessing is a part of the deal is not our problem. We have been saying from Day One that this is essential."
External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee's statement on Sunday that the U.S. side appeared to be facing "legal constraints" in completing the nuclear deal, say officials, is a reflection of India's view that the necessary adjustments to domestic law President Bush promised in July 2005 have not been fully carried out.
In last week's talks, say officials, a few relatively minor issues were resolved but all the big obstacles — reprocessing, security of fuel supplies, fall-back safeguards, and access to nuclear fuel cycle equipment — remain. On Article 14 of the draft 123 agreement — which deals with the circumstances under which there would be cessation of cooperation as well as the consequences that would follow — "there is still a lot of work that has to be done." For the moment, however, officials say efforts are focussed on ensuring that any consequences that follow an Indian nuclear test should not compromise the country's ability to ride out any cut-off in fuel supplies that may follow.
Giving an account of one of the minor issues which was resolved, Indian officials said the status of "byproduct material" — defined in U.S. statute as "all materials (except fissionable material) yielded in the processes of producing fissionable material" — has now been settled. Byproduct material, which has a variety of industrial, commercial and medical applications, is not subject to safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency. "But the U.S. side started by demanding Indian byproduct material had to be safeguarded!" said an official.
After a lengthy tussle, the U.S. backed off. Last week in Delhi, a compromise was reached wherein India said it would "share information" on any such material produced from U.S.-supplied equipment.
While declining to provide specific details on the different proposals covering reprocessing and security of fuel supplies, senior officials said the Indian side essentially sought to impress upon their American interlocutors the "legacy issue" of Tarapur. This is the U.S.-built reactor whose spent fuel has been accumulating for decades with Washington withholding permission to reprocess and refusing to take back what is essentially a toxic hazard.
"There is also a practical issue," said an official. If India's ambitious plans on the nuclear front fructify and 20 additional 1000 MWe reactors are built, the accumulation of spent fuel would be enormous. "At that point, if we find we are not able to reprocess, this would be a massive problem."
"In the Indian mind, Tarapur is negatively famous for two things," said an official. "For the fact that fuel supplies for the reactor were cut-off, and for our inability to reprocess. Hence, we need to show that through this negotiation we will no longer be exposed to these problems again. So we have to have strategic reserves to tide us over the problem of any disruption of supplies, and we have to have reprocessing."
In practical political terms, say officials, the Prime Minister has to be able to "honestly get up and say `Yes' if asked whether this negative legacy has been overcome, that there is reprocessing, that he has ensured there will be no supply disruptions for our reactors."
Senior officials say an affirmative answer to both questions — as well as to the question of whether India's strategic programme and three-stage energy programme have been protected — is crucial if the government is to be able to "sell the deal" to Parliament and the public.
`Joint safeguards' opposed
At the same time, officials hasten to add, that there are other big issues which are still unresolved in the 123 process. On fallback safeguards, which were mandated by the Hyde Act passed last December, the U.S. side is insisting that India agree to secondary bilateral safeguards. Indeed, one U.S. proposal is for so-called "joint safeguards" to be conducted by the IAEA and U.S. officials, something the Indian side has categorically rejected.
As for access to reprocessing, enrichment and heavy water equipment and technology, the U.S. is saying its proposed cooperation with India will not cover this. While the Indian side does not realistically expect controls to be eased on the Nuclear Suppliers Group "trigger list" items — i.e. actual reprocessing or enrichment plants — it must be able to buy "dual use" list items for use in civilian reprocessing and enrichment facilities.
"The Hyde Act allows these items only if an Indian facility is part of the U.S.-led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership or a multinational fuel cycle facility of the IAEA," said an official. "But we want to be able to buy these items for our national fuel cycle facilities." Until now, however, the U.S. is refusing to budge on this front.
6 June 2007
The Hindu
'Manmohan sent strong message through Burns'
Parliament, people expect `Tarapur legacy' on fuel disruption, reprocessing to be overcome
Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh used the "courtesy call" Washington's top nuclear negotiator made on him on Saturday night to convey to the United States "in the clearest manner possible" that the nuclear deal would not be acceptable to either Parliament or people if it did not insulate India's nuclear facilities from supply disruptions and grant the right to reprocess spent fuel.
Giving an account of the "brisk and businesslike" meeting, which was scheduled only after it became clear that negotiations on the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement were going nowhere, senior Indian officials said the Prime Minister's message was intended to convey the fact that the Government had no intention of backing off on these and other red lines drawn by him in Parliament in August 2006.
Together with the "extremely intensive" technical discussions stretching over three days, Indian officials say the Prime Minister's brief meeting with U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns "hopefully" drove home the point that India's insistence on reprocessing and fuel assurances was not a "negotiating tactic" but a reflection of domestic political realities.
"No Prime Minister of India can stand up and tell Parliament that he is going ahead with this deal even though we haven't got reprocessing rights and there is no security of fuel supplies," a senior official told The Hindu. "This is frankly not saleable politically."
Asked for his assessment of how Mr. Burns reacted to the Indian message, an official said the feeling on the U.S. side has been that "We are doing such a big deal for India, why the hell are you not taking it? Why are you making such a big deal about reprocessing and strategic reserves?" "But now, for the first time, there seems to have been an appreciation from the Americans that there is a political issue which has to be resolved, and that we are not bluffing," said the official.
He added: "I can't say the issue will be resolved, but if as a result of this last meeting we are now on the same wavelength, there is a better chance."
For India, said the officials, "full civil nuclear energy cooperation" includes four separate spheres: reactors, fuel, reprocessing rights and fuel cycle equipment and technology. "It is very important to get this principle incorporated into the 123 agreement," said an official. "The fact that the [Bush] administration did not take the trouble to inform the U.S. Congress that reprocessing is a part of the deal is not our problem. We have been saying from Day One that this is essential."
External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee's statement on Sunday that the U.S. side appeared to be facing "legal constraints" in completing the nuclear deal, say officials, is a reflection of India's view that the necessary adjustments to domestic law President Bush promised in July 2005 have not been fully carried out.
In last week's talks, say officials, a few relatively minor issues were resolved but all the big obstacles — reprocessing, security of fuel supplies, fall-back safeguards, and access to nuclear fuel cycle equipment — remain. On Article 14 of the draft 123 agreement — which deals with the circumstances under which there would be cessation of cooperation as well as the consequences that would follow — "there is still a lot of work that has to be done." For the moment, however, officials say efforts are focussed on ensuring that any consequences that follow an Indian nuclear test should not compromise the country's ability to ride out any cut-off in fuel supplies that may follow.
Giving an account of one of the minor issues which was resolved, Indian officials said the status of "byproduct material" — defined in U.S. statute as "all materials (except fissionable material) yielded in the processes of producing fissionable material" — has now been settled. Byproduct material, which has a variety of industrial, commercial and medical applications, is not subject to safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency. "But the U.S. side started by demanding Indian byproduct material had to be safeguarded!" said an official.
After a lengthy tussle, the U.S. backed off. Last week in Delhi, a compromise was reached wherein India said it would "share information" on any such material produced from U.S.-supplied equipment.
While declining to provide specific details on the different proposals covering reprocessing and security of fuel supplies, senior officials said the Indian side essentially sought to impress upon their American interlocutors the "legacy issue" of Tarapur. This is the U.S.-built reactor whose spent fuel has been accumulating for decades with Washington withholding permission to reprocess and refusing to take back what is essentially a toxic hazard.
"There is also a practical issue," said an official. If India's ambitious plans on the nuclear front fructify and 20 additional 1000 MWe reactors are built, the accumulation of spent fuel would be enormous. "At that point, if we find we are not able to reprocess, this would be a massive problem."
"In the Indian mind, Tarapur is negatively famous for two things," said an official. "For the fact that fuel supplies for the reactor were cut-off, and for our inability to reprocess. Hence, we need to show that through this negotiation we will no longer be exposed to these problems again. So we have to have strategic reserves to tide us over the problem of any disruption of supplies, and we have to have reprocessing."
In practical political terms, say officials, the Prime Minister has to be able to "honestly get up and say `Yes' if asked whether this negative legacy has been overcome, that there is reprocessing, that he has ensured there will be no supply disruptions for our reactors."
Senior officials say an affirmative answer to both questions — as well as to the question of whether India's strategic programme and three-stage energy programme have been protected — is crucial if the government is to be able to "sell the deal" to Parliament and the public.
`Joint safeguards' opposed
At the same time, officials hasten to add, that there are other big issues which are still unresolved in the 123 process. On fallback safeguards, which were mandated by the Hyde Act passed last December, the U.S. side is insisting that India agree to secondary bilateral safeguards. Indeed, one U.S. proposal is for so-called "joint safeguards" to be conducted by the IAEA and U.S. officials, something the Indian side has categorically rejected.
As for access to reprocessing, enrichment and heavy water equipment and technology, the U.S. is saying its proposed cooperation with India will not cover this. While the Indian side does not realistically expect controls to be eased on the Nuclear Suppliers Group "trigger list" items — i.e. actual reprocessing or enrichment plants — it must be able to buy "dual use" list items for use in civilian reprocessing and enrichment facilities.
"The Hyde Act allows these items only if an Indian facility is part of the U.S.-led Global Nuclear Energy Partnership or a multinational fuel cycle facility of the IAEA," said an official. "But we want to be able to buy these items for our national fuel cycle facilities." Until now, however, the U.S. is refusing to budge on this front.
05 June 2007
Rights for forgotten tribes
Amdist the claims and counter-claims of Gujjars and Meenas, the machinations of the Government and the brutality of the Police, Nandini Sundar has an excellent article in today's Hindustan Times editorial page about Rajasthan's forgotten tribals -- those who did not take to the streets to press or challenge a claim to reservation for the simple reason that official affirmative action policies have failed to benefit them in any substantive way.4 June 2007
Hindustan Times
Rights for forgotten tribes
By Nandini Sundar
Predictably, public discourse on the Gujjar-state-Mina (as the census spells them) standoff in Rajasthan has centred on two, or, at best, three issues: while a large section of the media and some political commentators — fresh from the OBC bust up — have decried the irrationality of community-based reservations, another section has tried to frame the legitimate claims of the Gujjars against the lack of trickle-down. The brutality of the police firing merits passing mention, but will soon disappear, like all the other statistics of people killed by a trigger-happy police let loose by incompetent administrations. As if five lakh rupees here, and one lakh there were enough to deflect from the underlying issue of how governments in India treat demonstrating interest groups.
It is easy to forget, in the midst of all this noise, that the Minas are not the only Scheduled Tribe (ST) in Rajasthan. But everyone, ranging from TV commentators to some Minas themselves, seem to think so: "Minas in Rajasthan are the only Scheduled Tribes and we would not tolerate any inclusion into our community," Bhanwar Lal Mina, president of the Rashtriya Mina Mahasabha, is reported to have said. Even the MP from Barmer, Manvendra Singh, in whose district Bhils constitute almost 6% of the population (and 99% of the district's ST population), neglects to mention that they exist. No TV reporter, to my knowledge, has asked a Bhil leader what she or he feels about the stands taken by the Gujjars and the Minas, and no political commentator has yet asked why groups like the Bhils or Saharias are unable to take advantage o0f the reservations they are entitled to, and which they so desperately need.
At 12.6% of the state, Rajasthan's tribal population is somewhat higher than the national average: the Minas constitute 53.5% of the total ST population, the Bhils 39.5%, smaller groups like the Garasia, Damor, Dhanka & Saharia are 6.6%, while the Bhil Mina, Naikda, Kathodi, Patelia, Kokna and Koli Dhor with populations ranging from below 100 to about 3000 make up the remaining 0.3%. The Minas almost exclusively dominate the eastern portion of the state's Sawai Madhopur, Dholpur, Bharatpur, Karauli, Dausa, while the Bhils live in south-western Rajasthan. Banswara district is 72% adivasi, with Dungarpur and Udaipur following next in terms of adivasi populations, and it is not co-incidental that issues like the right to food, employment guarantee and common property resources have been so critical here.
The differences between the Bhils and Minas are pronounced. While the Minas have an overall literacy rate of 52.2%, which is higher than the national ST average of 47.1%, the Bhils and Saharias have an overall literacy rate of 35.2% and 34.2% respectively. 3.5% of Minas are graduates compared to 0.9% of Bhils, 0.6% of Garasias and 0.1% of Saharias. No wonder then that all the government posts reserved for STs are occupied by Minas, making them not just the dominant tribe in Rajasthan, but one of the groups which has most benefited through reservations nationally, although their literacy rate is still lower than the state average of 61%. Even a cursory look at the civil services or even universities reveals a number of Minas, but scarcely any Bhils from Rajasthan or Madhya Pradesh, Gonds from Chhattisgarh, or Hos from Jharkhand, all numerically significant communities.
Explaining why certain groups have been able to take advantage of reservations and others have been left out is a complex issue. It involves tracking histories of education, migration, and social networks. For instance, the Uraons in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, another group with access to government jobs, have had a long history of missionary education, though within Jharkhand, they are not as politically powerful as the Santhal and the Mundas. However, the Minas are better off not just in terms of education and employment but also land holdings, annual incomes and assets. A study by MK Bhasin and Shampa Nag found that among STs in Rajasthan, a greater percentage was engaged in agricultural or casual labour (50%) as against cultivation (40%). Among Minas, however, 85% were engaged in cultivation, and only 1.5% in agricultural labour.
Literacy figures for Gujjars are hard to come by since the census does not disaggregate for OBC groups. But even assuming that they are disadvantaged compared to the Jats, or even the Minas, and have suffered under the neglect of rural livelihoods, that by itself does not constitute a justification for giving them ST status. As Ann Gold and Bhoju Ram Gujar bring out in In the Time of Trees and Sorrows, the local politics was not about Gujjars vs Minas, both of whom were relatively privileged communities, although subservient to the court, but about access to the forests and the problems of agriculture. It is this lived relationship, the common frustration with government services and lack of employment, which needs to be restored to the forefront of political discourse. It is another question whether the current political parties and caste leaderships are capable of doing this.
While it is true that state categorisations placed one group in the st category and flung another into the OBC list, the solution lies not in inflating the ST list or scrapping reservations, at least for scheduled tribes, but renewing the principles on which the Constitution envisaged special provisions for adivasis. The criteria used initially were vague, so deserving communities like the Kols of Sonbhadra got left out and many, who were scheduled, still need this protection. The kind of sheer discrimination STs face is not comparable to OBCs or even SCs, who perform better on education and employment criteria.
Apart from being the major victims of displacement, the absence of a significant middle-class and successful political formations like the BSP mean the adivasis are the most voiceless group in Indian society today. Without reservations, we would not even have the few adivasi MPs that we have now. If, with a quota of 7.5% there are only 2.2% ST teachers in Delhi University, without reservations, even they could get edged out. Few adivasi communities can aspire to the kind of front page coverage of their mobilisation in the way that both Gujjars and Minas have achieved with their narrow caste demands — even when they come out in lakhs to demand the forest rights bill or protest against atrocities.
Since the other tribes of Rajasthan do not exist for the government, the media or political commentators — neither in a political nor a metaphorical sense — this makes them the groups, which are most deserving of ST status. The objectives of the National Tribal Policy of 2006 include: "Arresting the increasing demand from new communities for inclusion in the list of STs by rationalising the process of scheduling; examine the need for de-scheduling of certain STs and sub-categorisation of existing STs to ensure that benefits are evenly spread across the tribes by 2020." Will the UPA and the NDA have the courage to live up to this?
Nandini Sundar is professor of Sociology at the Delhi School of Economics.
04 June 2007
The stalemate and beyond
The Hindu's editorial today is very clear about how the impasse can be overcome...
4 June 2007
The Hindu
Editorial: The stalemate and beyond
After three days of "intensive, productive and constructive" negotiations on their proposed nuclear cooperation agreement, India and the United States have reached an impasse, though it is too early to say whether this impasse is fatal or not. India is looking for an agreement that will give legal expression to the full set of commitments each side made on July 18, 2005 (J18) and March 2, 2006 (M2), when the original nuclear deal and subsequent separation plan for India's civil and military facilities were agreed upon. Central to these two sets of commitments is the idea that India will be allowed to reprocess the spent fuel produced by any light water reactors or low enriched uranium it may import from the U.S. Equally central is the integrity of the fuel supplies India acquires pursuant to the overall deal. Under no circumstances can those supplies — in exchange for which Indian civilian reactors are to be placed under permanent international safeguards — be compromised by any cessation of cooperation for whatever reason. Thirdly, India is unwilling to accept that its political commitment not to test a nuclear weapon be converted into an obligation with legal consequences. There are other issues too, all of which stem from the inadequacies and shortcomings of the Hyde Act. But New Delhi believes there is no point expending energy on those unless these fundamental differences are ironed out first.
Simply put then, if there is no reprocessing in the `123 agreement' or if there is any language that jeopardises the security of future nuclear fuel supplies, there will be no deal. Whether Nicholas Burns, who headed the U.S. delegation during the latest parley, clearly understands this, however, remains to be seen. While Indians across the board welcome the prospect of unfair technology restrictions on the country being lifted, few will want this to happen at the expense of our indigenous, three-stage nuclear programme. Reprocessing of spent fuel is an integral part of the programme and it is precisely because of the bitter experience in Tarapur — where consent rights were never given — that India is fully justified in seeking the incorporation of prior consent in the `123 agreement' itself. In any case, leaving the issue to the future is fraught with danger. Though the U.S. itself is now coming around to recognising the usefulness of reprocessing and has come up with the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership as a "proliferation-resistant" plan for the supply of nuclear fuel, the position it envisages for India is one of a "recipient" country, which will do no reprocessing itself. A deal is still possible provided Washington sticks to the letter and spirit of J18/M2. The Hyde Act wildly deviated from this benchmark but the U.S. assured Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that the `123 agreement' would bring matters back on track. The moment of truth will soon be upon us.
4 June 2007
The Hindu
Editorial: The stalemate and beyond
After three days of "intensive, productive and constructive" negotiations on their proposed nuclear cooperation agreement, India and the United States have reached an impasse, though it is too early to say whether this impasse is fatal or not. India is looking for an agreement that will give legal expression to the full set of commitments each side made on July 18, 2005 (J18) and March 2, 2006 (M2), when the original nuclear deal and subsequent separation plan for India's civil and military facilities were agreed upon. Central to these two sets of commitments is the idea that India will be allowed to reprocess the spent fuel produced by any light water reactors or low enriched uranium it may import from the U.S. Equally central is the integrity of the fuel supplies India acquires pursuant to the overall deal. Under no circumstances can those supplies — in exchange for which Indian civilian reactors are to be placed under permanent international safeguards — be compromised by any cessation of cooperation for whatever reason. Thirdly, India is unwilling to accept that its political commitment not to test a nuclear weapon be converted into an obligation with legal consequences. There are other issues too, all of which stem from the inadequacies and shortcomings of the Hyde Act. But New Delhi believes there is no point expending energy on those unless these fundamental differences are ironed out first.
Simply put then, if there is no reprocessing in the `123 agreement' or if there is any language that jeopardises the security of future nuclear fuel supplies, there will be no deal. Whether Nicholas Burns, who headed the U.S. delegation during the latest parley, clearly understands this, however, remains to be seen. While Indians across the board welcome the prospect of unfair technology restrictions on the country being lifted, few will want this to happen at the expense of our indigenous, three-stage nuclear programme. Reprocessing of spent fuel is an integral part of the programme and it is precisely because of the bitter experience in Tarapur — where consent rights were never given — that India is fully justified in seeking the incorporation of prior consent in the `123 agreement' itself. In any case, leaving the issue to the future is fraught with danger. Though the U.S. itself is now coming around to recognising the usefulness of reprocessing and has come up with the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership as a "proliferation-resistant" plan for the supply of nuclear fuel, the position it envisages for India is one of a "recipient" country, which will do no reprocessing itself. A deal is still possible provided Washington sticks to the letter and spirit of J18/M2. The Hyde Act wildly deviated from this benchmark but the U.S. assured Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that the `123 agreement' would bring matters back on track. The moment of truth will soon be upon us.
Forget the G8, it's time for a Brics summit
Dateline Brasilia: Instead of waiting like supplicants outside the portals of the G8, Brazil, India, China, and South Africa should realise a summit of their own would transform the world order more effectively than membership in a club of last century's powers.4 June 2007
The Hindu
Forget the G8, it's time for a Brics summit
Instead of waiting like supplicants outside the portals of the G8, Brazil, India, China, and South Africa should realise a summit of their own would transform the world order more effectively than membership in a club of last century's powers.
Siddharth Varadarajan
ON MONDAY, when President Lula of Brazil and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh sit down to take stock of the bilateral relationship between two of the most important rising powers of the 21st century, they should go beyond merely asking what they can do for each other and ask what they can do for the world.
What makes the question especially pertinent is the fact that barely days after meeting each other in Delhi, the two leaders will sit down again in Heilingendamm with their counterparts from China, South Africa, and Mexico for an "outreach" meeting with the G8 group of industrialised countries. There, the latter, fresh from their own exclusive meeting, would seek to engage the "outreach" countries on issues the G8 considers vital for the future of humankind. And the leaders of the "outreach" countries, in turn, would smilingly participate in this meaningless and demeaning ritual in the hope that one day, the private club's doors would swing open to admit them too.
Consider the irony. Collectively, the outreach nations, plus Russia — a late entrant into the G8 and still very much an outsider — have equal or arguably greater system-shaping power in the world today than the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan. Taken together, the BRIC countries account for a substantial share of world growth and output, not to speak of overwhelming dominance in terms of land mass and population. According to Goldman Sachs, which first coined the BRIC concept to map the rising share of Brazil, Russia, India, and China in the global economy, the four countries will likely be the largest economies in the world by 2050. But the intervening years will see the BRIC countries — or Brics, if we add South Africa, or Bricsam, if we add Mexico — increasing their share over world output and trade, and especially their influence in strategic sectors such as energy and natural resources. And yet, when it comes to working out the future rules of the global game, it is the G8 that sets the agenda and priorities.
This is not to say the U.S., France or other members of the "G8 minus 1" are not — and will not remain — dynamic, influential powers. But in terms of the evolving global system, the decisions, choices, and associations the Brics countries make are more likely to be decisive. This is not just an objective fact, driven by economics, but a global "good" in normative terms since these countries represent a much bigger share of the world's population than the powers of the last century.
The trouble is until now, the Brics countries have tended to look at each other through Northern eyes. Though mutual economic interaction has risen substantially, the Big Six have invested little or no effort in getting to understand one another in the political and cultural realm. In an interview with Indian reporters on the eve of President Lula's visit to India, a senior Brazilian official acknowledged this. "Because we use the North's lenses to understand each other, we have ended up incorporating their distorted view," said Roberto Jaguaribe, a Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. "It is important that we multiply our own exchanges and visits. We might still have a distorted view but at least these will be our own distortions!"
Asked about the potential for greater Brics interaction, Mr. Jaguaribe noted that the concept "brings us back to very basic factors that have been neglected for long — size and population." The concept may have originated outside of the world of diplomacy, he said, but that did not mean the countries concerned should not make full use of it.
But are the Brics countries ready to ramp up their interaction on the global stage? If one looks at the activity each of them is individually engaged in, the answer is clearly yes. Brazil, India, and South Africa have already developed the IBSA forum. India also has begun to interact with China and Russia through the trilateral process. Both India and China have active engagements with Africa, though Beijing is far more active than Delhi in this regard. Finally, Brazil has taken the initiative to hold summits between South America and Africa and South America and the Middle East. On the world trade front, there is the G20. Each of these is a vital part of the new geometry of the emerging global system but what is lacking is an overall thrust or focus. And such a focus can only come by emphasising the shared values and interests that find no space in the global discourse dominated by the G8's agenda.
What are these values and interests? First and foremost, inclusive growth. Though the Brics are all market economies, the political culture in each of these countries provides more space for the kind of equitable and balanced growth that the world's poor badly need than the political culture in the G-8 bloc. Secondly, there is the emphasis on the pacific settlement of disputes, rather than the use of sanctions and force. Clearly here, a Brics summit could prove useful as a forum for generating fresh momentum for the claim India, South Africa, and Brazil have for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council. Thirdly, as some of the world's largest energy producers and consumers, straddling both hydrocarbons and biofuels, the Brics are crucial to the evolution of a rational energy future for the world. Fourthly, as big contributors to global migration, the Brics (or especially Bricsam) have a huge stake in the rational and humane treatment of migrant labour, an issue which never makes it to the agenda of either the G8 or the World Trade Organisation. Fifthly, a Brics summit could place on the world's agenda a serious discussion on the health status of the world's poor and the need for more accessible drugs, even if this means putting an end to the misuse of patents and intellectual property by big pharmaceutical companies.
The beauty of the Brics summit concept is that it is intuitive, logical, and entirely plausible. All over the world, people are waiting for countries such as India and Brazil to play their due role. Standing in a field full of ripe corn stalks, Wilmar Luis Da Silva, the Agriculture Secretary of the Brasilia federal district, told me last month how Germany, which produces no coffee, was one of the world's largest "exporters" of coffee. As for soya bean, a handful of companies based in the U.S. dominate world trade. "I think countries that need soy should buy directly from Brazil — we should start making these connections." "I am making a suggestion for Brazil and India to work together," he said, locking his two hands together in a tight grip.
This is the future President Lula and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh must work towards, using the Brazil-India strategic partnership as a building `bric' for the new world order.
(Concluded)
03 June 2007
Nuclear talks reach stalemate

As expected, American intransigence on giving India the right to reprocess spent fuel as well as on other issues led to an impasse, with the three-day long technical interaction betweenn the two sides in Delhi ending inconclusively on Saturday.
3 June 2007
The Hindu
Stalemate on reprocessing issue
Menon says "we still have some distance to travel"
Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI: After three straight days of hardnosed negotiations over their proposed nuclear cooperation agreement, India and the United States have hit an impasse with no real progress registered on the major issues separating them.
Though some minor questions have been cleared up, senior Indian officials familiar with the course of the negotiations told The Hindu that a "stalemate" was reached late Friday night on several issues — including the right to reprocess spent fuel produced by any imported reactor — and that Saturday's discussions could not resolve matters.
Indian officials declined to characterise the situation as a "deadlock" and said more time was needed. "But if there are no reprocessing consent rights, then we simply can't proceed," said an official, referring to the process — integral to India's indigenous civil nuclear programme — of converting the spent fuel produced by a nuclear reactor into fresh fuel for use in a fast breeder reactor.
Officials also sense a certain hardening of the American position on reprocessing since the past few meetings on the `123 agreement'. "Whatever reprocessing we wish to do with imported fuel or reactors would be under international safeguards but the U.S. side is simply unwilling to accept our right to reprocess," said an official, blaming the "non-proliferation lobby" in Washington for the impasse.
At a press conference on Saturday evening, Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon confirmed that reprocessing rights was one of the issues still under discussion but declined to elaborate on any specifics. Striking a positive tone, he described the three days of discussions with the U.S. team led by Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns as "intensive, productive and constructive" but said the two sides "still have some distance to travel."
Flanked by S. Jaishankar of the Ministry of External Affairs and R.B. Grover of the Department of Atomic Energy — both key members of the Indian negotiating team — Mr. Menon said that of the several issues which were still open "we have managed to remove some but some still remain."
India's goal, he said, is "to reach [a 123] agreement which fully reflects the July 18, 2005 and March 2, 2006 agreements, as well as the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament." A separate statement issued by the U.S. embassy on Saturday night said that India and the U.S. had made "some progress" on the 123 but "more work remains to be done to complete arrangements that will permit a civil nuclear agreement to be finalised."
Though no dates have been fixed for the next round of talks, Mr. Menon said both sides "need a little time to think over what we've done over the past few days."
He said India did not believe in setting dates or deadlines but expressed his confidence that an agreement would eventually be clinched. "All told, [Mr. Burns's visit] has been positive and useful. This has taken us some way forward towards our goal — a 123 agreement which reflects in legal terms what our leaders have already agreed to."
Mr. Menon said the reason he and Mr. Burns did not address a joint press conference was because the U.S. Under Secretary had a flight to catch. When Mr. Burns arrived in Delhi three days ago, however, Indian officials had planned to end his visit with a joint press conference.
Before his departure, Mr. Burns paid a courtesy call on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Mr. Menon also said that External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee had extended an invitation to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to visit India.
India will stick to `rights-based' approach on reprocessing
An explanation of why India is insisting on explicit reprocessing rights up front.
3 June 2007
The Hindu
India will stick to `rights-based' approach on reprocessing
`Without reprocessing, there is nothing'
Siddharth Varadarajan
New Delhi: Providing a broad account of the differences between India and the United States on the inclusion of reprocessing rights in the draft bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, senior Indian officials say their mandate is to secure the explicit recognition of India's right to reprocess spent fuel in the `123 agreement'.
Under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, any country, which buys and uses U.S. nuclear equipment or fuel requires American consent prior to reprocessing the spent fuel which is produced. But rather than obtaining this consent later in a subsequent agreement - as the American side is insisting - India wants the agreement currently under negotiation to grant this consent and also to specify the precise parameters under which actual reprocessing will take place.
"There should not be any ambiguity in this matter," a senior official told The Hindu on Saturday.
So far, all that the U.S. side has been prepared to offer is "forward looking language" based on a formula similar to its 123 agreement with China. That agreement, concluded in 1985, provides for a presumption of approval in the event that China wishes to "alter U.S. origin material" and an expedited process of consultations to agree on a mutually acceptable arrangement. In addition, the U.S. has said it is willing to enter into a subsequent negotiation with India a few years down the line as and when the country is ready to reprocess the spent fuel that accumulates from U.S. reactors or fuel.
Indian officials say that while the lack of explicit consent rights may be acceptable to China - whose 123 agreement begins with the premise that the country has "no intention" of reprocessing U.S.-origin or U.S.-obligated fuel - India needs its rights to be recognised up front. "Reprocessing is integral to our entire three-stage programme," said an official. "Without reprocessing, there is nothing".
Though officials acknowledge that any actual reprocessing is still years away, India's insistence on explicit consent rights is based on a close study of the tortuous process Japan and Euratom had to go through before they were able to begin the reprocessing of spent U.S. fuel. "Don't' forget, these were American allies, with a long history of close defence cooperation and no strategic programme to worry about," one official said. "And yet the process dragged on for a long time and finally came with all kind of intrusive inspections." In contrast, not only do the U.S. and India not enjoy that kind of comfort level, but India also has the history of Tarapur behind it. There, huge pools of spent fuel produced by an American-built reactor have accumulated over the years with Washington neither agreeing to take it back nor granting India the right to reprocess. "That is why we are insisting on a clear, rights-based approach."
Right of return
While there are still differences between India and the United States on the precise circumstances under which the proposed U.S. "right of return" of nuclear equipment and materials will kick in, India is insisting that any imported fuel supplies and stockpiles cannot be compromised in any way.
Guaranteeing adequate fuel - including a strategic reserve - for India's reactors was a key provision in the March 2, 2006 separation plan agreed by the U.S. and India. However, the Hyde Act contains a provision limiting the provision of fuel supplies for India and directing the administration to lobby against fuel supplies for India in the event that the U.S. ends its own nuclear cooperation with India. And then there is also the right of return, which, if incorporated into the 123 in the manner the U.S. wants, would lead to India being forced to surrender its imported fuel reserves if it ever were to conduct a nuclear weapons test.
U.S. assurance
At his press conference on Saturday, Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon said that the U.S. administration has "assured us that there is nothing in the Hyde Act which will prevent them meeting their obligations from the July 2005 and March 2006 agreements".
But he added a caveat: "Only when we finish the task" would India be able to confirm whether this was finally the case or not.
Over the three-day parley, the status of India's strategic fuel reserve also emerged as a major stumbling block. "I think as a result of our talks, we have a better understanding of their concerns and they of ours," said an official.
He added that India this time was "more explicit than it has ever been so far" that the ownership of any nuclear fuel it imports under the Indo-U.S. agreement is a red line which cannot be crossed under any circumstances.
So far, Indian and U.S. negotiators have met four times in a formal setting to discuss the 123 agreement, first in Delhi, then Cape Town, London and finally Delhi again. "As far as we are concerned, we have nothing more to give," a senior Indian official said. "Now it is up to both sides to reflect on where we go from here."
3 June 2007
The Hindu
India will stick to `rights-based' approach on reprocessing
`Without reprocessing, there is nothing'
Siddharth Varadarajan
New Delhi: Providing a broad account of the differences between India and the United States on the inclusion of reprocessing rights in the draft bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, senior Indian officials say their mandate is to secure the explicit recognition of India's right to reprocess spent fuel in the `123 agreement'.
Under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, any country, which buys and uses U.S. nuclear equipment or fuel requires American consent prior to reprocessing the spent fuel which is produced. But rather than obtaining this consent later in a subsequent agreement - as the American side is insisting - India wants the agreement currently under negotiation to grant this consent and also to specify the precise parameters under which actual reprocessing will take place.
"There should not be any ambiguity in this matter," a senior official told The Hindu on Saturday.
So far, all that the U.S. side has been prepared to offer is "forward looking language" based on a formula similar to its 123 agreement with China. That agreement, concluded in 1985, provides for a presumption of approval in the event that China wishes to "alter U.S. origin material" and an expedited process of consultations to agree on a mutually acceptable arrangement. In addition, the U.S. has said it is willing to enter into a subsequent negotiation with India a few years down the line as and when the country is ready to reprocess the spent fuel that accumulates from U.S. reactors or fuel.
Indian officials say that while the lack of explicit consent rights may be acceptable to China - whose 123 agreement begins with the premise that the country has "no intention" of reprocessing U.S.-origin or U.S.-obligated fuel - India needs its rights to be recognised up front. "Reprocessing is integral to our entire three-stage programme," said an official. "Without reprocessing, there is nothing".
Though officials acknowledge that any actual reprocessing is still years away, India's insistence on explicit consent rights is based on a close study of the tortuous process Japan and Euratom had to go through before they were able to begin the reprocessing of spent U.S. fuel. "Don't' forget, these were American allies, with a long history of close defence cooperation and no strategic programme to worry about," one official said. "And yet the process dragged on for a long time and finally came with all kind of intrusive inspections." In contrast, not only do the U.S. and India not enjoy that kind of comfort level, but India also has the history of Tarapur behind it. There, huge pools of spent fuel produced by an American-built reactor have accumulated over the years with Washington neither agreeing to take it back nor granting India the right to reprocess. "That is why we are insisting on a clear, rights-based approach."
Right of return
While there are still differences between India and the United States on the precise circumstances under which the proposed U.S. "right of return" of nuclear equipment and materials will kick in, India is insisting that any imported fuel supplies and stockpiles cannot be compromised in any way.
Guaranteeing adequate fuel - including a strategic reserve - for India's reactors was a key provision in the March 2, 2006 separation plan agreed by the U.S. and India. However, the Hyde Act contains a provision limiting the provision of fuel supplies for India and directing the administration to lobby against fuel supplies for India in the event that the U.S. ends its own nuclear cooperation with India. And then there is also the right of return, which, if incorporated into the 123 in the manner the U.S. wants, would lead to India being forced to surrender its imported fuel reserves if it ever were to conduct a nuclear weapons test.
U.S. assurance
At his press conference on Saturday, Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon said that the U.S. administration has "assured us that there is nothing in the Hyde Act which will prevent them meeting their obligations from the July 2005 and March 2006 agreements".
But he added a caveat: "Only when we finish the task" would India be able to confirm whether this was finally the case or not.
Over the three-day parley, the status of India's strategic fuel reserve also emerged as a major stumbling block. "I think as a result of our talks, we have a better understanding of their concerns and they of ours," said an official.
He added that India this time was "more explicit than it has ever been so far" that the ownership of any nuclear fuel it imports under the Indo-U.S. agreement is a red line which cannot be crossed under any circumstances.
So far, Indian and U.S. negotiators have met four times in a formal setting to discuss the 123 agreement, first in Delhi, then Cape Town, London and finally Delhi again. "As far as we are concerned, we have nothing more to give," a senior Indian official said. "Now it is up to both sides to reflect on where we go from here."
02 June 2007
Myth and reality of ethanol and biofuels

Dateline Sao Paulo: Biofuel from sugarcane may have worked well for Brazil so far but the attempt to expand or replicate the model, especially using corn and other grains, will endanger the planet's food security and take a huge toll on the environment too.
2 June 2007
The Hindu
Myth and reality of ethanol and biofuels
Siddharth Varadarajan
BRAZIL HAS known about sugar booms ever since it first began its bittersweet tryst with that cash crop of colonialism 500 years ago.
The former Portuguese colony prospered for nearly a century before the emergence of new sources of production in the Caribbean led to a crash in world sugar prices. From sugar, Brazil turned to gold, rubber, and then coffee, each generating, in turn, its own boom and bust. The abolition of slavery came only in 1888, well after the rest of the `Western' world had moved on to a more rational system for the exploitation of labour. This was also when a new wave of immigration started, and when the foundations of modern industry began decisively to be laid.
Today, Brazil is the ninth largest economy of the world and its industrial base encompasses everything from aircraft and cars to uranium enrichment. But sugarcane remains the country's first love and is today enjoying another boom of sorts thanks to the promise of an abundant, renewable source of fuel — ethanol — that accounts for 50 per cent of the industry's output.
In 1925, the year Henry Ford made his famous statement that ethyl alcohol was the "fuel of the future," a motor car fuelled only by ethanol was driven by enthusiasts all the way from Rio de Janeiro to Sao Paulo, some 400 km away. During World War II, when gasoline became scarce in Brazil, ethanol began to be produced on an industrial scale and in some regions of the country cars were driven on fuel blends containing up to 65 per cent ethanol.
As the price of oil fell following the end of the war, interest in ethanol waned until the mid-1970s when Brazil was hit by a double shock: spiralling oil prices and falling sugar prices. This is when the government launched its `Proalcool' national ethanol policy. The policy consisted of mandating the compulsory blending of ethanol with gasoline in progressively higher proportions and providing tax credits and fiscal incentives for the manufacture of pure ethanol-run cars. The measures worked and by the late 1980s, over 90 per cent of all cars manufactured in the country came with dedicated ethanol engines.
"That's when the price of oil fell again internationally and rising sugar prices also tilted the ethanol-sugar product mix decisively in favour of sugar," Alfred Szwarc, technology adviser to UNICA, the Sugar Cane Agroindustry Union, in Sao Paulo told this reporter. Once again, the ethanol industry went into a tailspin.
It was in order to get around the problem of cyclical oil prices that Brazilian auto manufacturers and energy planners hit upon the idea of `flex fuel' cars. By law, all gasoline sold in Brazil is actually gasohol, containing around 23 per cent ethanol. The flex car allows owners to use gasohol and ethanol in any combination. Today, according to Mr. Szwarc, the total fleet of flex fuel cars is 3 million and flex cars represent 83 per cent of all new cars sold in Brazil.
2 June 2007
The Hindu
Myth and reality of ethanol and biofuels
Siddharth Varadarajan
BRAZIL HAS known about sugar booms ever since it first began its bittersweet tryst with that cash crop of colonialism 500 years ago.
The former Portuguese colony prospered for nearly a century before the emergence of new sources of production in the Caribbean led to a crash in world sugar prices. From sugar, Brazil turned to gold, rubber, and then coffee, each generating, in turn, its own boom and bust. The abolition of slavery came only in 1888, well after the rest of the `Western' world had moved on to a more rational system for the exploitation of labour. This was also when a new wave of immigration started, and when the foundations of modern industry began decisively to be laid.
Today, Brazil is the ninth largest economy of the world and its industrial base encompasses everything from aircraft and cars to uranium enrichment. But sugarcane remains the country's first love and is today enjoying another boom of sorts thanks to the promise of an abundant, renewable source of fuel — ethanol — that accounts for 50 per cent of the industry's output.
In 1925, the year Henry Ford made his famous statement that ethyl alcohol was the "fuel of the future," a motor car fuelled only by ethanol was driven by enthusiasts all the way from Rio de Janeiro to Sao Paulo, some 400 km away. During World War II, when gasoline became scarce in Brazil, ethanol began to be produced on an industrial scale and in some regions of the country cars were driven on fuel blends containing up to 65 per cent ethanol.
As the price of oil fell following the end of the war, interest in ethanol waned until the mid-1970s when Brazil was hit by a double shock: spiralling oil prices and falling sugar prices. This is when the government launched its `Proalcool' national ethanol policy. The policy consisted of mandating the compulsory blending of ethanol with gasoline in progressively higher proportions and providing tax credits and fiscal incentives for the manufacture of pure ethanol-run cars. The measures worked and by the late 1980s, over 90 per cent of all cars manufactured in the country came with dedicated ethanol engines.
"That's when the price of oil fell again internationally and rising sugar prices also tilted the ethanol-sugar product mix decisively in favour of sugar," Alfred Szwarc, technology adviser to UNICA, the Sugar Cane Agroindustry Union, in Sao Paulo told this reporter. Once again, the ethanol industry went into a tailspin.
It was in order to get around the problem of cyclical oil prices that Brazilian auto manufacturers and energy planners hit upon the idea of `flex fuel' cars. By law, all gasoline sold in Brazil is actually gasohol, containing around 23 per cent ethanol. The flex car allows owners to use gasohol and ethanol in any combination. Today, according to Mr. Szwarc, the total fleet of flex fuel cars is 3 million and flex cars represent 83 per cent of all new cars sold in Brazil.
As a result, Brazil's total annual output of ethanol stands at 17.9 billion litres — a stunning 12.6 per cent of the country's total energy mix — of which around four billion litres are exported every year.
Though these figures seem high, they pale in comparison to the future scenario for biofuels that the United States has started to paint for itself and the world, and therein lies the downside for what is otherwise a fairly useful alternative energy scenario.
In his State of the Union address earlier this year, U.S. President George W. Bush unveiled a plan for ending America's "addiction of oil." This involves reducing gasoline consumption by 20 per cent by 2017, and supplementing the shortfall by producing or importing as much as 135 billion litres of biofuel.
Unlike Brazil, ethanol in the U.S. is produced primarily from corn, a vastly inferior source from the energy balance point of view since the ratio between renewable energy produced and fossil energy used in its production is only around 1.3 to 1.8. In Brazil, the ratio claimed by UNICA is as high as 8.9 because the electricity used in the production process is generated from cane waste such as bagasse rather than from the national grid.
But more than the energy inefficiency, a massive corn-fed ethanol programme protected by hefty subsidies means huge increases in the price of corn and other grains, as well as of fertilizers. And as the ethanol output grows to meet Mr. Bush's target, there is a real danger that food prices would have risen so high as to compromise the nutrition of millions of poor, especially in the developing world.
Impact on food supply
This is the reason why Cuban President Fidel Castro has attacked the American plan and the wider `ethanol alliance' that Mr. Bush struck with his Brazilian counterpart, Luis Inaciao Lula da Silva, earlier this year. "Transforming food into fuels," wrote Mr. Castro recently, "is a monstrosity."
Mr. Castro is not alone in being fearful of the impact of ethanol and biofuels on the production of food and the environment. For Wilmar Luis da Silva, the agriculture secretary for the small but prosperous hinterland of the Brasilia federal district, the U.S. ethanol programme has already unleashed a chain of events that has led to the price of fertilizers shooting up worldwide. "Thanks to the subsidies the U.S. pays its corn producers, the price of fertilizer has already gone up. In Brazil, 60 to 70 per cent of the cost of production in agriculture is fertilizer. Nitrogen prices have risen from 200 to 500 dollars per tonne in the past 90 days. Potash has also gone up."
Mr. Da Silva also said that because rising ethanol demand prices corn beyond the reach of cattle farmers, grains such as soy were being used as farm feed. "Today, the U.S. is the biggest producer of soya but if they start buying all the soya in the world, food prices will go up in Brazil and elsewhere," he said.
As a representative of UNICA, Mr. Szwarzc is quick to deny Brazil's own cane-driven ethanol programme will compromise the country's food security. "Today, we use 3.3 million ha for ethanol production and another 6 m ha for sugar, amounting to around 10 per cent of the total 60 m ha under cultivation." But what about future expansion, as Lula seeks to push for ethanol exports worldwide? Mr. Szwarc said Brazil had more than 220 m ha of pasture land and that if better pasture processes were followed "some 20 m additional ha can easily be converted to agriculture." And since most of Brazil's cane output is rainfed, he said there was no pressure on water resources either.
But what is true for Brazil may not be true for other parts of the world. And it is certainly not true for corn ethanol, say critics, who argue that monoculture and fertiliser use will cause tremendous environmental damage in the long run.
And there are the working conditions on sugarcane plantations, where 80 per cent of the crop in Brazil is still harvested by hand.
The status of cane workers, captured in a documentary film, Ethanol Slaves, made by Finnish director Martti Backman, has been the subject of much controversy. In his recent writings, Mr. Castro has referred to Brazilian studies which affirm that a cane cutter needs to perform "36,630 flexing movements with his legs, make small trips 800 times carrying 15 kilos of cane in his arms, and walk 8.8 km in his chores" every day.
Biodiesel option
But if corn is a disaster and sugarcane has its limitations, what about other sources of biofuel? Petrobras, Brazil's national oil company, has developed a technique of squeezing 590 litres of biodiesel from one tonne of castor beans and is now producing 40,000 litres daily at a plant in Guamare in Rio Grande do Norte. At a working prototype at the Petrobras research facility in Rio de Janeiro, an engineer, Carlos Khalil, explained the process through a working model and said the productions costs compared favourably with diesel produced from crude oil.
But here too there are problems. The environmentalist Saulo Araujo has noted that plantations of castor are expanding rapidly in the northeastern State of Piaui and that even forest reserves are being logged to make way for monoculture cropping of castor. And there are also concerns about emissions from biodiesel.
For Mr. Szwarc, the true future of biofuels lies in cellulose. Echoing Henry Ford's 80-year-old claim that "there is fuel in every bit of vegetable matter... like weeds, sawdust," he says the U.S. and Brazil plan to collaborate on this front. "We can use bagasse waste, rice husks, leaves, stems — all of this could one day be used to produce cellulose ethanol."
If it works, the world's food supply might well be saved. But in the interim, more ethanol might mean pump prices in the U.S. stay steady. But the rest of the world is going to have to start paying a lot more for its food.
Though these figures seem high, they pale in comparison to the future scenario for biofuels that the United States has started to paint for itself and the world, and therein lies the downside for what is otherwise a fairly useful alternative energy scenario.
In his State of the Union address earlier this year, U.S. President George W. Bush unveiled a plan for ending America's "addiction of oil." This involves reducing gasoline consumption by 20 per cent by 2017, and supplementing the shortfall by producing or importing as much as 135 billion litres of biofuel.
Unlike Brazil, ethanol in the U.S. is produced primarily from corn, a vastly inferior source from the energy balance point of view since the ratio between renewable energy produced and fossil energy used in its production is only around 1.3 to 1.8. In Brazil, the ratio claimed by UNICA is as high as 8.9 because the electricity used in the production process is generated from cane waste such as bagasse rather than from the national grid.
But more than the energy inefficiency, a massive corn-fed ethanol programme protected by hefty subsidies means huge increases in the price of corn and other grains, as well as of fertilizers. And as the ethanol output grows to meet Mr. Bush's target, there is a real danger that food prices would have risen so high as to compromise the nutrition of millions of poor, especially in the developing world.
Impact on food supply
This is the reason why Cuban President Fidel Castro has attacked the American plan and the wider `ethanol alliance' that Mr. Bush struck with his Brazilian counterpart, Luis Inaciao Lula da Silva, earlier this year. "Transforming food into fuels," wrote Mr. Castro recently, "is a monstrosity."
Mr. Castro is not alone in being fearful of the impact of ethanol and biofuels on the production of food and the environment. For Wilmar Luis da Silva, the agriculture secretary for the small but prosperous hinterland of the Brasilia federal district, the U.S. ethanol programme has already unleashed a chain of events that has led to the price of fertilizers shooting up worldwide. "Thanks to the subsidies the U.S. pays its corn producers, the price of fertilizer has already gone up. In Brazil, 60 to 70 per cent of the cost of production in agriculture is fertilizer. Nitrogen prices have risen from 200 to 500 dollars per tonne in the past 90 days. Potash has also gone up."
Mr. Da Silva also said that because rising ethanol demand prices corn beyond the reach of cattle farmers, grains such as soy were being used as farm feed. "Today, the U.S. is the biggest producer of soya but if they start buying all the soya in the world, food prices will go up in Brazil and elsewhere," he said.
As a representative of UNICA, Mr. Szwarzc is quick to deny Brazil's own cane-driven ethanol programme will compromise the country's food security. "Today, we use 3.3 million ha for ethanol production and another 6 m ha for sugar, amounting to around 10 per cent of the total 60 m ha under cultivation." But what about future expansion, as Lula seeks to push for ethanol exports worldwide? Mr. Szwarc said Brazil had more than 220 m ha of pasture land and that if better pasture processes were followed "some 20 m additional ha can easily be converted to agriculture." And since most of Brazil's cane output is rainfed, he said there was no pressure on water resources either.
But what is true for Brazil may not be true for other parts of the world. And it is certainly not true for corn ethanol, say critics, who argue that monoculture and fertiliser use will cause tremendous environmental damage in the long run.
And there are the working conditions on sugarcane plantations, where 80 per cent of the crop in Brazil is still harvested by hand.
The status of cane workers, captured in a documentary film, Ethanol Slaves, made by Finnish director Martti Backman, has been the subject of much controversy. In his recent writings, Mr. Castro has referred to Brazilian studies which affirm that a cane cutter needs to perform "36,630 flexing movements with his legs, make small trips 800 times carrying 15 kilos of cane in his arms, and walk 8.8 km in his chores" every day.
Biodiesel option
But if corn is a disaster and sugarcane has its limitations, what about other sources of biofuel? Petrobras, Brazil's national oil company, has developed a technique of squeezing 590 litres of biodiesel from one tonne of castor beans and is now producing 40,000 litres daily at a plant in Guamare in Rio Grande do Norte. At a working prototype at the Petrobras research facility in Rio de Janeiro, an engineer, Carlos Khalil, explained the process through a working model and said the productions costs compared favourably with diesel produced from crude oil.
But here too there are problems. The environmentalist Saulo Araujo has noted that plantations of castor are expanding rapidly in the northeastern State of Piaui and that even forest reserves are being logged to make way for monoculture cropping of castor. And there are also concerns about emissions from biodiesel.
For Mr. Szwarc, the true future of biofuels lies in cellulose. Echoing Henry Ford's 80-year-old claim that "there is fuel in every bit of vegetable matter... like weeds, sawdust," he says the U.S. and Brazil plan to collaborate on this front. "We can use bagasse waste, rice husks, leaves, stems — all of this could one day be used to produce cellulose ethanol."
If it works, the world's food supply might well be saved. But in the interim, more ethanol might mean pump prices in the U.S. stay steady. But the rest of the world is going to have to start paying a lot more for its food.
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Nuclear talks to enter third day
Indian officials say they will not makke undue haste in concluding the 123 agreement and are looking at August as a possible deadline for agreement rather than the next few days.
2 June 2007
The Hindu
Nuclear talks to enter third day
Siddharth Varadarajan
New Delhi: Negotiations between India and the United States over the terms of their proposed nuclear cooperation agreement will carry on for a third day, official sources said on Friday night.
Senior officials were extremely guarded in their comments about how Friday's technical round of talks had gone. Asked whether there was the likelihood of a breakthrough on Saturday, one highly placed Indian source told The Hindu , "Several issues are being sorted out one by one, hopefully."
While declining to provide details of the actual negotiations, another official said the Indian and American sides differed over the interpretation of the July 2005 agreement, with the U.S. negotiators taking the position that since the reprocessing of spent fuel did not explicitly figure in that joint statement, their Government was not obliged to accommodate the Indian demand for consent rights. On their part, Indian negotiators emphasised the fact that reprocessing was an integral part of the "full civil nuclear cooperation" the statement spoke of, as well as of the benefits that all countries "with advanced nuclear technology" were entitled to.
As for the U.S. insistence on including a "right of return" over any nuclear equipment or material in the event of an Indian nuclear test, the Indian side is insistent that this "right" cannot apply to any fuel supplies provided, including a strategic reserve.
Without prejudice to the outcome of Saturday's interaction, senior officials told The Hindu that India was not going to make undue haste in concluding the `123 negotiations' in time for the meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President George W. Bush on the sidelines of the G-8 outreach meeting at Heilingendamm next week.
"We have been informed that Mr. Bush will leave Germany earlier than scheduled, so there will hardly be time for anything other than a very brief meeting between Dr. Singh and the U.S. President," a highly placed source said. "Of course, we hope to register substantial progress in this round itself but, in general, we are aiming at August, so that the 123 agreement is in place when Congress comes back from its summer recess."
On Friday evening, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns — the Bush administration's point man for seeing the nuclear deal with India through — held a lengthy meeting with National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan at the latter's office in the PMO. Others present at the parley were Department of Atomic Energy Chairman Anil Kakodkar and Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon.
Mr. Burns also separately met External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Minister of State in the MEA Anand Sharma. According to MEA sources, though the U.S. side would like Mr. Burns to pay a "courtesy call" on Dr. Singh, the Ministry had not cleared the meeting as of Friday night and was unlikely to do so on Saturday.
2 June 2007
The Hindu
Nuclear talks to enter third day
Siddharth Varadarajan
New Delhi: Negotiations between India and the United States over the terms of their proposed nuclear cooperation agreement will carry on for a third day, official sources said on Friday night.
Senior officials were extremely guarded in their comments about how Friday's technical round of talks had gone. Asked whether there was the likelihood of a breakthrough on Saturday, one highly placed Indian source told The Hindu , "Several issues are being sorted out one by one, hopefully."
While declining to provide details of the actual negotiations, another official said the Indian and American sides differed over the interpretation of the July 2005 agreement, with the U.S. negotiators taking the position that since the reprocessing of spent fuel did not explicitly figure in that joint statement, their Government was not obliged to accommodate the Indian demand for consent rights. On their part, Indian negotiators emphasised the fact that reprocessing was an integral part of the "full civil nuclear cooperation" the statement spoke of, as well as of the benefits that all countries "with advanced nuclear technology" were entitled to.
As for the U.S. insistence on including a "right of return" over any nuclear equipment or material in the event of an Indian nuclear test, the Indian side is insistent that this "right" cannot apply to any fuel supplies provided, including a strategic reserve.
Without prejudice to the outcome of Saturday's interaction, senior officials told The Hindu that India was not going to make undue haste in concluding the `123 negotiations' in time for the meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President George W. Bush on the sidelines of the G-8 outreach meeting at Heilingendamm next week.
"We have been informed that Mr. Bush will leave Germany earlier than scheduled, so there will hardly be time for anything other than a very brief meeting between Dr. Singh and the U.S. President," a highly placed source said. "Of course, we hope to register substantial progress in this round itself but, in general, we are aiming at August, so that the 123 agreement is in place when Congress comes back from its summer recess."
On Friday evening, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns — the Bush administration's point man for seeing the nuclear deal with India through — held a lengthy meeting with National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan at the latter's office in the PMO. Others present at the parley were Department of Atomic Energy Chairman Anil Kakodkar and Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon.
Mr. Burns also separately met External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Minister of State in the MEA Anand Sharma. According to MEA sources, though the U.S. side would like Mr. Burns to pay a "courtesy call" on Dr. Singh, the Ministry had not cleared the meeting as of Friday night and was unlikely to do so on Saturday.
01 June 2007
Putting people's health before drug company profits

Dateline Rio: Brazil is being pilloried for joining the 'Axis of IP Evil' but by breaking Merck's patent on Efavirenz, its AIDS control programme will save $30 million every year.
1 June 2007
The Hindu
Putting people's health before drug company profits
Siddharth Varadarajan
Tucked away inside a nondescript campus on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro, the silent, gleaming corridors of the Farmanguinhos Drugs Technology Institute have emerged as the latest battleground in the war between Big Pharma and the handful of national governments seeking to prevent monopoly profits from coming in the way of their citizens' health needs.
As a state-run institute, Farmanguinhos manufactures and supplies the Health Ministry's "strategic programmes" with drugs that are freely distributed to the Brazilian population through the country's 'unified health system' (SUS). With more than 180,000 registered AIDS patients and a presidential decree ordering the free supply of medication to them, the Brazilian health ministry spends more than $450 million every year buying anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs). One of these is Efavirenz, a patented drug developed by the U.S.-based company, Merck, and sold to Brazil at $1.56 a tablet or $580 per patient for a year's supply.
With comparable generics available from India for as little as $0.45 a tablet, the Brazilian authorities had long been pressing Merck for a price reduction. Under existing World Trade Organisation rules, including the 2001 Trade-related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS, agreement, governments have the right to issue a "compulsory license" for patented drugs if there is a pressing public health need, thereby enabling the import of cheaper generics as well as the domestic reverse-engineering of patented formulations.
Merck strung Brasilia along, assuming the threat of compulsory licensing was a ruse. Shortly after winning the national elections for a second time, however, the government of President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva hit back: On April 25, the health ministry notified Efavirenz as a drug of public interest, the first step towards compulsory licensing. Merck finally offered a 30 per cent price cut, which the Brazilian government rejected as inadequate. Finally, on May 5, a compulsory license was issued.
Farmanguinhos and another public laboratory have now begun work on manufacturing the drug and are expected to have a production line up and running within a year. In the interim, the government has said it will buy the requisite quantity of the generic version of Efavirenz from India. The three Indian companies likely to benefit from this are Cipla, Ranbaxy and Aurobindo Pharma.
"The government's decision was really a last resort", Dr. Lauciene Amaral, an intellectual property specialist with Farmanguinhos, told this reporter during a recent visit to the institute. "Merck could have agreed either to a significant price reduction or the transfer of technology. From 2004, in one way or another, this discussion went on. But there was no agreement on either. That is why we had to take this step".
In his public statements, President Lula has been more direct. "It is not possible for anyone to get rich with the misery of others. In a choice between our trade and our health, we will take care of our health," he said in a speech announcing the licensing decision. He also warned that action might be taken in the case of other drugs too. "If the prices are not fair, not only for us, but for every human being infected on this planet, we will have to make this decision".
For President Lula -- who arrives in New Delhi on Sunday for an official visit to India -- this new willingness to confront big drug companies on pricing marks a shift from his earlier policy of seeking only modest concessions. For example, the Brazilian government signed an agreement with Abbott Laboratory in 2005 setting the price of another anti-retroviral, Kaletra, for six years and committing itself not to go in for compulsory licensing for any of the ingredients of this drug. The agreement brought the annual drug cost down somewhat but at $1,380 per patient is much higher than the $500 other countries like South Africa pay.
Not surprisingly, Brazil's push for compulsory licensing is the result of spiralling costs since 2005, caused mainly by the proportional reduction of first-line drug use, which are locally manufactured, and increased second line therapies, all imported and patent protected.
According to the Brazilian ministry of health, the Efivarenz compulsory license will save the country $30 million a year and as much as $237 million by 2012, when Merck's patent expires.
In legal terms, Brazil is not breaking Merck's patent but only suspending it. And a royalty of 1.5 per cent will be paid to the company for all generics sold in the country at the price of $0.45 or lower. Nevertheless, Merck has reacted with anger and outrage. "This expropriation of intellectual property sends a chilling signal to research-based companies about the attractiveness of undertaking risky research on diseases that affect the developing world, potentially hurting patients who may require new and innovative life-saving therapies," a company statement noted.
Roberto Camilo Castrignani, vice operations director for Farmaguinhos, dismisses this argument. "Look, what we have done with Efivarenz is an exceptional thing. But in any case, these big companies don't do much research on tropical diseases like malaria, Chagas' disease, leishmaniasis, tuberculosis and leprosy, which are a big problem for us".
According to Oxfam, developed countries in North America, Europe and East Asia account for 80 per cent of global pharmaceutical sales. The whole of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, on the other hand, accounts for less than two per cent of global sales. Thus there is no reason why compulsory licensing by developing countries should have an adverse impact on the incentive of big pharmaceutical companies to invest in R&D.
While Merck maintains a country like Brazil can afford to pay more for its drug than countries which are poorer, Brasilia has taken the fight for lower prices one step further by pushing for a resolution at the recently concluded World Health Assembly in Geneva encouraging governments to address "the linkage between the cost of research and development and the price of medication".
The resolution was passed unanimously after one delegation -- the United States -- walked out. Washington's fear -- and the fear of the big drug companies for whom the U.S. administration always bats -- is that Brazil's decision might prompt other countries to join the slowly expanding 'Axis of IP Evil'. Last year, Thailand thumbed its nose at the U.S., issuing compulsory licenses for three patented formulations, including Efavirenz and Kaletra. China, Cuba. South Africa and India are also considered members of the 'axis', though India's new Patents Act, passed amidst opposition by health advocacy groups in 2005, grants pharma companies considerable leeway as far as patent protection is concerned.
For Brazil and India, increased collaboration in the pharmaceutical sector is a priority area on the bilateral front and at least one Indian drug company, Strides Arcolab, has already established a manufacturing facility in Brazil under the name Cellofarm. But health activists are also looking forward to greater cooperation between the two countries at both the WTO and World Health Organisation. "It was amazing to see how closely the Brazilian and Thai delegations worked together at the WHO's World Health Assembly earlier this week", Dr. Meera Shiva, an NGO observer, told The Hindu. "India must also be in the forefront of the struggle for cheaper drugs and social medicine".
1 June 2007
The Hindu
Putting people's health before drug company profits
Siddharth Varadarajan
Tucked away inside a nondescript campus on the outskirts of Rio de Janeiro, the silent, gleaming corridors of the Farmanguinhos Drugs Technology Institute have emerged as the latest battleground in the war between Big Pharma and the handful of national governments seeking to prevent monopoly profits from coming in the way of their citizens' health needs.
As a state-run institute, Farmanguinhos manufactures and supplies the Health Ministry's "strategic programmes" with drugs that are freely distributed to the Brazilian population through the country's 'unified health system' (SUS). With more than 180,000 registered AIDS patients and a presidential decree ordering the free supply of medication to them, the Brazilian health ministry spends more than $450 million every year buying anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs). One of these is Efavirenz, a patented drug developed by the U.S.-based company, Merck, and sold to Brazil at $1.56 a tablet or $580 per patient for a year's supply.
With comparable generics available from India for as little as $0.45 a tablet, the Brazilian authorities had long been pressing Merck for a price reduction. Under existing World Trade Organisation rules, including the 2001 Trade-related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS, agreement, governments have the right to issue a "compulsory license" for patented drugs if there is a pressing public health need, thereby enabling the import of cheaper generics as well as the domestic reverse-engineering of patented formulations.
Merck strung Brasilia along, assuming the threat of compulsory licensing was a ruse. Shortly after winning the national elections for a second time, however, the government of President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva hit back: On April 25, the health ministry notified Efavirenz as a drug of public interest, the first step towards compulsory licensing. Merck finally offered a 30 per cent price cut, which the Brazilian government rejected as inadequate. Finally, on May 5, a compulsory license was issued.
Farmanguinhos and another public laboratory have now begun work on manufacturing the drug and are expected to have a production line up and running within a year. In the interim, the government has said it will buy the requisite quantity of the generic version of Efavirenz from India. The three Indian companies likely to benefit from this are Cipla, Ranbaxy and Aurobindo Pharma.
"The government's decision was really a last resort", Dr. Lauciene Amaral, an intellectual property specialist with Farmanguinhos, told this reporter during a recent visit to the institute. "Merck could have agreed either to a significant price reduction or the transfer of technology. From 2004, in one way or another, this discussion went on. But there was no agreement on either. That is why we had to take this step".
In his public statements, President Lula has been more direct. "It is not possible for anyone to get rich with the misery of others. In a choice between our trade and our health, we will take care of our health," he said in a speech announcing the licensing decision. He also warned that action might be taken in the case of other drugs too. "If the prices are not fair, not only for us, but for every human being infected on this planet, we will have to make this decision".
For President Lula -- who arrives in New Delhi on Sunday for an official visit to India -- this new willingness to confront big drug companies on pricing marks a shift from his earlier policy of seeking only modest concessions. For example, the Brazilian government signed an agreement with Abbott Laboratory in 2005 setting the price of another anti-retroviral, Kaletra, for six years and committing itself not to go in for compulsory licensing for any of the ingredients of this drug. The agreement brought the annual drug cost down somewhat but at $1,380 per patient is much higher than the $500 other countries like South Africa pay.
Not surprisingly, Brazil's push for compulsory licensing is the result of spiralling costs since 2005, caused mainly by the proportional reduction of first-line drug use, which are locally manufactured, and increased second line therapies, all imported and patent protected.
According to the Brazilian ministry of health, the Efivarenz compulsory license will save the country $30 million a year and as much as $237 million by 2012, when Merck's patent expires.
In legal terms, Brazil is not breaking Merck's patent but only suspending it. And a royalty of 1.5 per cent will be paid to the company for all generics sold in the country at the price of $0.45 or lower. Nevertheless, Merck has reacted with anger and outrage. "This expropriation of intellectual property sends a chilling signal to research-based companies about the attractiveness of undertaking risky research on diseases that affect the developing world, potentially hurting patients who may require new and innovative life-saving therapies," a company statement noted.
Roberto Camilo Castrignani, vice operations director for Farmaguinhos, dismisses this argument. "Look, what we have done with Efivarenz is an exceptional thing. But in any case, these big companies don't do much research on tropical diseases like malaria, Chagas' disease, leishmaniasis, tuberculosis and leprosy, which are a big problem for us".
According to Oxfam, developed countries in North America, Europe and East Asia account for 80 per cent of global pharmaceutical sales. The whole of sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, on the other hand, accounts for less than two per cent of global sales. Thus there is no reason why compulsory licensing by developing countries should have an adverse impact on the incentive of big pharmaceutical companies to invest in R&D.
While Merck maintains a country like Brazil can afford to pay more for its drug than countries which are poorer, Brasilia has taken the fight for lower prices one step further by pushing for a resolution at the recently concluded World Health Assembly in Geneva encouraging governments to address "the linkage between the cost of research and development and the price of medication".
The resolution was passed unanimously after one delegation -- the United States -- walked out. Washington's fear -- and the fear of the big drug companies for whom the U.S. administration always bats -- is that Brazil's decision might prompt other countries to join the slowly expanding 'Axis of IP Evil'. Last year, Thailand thumbed its nose at the U.S., issuing compulsory licenses for three patented formulations, including Efavirenz and Kaletra. China, Cuba. South Africa and India are also considered members of the 'axis', though India's new Patents Act, passed amidst opposition by health advocacy groups in 2005, grants pharma companies considerable leeway as far as patent protection is concerned.
For Brazil and India, increased collaboration in the pharmaceutical sector is a priority area on the bilateral front and at least one Indian drug company, Strides Arcolab, has already established a manufacturing facility in Brazil under the name Cellofarm. But health activists are also looking forward to greater cooperation between the two countries at both the WTO and World Health Organisation. "It was amazing to see how closely the Brazilian and Thai delegations worked together at the WHO's World Health Assembly earlier this week", Dr. Meera Shiva, an NGO observer, told The Hindu. "India must also be in the forefront of the struggle for cheaper drugs and social medicine".
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