Iran: Gas, gas everywhere but not a bit to sell

Caught between the Great Satan of sanctions and the Deep Blue Sea of indecisiveness and bad planning, Iran's enormous gas reserves remain hugely under-utilised.

26 August 2006
The Hindu

Gas, gas everywhere but not a bit to sell

Siddharth Varadarajan

FOR THOSE unlucky enough to have to work there, Assaluyeh, a boomtown coming up alongside the massive offshore South Pars gas field on the Persian Gulf coast, is unlovingly called darwaza-e-jahannum or gateway to hell. In the summer, temperatures can hit 50 degrees Centigrade and the humidity washes around you like a giant sticky wave. But for the Government of Iran, Assaluyeh, headquarters of the Pars Special Economic Energy Zone, is the new El-Dorado where some $15 billion has already been invested and into which many billions more need to be poured so that the enormous potential of the nearby gas field can be exploited fully.

So just how big is South Pars? "What we have here is 8 per cent of total gas reserves in the world," says S.A. Jalil Razavi, head of the PSEEZ. With proven reserves of 27 trillion cubic metres, Iran is second only to Russia in the list of gas-rich states, accounting for 16 per cent of world reserves. And since one-half of that is in South Pars, 100 kilometres offshore, Assaluyeh has emerged as the country's most important and dynamic energy and petrochemical hub with eight phases involving the extraction and cracking of gas and condensates already operational and another 14 at various stages of construction and planning.

And yet, Iran is today only a bit player in the world gas trade. Despite having as much gas as the combined reserves of Saudi Arabia, the United States, Canada, Britain, Algeria, Norway, Netherlands, and Indonesia, its annual production — at 80 billion cubic metres — is barely 8 per cent of the combined output of those countries. Qatar, whose North Gas Field is part of the same gas structure as South Pars, produces (and exports) much more than Iran. In any event, the bulk of what Iran produces is consumed domestically, leaving only some residual gas for export to Turkey. As a result of conscious attempts at substitution, gas today directly accounts for 60 per cent of total Iranian energy consumption, freeing up an additional one million barrels of higher priced crude oil for export as a result. And if one considers that the bulk of Iran's sour gas production is injected into its oilfields to boost crude production, it becomes clear that gas is seen by the Iranians as mainly a medium for increasing crude oil export revenues rather than an exportable commodity in itself.

As the Assaluyeh phases mature, however, the attitude towards gas is likely to change. Not only have rising oil prices lifted the terms on which gas is being sold worldwide — in the long run, the price of oil and gas per unit of standardised calorific value will tend towards equality — but the power balance in the gas market is gradually shifting away from buyers and towards sellers. In the South Pars, three liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects involving two trains each are likely to come on stream by 2010-11 with a total envisaged sea-to-ship capacity of 34 million tonnes per annum. Iran has experienced some difficulty accessing proprietary, commercially proven liquefaction technologies because of U.S. sanctions but its foreign partners — Shell, Repsol, and Total — are confident their use of European-patented processes such as DMR and Liquefin will help circumvent the provisions of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. However, much will depend on how skilfully the Iranian leadership manages to negotiate its nuclear file through the threatening minefield of United Nations sanctions.

In the past two years, Iran has signed an MoU for the eventual sale of $100 billion worth of LNG to China over the next two decades, as well as an actual contract for the annual export of 5 million tonnes of LNG to India. Thanks to the sharp and sustained rise in world oil prices, the Iranian Majlis, which scrutinises the work of the Iranian Oil Ministry and nationalised companies, is reluctant to clear the contract since the current price of benchmark crude is more than double the upper ceiling of $31 a barrel referenced in that agreement. Assuming the deal eventually goes through, India will likely be supplied by one of the Greenfield trains currently planned. Less clear is which specific South Pars phase will feed the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline; certainly it has not been identified yet. At the same time, Iranian officials seem clear about the strategic importance of the project not just for relations among the three countries but also for allowing Iran to create a new hydrocarbon export outlet with exciting prospects for backward linkages to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.

Before the three hurdles of U.S. opposition to the pipeline, Indian suspicion of Pakistan, and differences in gas pricing are crossed, the Majlis needs to clearly define Iran's gas export policy. In a recent parliamentary debate, Oil Minister Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian was accused by some MPs of selling Iranian gas instead of conserving it for future use when oil runs out. (Fear of a post-oil world is also what is driving the Iranian civilian nuclear energy programme to a large extent.) Apart from using gas for domestic energy and oilfield injections, MPs argue that Iran should add value to its gas by setting up export-oriented petrochemical industries rather than selling the precious resource untreated. Mr. Nejad-Hosseinian replied that so far no gas had actually been sold and that it was for Parliament to decide what the country's policy should be in this regard.

In theory, Iran's reserves are large enough to meet every conceivable domestic need and still leave enough for it to be a major gas exporter until well into the next century. But Iran is short of capital and technology and finds it difficult to develop its gas fields with the Damocles sword of sanctions hanging over the head of all potential collaborators. As a result, the government in Tehran is not in a hurry to prioritise the sector's development.

"So far, sanctions have not affected us and I hope we will continue to manage," Hoshang Taheir, an engineer with the Pars Oil and Gas Company, told The Hindu in Assaluyeh earlier this month. "In the current phases, 60 to 75 per cent of the material used is Iranian and this is written into the agreement we sign with our foreign partners." At the Mobeen Utility Centre, where gigantic Hitachi pumps suck in 100,000 cubic metres of deep sea water per hour to cool a nearby petrochemical complex, the presence of foreign technology is evident.

Given the differences over gas pricing, one way for India and Iran to move ahead could be to combine mutually acceptable gas sales agreements with joint ventures in which Indian companies undertake to help Iran modernise and develop its oil and gas sector. For both India and Iran, the true value of collaboration lies not so much in the direct mutual gains each will undoubtedly make but in the wider integrative processes energy links between the two will generate for Asia as a whole.

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You can subscribe now!

In response to queries, I've finally figured out how to put in a subscription button on this site. If you want to receive my latest posts when they are put up, please enter your email adddress in the form on the left-side panel.

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Down but not out, leading Iranian reformist looks ahead

A former Speaker of the Majlis, Mehdi Karroubi was the leading reformist contender in Iran's presidential election of 2005 but lost to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad under circumstances he considers improper. In an interview to The Hindu in Tehran, he discusses his political plans. Excerpts:

24 August 2006
The Hindu

Down but not out, leading reformist looks ahead

Siddharth Varadarajan and John Cherian

After the 2005 elections, you wrote an open letter questioning the results. Why do you feel they were unfair?

I don't want to enter into a discussion about that election because it is in the past. During the first round of voting, when 15 million votes had been counted, I had 28 per cent of the vote, Mr. [Hashemi] Rafsanjani around 22 per cent and Mr. [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad something between 17 and 18 per cent. But hours after the announcement of those trends, everything changed. I found myself in second place and hours later in third place! I believe the Guardian Council and government were responsible because the earlier trends could not have led to such a result. So there was something wrong with the counting but I don't want to enter into a discussion about it. I will add one last point. I wrote to the Supreme Leader [before the second round] and he told me he had given orders for a recount of some of the votes. But the government insisted the elections had been conducted properly and did not agree.

But at least your defeat has not made you withdraw from active politics! You have founded a new party. What are your political plans?

After the 2005 election, I had three ideas. First, to start the Ettemad-e-Milli party, then the Ettemad-e-Milli newspaper, and third, to launch a satellite TV channel. In the first and second goals, I have been successful. I have established my party and my newspaper is in print. I devote most of my energies towards the party. In about a year, we have opened offices in 30 provinces. So we are ready to play a role in the political arena and take part in elections — for which we are gearing up. This year, we have elections for the Majlis-e-Khobregan, which appoints the Supreme leader. And we will contest.

Has the government created obstacles for you?

No, we have not had any problems. The Interior Ministry has not made trouble but some newspapers have tried to create an atmosphere against me. Of course, some government officials don't like the work I'm doing but if we want democracy, we need parties in our country. In a speech I made at a recent seminar in Tehran, I said parties are the prerequisite for establishing democracy.

But you haven't managed to start your TV channel yet?

The Intelligence Ministry and the Supreme National Security Council [SNSC] oppose it. We wanted our reporters to go to different places, conduct interviews, but we wanted it to be legal. But these two institutions believe such activities would be a breach of the Constitution and that it would create problems. Because of their opposition, we have not been able to start this channel but we do not think it is illegal as far as the Constitution is concerned.

Persian channels broadcasting from California are popular here and yet there are no Iranian private channels.

The person most opposed to private channels is Mr. Ali Larijani of the SNSC, who used to be head of State radio and television. He has been opposed to the idea ever since. According to the government, any satellite channel is illegal. Well, it is illegal but it exists! They criticised me and said, `You were Speaker and according to the legislation of Parliament, having a satellite dish is illegal, so how can you now start a channel'? Actually, the Majlis passed that law before I became Speaker. One of the arguments we used was that this law cannot stop us from broadcasting to people outside Iran. There are many Persian-speaking people in the region and abroad. But they did not agree to this.

As democracy in Iran matures, is there some need to debate and discuss the role of the Vali-e-Faqih? Dr. Mohsen Kadivar argues the Supreme Leader should be under the Constitution and not above it.

I believe the same. Just as Ministers are chosen by Parliament, the Leader is elected by the khobregan, or experts, who are directly elected by the people. The Vali should be in the framework of the Constitution. In fact, everything has been put into the Constitution about this matter and we just want it to be followed.

Had you been elected President, how would your foreign and domestic policies have been different from those of Mr. Ahmadinejad?

Naturally, anyone who runs in an election will have methods, positions and ways of dealing with political issues that are different from others. I was Speaker of the 6th Parliament, and I had very good interaction with other heads of Parliament around the world. We invited many of them here and we made overseas trips — even the Speaker of India was invited here and we had interactions with him. That background will tell you something about what my foreign policies as President would have been.

Do you approve of the nuclear policy of the Ahmadinejad government?

On the nuclear issue, I experienced three phases. In the first phase, I was in Parliament, and was totally involved. I was present in the sessions where decisions were taken on this issue, and I was fully informed about the negotiations. After I left Parliament, I was still in touch with the government and though I was not directly involved in the discussions and decision-making, I approved of the group of negotiators like [Hasan] Rowhani, [Javad] Zarif, etc. But ever since the government changed [in 2005], I have not been so well informed. So I have only some general positions. I would say confidence building is the most important thing and diplomacy is a very important factor. We should avoid sanctions and should not do something to lead to sanctions. We have the right to peaceful nuclear energy and we should have this technology but we should not stop negotiating and building confidence.

President Ahmadinejad's statements on Israel are very controversial. What are your views on those?

I do not want to enter into a discussion about his statements. But on the whole, Iran wants a fair peace in the region. Every human being belongs to his country and so do the Palestinians. They were born there and belong to this land. They deserve to experience fair peace, to have an independent government, to have elections. This is our position about Palestine. We also believe the world should react against Israel's actions in Lebanon. Many civilians and innocent people were affected by Israel's attacks. These massacres, this violence will only make way for radicalism in the region.

In some parts of Tehran, we have seen posters saying Israel must be wiped off the map. Is it helpful to advocate such a position?

These posters are the positions of some groups and parties and should not be seen as the position of the government or the whole system. The land of Palestine belongs to Muslims, Jews and Christians and there should be elections in their land. In general, we should listen to what the Palestinian revolutionaries themselves say and want.

When Mohammad Khatami was President, he tried his best to improve relations with the West but did not succeed. Some Iranians say the U.S. is not sincere.

People in Iran do not have a very good impression about America because of the past experiences — the coup against Mossadegh, and the immunity granted to Americans by the Shah. Of course, we should negotiate according to our principles and in equality but this issue should be resolved. Sometimes, Iran has not encouraged negotiations and sometimes the U.S. has not been interested. America is sticking to its positions out of pride so there are difficulties. I believe in negotiations and dialogue but it should be on a fair and equal basis. Only then a solution can be found.

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In Iran, democracy wrestles with clerical authority

With a vibrant and often polarised political culture, Iran is arguably more tolerant of debate than many countries in the region. But there are also limits.

23 August 2006
The Hindu

In Iran, democracy wrestles with clerical authority

Siddharth Varadarajan

NEARLY THREE decades after the overthrow of the Shah of Iran, the Islamic Republic has managed to create a political system and society that defy easy description.

Direct popular elections are held regularly for the post of President, the Majlis, or Parliament, as well as for the all-important Majlis-e-Khobregan, or Assembly of Experts, which is responsible for selecting, overseeing and even dismissing Iran's powerful Supreme Leader, or Vali-e-Faqih. Yet, no candidate can contest any election unless his or her name is cleared by the Guardian Council, half of whose members are chosen by the Supreme Leader and half by Parliament. On paper, this complicated system of interlocking supervision is meant to create checks and balances but in reality, it is the Supreme Leader — earlier Ayatollah Khomeini, and now Ayatollah Khamenei — who has virtually unlimited authority.

The end result is an Islamic Republic that is more `Islamic' than republic, in which democracy flourishes but squarely within the limits established by the Supreme Leader's ultimate oversight.

There is contestation in political life and the print media too reflects this diversity. Mehdi Karroubi, a former Majlis Speaker and the leading reformist contender for President in the 2005 elections, publicly accused the authorities of rigging the first round in order to push him to third place and out of the run-off. In an interview to The Hindu at his Tehran office earlier this month, he repeated his accusation. But with an eye to the future, he has started a new party and newspaper, both called `Ettemad-e-Milli', and is busy preparing for the next round of elections, including to the Guardian Council. Ettemad-e-Milli editor Javed Haghshenas regularly takes on the Ahmadinejad government on a range of issues, including economic mismanagement. Newspapers which are too critical are sometimes shut down, only to resume publication the next morning under a new name. "The government got upset when our cartoonist did a caricature of the President," he said. "But as you can see, we continue to come out."

Society, too, has moved on. There is greater freedom than in the early revolutionary years and despite the hold of the clerics, some slackening of the hold of religion, especially on the youth, has also occurred. One university administrator who had been a student before the revolution said there is far greater discussion of politics on campus today than during the Shah's time when students and academics feared the control of Savak, the secret service. "Back then, the prayer room at the university used to be full. Now, kids go there to rest or sleep."

Conservatives ascendant

Throughout much of the past two decades, `pragmatists' and `reformists' favouring greater openness had the upper hand within the elected sphere. But since the 2004 Majlis elections, in which hundreds of reformists were summarily disqualified by the Guardian Council, and the 2005 presidential election which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won handily, it is the "conservatives" and "radicals" who are increasingly setting the agenda.

But even here, the system is capable of surprises. When Mr. Ahmadinejad was elected, most urban women braced themselves for stricter enforcement of the public dress code which requires female hair to be covered at all times and the body to be cloaked in a loose-fitting coat or robe known as a manteau. Not only has that not happened yet — as can be seen from the stylistic licence many middle class women take with their manteaux — the President went a step forward and announced, to the consternation of conservative clerics, that he favoured women entering stadiums to see men play football.

At the same time, the recent conservative ascendancy is no ordinary swing of the political pendulum. Said one analyst on condition of anonymity: "There has never been a time when all branches of government have been so united. In Khatami's time, and even Rafsanjani's, officials and leaders in government, the majlis and the various councils, tended to have different ideas. But in the set-up today, the ideas are uniform. And I think this is what is leading to a certain sense of alienation and disenchantment among the youth."

For the past two decades, the primary function of the Supreme Leader has been to balance the pushes and pulls from different factions in government. Today, with virtually everybody in government pushing in the same direction and with high oil prices providing unprecedented fiscal power to President Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah Khamenei is seen as looking for ways to temper this concentration of power. Among the steps he has taken is accommodating prominent non-conservatives like Mr. Rafsanjani, who lost the presidential elections to Mr. Ahmadinejad last year, and former foreign ministers Kamal Kharazzi and Ali Akbar Velayati in the power structure.

"The leader has veto power when major decision-makers are at an impasse but I don't think he involves himself in the nitty-gritty of the nuclear issue, for example," one prominent academic said. And yet, the fact that one individual can enjoy powers which place him above the constitution is a source of profound discomfort for many, even if public criticism of the system is relatively rare. One exception is Hojatoleslam Mohsen Kadivar, a philosopher and religious scholar who has been arguing for nearly a decade that the Vali-e-Faqih system is incompatible with both Islam and democracy.

In an interview to The Hindu, Dr. Kadivar, a professor at the Tarbiat Modarres University, said that the case for a Supreme Leader standing above the Constitution could not be made by recourse to the Quran, the teachings of the Prophet, Shia doctrine, or reason. "Even in practice, Iran's constitution 100 years ago did not grant the monarch as much power as the Supreme Leader enjoys in legal terms today," he said.

In his book, Hukumat-e-Velayi, Dr. Kadivar criticised the Supreme Leader theory in terms of jurisprudence. He argued that the system was a mixture of Plato's theory of the philosopher-king, Ibn-e-Arabi's mystic idea of the "perfect individual" and the ancient concept of Iranian kingship as propounded in the Shahnama of Firdousi and elsewhere.

"The mixture of these concepts is Velayat-e-Faqih and they wrote this into the Constitution," says the soft-spoken cleric who is widely regarded as one of Iran's most prominent reformist intellectuals. "[In jurisprudence], velayat refers to authority that is akin to that which a father exerts over minor children... This is a very dangerous concept." Soon after his book came out about eight years ago, Dr. Kadivar was sent to prison. "Officially, I was not jailed because of the book but for some speeches and interviews... I had called the regime here an `Islamic Kingdom' and they said this was a crime and imprisoned me for 18 months."

Later, the head of the special court for the clergy sent word that he had made a mistake. "Before, no one knew you and now everyone does. But if you go to prison again, it will be for a long time," Dr. Kadivar was told.

Though he has not been imprisoned since then, Dr. Kadivar says he is subject to other limitations. "For example, no newspaper wants to publish my political articles. And publishing books nowadays is also very difficult because it needs permission from the ministry." The rule for books was always there but it was rarely enforced during the Rafsanjani or Khatami presidencies. "Three months ago, I wanted to speak at a seminar on the first decade of the Iranian constitution at Sorbonne and the School of Oriental and Africa Studies in London. Forty-eight hours before I was to leave, I was told by the president of my university that I was not allowed to go as my leave had been cancelled!"

Dr. Kadivar also says that his lectures on philosophy are recorded without his permission and that two months ago, the university authorities told him he could not meet any foreigner in his office without permission a week in advance.

Right to democracy

Asked how his views on current affairs differed from those of the establishment, Dr. Kadivar said the most important differences were on domestic issues. "But even in foreign policy, nuclear energy is not the most important point for the reformists. We have many other rights too, including the right to be free. But for conservatives, the nuclear right is the first right of Iranians, more important than other rights... The regime sees nuclear energy as a currency of power but our problem is we need democracy."

On his part, Dr. Karroubi doesn't minimise the importance of the nuclear issue for Iran. But asked how he might have handled things had he been elected president, he says confidence building is the key. "Iran should not do anything which will lead to sanctions... We should negotiate according to our principles... but this issue should be solved peacefully." The U.S., he said, is sticking to its positions out of pride so there are difficulties. "But if there is dialogue on a fair basis, a just basis, a solution can be found."

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Iran: Little chance of nuclear compromise

Tehran will respond to the pending European package but is unlikely to suspend enrichment under pressure. What the world must realise is sanctions will take us further from and not closer to a peaceful solution.

22 August 2006
The Hindu

Little chance of nuclear compromise

Tehran will respond to the pending European package but is unlikely to suspend enrichment under pressure. What the world must realise is sanctions will take us further from and not closer to a peaceful solution.

Siddharth Varadarajan

IN 1983, some 20 years before Iran was accused by the United States and its allies of having a clandestine nuclear fuel enrichment programme, Tehran approached the International Atomic Energy Agency with a request for technical assistance in setting up a pilot plant for the production of uranium hexafluoride (UF6).

UF6 is the basic feedstock in the uranium enrichment process, in which the gas is spun through centrifuge machines in order to produce low enriched uranium for reactors — or highly enriched uranium for bombs. At the time, Iran was specifically interested in restarting work begun in the Shah's period on converting U308 into UO2 pellets and then going on to set up a pilot facility for UF6 production.

Since the IAEA Statute commits the agency to provide technical assistance to member states, a team of experts travelled to Iran to interact with scientists at Entec, the Iranian atomic establishment set up in 1974 with French assistance to work on the fuel cycle. According to an account provided by Mark Hibbs in Nuclear Fuel, one of the most authoritative newsletters of the international nuclear industry, the IAEA experts recommended that the agency assist Entec to help their scientists overcome their lack of practical experience. They also suggested that the IAEA provide expert services in a number of areas including the fuel cycle.

But the promised IAEA help never materialised. According to Mr. Hibbs: "Sources said that when in 1983 the recommendations of an IAEA mission to Iran were passed on to the IAEA's technical cooperation program, the U.S. government then `directly intervened' to discourage the IAEA from assisting Iran in production of UO2 and UF6. `We stopped that in its tracks,' said a former U.S. official." Rebuffed by the IAEA, Iran signed an agreement with Argentina, only to have Washington force Buenos Aires to back off in 1992. Five years later, the Clinton administration got China to abandon its official assistance to Iran on the fuel cycle.

It is worth recalling this history because it helps us to understand a core concern at the heart of the current crisis over Iran's nuclear programme: If Iran's intentions were peaceful, why did it go about its enrichment programme with so much secrecy? True, its safeguards agreement did not require it to declare the enrichment facility it was building at Natanz to the IAEA until six months before nuclear material was to be introduced into them. But the "concealed" nature of the facility and the furtiveness of its acquisitions programme have led some to conclude that Tehran secretly intended to make bombs. Even if not everyone believes that, many countries feel Iran should suspend all enrichment activity as a confidence-building measure until the IAEA concludes that there are no undeclared nuclear activities in the country.

The Iranian response is one of bewilderment and even anger. When Iran openly sought to develop the fuel cycle and the IAEA was willing to help it, the U.S. intervened to stop this. Whenever Tehran signed a public agreement with an international partner, Washington worked overtime to kill it.

Given this reality, the only way to build a fuel cycle programme — even if one's aims were purely peaceful — would have been to go about it with stealth. But today, this stealth, which was imposed on Iran at a time when there was no evidence of non-civilian use, is being cited as evidence of malafide intention and as the main reason why Iran must agree to suspend enrichment immediately.

This week, the Iranian Government is likely to provide a formal response to the package of proposals presented to it by the European Union and five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in June.

Security Council deadline

Though Iran had indicated its willingness to revert to the EU by August 22, the United States unnecessarily upped the ante by getting the UNSC to pass Resolution 1696 last month threatening Tehran with sanctions if it did not suspend all nuclear enrichment activity by August 31. "I can't understand the logic of the resolution," a senior Western diplomat based in Tehran told The Hindu earlier this month. "When they are saying they will give an answer by a certain date, why impose an ultimatum of this kind?"

"Having trust in each other is essential," Vice-President Esfandiar Rahim Mashaii told The Hindu, "but peaceful enrichment is our right and there can be no compromise." When his attention was drawn to a statement by Joschka Fischer in Tehran that week that Europe recognised Iran's rights but wanted trust to be re-established, Dr. Mashaii said the former Foreign Minister of Germany was not being honest. "When we wanted to build the Bushehr reactor and Russia agreed to cooperate, they put pressure on Russia not to do this work ... Why was Germany against this? They did not give us the right to even use fuel. But now that we have the ability to produce that fuel, they say, `Don't produce it, we will give it to you!' Are they telling the truth? Whenever we retreat, they advance, and when we go forward, they retreat."

According to a prominent Tehran-based analyst, who spoke to The Hindu on condition of anonymity, the nuclear question has become a national issue in which "the right to enrichment is equated with Mossadegh's oil nationalisation and the same group of imperialist countries is being seen as denying Iran control over its energy security." The analyst, who has environmental concerns about Iran going down the nuclear route and is also opposed to President Ahmadinejad's confrontationist style, says the nuclear issue is just an excuse for the U.S. "In the Shah's time, Iran had even more oil per capita than it does now, but there were no objections to our nuclear programme. Essentially, the nuclear issue is being used to put pressure on Iran to change its foreign policy, especially towards Israel and the peace process. For example, the U.S. is not pressing Pakistan to even slow down its nuclear weapons programme despite the fact that they are the ones who have had ties to non-state actors."

The analyst believes the Iranian leadership is not particularly perturbed by the threat of sanctions. But the U.S. needs to realise pressure will only lead to a hardening of attitudes. "Even if we had a clandestine programme, as they claim," he said, "I am certain this did not exist prior to 2000. But post 9/11, the `Axis of Evil' speech and the invasion of Iraq — all of this has strengthened the hands of those who say Iran cannot trust the IAEA/U.N. system. In fact, some say the Bush-Blair policy was to use the IAEA and U.N. to ensure Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction before they concluded it was `safe' to invade."

There are some in Iran — notably Hosein Shariatmadari, publisher and editor of Kayhan — who say the country should quit the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) but the broad consensus within the ruling establishment is still in favour of dialogue and diplomacy. "I think the Iranian leaders want to resolve this peacefully... but want an honourable outcome which won't harm Iran's prestige."

For many Iranians, Israel's attack on Lebanon marked the opening round of an American-led military-political campaign aimed first, at forcing Tehran to abandon its civilian enrichment programme, and eventually at bringing about `regime change' there. "The U.S. and Israel believe Iran is inflexible on the nuclear issue because it thinks it has the card of Hizbollah which it can play against Israel if military action is ever taken against its nuclear facilities. And I think that is why they decided to try and finish off Hizbollah," says the analyst.

The irony is that whenever Iran has sought to reach out to the U.S. and establish the framework for a `grand bargain,' Washington has responded with silence or contempt. In 2003, when Mohammad Khatami was President, an approach was made to the Bush administration via the Swiss embassy in Tehran for a dialogue aimed at an eventual rapprochement. The letter, which apparently had the blessings of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, included an offer to accept the Saudi initiative for a two-state solution to the Palestinian question. But the White House threw it into the dustbin.

That document, with its formula of a grand bargain including recognition of Iran's rights and implicit recognition of Israel, was no flash in the pan. "If they accept our sovereign rights, we are prepared to make dialogue with any organisation or any country," Dr. Mashaii told The Hindu. Asked whether that offer of dialogue included Israel as well, Dr. Mashaii repeated: "If the United Nations accepts our sovereign rights, we are ready to dialogue with any organisation or country."

Anybody who knows Iran and its culture should understand it will never agree to suspend uranium enrichment under duress. The imposition of sanctions will make no difference but will only increase the clamour from neocons in the U.S. for airstrikes and war. What the world needs is a creative political solution that respects Iran's rights and allays international concerns. The Europeans presented a package which seeks to bind Tehran to the NPT but which deliberately refrains from reaffirming Iran's inalienable right to nuclear energy in conformity with Article IV of that treaty. No doubt Iran will formulate a response. The international community should seek to build upon that response and keep the dialogue going.

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Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's red lines

At the end of a vigorous debate on the implementation of the nuclear deal with the United States in the Rajya Sabha, India's upper house of Parliament, on Augsut 17, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh replied in detail to the points raised. I am enclosing below the text in full of his remarks, as released by the PMO late Thursday night.

To summarise, Dr Singh has ruled as unaceptable to India the following conditions which have come up in either the Senate or House version of the draft amendments to the U.S. Atomic Energy Act:

1. Any attempt to exclude the nuclear fuel cycle from the term "full civil nuclear cooperation"

2. Any attempt to place Indian facilities under safeguards before ALL nuclear restrictions on India are lifted irreversibly.

3. Any attempt to turn the Presidential waiver into an annual certification exercise.

4. Any attempt to add a layer of U.S. inspection of Indian nuclear facilities over and above IAEA inspections.

5. Any attempt to impose a moratorium on production of fissile material or a non-verfiable FMCT (John Bolton please note).

6. Any attempt to include a reference to an Indian nuclear detonation in the India-U.S. Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as a condition for future cooperation.

7. Any attempt to make the deal confitional on "extraneous" issues like India joining the Proliferation Security Initiative or helping the U.S. isolate Iran.

He also said for the first time that notwithstanding India's commitment to in-perpetuity safeguards, its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA would provide for "corrective measures" in the event these safeguarded facilities are denied imported fuel.

He also made a number of declarations about the independence of Indian foreign policy which can be proved true or false only with the passage of time.

I will write on this topic in more detail in a day or two but it seems to me, initially, at least, that now that these red lines have been clearly marked out, it is for the White House to ensure the proposed legislation stays within their confines. If not, the deal will most certainly be off.
[For the full text of the PM's statement, click on the link below to read the rest of this post]

Excerpts from Prime Minister's Reply to Discussion in Rajya Sabha on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States on 17.8.2006

…….At the outset, I would like to convey my gratitude to all the Hon'ble Members who have participated in this debate. I am grateful for this opportunity to clarify some of the issues arising from the discussion. I will do so in a non partisan spirit and I have every reason to believe that after I have finished that I will be able to carry the whole House with me. Our Government has never shied away from a full discussion in Parliament on this important issue. On three previous occasions on July 29, 2005, February 27, 2006 and March 7, 2006, I had made detailed statements and discussed this important subject in this august House. Once again, several issues have been raised during the current discussions and I wish to take this opportunity to respond to them. I also intend to cover developments since my last Suo Motu statement of March 7 this year.

2. Two types of comments have been made during the discussion in the House. The first set of issues pertains to the basic orientation of our foreign policy. Some Hon'ble Members have observed that by engaging in discussions with, and allegedly acquiescing in the demands made by the United States, we have compromised the independent nature of our foreign policy.

3. The second set of issues pertain to deviations from the July 18 Joint Statement and the March 2 Separation Plan. Many of the points raised by the Hon'ble Members have also been aired outside Parliament, notably also by some senior members of the scientific establishment. Overall, a listing of the important concerns include the following: that the India-US Nuclear initiative and more particularly the content of the proposed legislation in the US Congress, could undermine the autonomy of our decision-making; limit the options or compromise the integrity of our strategic programme; and adversely affect the future of our scientific research and development. To sum up, this would suggest that India's strategic nuclear autonomy is being compromised and India is allowing itself to be pressurized into accepting new and unacceptable conditions that are deviations from the commitments made by me to Parliament in July 2005 and in February and March this year.

4. I recognize that many of these concerns are borne out of genuine conviction that nothing should be done that would undermine long standing policies that have a bearing on India's vital national security interests. I fully share and subscribe to these sentiments. I would like to assure the Hon'ble Members that negotiations with the US regarding the civilian nuclear deal have not led to any change in the basic orientation of our policies, or affected our independent judgment of issues of national interest. Last year during my visit to the US, I addressed the National Press Club in the full glare of the media. A question was put to me regarding what I thought about the US intervention in Iraq. In the full public glare of the media I said that it was a mistake. I said the same to President Bush when he visited India. I said India does not find favour with regime change.

5. The thrust of our foreign policy remains the promotion of our national interest. We are unswerving in our commitment to an independent foreign policy. We do recognize the complexities present in an increasingly inter-dependent and multi-polar world. While we recognize that the United States is a pre-eminent power and good relations with the U.S. are in our national interest, this has not in any way clouded our judgment. There are many areas of agreement with the United States, but at the same time there are a number of areas in which we have differences and we have not shied away from making these known to the US, as also expressing them in public. Currently, we are engaged not only with the US but other global powers like Russia, China, the EU, UK, France and Japan. We are also focusing on ASEAN, as well as countries in West Asia, Africa and Latin America. More importantly, we are devoting proportionately larger time and effort in building relations with countries in our immediate neighbourhood like Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Pakistan. Our relations with all these countries are determined by the dictates of our enlightened national interest and we have not allowed any other country, including the United States, to influence our polices. This will not change as long as I am Prime Minister.

6. I would, hence, again reiterate in view of the apprehensions expressed, that the proposed US legislation on nuclear cooperation with India will not be allowed to become an instrument to compromise India's sovereignty. Our foreign policy is determined solely by our national interests. No legislation enacted in a foreign country can take away from us that sovereign right. Thus there is no question of India being bound by a law passed by a foreign legislature. Our sole guiding principle in regard to our foreign policy, whether it is on Iran or any other country, will be dictated entirely by our national interest.

7. Let me now turn to some of the concerns that have been expressed on the second set of issues regarding possible deviations from assurances given by me in this august House on the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement and the March 2, 2006 Separation Plan. I would like to state categorically that there have neither been nor will there be any compromises on this score and the Government will not allow such compromises to occur in the future.

8. Hon'ble Members will recall that during President Bush's visit to India in March this year, agreement was reached between India and the United States on a Separation Plan in implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005. This Separation Plan had identified the nuclear facilities that India was willing to offer, in a phased manner, for IAEA safeguards, contingent on reciprocal actions taken by the United States. For its part, the United States Administration was required to approach the US Congress for amending its laws and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group for adapting its Guidelines to enable full civilian nuclear cooperation between India and the international community.

9. The US Administration had thereafter approached the US Congress to amend certain provisions of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which currently prohibit civil nuclear cooperation with India. The US House of Representatives International Relations Committee passed a Bill on the subject on 27th June 2006. The House of Representatives passed the Bill as approved by its International Relations Committee on July 27.

10. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed its version of the Bill on June 29, 2006. The US Senate is now expected to vote on this version of the Bill some time in September. We have concerns over both the House and Senate versions of the Bill. Since the two Bills are somewhat different in content, according to US practice they will need to be reconciled to produce a single piece of legislation. After adoption by both the House and the Senate, this would become law when the US President accords his approval. The final shape of the legislation would, therefore, be apparent only when the House and the Senate complete the second stage of assent/adoption.

11. Meanwhile, the US Government has approached the Nuclear Suppliers' Group to adapt its guidelines to enable full civil nuclear cooperation between India and the International community. In March this year, the NSG at its plenary meeting in Brazil held a preliminary discussion on this issue. The matter will be further discussed by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group later this year. On our part, we have separately raised this issue with several countries and urged them to lift the existing restrictions on nuclear supplies to India. I myself have raised this issue with the Heads of State or Government of Russia, France, UK, Japan, Germany, Brazil, Norway, Iceland and Cyprus, among others.

12. In view of the concerns voiced by the Hon'ble Members, I shall try to address each of these concerns in some detail. I shall, however, begin by affirming that our approach is guided by the understandings contained in the July 2005 Joint Statement and the March 2006 Separation Plan. What we can agree with the United States to enable nuclear cooperation must be strictly within these parameters.

13. The key provisions to which references have been made in Parliament and outside are the following:

(i) Full Civil Nuclear Cooperation : The central imperative in our discussions with the United State on Civil Nuclear Cooperation is to ensure the complete and irreversible removal of existing restrictions imposed on India through iniquitous restrictive trading regimes over the years. We seek the removal of restrictions on all aspects of cooperation and technology transfers pertaining to civil nuclear energy ranging from nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, to re-processing spent fuel, i.e. all aspects of a complete nuclear fuel cycle.

This will be the surest guarantee of India's acceptance as a full and equal partner of the international nuclear community, even while preserving the integrity of our three stage nuclear programme and protecting the autonomy of our scientific research and development. We will not agree to any dilution that would prevent us from securing the benefits of full civil nuclear cooperation as amplified above.

(ii) Principle of Reciprocity : I had earlier assured the House that reciprocity is the key to the implementation of our understanding contained in the July 2005 Statement. I stand by that commitment. When we put forward the Separation Plan, we again made it clear to the United States that India could not be expected to take on obligations such as placing its nuclear facilities under safeguards in anticipation of future lifting of restrictions. India and the United States have held one round of discussions on a proposed bilateral cooperation agreement. India and the IAEA have held technical discussions regarding an India-specific Safeguards agreement. Further discussions are required on both these documents. While these parallel efforts are underway, our position is that we will accept only IAEA safeguards on the nuclear facilities, in a phased manner, and as identified for that purpose in the Separation Plan only when all nuclear restrictions on India have been lifted. On July 29 last year, I had stated that before voluntarily placing our civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, we will ensure that all restrictions on India have been lifted. There has been no shift in our position on this point.

(iii) Certification : The draft Senate Bill requires the US President to make an annual report to the Congress that includes certification that India is in full compliance of its non proliferation and other commitments. We have made it clear to the United States our opposition to these provisions, even if they are projected as non binding on India, as being contrary to the letter and spirit of the July Statement. We have told the US Administration that the effect of such certification will be to diminish a permanent waiver authority into an annual one. We have also indicated that this would introduce an element of uncertainty regarding future cooperation and is, not acceptable to us.

(iv) India as a State possessing Advanced Nuclear Technology : Hon'ble Members may recall that the July Statement, had acknowledged that India should be regarded as a State with advanced nuclear technology enjoying the same advantages and benefits as other states with advanced nuclear technology, such as the US. The July Statement did not refer to India as a Nuclear Weapons State because that has a particular connotation in the NPT but it explicitly acknowledged the existence of India's military nuclear facilities. It also meant that India would not attract full scope safeguards such as those applied to Non Nuclear Weapon States that are signatories to the NPT and there would be no curbs on continuation of India's nuclear weapon related activities. In these important respects, India would be very much on par with the five Nuclear Weapon States who are signatories to the NPT. Similarly, the Separation Plan provided for an India specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA with assurances of uninterrupted supply of fuel to reactors together with India's right to take corrective measures in the event fuel supplies are interrupted. We have made clear to the US that India's strategic programme is totally outside the purview of the July Statement, and we oppose any legislative provisions that Mandate scrutiny of either our nuclear weapons programme or our unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

(v) Safeguards Agreement and Fuel Assurances : In this respect too, it is worth emphasizing that the March 2006 Separation Plan provides for an India Specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, with assurances of uninterrupted supply of fuel to reactors that would be placed under IAEA safeguards together with India's right to take corrective measures in the event fuel supplies are interrupted. We, of course, have the sovereign right to take all appropriate measures to fully safeguard our interests. An important assurance is the commitment of support for India's right to build up strategic reserves of nuclear fuel over the lifetime of India's reactors. We have initiated technical discussions at the expert level with the IAEA on an India Specific Safeguards Agreement. Both the Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the United States and the India-Specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA would be only within the parameters of the July Statement and the March Separation Plan. There is no question of India signing either a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA or an Additional Protocol of a type concluded by Non Nuclear Weapons States who have signed the NPT. We will not accept any verification measures regarding our safeguarded nuclear facilities beyond those contained in an India-Specific Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Therefore there is no question of allowing American inspectors to roam around our nuclear facilities.

(vi) Integrity and reliability of our strategic programme - autonomy of decision-making and future scientific research and development: In my statement of March 7, 2006, I had assured Parliament that the Separation Plan would not adversely affect our strategic programme. I reiterate that commitment today. The Separation Plan has been so designed as to ensure adequacy of fissile material and other inputs for our strategic programme, based on our current and assessed future needs. The integrity of our 3 Stage nuclear programme will not be affected. The autonomy of our Research and Development activity, including development of our fast breeder reactors and the thorium programme, in the nuclear field will remain unaffected. We will not accept interference by other countries vis-à-vis the development of our strategic programme. We will not allow external scrutiny of our strategic programme in any manner, much less allow it to be a condition for future nuclear cooperation between India and the international community.

(vii) Moratorium on production of fissile material: Our position on this matter is unambiguous. We are not willing to accept a moratorium on the production of fissile material. We are only committed to negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, a commitment which was given by the previous government. India is willing to join only a non discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated and internationally verifiable FMCT, as and when it is concluded in the Conference on Disarmament, again provided our security interests are fully addressed.

(viii) Non discriminatory Global Nuclear Disarmament: Our commitment towards non-discriminatory global nuclear disarmament remains unwavering, in line with the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan. There is no dilution on this count. We do not accept proposals put forward from time to time for regional non proliferation or regional disarmament. Pending global nuclear disarmament, there is no question of India joining the NPT as a non nuclear weapon state, or accepting full scope safeguards as a requirement for nuclear supplies to India, now or in the future.

(ix) Cessation of Future Cooperation : There is provision in the proposed US law that were India to detonate a nuclear explosive device, the US will have the right to cease further cooperation. Our position on this is unambiguous. The US has been intimated that reference to nuclear detonation in the India-US Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement as a condition for future cooperation is not acceptable to us. We are not prepared to go beyond a unilateral voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing as indicated in the July Statement. The same is true of other intrusive non proliferation benchmarks that are mentioned in the proposed US legislation. India's possession and development of nuclear weapons is an integral part of our national security. This will remain so.

14. Hon'ble Members will appreciate the fact that an international negotiation on nuclear energy cooperation particularly when it involves dismantling restrictive regimes that have lasted for over three decades is a complex and sensitive exercise. What we are attempting today is to put in place new international arrangements that would overturn three decades of iniquitous restrictions. It is inevitable, therefore, that there would be some contradictory pulls and pressures. This does not mean that India will succumb to pressures or accept conditionalities that are contrary to its national interests.

15. I had personally spoken to President Bush in St. Petersburg last month on this issue, and conveyed to him that the proposed US legislation must conform strictly to the parameters of the July 18, 2005 Statement and the March 2, 2006 Separation Plan. This alone would be an acceptable basis for nuclear cooperation between India and the United States. India cannot, and is not prepared to, take on additional commitments outside this agreed framework or allow any extraneous issues to be introduced. I have received an assurance from the US President that it was not his intention to shift goalposts, and that the parameters of the scope of cooperation would be those contained in the July 2005 Joint Statement and the March 2006 Separation Plan. A White House Statement of Administration Policy of July 26, 2006 recognizes some, though not all, of India's concerns, and conveyed that the Administration has voiced them with the Congress.

16. I can assure you that there is no ambiguity in our position in so far as it has been conveyed to the US. The US is aware of our position that the only way forward is strict adherence to July Statement and March Separation Plan. I am hopeful that the bilateral India US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement when concluded will take into account the issues raised here. However, I must be honest and frank that I cannot predict with certainty the final form of the US legislation or the outcome of this process with the NSG, which consists of 45 countries with divergent views. We are hopeful that this will lead in a direction wherein our interests are fully protected and that there is a complete lifting of restrictions on India that have existed for three decades. Such an outcome if it materializes will contribute to our long term energy security by enabling a rapid increase in nuclear power. It would lead to the dismantling of the technology denial regimes that have hampered our development particularly in hi tech sectors. I will have wide consultations including with the members of the Atomic Energy Commission, the nuclear and scientific communities and others to develop a broad based national consensus on this important matter. I wish to inform members of the House that I have invited members of the Atomic Energy Commission on the 26th August for a meeting. That same day I have also invited the group of distinguished scientists who have expressed concerns to meet me.

17. Finally, I would only like to state that in keeping with our commitments to Parliament and the nation, we will not accept any conditions that go beyond the parameters of the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement and the March 2, 2006 Separation Plan, agreed to between India and the United States. If in their final form the US legislation or the adapted NSG Guidelines impose extraneous conditions on India, the Government will draw the necessary conclusions, consistent with the commitments I have made to Parliament.

[Prime Minister also gave the following responses to points raised by the Left parties ]

1. Whether the deal will give "full" civilian nuclear technology and lift all existing sanctions on dual use technology imposed on India for not signing the NPT.

Response: The objective of full civil nuclear cooperation is enshrined in the July Statement. This objective can be realized when current restrictions on nuclear trade with India are fully lifted. In accordance with the July Statement, US has initiated steps to amend its legislation and to approach the NSG to adapt its guidelines. We seek the removal of restrictions on all aspects of cooperation and technology transfers pertaining to civil nuclear energy - ranging from supply of nuclear fuel, nuclear reactors, reprocessing spent fuel, i.e., all aspects of complete nuclear fuel supply. Only such cooperation would be in keeping with the July Joint Statement.

2. Cannot accept restrictions on Indian foreign policy to be imposed such as on Iran, irrespective of whether it is in the policy section or in the sense of the House section of the legislation.

Response: Government is clear that our commitments are only those that are contained in the July Joint Statement and in the Separation Plan. We cannot accept introduction of extraneous issues on foreign policy. Any prescriptive suggestions in this regard are not acceptable to us. Our foreign policy is and will be solely determined by our national interests. No legislation enacted in a foreign country can take away from us this sovereign right.

3. Signing of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity for the civilian programme to take place after the US Congress had approved a "123 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement". All restrictions on India to be lifted before we sign the IAEA safeguards.

Response: I had conveyed to Parliament on July 29, 2005 on my return from Washington that before placing any of our nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, we will ensure all restrictions on India have been lifted. Under the Separation Plan agreed to with the United States, India has offered to place under IAEA safeguards 14 of its reactors presently operating or under constructions between 2006 and 2014. The nuclear facilities listed in the Separation Plan will be offered for safeguards only after all nuclear restrictions have been lifted on India. This would include suitable amendments to the US legislation to allow for such cooperation, the passing of the bilateral agreement with India and the adaption of the NSG guidelines. It is clear that India cannot be expected to take safeguards obligations on its nuclear facilities in anticipation of future lifting of restrictions.

4. Guarantees on fuel as agreed in the March 2006 statement. In case the US reneges on supply of fuel, they will ensure continuity through other members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Response: Separation Plan includes elaborate fuel supply assurances given by the United States. Understandings in the Separation Plan also provide for contingency of disruption of fuel supplies to India. In such a case, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries (Russia, France and United Kingdom) aimed at restoring fuel supplies to India. An important assurance is the commitment of support for India's right to build strategic reserves of fuel over the life time of its nuclear reactors. In the event of disruption of fuel supplies despite the assurances, India will have a right to take corrective measure to ensure the operation of its nuclear reactors.

5. India will work for an FMCT and for nuclear disarmament with all nuclear weapon states, in line with the Rajiv Gandhi Plan or Delhi Declaration in tandem.

Response: Our support for global nuclear disarmament remains unwaivering. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had put forward an Action Plan in the 1988 UNGA Special Session on Disarmament. We remain committed to the central goal of this Action Plan, i.e., complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to global nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework. India has agreed to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. There has been no change in our position on this matter.

6. In the original deal, there is no provision for US inspectors, only provision for IAEA inspectors. The draft US Bills contains such provisions.

Response: In the Separation Plan, we have agreed to offer for IAEA safeguards nuclear facilities specified in the Separation Plan for that purpose. The nature of safeguards will be determined by an India specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. This will be applied to the safeguarded nuclear facilities in India. Therefore, there is no question of accepting other verification measures or third country inspectors to visit our nuclear facilities, outside the framework of the India specific safeguards agreement.

7. An India-specific protocol and not an Additional Protocol as per IAEA Standard Modified Protocol.

Response: In the Separation Plan, we have agreed to conclude an India specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The question of an Additional Protocol will arise only after the India specific safeguards agreement is in place. As a country with nuclear weapons, there is no question of India agreeing to a Safeguards agreement or an Additional Protocol applicable to non-nuclear weapon states of the NPT.

8. References to Iran in the House Bill.

Response: We reject the linkage of any extraneous issue to the nuclear understanding. India's foreign policy will be decided on the basis of Indian national interests only.

9. Reference to Proliferation Security Initiative in the House and Senate Bills.

Response: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is an extraneous issue as it is outside the framework of the July 18 Joint Statement. Therefore, we cannot accept it as a condition for implementing the July Statement. Separately, the Government has examined the PSI. We have certain concerns regarding its legal implications and its linkages with the NPT. We also have concerns with amendments to the suppression of Unlawful Activities at Sea Treaty under the International Maritime Organisation.

10. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment linking the granting of MFN status to USSR to Jewish emigration is an example relevant to the current debate.

Response: We have studied the proposed US legislation very carefully, including the so-called binding and non-binding provisions. The non-binding provisions do not require mandatory action, but at the same time, have a certain weight in the implementation of the legislation as a whole. We have conveyed our concerns to the US Administration in this respect. Jackson-Vanik Amendment was binding on the Administration and cannot be cited as a precedent for non-binding references in the current bills. A more accurate example than the Jackson-Vanik Amendment is the set of provisions accompanying the renewal of MFN status to China, that included references to China's human rights, China's political and religious prisoners, protection of Tibetan heritage and freedom of political expression.

11. Role of Parliament in approving foreign policy.

Response: India follows a Parliamentary model, as specified in our Constitution, wherein treaty making powers rest with the Executive. However, we have kept Parliament fully in the picture regarding various stages of our negotiations with the United States. Broad based domestic consensus cutting across all sections in Parliament and outside will be necessary. We will work towards that objective by addressing various concerns as fully as possible.

[Prime Minister also gave the following responses to points raised by the group of nuclear scientists]

1. "India should continue to be able to hold on to her nuclear option as a strategic requirement in the real world that that we live in, and in the ever-changing complexity of the international political system. This means that we cannot accede to any restraint in perpetuity on our freedom of action. We have not done this for the last 40 years after the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into being, and there is no reason why we should succumb to this now. Universal nuclear disarmament must be our ultimate aim, and until we see the light at the end of the tunnel on this important issue, we cannot accept any agreement in perpetuity."

Response: We are very firm in our determination that agreement with United States on Civil Nuclear Energy in no way affects the requirements of our strategic programme. We are fully conscious of the changing complexity of the international political system. Nuclear weapons are an integral part of our national security and will remain so, pending the global elimination of all nuclear weapons and universal non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament. Our freedom of action with regard to our strategic programmes remains unrestricted. The nuclear agreement will not be allowed to be used as a backdoor method of introducing NPT type restrictions on India. Our offer to put nuclear facilities under safeguards in perpetuity is conditional upon these facilities securing fuel from international sources for their life time. If the fuel supply assurances as enumerated in Separation Plan are disrupted, then India will have the right to take corrective
measures to ensure the continued operation of these reactors.

2. 'After 1974, when the major powers discontinued cooperation with us, we have built up our capability in many sensitive technological areas, which need not and should not now be subjected to external control. Safeguards are understandable where external assistance for nuclear materials or technologies are involved. We have agreed to this before, and we can continue to agree to this in the future too, but strictly restricted to those facilities and materials imported from external sources.'

Response: Sensitive nuclear technology facilities have not been covered in the Separation Plan. Therefore, there is no question of putting them under safeguards or under external controls. Even with regard to nuclear facilities that have been included in Separation Plan, safeguards will be applied in phases between 2006 and 2014. These safeguarded facilities will be eligible for and will receive fuel materials and technology from international sources. If such supplies cease, then India will be free to protect its interests through corrective measures. That will be spelt out clearly in the India specific safeguards agreement.

3. 'We find that the Indo-US deal, in the form approved by the US House of Representatives, infringes on our Independence for carrying out indigenous research and development in nuclear science and technology. Our R&D should not be hampered by external supervision or control, or by the need to satisfy any international body. Research and technology development are the Sovereign rights of any nation. This is especially true when they concern strategic national defence and energy self-sufficiency.'

Response: Our independence for carrying out independent research and development in nuclear science and technology will remain unaffected. There will be no external supervision of our R&D since none of the sensitive R&D facilities which handle nuclear material have been included in the Separation Plan. Nothing in the Separation Plan infringes on our sovereign right to conduct research and technology development concerning our national defence and energy self-sufficiency. Government is committed to preserve the integrity of the three stage nuclear power programme, including utilization of our vast thorium resources. Certain nuclear facilities including centers such as TIFR, Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre, Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics etc., have been designated as civilian in the Separation Plan. As these facilities will not handle nuclear material, there is no question of safeguards being applied to them. We expect these centers to participate as full partners in international collaboration project.

4. 'While the sequence of actions to implement the cooperation could be left for discussion between the two governments, the basic principles on which such actions will rest is the right of Parliament and the people to decide. The Prime Minister has already taken up with President George Bush the issue of the new clauses recommended by the US House of Representatives. If the US Congress, in its wisdom, passes the bill in its present form, the 'product' will become unacceptable to India, and diplomatically, it will be very difficult to change it later. Hence, it is important for our Parliament to work out, and insist on, the ground rules for the nuclear deal, at this stage itself.'

Response: I had taken up with President Bush our concerns regarding provisions in the two bills. It is clear that if the final product is in its current form, India will have grave difficulties in accepting the bills. US has been left in no doubt as to our position. The ground rules for our discussions are clear. These are the parameters of the July Statement and the March Separation Plan and commitments given by me to Parliament in the three Suo Moto Statements and my reply to today's discussions will be the guiding principles of our position. Parliament has been kept fully informed at every stage of the discussions. In their final form, if US legislation or the NSG guidelines impose extraneous conditions on India, the Government will draw the necessary conclusions consistent with my commitments to Parliament.

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'Set ground rules on nuclear deal' , say scientists

India's senior-most nuclear scientists have written to Members of Parliament warning that the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal infringes on indigenous research and development, and that the country should guard against accepting "any agreement in perpetuity" until such time the final aim of universal nuclear disarmament is realised.

15 August 2006
The Hindu

'Set ground rules on nuclear deal'

Siddharth Varadarajan

New Delhi: Concerned by the legislative shape the India-U.S. nuclear agreement is taking in Washington, a group of senior nuclear scientists has called on Parliament to take a "unanimous decision" rejecting any "restraint in perpetuity" on the country's freedom of action or research capabilities in the nuclear field.

The statement, signed by eight top scientists, including three former chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission, is likely to strengthen the Left's demand for Parliament to adopt a resolution highlighting India's concerns about the deal.

"Unacceptable to India"

The scientists hail the July 18, 2005 agreement with the U.S. and welcome India's prospective entry into the "international nuclear community."

But they say the U.S. Congress has "modified ... the implementation of [the] agreement" and that if the draft U.S. law is passed in the present form, "the `product' will become unacceptable to India." Stressing that it will be difficult to scrap these modifications once legislated, the scientists say Parliament must "work out, and insist on, the ground rules for the nuclear deal, at this stage itself."

The statement identifies four areas of concern. First, that India "cannot accede to any restraint in perpetuity on [its] freedom of action" as far as the strategic requirements of its nuclear option are concerned. "Universal nuclear disarmament must be our ultimate aim and until we see the light at the end of the tunnel... we cannot accept any agreement in perpetuity."

Second, they say India's capability in sensitive technological areas should not be subjected to external control and that safeguards should be "strictly restricted to those facilities and materials imported from external sources."

Third, the U.S. draft law "infringes on [India's] independence for carrying out indigenous R&D in nuclear science and technology" and Parliament should ensure that Indian research and design is "not hampered by external supervision or control." Finally, say the scientists, it is Parliament's right to decide "the basic principles" on which the nuclear deal will be implemented and it must act now.

The signatories are H.N. Sethna, M.R. Srinivasan and P.K. Iyengar, all former chairmen of the AEC, A. Gopalakrishnan, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, S.L. Kati, former director of the Nuclear Power Corporation, A.N. Prasad, former director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Y.S.R. Prasad, former chairman and managing director of NPC, and Placid Rodriguez, former director of the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research.

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A defeat for Israel, but also for justice

The U.N. resolution is a consolation prize for the Olmert regime, whose failure in Lebanon throws the wider U.S.-Israeli game plan for the region into disarray.

14 August 2006
The Hindu

A defeat for Israel, but also for justice

Siddharth Varadarajan

WHEN ISRAEL attacked Lebanon a month ago, it had two stated and two unstated military objectives. The stated objectives were the unconditional release of two of its soldiers captured by Hizbollah, and the physical destruction of the Lebanese resistance force, its leadership and command structure. As for the unstated objectives, the first was to so totally degrade the civilian infrastructure of the country that the non-Shia population of Lebanon would turn against Hizbollah and the Shias for inviting the wrath of Israel upon them in this manner. And the second, to deny Iran and its supporters the chance of opening a second front against Israel from close quarters — in the event of American airstrikes on Iranian nuclear installations.

In turn, these military objectives were part of a wider political objective: to use Israel's overwhelming military superiority as the basis for implementing the Sharon-Olmert plan of a unilaterally imposed "peace settlement" on the region which would leave Tel Aviv in control of as much Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian land and water as it deems necessary.

Predictable blame-game

When the promised ceasefire takes effect on Monday morning, however, Israel will find that not a single one of its objectives has been achieved.

This failure has ignited a predictable blame-game within the Israeli military and political establishment but the repercussions of military defeat will travel much further afield. The Olmert regime took a big gamble in going to war and the Bush administration backed it to the hilt in the hope that a "New Middle East" could be built on the backs of a military machine that was believed to be invincible. By smashing that myth of invincibility and registering a decisive military and even moral victory over the Israeli Defence Forces, Hizbollah has thrown the neo-conservative agenda for a "New Middle East" into utter disarray.

The Lebanese militia has not only managed to preserve its capability to fight despite the withering bombardment of its strongholds in southern Lebanon but has also inflicted severe losses on the Israeli military. Nor has its ability to fire Katyusha rockets into northern Israel in retaliation for the Israeli bombing of civilian areas been effectively degraded. The IDF's desperate push towards the Litani river following the adoption of a ceasefire resolution by the United Nations Security Council has itself cost the lives of more than two dozen soldiers, taking the number of Israeli troops killed in the war to well over 100.

More than 30 years of enforcing a military occupation and fighting children and poorly-equipped guerrillas have clearly taken their toll on the ability of the legendary Israeli army to fight a full-fledged war. That is why, right at the outset, the IDF had hoped to rely more or less exclusively on air power and deploy ground forces only after Hizbollah had been sufficiently softened up. However, the international outrage that Israel's bombardment of Lebanon provoked, particularly after the Qana massacre, forced Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and his backers in Washington to change tack. Israel realised it had to commit a more significant detachment of ground troops if Hizbollah was to be defeated. At the same time, it preferred the easier option of an international stabilisation force coming in to finish the job for it.

Since the political balance of power in the Security Council is more decisively in favour of Israel than the military balance is on the ground in southern Lebanon, Washington's priority has been to use its clout at the U.N. to bring in to the region a well-armed military force that could prosecute Tel Aviv's war aims more effectively. UNSC Resolution 1701, passed unanimously on Friday, was originally intended to do just that. Its original version ignited outrage in Lebanon and the Arab world but even as now amended, the resolution is problematic on a number of grounds. At the same time, its military provisions fall somewhat short of the original American-Israeli objective.

Rather than creating a new stabilisation force — which would respond, by default, to the command and control structures of the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) — the Security Council has expanded the mandate and size of the existing U.N. peacekeeping force on the ground, UNIFIL. The new mandate will include monitoring the cessation of hostilities, accompanying and supporting the Lebanese Army as it deploys up to the Israeli border in tandem with the Israeli withdrawal, assisting the Lebanese army "in taking steps towards the establishment" of an area between the border and the Litani river that is free of armed forces not authorised by the Lebanese Government, and assisting the Lebanese Government "at its request" to establish better control over its borders.

In order to discharge this enlarged mandate, UNIFIL has been authorised to "take all necessary action" — a code word for the use of even offensive military action — to ensure that the territory where it is deployed is "not utilised for hostile activities of any kind." In other words, UNIFIL would be authorised to attack Hizbollah if the militia sends fighters south of the Litani to launch rockets into Israel. UNIFIL has also been authorised to use deadly force "to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence," which, at least in theory, could also apply to situations such as Israeli airstrikes and attacks on civilian areas of the kind Lebanon has witnessed this past month.

Whether this expanded mandate will help preserve the peace will depend entirely on UNIFIL's ability to avoid getting caught in the wider American political agenda. If it acts professionally and solely as a facilitator for the Lebanese army, there is no reason why Hizbollah will not cooperate with it. At any rate, Hizbollah, with the consent of the Lebanese Government, is free to preserve its military capability north of the Litani as a hedge against future Israeli aggression.

The problem with Resolution 1701, however, is that it is structured in such a way as to prolong or re-ignite the conflict between Israel and Lebanon rather than to settle it expeditiously on the basis of reason and justice.

The most important shortcoming is the resolution's vague formulation on the need for Israel to vacate the territories in Lebanon it has forcibly occupied over the past month. If Israel takes the view that it will not begin withdrawing until the expanded UNIFIL force is in place, Hizbollah will be perfectly justified in attacking what is after all an army of occupation. But apart from the immediate issue of an Israeli withdrawal, the resolution contains no timeframe for tackling the root causes of the conflict. Israel will remain in occupation of the Shebaa farms, which is Lebanese territory, it will not be obliged to hand over within any specified time period the map of land mines it has laid on Lebanese territory, nor is it obliged to return the Lebanese prisoners it is holding. As for the hundreds of Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace and territorial waters which occur every year, no specific mechanisms for redressal have been created to ensure these do not occur again.

Glaring omissions

There are other glaring omissions too. For example, the resolution does not oblige Israel to pay Lebanon any compensation for the destruction of civilian life and property it has wilfully caused since its attack began on July 12.

Unless the international community moves sincerely to address these fundamental questions and finds a way to impose punitive costs on Israel for its wholly disproportionate use of military force, the underlying problem will never go away.

© Copyright 2000 - 2006 The Hindu

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"We are still interested in dialogue based on justness and fairness"

Those who think only about bombs, war, and attacking others are the root cause of everything that is wrong in the world, Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tells The Hindu in an exclusive interview.

10 August 2006
The Hindu

"We are still interested in dialogue based on justness and fairness"

Siddharth Varadarajan & John Cherian

We are meeting at a time when the crisis over Iran's nuclear programme is being escalated. Last week, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution threatening sanctions on Iran even as you are still evaluating your response to the European package of incentives. What is your government likely to do now?

As I see it, the issue has not become more complicated. Rather, it is clear. The U.S. and certain European countries do not want Iran to have access to peaceful nuclear technology, to use that technology. And they are using everything at their disposal to make sure of this. Recent developments in Lebanon again demonstrate that the UNSC is an instrument under their control. And they used this instrument at their disposal, so nothing important has happened. From the very beginning, they were threatening us with their instrument, which is the UNSC. And we responded by asking whether the Security Council is controlled by you because you are constantly talking about it and using it to threaten us. We have known this [reality] for some time now. But these days everything has become that much clearer.

We have always been interested in talking, and we are still interested in dialogue, in the context of the law, our national interest, and based on justness and fairness. And in a fair atmosphere. This is because we conduct our affairs lawfully and we have always believed — and continued to believe — in the concepts of peace and tranquillity and justice. So we have nothing to fear.

We managed to secure — to access — this technology indigenously, here in Iran [points to his head]. This is the end result of our scientific endeavours. Nobody can take this away from us [again points to his head]. Having said that, we are still interested in talking if there are parties out there which might have questions. We are always interested in receiving their questions and responding to them. They have given us a proposal. And we have responded by saying that we will respond to you later. And we are very much in the middle of studying that package. And we also gave them a date.

August 22?

Yes, we said we would reply on the 22nd of August and they issued a resolution nevertheless! I am at a loss to explain this. What is the meaning of this? The only conclusion I can draw is that they are bullying us. They want to impose their will on us. They really are not looking for a dialogue. In all honesty, they do not want to talk to us but want to impose their wishes on us. They want to deny us our rights. They want to place a Damocles sword over our head so that we give up eventually. But they have miscalculated. The time for such behaviour is in the past, it's finished. We are not concerned. And they will regret the miscalculation they have made today.

Last year, at the U.N. General Assembly, you made an interesting proposal for a multinational fuel cycle but the other countries did not respond. Is it possible that on August 22, you will make another proposal, so as to keep the path for dialogue open?

What we have announced is that we are going to study the package of incentives, and later we are going to express our opinion on this. We are interested in continuing with negotiations. But their most recent behaviour is reason enough for us to doubt their sincerity. Given everything that has happened, we no longer have any confidence, any trust. We assume that the whole idea of presenting us with a package was a political exercise more than anything else. So it has become very difficult for us to remove from our mind the conclusion we have arrived at, which is that they are less than sincere. It is difficult for us to believe they have given up their colonial practices. Of course, there is a lot of possibility, a lot of likelihood, that we are going to continue the packages more and we are going to come back with a response. We are trying our very best to do just that.

Were you surprised at Russia and China joining hands with the U.S., France, and Britain in passing this resolution at the UNSC?

No. We are standing on our own two feet. Of course, we would like to see our friends stand side by side with us.

Iran and the NPT

Are there any circumstances — if this approach of the U.S. and the Europeans continues, the approach, as you see it, of increasing pressure on you — that Iran may one day decide to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Is that at all a possibility?

We have said time and again that all of our nuclear activities are peaceful, and are conducted in the context and under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and also the articles of the NPT. We remain firmly inside those boundaries. Nevertheless, if they decide to use the instruments at their disposal to put pressure on us to limit our activities, and try to take away or deny what is rightfully ours, and to distort our rights, obviously we are going to change our mind.

About being in the NPT, or about the peaceful nature of your nuclear programme?

Well, we are going to respond commensurate to their response. In other words, we are going to respond in kind. Having said that, they will not be able to put pressure on us.

There is a famous fatwa of Ayatollah Khomeini that it is against Islam to use the nuclear bomb. But do you also consider it un-Islamic to make or keep the bomb for deterrence purposes?

We think that the time of weapons of mass destruction having a say in, or determining the course of, political or human relations is in the past. It is finished. And in the very near future, these existing arsenals are going to become useless. All nations very much abhor war, killing, and bloodshed. There are only a few big powers that want to speed up the arms race, and of course, the reason they are interested in this is to line their own pockets. Today, the age of thinking, of cultural exchanges and endeavours has dawned. What we desperately need is better human interaction, peace, justice, pens — people in the media, for example — that work for the greater good. These are the factors that contribute to or bring about happiness and well-being. Bombs do not provide prosperity. The money that is spent on armaments should rightfully be spent on better welfare, for the development of our various societies, and also healthcare.

Iran has made impressive advances in the past two decades but in the energy field there are two critical weaknesses. You have a lack of refining capability, so you import gasoline. And you also don't have the technology to liquefy gas. While accepting that Iran has every right to pursue nuclear energy, wouldn't the goal of energy security, at least in the medium term, be better served by investing your money on refineries and doing research on LNG technology rather than nuclear fuel enrichment?

These two do not create any impositions on each other. The experts who have been involved in the fields [you mention] must do a better job. And of course we have approached them, to be much quicker. These are two parallel endeavours, and one does not translate into any obstacles in the way of the other. Can one say that a country which desperately requires greater amounts of energy must ignore healthcare cover? Or ignore such issues as aerodynamics, lasers or state-of-the-art medical services? There are different branches of technology and science. It is very natural for a country to progress more in one branch than another.

Relations with India

Last year, after India voted against Iran at the IAEA, your government expressed its disappointment. There are some who are saying the LNG contract for 5 million tonnes has run into trouble as a result. How do you assess the state of bilateral relations today?

The relationship between India and Iran is a historical one. Many cultural and civilisational commonalities have linked the two countries together. Our literature, arts and also our social practices and customs, our intellectuals, and also the tastes and sentiments of my people are very similar to that of the Indian nation. Aside from those, in the region we have many shared interests and shared points of view and positions. Our relations are steeped in history. Having said that, we were dismayed with the position taken by the Indian government. This came as a surprise. Again, having said that, this will not play a role in determining our relations. As far as relations are concerned, we are working for and hoping for very clear future horizons, promising horizons. Iranians are very much at ease when they are in the company of their Indian brethren and we have a lot of affinity with Indians. Ours is not the kind of relationship that will be affected by one mistake. I think the relations are important enough that if one of the parties makes a mistake, they would correct that mistake themselves. Having said that, we are not worried about that. But having said that, this came as a surprise.

When India's Petroleum Minister, Murli Deora, met you in Shanghai in June, you said you would ask the Majlis [Parliament] to clarify the status of the LNG contract. Could you tell us what is the position?

I want to stress that the LNG contract has nothing to do with the [IAEA] issue. In all honesty, everything boils down to a legal interpretation of the contract. A difference of opinion exists between our oil company and its Indian counterpart. We really want to expand our cooperation. And as you might appreciate, as far as [energy cooperation with India] is concerned, I myself am personally following matters. I have directed my colleagues to approach the Majlis and ask them where we stand on the LNG issue. I think that in about 30-40 days from now, we will have an answer.

Many people in Iran, India, and Pakistan are looking forward to the natural gas pipeline currently under discussion. But the pricing of gas is emerging as a stumbling block. Given the strategic importance of the pipeline for the three countries, and especially Iran, are you willing to be flexible as far as price is concerned?

We have a great deal of respect and love for the people of India and Pakistan. We look upon them as our own people. We are very interested in this pipeline being constructed. You have to appreciate that at the moment we have a lot of offers [for our gas] from Europe with very high prices. Nevertheless, we would like this pipeline to be constructed and stretch between Iran, Pakistan, and India. We want this pipeline to be the pipeline of brotherhood and peace. And of course, we would very much like to be flexible. At the end of the day, well, we have to go through the National Iran Oil Company (NIOC), and they obviously are a legal entity. They have to work out an agreement, and obviously their mentality, how they look at this venture, is an economic one, and they have to sell this gas, this commodity, at the best possible price. This natural gas pipeline will be a securable and bankable pipeline. With that in mind, its prices cannot be very far away from international prices. I think that we can come to an agreement, inshallah. [We should give] some time to the experts of the three countries to reach an agreement.

Letters to Bush, Merkel

One of the interesting aspects of your diplomatic style is the letters you have written — to U.S. President George W. Bush for example, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. What is the purpose behind these letters? Were they meant to be an invitation to dialogue? And are you disappointed you never got a reply?

There are two points you need to appreciate. The westerners have devised a framework for diplomatic activity; they have written the rules of the game, so to speak, and want everyone to play by those rules. I assure you that whoever plays by those rules, whoever remains in that framework, will be worse off. We have to come up and use our practices and ways and methods. We very much can have our frameworks. We have a very rich culture, a very ancient civilisation to draw on. We have proposals, ideas to help find solutions to the many international problems which exist. So with these, we fully believe we can have a better world, we can govern the world much better than it is governed today.

The letters I sent, their spirit, were messages more than anything else. Of course, I was hoping — I was interested in them appreciating and accepting these rightful words. And I would have liked them to return to what is right, and appreciate the truth. But they are free to make their own choices. But at the end of the day, all individuals will reap the seeds they have sown, the choices they have made. Of course, you can see for yourself, the result of these two diplomatic initiatives. I believe that the goals set have been secured. This was a message, a call, an invitation to peace and appreciation of the truth. If they were to accept the message, so much the better. And if they refuse, nations around the world will come to appreciate that they oppose peace, because this is a call to peace, an invitation to peace.

The Lebanon crisis

Your colleagues are signalling that our time is up but we have to ask one last question, on Lebanon. Does the failure of Israel to achieve its aims in Lebanon create a new opportunity for the international community to push for a just peace in the Middle East where all countries can live peacefully within secure borders and in freedom?

We believe that the incidents which have unfolded in Lebanon will change the ongoing equations in the region. The regime of occupation of al-Quds [Israel] is a regime which is very much dependent on and boasts about its military war machine. This regime does not have a humanitarian relationship, a long-standing relationship with the countries of the region. It is only falling back, so to speak, on its military might. This is a might, mind you, which they have used time and again for 60 long years. But this military might and this war machine have now come to an abrupt halt. Obviously, this vacuum is a prelude to certain changes, and these will come about. Developments are yet to unfold. We very much hope that these developments will lead to a just and durable peace.

Having said that, once you look at this arena, and also the behaviour shown by America, Britain, and the Zionist regime, this dream, this hope, sometimes seems far-fetched. Because they are not bothered with peace. Rather, they are interested in perpetuating their occupation. They are looking for a fight. They want to have hegemony. This is very much evident from the behaviour shown by the Americans and the British when the whole issue of establishing a ceasefire [in Lebanon] was being debated recently. The duty of the UNSC is to help establish peace and security. The first action that must be taken is to establish a ceasefire. But they were thinking that if they oppose a ceasefire and help the war to continue in Lebanon, that in turn will help them secure their goals and interests. And as we speak, they are still killing time, dragging their feet, to buy the Zionists some time so that they can have some military victories. On the other hand, they are talking about and circulating texts for specific resolutions to be passed and through these they are hoping to secure the interests that the Zionist regime failed to secure through a military attack and campaign. For this reason, as we can all see, the war rages on.

Allow me to say something else — a point which I believe the Indian and Iranian people fully believe in. What has happened most recently in Lebanon tells us all that certain big powers are not interested in the welfare of other nations. They are only thinking about their own interests, and lining their pockets and expanding their control and hegemony. Who are they? These are the people who say that ethical considerations have no place in political relationships and social relations. They have no reservations whatsoever in oppressing others, telling lies, committing atrocities and also being corrupt. All of these come together to tell me that humanity at large is aching for rulers who are ethical. And the world needs pious people, pure people. People who love each other. Those who think only about bombs, attacking others, aggression, and oppressing others — they are the root cause of everything that is wrong with the world. The failure of the UNSC in helping to bring peace and tranquillity to various nations can be found in the conduct of certain leaders.

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