Anybody remember Manipur?

29 June 2005
The Hindu

Opinion Anybody remember Manipur? Siddharth Varadarajan With the first anniversary of Manorama Devi's killing upon us, the Government must make public the report of the Justice Jeevan Reddy review panel on the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act without any further delay.

ON THE night of July 11, 2004, a detachment of the Assam Rifles arrested a young Manipuri woman named Manorama Devi from her home. The next morning, villagers some four kilometres away stumbled upon her bullet-ridden, lifeless body. The Assam Rifles claimed she had been shot dead while trying to escape, a story no one in Manipur was prepared to believe.

As the Centre went into deep denial and then slumber, the State went up in flames. Apart from calling for the prosecution of the soldiers involved in Manorama's arrest and killing, people demanded that the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) — the draconian 1958 law under which the armed forces enjoy broad immunity from prosecution — be immediately scrapped.

Manmohan's promise

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh finally intervened on November 1, meeting a delegation of the Apunba Lup, the umbrella grouping of 32 organisations spearheading the campaign against the AFSPA. Promising to review the controversial law "and also consider how a more humane Act can be put in place," Dr. Singh said it was his hope and belief that it would be possible "to work together with the people of Manipur to write a new chapter in the history of the State."

Six months on, the Prime Minister has a chance to redeem that pledge. On June 6, the expert panel his Government set up in November to review the workings of the AFSPA submitted its report. Headed by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, a retired judge of the Supreme Court, the review panel consisted of the former Director-General of Military Operations (DGMO) and well-known military analyst Lt. Gen V.R. Raghavan, noted academician and former Vice-Chancellor of Marathwada University Prof. S.B. Nakade, senior journalist and expert on Northeastern affairs Sanjoy Hazarika, and P.P. Srivastava, former Special Secretary (Home).

Given a panel with such credentials — every stakeholder inside and outside government would have no problem reposing faith in at least one member — the Government should have had no hesitation in making its unanimous report public. However, bureaucratic pedantry and caution appear to have triumphed over political instinct.

Not only have the contents of the report not been made public so far, if the internal security establishment has its way they will not be made so any time soon. First the MHA will "study" the report and form a view. Then the Ministries of Defence and Law will do the same. Then, perhaps, a note will be prepared and submitted to the Cabinet along with the report. "By the time the government is ready to say anything publicly, leave alone take action, the Monsoon Session of Parliament could well be over and one might end up in the Winter Session," a North Block official told The Hindu.

In Manipur, where cynicism abounds, people are convinced the review panel has taken a "safe" stand on the AFSPA. Though Justice Reddy has said on more than one occasion that his remit includes recommending "the repeal of the Act, or its amendment of its modification," most Manipuris believe the panel has called only for some amendments. Since the internal security establishment would be quite happy with that outcome, however, it is also possible that the delay in making the report public is because Justice Reddy and his team have done the unthinkable and called for the Armed Forces Act to be scrapped in toto.

No need for secrecy

Regardless of what has been recommended, it should be obvious to the Prime Minister that the Centre has nothing to gain politically from being secretive at this stage. Broadly speaking, there are only four possible scenarios. First, if the panel has suggested repeal and the Centre is disinclined to accept this suggestion, secrecy can at best defer the political cost this will exact but not mitigate or avoid it.

Second, if the panel has suggested repeal and the Centre is prepared to go along, the political returns, in terms of goodwill, are likely to be the highest if the report is made public immediately — before the anniversary of Manorama's killing — rather than later when the agitation against the AFSPA starts building up again. Indeed, in handing the people of Manipur a tangible victory — and in honouring their peaceful, mass protests — the Prime Minister will help create the political climate for bringing a negotiated end to the ongoing armed insurgency in the State.

The third and fourth scenarios involve the panel recommending only modifications in the AFSPA. If the Centre is inclined to accept this, the cost/benefit ratio of making the report public now versus later will be more or less identical. The only scenario where it might pay to delay the release of the report is in the unlikely event that the Centre is inclined to push for a repeal of the Act even though the panel has not sought it.

There are two additional reasons for the Centre acting sooner rather than later. Last week, the Gauhati High Court said that the C. Upendra Commission set up by the Manipur Government to probe the Manorama incident had no jurisdiction since the Assam Rifles came under the Centre. At the same time, the Court added that this did not mean Justice Upendra's report — which was submitted on November 22, 2004 but never made public — had no legal validity. "In view of the interim direction by the Court [... ] some amount of legality [may be attributed] to the report inasmuch as the report can be assured to have been prepared under the direction of the Court."

Declaring the Upendra report a "valuable document available for consideration and initiation of appropriate action", the High Court ruled that the Commission's findings be handed over to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs for "speedy action" against "the indicted persons, if any." The Court also asked that the MHA take an immediate decision about making the report public in keeping with the citizen's right to information.

At this stage, the public neither knows what Justice Upendra has recommended in the Manorama case nor what Justice Jeevan Reddy and his fellow panel members have suggested on the wider issue of the AFSPA. What we do know is that Manorama-type incidents continue to occur with alarming regularity — on June 20, for example, the nephew of Manipur's Culture Minister was arrested and allegedly killed in custody — and that a stop has to be put to them. The only way this can be done is to end the impunity enjoyed by the armed forces. If the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act is in conflict with the rule of law, it is clear which must prevail and which must go.

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

Siachen: solutions for the taking

20 June 2005 The Hindu Opinion - News Analysis Siachen: solutions for the taking Siddharth Varadarajan The only guarantee that the glacier will remain demilitarised once India and Pakistan withdraw is a political one. And only Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Musharraf have the capacity to effect it. IN DECLARING that it was time to convert the world's highest battleground in Siachen into a "mountain of peace," Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has sent a clear signal that demilitarisation of the glacier is a political objective he is personally committed to achieving. But sending a signal down the line is one thing. Getting the civil and military establishments to develop creative approaches to a problem that has defied resolution for more than two decades is another. Defence Secretary-led negotiating teams will never produce an outcome that will satisfy the concerns of all stakeholders in Siachen. The core challenge is to ensure the glacier remains demilitarised once India and Pakistan withdraw. This guarantee must necessarily be political rather than military. And this can only be achieved by the Prime Minister directly discussing the terms of a settlement with General Pervez Musharraf. Whatever the soldiers deployed at a height of more than 18,000 feet may feel, the Army as an institution, in fact, sees no pressing need to disengage from the glacier. More than 770 soldiers are believed to have lost their lives atop the glacier since Operation Meghdoot, the April 1984 operation that led to India acquiring a commanding position atop the three principal passes along the Saltoro range. Today, however, a ceasefire is in place along the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), the Army's 102 Infantry Brigade has a much better knowledge of the terrain, including crevasses, and the equipment available to kit soldiers, though still inadequate, is better than before. Staying on costs the exchequer anywhere from Rs.3 crore to Rs.5 crore a day. But from the calculus of human cost, the Army feels it can continue to sustain its Siachen presence more or less indefinitely. Army's objections Whatever the arguments put forward in the wake of Operation Meghdoot, there is a broad consensus amongst military men that Siachen qua glacier has little or no strategic value. "Siachen does not have any strategic significance," Lt. Gen. M.L. Chibber (retd.) told Force magazine last December. "The strategic significance being talked about is all invention." As GOC-in-C of the Northern Army Command, he had planned and launched the 1984 operation. But if Siachen lacks strategic significance, this does not mean withdrawing from the glacier is free of collateral costs: The Army fears any pullback from Siachen, even if part of a bilateral agreement to redeploy forces, would be presented in Pakistan as a "victory" over an Indian side that did not have the "stomach" to stick it out. There is also the problem of trust. Historians will always argue over the evidence but the Army is convinced it moved into Siachen to pre-empt Pakistan's entry into the undemarcated Saltoro range north of NJ 9842, the northernmost mutually agreed map coordinate on the ceasefire line/Line of Control in Kashmir. Though the ceasefire agreement spoke of the ceasefire line going "North" to the glaciers from NJ 9842, Pakistani maps drew a straight line in a north-easterly direction up to the Karakoram Pass. So long as Islamabad sticks to that claim line, senior Indian officers say, there will always be the danger that Pakistani forces might eventually move up the Saltoro range to posts vacated by India. By insisting on "authentication" of the location of present posts held by both sides, the Army leadership wants to provide a grid-by-grid answer to Pakistan's "cartographic aggression." It also feels authentication will help India build an international case for support if ever Pakistan reneges on the terms of a withdrawal agreement. The way out If the Prime Minister is to realise his dream of demilitarising Siachen, he will have to come up with convincing answers to all these reservations. First, Dr. Singh has to make it clear that he is not looking at Siachen as a standalone problem. If Siachen were the only outstanding issue between India and Pakistan, the Army's arguments would have considerable traction. But the reality is that Siachen is only one component of a larger problem. Maintaining a military presence on the glacier is not a core interest in the way that the Prime Minister has said India's borders with Pakistan are. Short of redrawing those borders or partitioning any territory on a religious basis, he has said, the sky is the limit. Compromising on Siachen in order to allow its demilitarisation will, in fact, help India push along the peace process in the current beneficial direction. Secondly, on the question of authentication, the Prime Minister needs to stress that there is more than one way of securing a cartographic commitment from Pakistan. The purpose of authentication is to ensure that after a withdrawal has been effected, Pakistan will not move back to its old positions or up Gyong La, Bilafond La and Sia La — the three passes along the Saltoro range — to positions currently held by India. But the same purpose can be served by marking out a zone of disengagement within which, after a pre-determined date, any Pakistani or Indian military presence would be considered illegitimate. This would be regardless of where India and Pakistan had their posts (or claimed to have their posts) prior to the pre-determined date, and without prejudice to the claims either side has to the region as a whole. Such a plan could be launched in stages, around smaller zones, and verified by joint helicopter patrols. Eventually, the entire glacier would be covered. Indeed, in 1992, Indian and Pakistani negotiators virtually drew up such a zone, a mis-shaped rectangle with the Saltoro range in the middle, with India agreeing to remain well east of there and Pakistan well west. Such a formula would produce a grid-referenced map that would be as effective as a map authenticating the AGPL in mobilising international support in the event of any Pakistani transgression. Slightly less effective than a bilateral agreement would be the suggestion unilaterally to pull out after taking the military attaches of key countries based in New Delhi up to see for themselves the principal posts occupied by India. Thirdly, the issue of trust is absolutely fundamental to the continuation of the peace process. If Pakistan cannot be trusted to keep an agreement on the demilitarisation of Siachen, then authenticating the AGPL will serve no purpose other than lulling the Indian Army into a false sense of security. But trust is the only basis for any headway to be made. Trust not so much in any "change of heart" on Gen. Musharraf's part but in the rationality of Pakistan's decision-makers. If Islamabad reneges on any Siachen deal, it will end up pushing bilateral relations into a deep, deep freeze. Given the regional and international realities of our time, Pakistan is unlikely to believe its core interests will be served by such an outcome. In diplomacy as in war, countries must choose their battles wisely. Siachen is not a winnable proposition for either side but a withdrawal will provide benefits to both. Since he inherited the peace process from the previous government, Dr. Singh has led from the front. He owes it to the people of India and Pakistan to find a way down from Siachen. © Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

Economists may have some answers... but not all: Review of Global Crises, Global Solutions (ed.) Bjorn Lomborg

June 14, 2005 The Hindu Book Review GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS: Bjorn Lomborg — Editor; Cambridge University Press, The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, U.K. Rs. 995. Economists may have some answers... but not all Siddharth Varadarajan The papers provide a useful glimpse of what professional economists are thinking about these days on the 10 most serious challenges facing the world today This weighty tome— the brainchild of its editor, a professor of statistics at the University of Aarhus in Denmark— is based on the audacious and, in my opinion, slightly misplaced premise that economists have all the answers to the world's most serious problems. What Lomborg did was to invite 10 well-known economists and ask them to make concrete proposals to tackle a particular challenge in their area of expertise. He then asked a larger group of economists to critique these proposals. The final step was to invite a distinguished panel of eight senior economists, including Jagdish Bhagwati and Nobel laureates Robert W. Fogel, Douglas C. North and Vernon L. Smith, to evaluate the proposals made by the first group. Specifically, they were asked, "What would be the best ways of advancing global welfare, and particularly the welfare of developing countries, supposing that an additional $50 billion of resources were at governments' disposal?" Copenhagen Consensus The idea was to force the experts to prioritise a plan of action on the basis of some notion of what constitutes the global good. Since the economists met in the Danish capital (where they were paid an honorarium of $30,000 each for their exertions), the emerging document— consisting of a total of 38 proposals of which only 17 were finally ranked from "very good" to "bad"— has been called the "Copenhagen Consensus". However, as we shall see below, at least some of the emerging proposals have not proved to be consensual. The Copenhagen Consensus secretariat began the exercise by enumerating what they considered the 10 most serious challenges confronting the world today. Few would disagree with the list: climate change, communicable diseases, conflicts and arms proliferation, access to education, financial instability, governance and corruption, malnutrition and hunger, migration, sanitation and access to clean water, and subsidies and trade barriers. Each "challenge" is addressed in one chapter in the book. All the chapters are well-conceived, but "Malnutrition and hunger" by Jere R. Behrman, Harold Aldermann and John Hoddinott, and "Sanitation and access to clean water" by Frank Rijsberman, are outstanding. Ranking In the final overall ranking of cost-effective proposals deserving of a share of the notional budget of $50 billion, the panel placed the control of HIV/AIDS at the top with as much as $27 billion assigned to it. The other three proposals to be considered "very good" were providing micronutrients so that the prevalence of iron-deficiency anaemia could be reduced ($12 billion); pushing trade liberalisation; and new measures for the control and treatment of malaria ($13 billion). Five proposals were considered "good" from the perspective of their cost-benefit ratios. These were: development of new agricultural technologies to combat malnutrition and hunger; community-managed water supply and sanitation; small-scale water technology for livelihoods; research on water productivity in food production; and lowering the cost of starting a new business as a way of improving governance and reducing corruption. The four proposals rated "fair" were: lowering barriers for migration of skilled workers; improving infant and child nutrition; scaled-up basic health services; and reducing the prevalence of low birth weight. Finally, the panel labelled as "bad" four proposals made by the sectoral experts, mostly in the field of climate change: guest worker programmes for the unskilled; the optimal carbon tax; the Kyoto Protocol; and the value-at-risk carbon tax. Interestingly, not a single proposal under the challenges of financial instability, conflicts, and education, were considered by the panel to be worthy of ranking. On financial instability In his chapter on financial instability, Barry Eichengreen considered four proposals: re-imposing capital controls, re-regulating domestic financial markets, creating a single world currency and pursuing a solution to the currency mismatch problem wherein international financial institutions borrow and lend in emerging market currencies. The first two he dismisses as cost-ineffective, the third as desirable but politically unfeasible, and the fourth as the one most likely to succeed. The panel, however, felt the "uncertainties" and "complexities" in the field were too great to endorse any of these proposals. If Nobel laureates could not make up their minds, one wonders what lay bureaucrats and politicians are expected to do. While the Copenhagen Consensus sticks in the main to the "motherhood and apple pie" prescription that is the staple of modern development economics— most of the proposals ranked "very good to "fair" would easily make it to any check-list of spending priorities in India, for example— the project has proved somewhat controversial with environmentalists. In particular, they disagree with the characterisation of key climate change-related proposals as "bad" on grounds of cost-effectiveness. Indeed, cynics say the report bears the imprint of Bjorn Lomborg's earlier book, The Skeptical Environmentalist, which took a more optimistic view of global warming than what environmental scientists do. On migration too, the proposal to push for skilled migration alone is untenable on both positive and normative grounds. As Bhagwati notes in his comments, the argument that developed countries should take the skilled but not the unskilled from the poor nations, even on a temporary basis, "will not stand scrutiny among immigration experts unless they are of conservative persuasion." All told, the papers provide a useful glimpse of what professional economists are thinking about these days on key challenges. But is the book worth the million-odd dollars Lomborg and his sponsors must have spent on putting it together? Perhaps someone ought to do a cost-benefit analysis of the project and find out. © Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

Playing on fear, from Godhra to Guantanamo

June 13, 2005 The Hindu Opinion - Leader Page Articles Playing on fear, from Godhra to Guantanamo Siddharth Varadarajan As governments across the world realise that the fear of terrorism can be made to serve a political purpose, the distinction between `ordinary' crime and terrorism is being deliberately blurred. FIFTY-NINE train passengers — all Hindus — were burnt or asphyxiated to death on board the Sabarmati Express at Godhra on February 27, 2002 in a mysterious fire the cause of which is still unknown. Despite the absence of proper information or evidence, the Bharatiya Janata Party Government in Gujarat decided the fire was an act of jihadi terrorism and set in motion, facilitated and allowed a cycle of `retaliatory' violence that went on to claim the lives of some 2,000 Muslims across the State. The existence of a BJP-led government at the Centre allowed the Narendra Modi regime to get away with this. In the immediate aftermath of Godhra, the `terrorist' tag was used to create a siege mentality amongst the Hindus of Gujarat and India and help legitimise the genocidal violence unleashed. The police, however, correctly assumed the charge of `terrorism' to be largely driven by political imperatives and did not bother to refer to the Godhra incident as a terrorist act in the first chargesheet filed on May 22, 2002. Indeed, formal charges were laid in the case under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) only on September 20, 2002, nearly seven months after the original crime. The number of persons charged under the Act — since repealed under public pressure — was more than 100. Despite this, the police remained unsure about the applicability of POTA to the Godhra case. On March 5, 2003, the investigating officer filed an affidavit before the Gujarat High Court stating that "having realised that there is not sufficient evidence and material to attract the provisions of Pota, the same came to be dropped." However, this affidavit was subsequently withdrawn and POTA reapplied — on the basis of a confession one of the accused is alleged to have made in custody on February 5, 2003, i.e. a whole month earlier. So peculiar is this sequence of events that it is evident factors other than logic, forensics, and common sense were operating. The Narendra Modi Government in Gujarat had made a political determination that the Godhra incident had to be treated as a case of terrorism. The reasons were two-fold. First, to present the train fire as a pre-planned jihadi conspiracy, and second, to use the provisions of POTA to secure convictions on the basis of evidence that might not stand up to judicial scrutiny in a regular court of law. No case for POTA On May 15 this year, this whole shabby exercise was brought to an end by Justice (retd.) S.C. Jain in his capacity as chairman of the Central Review Committee (CRC) on POTA. After examining the prosecution's case, Mr. Justice Jain ruled that the Godhra incident did not occur as part of a conspiracy envisaged under the provisions of Pota. There was no evidence to suggest the mob was privy to the alleged conspiracy and even for the alleged ringleaders, he noted, "this theory of conspiracy does not seem probable on the case of the prosecution itself... The cause of the incident is a quarrel of one of the [passengers] with the tea vendor of Muslim community at the platform itself when the train halted." The retired judge accepted that the incident occurred at the date, time and place stated by the police but said the accused persons may be tried under the ordinary provisions of criminal law and not under the special provisions of POTA. The immediate effect of this ruling is that the Godhra detenus must now be freed of the POTA charges. In an April 13, 2005, ruling upholding the validity of the CRC, the Gujarat High Court stipulated that if the CRC so recommends, the public prosecutor must apply for withdrawal of prosecution under POTA "without any delay." Despite this clear-cut guideline, however, the Modi Government decided last week not to seek the withdrawal of POTA charges. Apart from holding out the promise of relief to the Godhra detenus, most of whom have been held without bail for more than two years, Mr. Justice Jain's ruling has a wider relevance for the manner in which the so-called `war on terror' is being prosecuted around the world. Stressing that a difference has to be made between a terrorist and an ordinary criminal, he said, "every `terrorist' may be a criminal but every criminal cannot be given the label of a `terrorist' only to set in motion the more stringent provisions" of anti-terrorism legislation. A similar argument in the international context was made last year by Professor Kalliopi K. Koufa, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Terrorism and Human Rights, in a path-breaking report to the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights. Prof. Koufa, a leading Greek expert on international law, has produced a scholarly analysis of the complex legal interplay between the war on terror and the protection of human rights. Though she has made a number of observations and recommendations that every country should sit up and take note of, the report has hardly received any media attention. Last month, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights voted to publish her report for wider dissemination. The United States was one of the few countries to oppose the move. Production of panic The reasons for this are not hard to find. Prof. Koufa notes that a number of States have national counter-terrorism laws, measures or practices "that unduly [and on occasion severely] violate human rights and humanitarian law norms as well as long-established principles of criminal law." Among these is nullum crimen sine lege, the principle that `there is no crime without a law.' In keeping with U.N. practice, Prof. Koufa takes no names but the reference to the indefinite detention without charge of suspected terrorists by the U.S. in Guantanamo is obvious. Apart from being used to curtail the rights of persons accused of ordinary crimes unrelated to terrorism, she points out that some of these measures "have also been shown to be ineffective in countering terrorism." Where Prof. Koufa breaks new ground is in her argument that "the fear of terrorism out of proportion to its actual risk ... can have undesirable consequences such as being exploited to make people willing to accept counter-terrorism measures that unduly curtail human rights and humanitarian law." Noting in particular that the fear of terrorism "is heightened by repeated and often exaggerated if not unlikely references to weapons of mass destruction potential in the hands of terrorist groups or certain States," she recommends that states' responses to terrorism should accurately reflect real risk and "refrain from generating undue fear of terrorism." The orchestration of fear though colour-coded alerts and other means is what allowed the Bush administration to pass the USA Patriot Act soon after 9/11. Today, the Senate Intelligence Committee is considering the Patriot Reauthorisation Act, which will further expand the power of the authorities to go through the private records of people who are not even terrorist suspects. Fear is what allows the alarming slippage that has taken place in the U.S. on the question of torture and indefinite detention without charge. Fear is what makes the U.S. courts, which once prided themselves on their independence, shy away from confronting this abuse of civilised norms by the executive. Fear is what allowed the Blair Government to overturn the Law Lords' landmark December 2004 ruling on the unconstitutionality of the British Prevention of Terrorism Act. In India, one example of the political use of fear was the manipulation of public sentiments following Godhra. The killing of alleged terrorists in "encounters" that almost always occur in the heart of the city — in a shopping mall like Ansal Plaza or outside Pragati Maidan, with the policemen involved never getting injured — is another way in which the production of fear takes place. Prof. Koufa's report also points out that a number of crimes not related directly or indirectly to terrorism have been included in national counter-terrorist laws. "Sometimes acts, merely symbolic ones or vandalism at the most, targeting economic entities, are being considered as terrorist acts. Addressing these merely criminal problems, while necessary, is not countering terrorism and the national or international public is not made any safer from terrorist risks." Finally, she calls on governments to ensure that there is no "undue investigative or prosecutorial advantage" in ordinary criminal cases "due to improper confusion with terrorist cases." In Godhra, this is precisely what the Narendra Modi Government is trying to do by pushing ahead with POTA charges when the evidence simply does not warrant it. When ordinary crime is talked up to the level of terrorism, the definitional dilution allows real terrorists to lose themselves in the overgrown thicket of those whom the state regards as suspects. The price, of course, is paid twice over by ordinary citizens, who must put up with restrictions on their rights that do not in fact enhance their security in any meaningful sense. © Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

Siachen: Manmohan's visit offers a chance

9 June 2005
The Hindu

Siachen

Manmohan's visit offers a chance

Siddharth Varadarajan

The key is for India to recognise that a speedy solution to Siachen is in its national interest and in the interest of the Army and is essential for the process of normalisation.

WHEN MANMOHAN Singh touches down in Siachen on Sunday, his aim will be not so much to lay claim to the icy wasteland which has taken the lives of hundreds of soldiers since 1984 as to help make up his mind about the best way for India and Pakistan to reach an agreement which can brings the troops back home.

Given the complex interplay of politics, bravado and symbolism that the high-altitude conflict has involved, say officials, this very public acknowledgement of the sacrifices which continue to sustain India's military presence on the glacier is precisely what the Army needs in order to come to terms with the futility of the Siachen conflict.

The former Defence Minister, George Fernandes, a frequent visitor to Siachen, reversed 11 years of official Indian policy soon after taking charge in 1998 by saying there was no need to pull back. There is a school of thought which says this U-turn helped the Pakistani military make up its mind to go ahead with its Kargil plan. Today, however, the Indian establishment is clear that it is in the country's interest for the troops to be withdrawn. "The principle of disengagement is conceded by everyone from the Ministry of External Affairs to the Ministry of Defence and the Army," a senior official told The Hindu . "The only issue is one of putting safeguards in place."

Human and emotional capital

More than any other arm of the Indian state, it is the Army that has expended the greatest human and emotional capital in the mountainous wastes of the Saltoro range beyond NJ 9842, the last demarcated point on the Line of Control in Kashmir. When the pullback from Siachen eventually takes place, the Army brass will want political assurances that it will not be asked to return at some later date.

It is not a coincidence that on the very day Indian and Pakistani officials were discussing Siachen in Rawalpindi, it was the Indian Army rather than the Ministry of External Affairs which sought to brief the public about India's position. "Before any disengagement and withdrawal of the troops can take place, there has to be a authentication of the Agreed Ground Position Line (AGPL) in some way or the other," General J.J. Singh told reporters.

The official dialogue faltered last month — as it has in the past — precisely on the issue of authentication, because Pakistan believes this would legitimate in some way the Indian military presence in a region where the LoC is undefined.

Announced within days of the latest round of talks between the defence secretaries of India and Pakistan on Siachen, Dr. Singh's visit will mark the first time an Indian Prime Minister sets foot on the glacier. Beyond the obvious symbolism, however, there is an important political point that is at stake, say officials familiar with the Prime Minister's thinking. In their April 18 statement Dr. Singh and President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan committed themselves to instructing their "existing institutional mechanisms [to] convene discussions immediately with a view to finding mutually acceptable solutions to [Sir Creek and Siachen] expeditiously." Though the recently concluded round of talks on Siachen saw both sides exchanging some new proposals such as the possibility of recording current positions using satellite imagery, the lack of forward movement was palpable. The Prime Minister, who has a promise to keep, knows this better than anyone else.

Under pressure at home for resiling from Pakistan's earlier stand that progress on normalisation would be predicated on progress towards a solution of the "core issue" of Kashmir, Gen. Musharraf is looking for some deliverables that he can present to his public as proof that he has not "sold out". Precisely because the Indian troop movement into Siachen was seen as an act of great treachery in Pakistan, an agreement on the withdrawal of troops would stand him in good stead and help protect the current momentum of the peace process from the large number of detractors on the Pakistani side.

Authentication

To India, the issue of authentication is important for both military and political reasons. In military terms, re-occupying positions currently held in the event of Pakistan moving in might not be possible given the differing ease of access on both sides. Politically too, the ghost of Kargil haunts Indian decision-makers. "Given the experience of Kargil, it is very important that both sides fix or verify where they are moving back from in Siachen," said a senior official. "In Kargil, we could mobilise international support on the basis of Pakistan's clear-cut violation of the LoC. There was no ambiguity, no gaps. We were able to show detailed maps with grid references that had been signed by the Directors-General of Military Operations on both sides." "In Siachen too," he added, "we need to avoid a similar situation." Ironically, Pakistan in November 1992 had offered to include the authentication of actual ground positions in an appendix to the main agreement but India chose not to be receptive at the time. That offer has never been repeated since then.

For the Prime Minister, the challenge is to come up with a formula for withdrawal that would address both the Indian Army's concerns and Pakistan's misgivings about undermining its legal position on the undemarcated area north of NJ9842.

On other issues — such as the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, the use of travel permits on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus and even the recent travel to Pakistan by the Hurriyat leadership — Dr. Singh has demonstrated an unerring ability to transcend the conservatism of his advisers. In Siachen, Pakistan does not want to mark current positions on the ground. And India fears the absence of a signed map might allow Pakistan to occupy positions beyond where its troops are currently deployed. One way around this would be to define clear zones of disengagement on a map where the presence of troops from either side would be considered a violation. There could be other solutions too, given modern technological systems of monitoring. By visiting Siachen, the Prime Minister will be in a better position to redefine the limits of what is politically feasible.

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

The Hurriyat visit to Pakistan as a CBM

2 June 2005
The Hindu


Using the Hurriyat visit to build confidence

Siddharth Varadarajan

WHEN SOME two dozen Hurriyat leaders cross the `Aman Setu' on foot and enter Pakistan-occupied Kashmir on Thursday for a tour of the region as well as Pakistan, the short walk they take will belie the great distance New Delhi has travelled in its approach to the Kashmir issue.

In 2000 and 2001, the Vajpayee Government's `Ramzan' ceasefire floundered and eventually produced no political outcome because the Prime Minister's Office and the Home Ministry at the time could not see eye to eye on allowing the Hurriyat leadership to visit Pakistan. The stumbling block was the Government's desire to dictate the composition of the proposed Hurriyat delegation. Subsequently, the Centre remained unhelpful on the question of foreign travel, denying most Hurriyat leaders except Mirwaiz Umar Farooq a passport. Despite the Centre beginning a dialogue process with the group, the passports question remained a lingering sore. Today, not only has the Government of India actively worked to ensure that the Hurriyat leaders are able to travel to PoK, it managed finally to overcome its initial hesitation in allowing the use of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus as a transit facility for the Hurriyat men to enjoy a more extensive visit to Pakistan-proper.

Since the letter of the agreement which launched the intra-Kashmir bus restricts passengers to travel only within the borders of the erstwhile princely State of Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi has now hit upon the artifice of passports for the separatists' onward journey from PoK.

Win-win solution

The solution is a win-win for everyone concerned. The Hurriyat men get passports, the Pakistan Government gets to freely host them anywhere in the country without causing too much heartburn in India, and the Manmohan Singh Government gets to fend off critics like the BJP who might otherwise have sought to exploit the Hurriyat leadership's "passportless" travel to Pakistan. It matters little if the passports are stamped by the Pakistani side or not, since it is the sovereign right of a government to take decisions on such matters as per its own inclinations. "The understanding between India and Pakistan as far as the bus service is concerned is quite clear", the external affairs ministry spokesman said on Wednesday. "If leaders are invited to visit Islamabad and they do so then the onus for that part of the journey lies on the Pakistan authorities". The only loser in all this, perhaps, is Syed Ali Shah Geelani. The Vajpayee Government's insistence in 2000 that he not be included in the proposed Hurriyat delegation to Pakistan had forced his rivals and detractors within the separatist conglomerate to rally around him. Today, with the Government having no objection to his visit, it is Mr. Geelani who has chosen not to board the bus to Muzaffarabad.

Whether it is working to plan or not, New Delhi's decision to allow the Hurriyat to visit Pakistan is a major and dramatic confidence-building measure. It is low in risk and high in symbolism, and will allow General Pervez Musharraf to tell Pakistani public opinion that India too is prepared to display new thinking on Kashmir. The April 18 joint India-Pakistan statement had evoked an unusually hostile reaction in Pakistan, in part because of the perception that Islamabad has conceded too much. When changing the country's external borders has been an article of faith for decades, the General's call for borders to be made irrelevant understandably caused consternation among many. He also came under fire for suggesting, while in New Delhi, that the separatist leaders were marginal to the bilateral dialogue process. By letting Gen Musharraf play host to the Hurriyat in Islamabad and other cities of Pakistan for a whole fortnight, however, New Delhi will help him to fend off domestic critics whose cries of "sell-out" help no one.