The truth behind the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal

29 July 2005
The Hindu

The truth behind the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal

In opening the door to nuclear commerce with India, Washington has confirmed how much an alliance with New Delhi is worth to it. But is anybody on the Indian side doing the math?

Siddharth Varadarajan

IN THE fullness of time, last week's nuclear agreement between India and the United States will be seen as one of those decisive moments in international politics when two powers who have been courting each other for some time decide finally to cross the point of no return. The U.S. and India have `come out', so to speak, and the world will never be the same again.

Every world order needs rules in order to sustain itself but sometimes the rules can become a hindrance to the hegemonic strength of the power that underpins that order. Following India's nuclear tests in 1998, the U.S. had two options: continuing to believe the Indian nuclear genie could be put back, or harnessing India's evident strategic weight for its own geopolitical aims before that power grows too immense or is harnessed by others like Europe or China. The U.S. has chosen the latter option, and the joint statement released by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on July 18 is the most dramatic textual manifestation of what Washington is attempting to do.

India too, had a choice. It could use its nuclear weapons status as a lever to push for a multipolar world system as well as for global restraints on the development of weapons of mass destruction. Or it could use its status as an instrument to help perpetuate an order based on the production of insecurity and violence in which it eventually hoped to be accommodated as a junior partner. The erstwhile Vajpayee Government was never interested in the former option and longed desperately for the latter. The fact that Dr. Singh has managed this is the real source of the BJP's bitterness, not the fact that India's nuclear weapons capability is to be capped (which it is not).

Those in India who marvel at how Mr. Bush could blithely walk away from 40 years of non-proliferation policy do not understand the tectonic shift that is taking place in the bilateral relationship as a result of increasing fears in U.S. business and strategic circles about China. Giving India anything less, or insisting that it cap or scrap its nuclear weapons, is seen by Washington's neo-conservatives as tantamount to strengthening China in the emerging balance of power in Asia. "By integrating India into the non-proliferation order at the cost of capping the size of its eventual nuclear deterrent," Ashley Tellis argued in a recent monograph, "[the U.S. would] threaten to place New Delhi at a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis Beijing, a situation that could not only undermine Indian security but also U.S. interests in Asia in the face of the prospective rise of Chinese power over the long term" (India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). This, then, is the real value of the deal in American eyes and the Indian public should be aware of it.

Predictably, critics in the U.S. have raised objections of one type or another. The non-proliferation lobby argues that President Bush's decision to sell nuclear technology and equipment to India will encourage other countries to go down the nuclear path. Not so say the advocates. Mr. Tellis — a former RAND Corporation analyst who served as an advisor to Robert Blackwill when he was U.S. Ambassador to India — is most forthright. He acknowledges the contradiction between the two goals of U.S. foreign policy — building India up as a counter to China and upholding the non-proliferation regime — but says the circle can be squared. His solution: don't jettison the regime "but, rather, selectively [apply] it in practice." In other words, different countries should be treated differently "based on their friendship and value to the U.S." With one stroke of the Presidential pen, India has become something more than a `major non-Nato ally' of the U.S. It has joined the Free World. It has gone from being a victim of nuclear discrimination to a beneficiary. India is not alone. Israel is already there to give it company.

From a strategic perspective, one of the most puzzling aspects of the joint statement was the inclusion of a reiteration by India of its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing without the U.S. making an explicit reciprocal commitment to abide by its own 1992 moratorium. At stake is not a formal question of protocol but the very real danger that the U.S. might go down the path of testing at some point in the future.

The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review was quite explicit on this point: "The United States has not conducted nuclear tests since 1992 and supports the continued observance of the testing moratorium. While the U.S. is making every effort to maintain the stockpile without additional nuclear testing, this may not be possible for the indefinite future." Stockpile safety is, of course, a ruse, given the fact that the U.S. is running active research programmes on a new generation of smaller and `smarter' nuclear weapons like `mini-nukes' and deep earth penetrators. Earlier this month, in fact, the U.S. Senate voted to keep alive the bunker-buster programme in the face of demands that it be scrapped.

The development of deadly new nuclear weapons by the U.S. should be a matter of great concern to India for their eventual deployment will degrade the security environment in the world and Asia. The same is true of the U.S. missile defence programme, which India, regrettably, will continue to remain engaged with. The Pentagon's goal in developing a missile shield is 'full-spectrum dominance,' including the weaponisation of space. Preventing this has been a major goal of most countries at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), with China insisting that a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) is as important as the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) , which would place no effective constraint on the U.S. or Russian arsenal because of their huge stockpiles of fissile material. In agreeing to "work with the U.S." on an FMCT, India has accorded primacy to this treaty over PAROS and other long-standing Indian goals at the CD such as negative security assurances and comprehensive disarmament where the U.S. is dragging its feet.

Hidden costs

Of all the misgivings present in the public mind, it is the fear of a quid pro quo on some other front that the Prime Minister most needs to dispel. Mr. Tellis, whose report on India-U.S. relations formed a valuable input to the Bush administration's thinking, argued, inter alia, that allowing India access to U.S. nuclear material and equipment would make New Delhi more likely to help further American strategic goals in the region. "[It] would buttress [India's] potential utility as a hedge against a rising China, encourage it to pursue economic and strategic policies aligned with U.S. interests, and shape its choices in regard to global energy stability... "

When it comes to "global energy stability" are India's interests in alignment with those of the U.S.? Clearly not. It is not a coincidence that the two "American concerns" a Wall Street Journal editorial demanded the Prime Minister address during his visit were India's relations with Myanmar and Iran. Both these countries have gas reserves that are vital for our energy security. Addressing the Africa-Asia summit in Jakarta in April this year, the Prime Minister had said : "While our continents include both major producers and consumers of energy, the framework within which we produce and consume energy is determined elsewhere. We must end this anomaly." And yet, in baldly stating that no international bank would want to underwrite the Iran gas pipeline, Dr. Singh would appear to have strengthened the very outside "framework" he once spoke against.

In addition to facing pressure on Iran, India is likely to be asked to let its Navy operate more frequently alongside the U.S. Navy in Asia. The purpose of these joint operations is essentially military and the U.S. wants India to also sign up for the Proliferation Security Initiative. Mr. Tellis's report had predicted that a nuclear deal would "increase [India's] enthusiasm for taking part in counter-proliferation activity in the Indian Ocean." The joint statement makes no direct mention of such cooperation though it speaks of a new "U.S.-India Disaster Relief Initiative that builds on the experience of the Tsunami core group." The real purpose of this initiative is revealed by the apparently inappropriate sub-heading under which it finds mention: `For Non-Proliferation and Security.'

All told, the deal signed in Washington raises a number of questions about the Manmohan Singh Government's policies in the field of nuclear energy, disarmament, `promotion of democracy,' energy security and strategic stability in Asia. No doubt the Government has answers. Spinning euphoric reports in the mass media is not the way of providing them. The Government owes it to the people to provide a detailed account of its nuclear policy in the form of a White Paper. Let the details of the Strobe Talbott-Jaswant Singh negotiations be made public. Let the Government place on record its estimate of how much the proposed separation of civilian and military nuclear facilities will cost and what the benefits of last week's agreement will be. And let it say openly that nuclear deal or not, India will continue to work for global disarmament and has no desire to play the role of a `hedge', fence or `tether' in the U.S. plan to contain China.

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

UN reform: G-4 remains focussed on the African Union

29 July 2005
The Hindu

G-4 remains focussed on the African Union

Siddharth Varadarajan

NEW DELHI: With the 60th anniversary summit of the United Nations fast approaching, the G-4 group of countries comprising India, Brazil, Japan and Germany are battening down the hatches for the final stages of their united push for the reform of the U.N. Security Council.

"The whole world now realises this game is for real," a senior official told The Hindu on Thursday. "The time for holding one's cards has gone." Countries that had remained silent till now have suddenly found their voice. In the process, the G-4 has discovered new friends and supporters like Nigeria. And it also has a very clear idea of who the "wreckers" are, apart from already vocal opponents like Italy, Pakistan, Argentina, Mexico and South Korea. Principal among them is the U.S.

Landmark agreement

Fresh from the landmark agreement with a number of African countries in London on July 26, Indian officials involved in the campaign are planning to ratchet up their efforts. A fresh round of demarches — requests to co-sponsor and vote for the G-4 draft resolution — is being readied. In addition, India is asking its friends and supporters to take a stand against the draft resolution tabled by the Uniting for Consensus group led by Italy and Pakistan, which envisages no increase in the permanent category of seats in the Security Council.

For the present, all eyes are on the African Union, which is to hold a summit level meeting in Addis Ababa on August 4 — its second in less than a month. Under the terms of the compromise struck between the G-4 Foreign Ministers and the African Ministers and officials present in London, the African Union will drop its demand for the immediate grant of veto power for the six new permanent members proposed to be inducted. The Africans had also wanted an extra non-permanent seat, taking the size of the enlarged Council to 26, but have agreed to share that seat on a rotational basis with Latin America and Asia.

The meeting in London went down to the wire because a number of African countries refused to accept Nigeria's acceptance of the compromise. Among the "wreckers" were Egypt, Algeria, Libya and Kenya. Djibouti and Seychelles, which were initially opposed, later agreed. . External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh made an impassioned plea to the Africans not to let this historic opportunity to win representation for their continent on the Security Council pass by. "The meeting went on for 12 hours, but at the end, we had a deal", an official said.

Since the AU works by consensus, the agreement now has to be ratified by all members at the summit level.

This consensus may well break down, say Indian officials. These officials think those African countries which want to see their continent get two permanent seats will endorse the G-4 text. The estimate is that at least 40 if not more African states will vote in favour, which will bring the G-4 closer to the magic figure of 128 needed to pass their resolution. "If all goes well," said an official, "we will go for a vote in the General Assembly at the end of August."

"At the end of the day," said Natwar Singh, "victory is still not certain. If the G-4 resolution is not accepted, it will be a big tragedy for the U.N. and the world. But the four of us will remain united." What the G-4 has done is no small thing, he added. "We have firmly placed the issue of Security Council reform on to the international agenda and that cannot now be undone by anybody."

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

Farewell to the gas pipeline?

22 July 2005
The Hindu

A farewell to the gas pipeline?

Siddharth Varadarajan

India needs Iranian gas till well into the 21st century. It would be folly to give up the energy bird in hand for two in the Bush.

BUSINESSMEN AND economists who have misgivings about the creditworthiness of one of their projects do not usually advertise that fact when they are in the market for a loan. Which is why it was surprising to see Prime Minister Manmohan Singh being so candid in an interview to the Washington Post on Wednesday on the bankability of the proposed gas pipeline from Iran.

Asked about India's discussions with Iran on the pipeline, the Prime Minister said India desperately needed new sources of energy. He then added: "But I am realistic enough to realise that there are many risks, because considering all the uncertainties of the situation there in Iran, I don't know if any international consortium of bankers would probably underwrite this."

Whether he deliberately meant to do so or not, Dr. Singh's last sentence is likely to knock the stuffing out of the ambitious project's financial prospects. What the Prime Minister has done is to give international bankers — who were not exactly queuing up anyway because of the fear of U.S. sanctions — a good reason not to touch the project, which is vital to India's energy security in the near to medium term.

In what is another first in the Indian discourse on the pipeline, the Prime Minister has linked the riskiness of the project to "the uncertainties of the situation there in Iran." This is, presumably, a reference to the election of Mohammed Ahmadinejad as President of Iran earlier this month. Or, more precisely, to the negative reaction in Washington to the Iranian electorate's choice of a man the U.S. says is a "hardliner."

Shift in India's stand?

Taken together with Monday's deal on nuclear energy with the United States, the Prime Minister's new-found scepticism on the Iran pipeline will heighten the suspicion that the Bush administration is extracting a very heavy price from India in exchange for recognising it as a state with "advanced nuclear technology." Though Dr. Singh told reporters prior to his departure from Washington on Thursday that a decision on the pipeline belonged to India, Iran and Pakistan alone and that "outside parties" had no role to play, his remarks to the Washington Post certainly suggest a major shift in the Indian position is already under way.

Now that the grand energy `bargain' has been struck in Washington, one can safely predict that the tone and tenor of discussions about the pipeline within the "strategic community" in India will shift from qualified support to outright hostility. All the old arguments — about becoming dependent on Pakistan, paying transit fees to the Musharraf regime, wanting reverse transit rights, safety and security — will be recycled in order to justify walking away from a project which Dr. Singh himself so boldly put onto the energy and diplomatic agenda of the country earlier this year.

In proposing an "energy dialogue" with India when she was in New Delhi in March, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was the first to explicitly link U.S. flexibility on the nuclear question to the Iran pipeline. Her advice that India abandon the Iranian project drew a spirited public rebuttal from External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh but a lot has changed since then. For one, the unexpected election of Mr. Ahmadinejad has forced the Bush administration to rework its sums, as have the recent attempts by China to speak of a new security framework for Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation's call for the U.S. to declare when its troops will leave Central Asia. For another, the Manmohan Singh government itself showed a new willingness to engage with America's strategic agenda in Asia.

On Monday, Washington delivered on its promise of an agreement on the nuclear front. If the new U.S.-India defence framework took New Delhi up to the door, the key to its unlocking lay in the safeguards and test ban concessions India made. What is left now is the implementation. And India has been told in no uncertain terms that if Congress is to legislate the changes President Bush has committed — he could have used a Presidential waiver but chose not to — the pipeline deal with Iran must not go through.

Those who argue that this condition is an acceptable price to pay do not realise the crucial role hydrocarbons — and in particular natural gas — will have to play as a source of energy for India's growing economy.

Nuclear energy today provides barely four per cent of India's energy needs. If the Bush administration is able to implement its commitments, the Indian nuclear energy sector could potentially get a boost in the short-term, though many former and serving scientists in the Department of Atomic Energy have grave reservations about the compromises the Indian side will have to make. Even with the most optimistic predictions, however, nuclear power will generate, at best, some 20 per cent of our energy needs by 2030. Where is the remaining 80 per cent going to come from?

Piped gas from Iran is a low-cost source but even this would need to be supplemented by gas imports from Myanmar, Qatar, and Central Asia. Importing gas in liquefied form is an option but the costs are much higher. Security of transit through Pakistan remains an issue but there are a number of financial and political solutions available, including the involvement of China as the end-point of the pipeline.

The Iranian project is not only vital for India's medium-term energy security, it is also the key which will help us unlock the potential of a pan-Asian energy grid involving Central Asia and China as well. U.S. opposition to the pipeline is not just because of its antipathy to the Islamic regime that is in power there. It is because Washington knows the involvement of Iran in this kind of project will undo the efforts it has made all these years to dominate the transit routes of Asian energy. Losing interest in the project — or discouraging potential investors from getting involved — is the last thing India should be doing.

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

India's nuclear bargain with U.S. may prove costly in long run

20 July 2005
The Hindu

Opinion - News Analysis Nuclear bargain may prove costly in long run Siddharth Varadarajan IAEA inspections at civilian plants will hamper nuclear programme, say experts. — Photo: PTI BONHOMIE, AT WHAT COST?: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush after the ceremonial reception at the White House in Washington on Monday. THE JOINT statement released in Washington after Monday's meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush is `historic' in many different ways but none more so than on the nuclear front. Both India and the United States have abandoned positions that were, until yesterday, virtual articles of faith for their respective establishments. The U.S. says it is now in favour of "full civil nuclear energy cooperation" with India, which it describes as "a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology". In return, India has agreed to "separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner" and place its "civilian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards." While both sides have shown considerable flexibility, it is India that has leapt a greater distance in conceding a key demand of the Bush administration that the IAEA be allowed to monitor the `non-military' side of the Indian nuclear energy programme. Apprehending such a decision, former and serving scientists at the Department of Atomic Energy had told The Hindu on Sunday that allowing international inspectors access to all civilian nuclear plants would seriously hamper ongoing research work on the fast breeder reactor (FBR) programme and compromise India's long-term energy security. On Tuesday, when news came from Washington confirming that this was precisely the bargain struck, the scientists reacted with anger and disbelief. `Against national interest' "I shudder to think how we could have conceded such a thing," A.N. Prasad, former director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), told this writer. "It is totally against the national interest." India, he said, would now face the prospect of its FBR programme being undermined and the cost of its nuclear weapons programme dramatically escalating. According to Dr. Prasad, segregation of civilian and military facilities in the nuclear field in India is "impossible." "Our military activities are not aimed at stockpiling nuclear weapons," he said. "Rather, the aim is deterrence, which in turn is based on a given level of threat perception." Since the United States and the other big nuclear weapons state have doctrines based on stockpiling, they can perhaps afford to maintain dedicated military facilities for the production and maintenance of nuclear munitions. "But even they are finding that stockpiling imposes further costs. The weapons become old, their materials degrade, they have to be dismantled and replaced." For India, he said, going down the route of stockpiling — which is what the logic of the Indo-U.S. joint statement implies — would be "highly counterproductive" and costly. Separating the civilian from the nuclear, as the Prime Minister has committed the country to doing, means having "declared, dedicated facilities for the military side which will necessarily have to be kept under-utilised" since the stated logic of the Indian nuclear weapons programme is "minimum deterrence." Today, the Indian deterrent is maintained by "incremental efforts" from existing "civilian" nuclear facilities around the country and not just the two research reactors at BARC, Dhruva and CIRUS. "We produce what we need for the military programme at any given time and leave the rest for civilian use," says Dr. Prasad. "Having dedicated facilities will terribly raise the cost of the weapons programme." According to P.R. Chari of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, the BARC reactors that produce weapon-grade plutonium also facilitate a significant amount of civilian research and activity, such as the production of radio isotopes. Firewalling military and civilian nuclear activities would mean denying scientists from university departments across the country access to BARC's research facilities. Danger in safeguards As far as India's "voluntary" commitment to place civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards is concerned, the agreement Dr. Singh reached with Mr. Bush is a compromise between the dreaded "full-scope safeguards" (which would include military facilities) and the "facility-specific safeguards" that the Department of Atomic Energy was prepared to concede. However, full-scope safeguards was always a bogey rather than a real problem — as the U.S. has been reconciled to India's nuclear weapons status ever since the Strobe Talbott-Jaswant Singh talks began during the Clinton administration. In the "four benchmarks" Mr. Talbott insisted on at the time, neither full-scope nor partial IAEA safeguards figured anywhere, though "strategic restraint," a nuclear test ban, export control, and work on a fissile material cut-off agreement did. Ever since Mitchell Reiss, head of the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Division in the first Bush administration, started advocating IAEA safeguards for Indian civilian nuclear facilities, the DAE had been bracing itself for the day when this would be pushed through. At stake, says Dr. Prasad, is the fast breeder programme and its eventual third stage when India's huge reserves of thorium will allow it to enjoy energy security "for the next 300 years." "Allowing IAEA inspectors and signing the Additional Protocol means throwing open not just your reactors but the entire chain, the whole fuel cycle. This is the crux of the whole issue." Only those who have worked on advanced nuclear research know the harmful effect intrusive inspections can have, he added. The FBR, he says, "is sacred for us in the long-run. Once we get into thorium, no one can touch us. If we do it and succeed, we will be on top of the world. But to reach there, we need full freedom to do our research. Nobody should be breathing down our necks." While the joint statement goes out of its way to suggest India will accept only those safeguards obligations "as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States," the impact of IAEA inspections on Indian plants is likely to be far greater than anything the U.S. has experienced. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 2004 on the Additional Protocol the U.S. has signed with the IAEA, Susan L. Burk, acting Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation, said that U.S. compliance with international safeguards served a "basically political purpose" of "underscoring U.S. support" for the IAEA-run inspections process worldwide. "[S]afeguards in the U.S.," she noted, "are not directed at uncovering illicit or non-compliant nuclear activities." In the two decades since the U.S. voluntarily accepted IAEA safeguards, she said, only 17 of its 250 declared civilian nuclear facilities had ever been inspected. In 1993, the IAEA discontinued its inspections because of budgetary constraints and agreed to restart them only after the U.S. said it would reimburse the agency's expenses. Today, the IAEA applies safeguards at only four U.S. facilities. Even if India negotiates a similar Additional Protocol with the IAEA and builds in the same `national security exclusion,' it is unlikely to get away that lightly. The safeguards the U.S. is subject to are "very nominal," says Dr. Prasad but India will find the agency being "much more meticulous" in its case. Ever since the NPT regime began, the U.S. has been keen to get a fix on the Indian programme. To begin with, the IAEA is bound to go on a voyage of discovery. Later, it might move on to more constricting inspections. "Tomorrow, if we need to pursue reprocessing or separation technology further, there are bound to be objections. The U.S. is likely to say, `Don't do it, we will give you the fuel'. But then you are back to being dependent." For India, there is the added danger of front-loading its own obligations under the joint statement. President Bush has committed himself to working with the U.S. Congress and America's allies to make an "exception" in the existing domestic and international regulatory framework for India but this is not likely to be a straightforward matter. Calling India a "state with advanced nuclear technology" has helped the U.S. bridge a semantic gap but it is not clear whether it will help the wider world of NPT signatories and Nuclear Suppliers Group members bridge what they perceive to be a legal gap. There is one final issue that needs to be highlighted. What was the need for India to reiterate its commitment — in a bilateral statement — to a moratorium on nuclear tests? At the very least, India should have insisted that the U.S. too reiterate its own moratorium and not pursue research on new nuclear munitions like "bunker busters" and space-based weapons. Not to speak of its disarmament obligations as a state with "advanced nuclear technology." Presumably, silence on these issues is also part of the grand nuclear bargain. © Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

Nuclear cooperation with U.S.: Experts urge caution

18 July 2005
The Hindu

Nuclear cooperation with U.S.: Experts urge caution

Siddharth Varadarajan

WHEN PRIME Minister Manmohan Singh meets U.S. President George Bush in Washington on July 18, his attempt to push cooperation in the civilian nuclear field will face one big hurdle: Washington's desire to tighten the already restrictive global regime governing the transfer of nuclear-related material for civilian purposes.

No matter how important a position India has come to occupy in U.S. strategic thinking, Washington will be careful not to do anything that will weaken the non-proliferation initiatives announced by President Bush in February 2003. If anything, the ongoing crisis over North Korea and Iran has increased the salience of these initiatives and reduced the Bush administration's appetite for making exceptions.

U.S. embargo

The American embargo on the supply of civilian nuclear equipment to India is linked to both its domestic laws and its membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Part I of whose guidelines prohibit the transfer of nuclear equipment to a country that does not accept comprehensive safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at all its nuclear facilities.

Though domestic law can be waived and adherence to the NSG guidelines is voluntary, the question of whether or not the Bush administration will reverse itself on the supply of civilian nuclear equipment will depend on its assessment of how this would impact on its wider counter-proliferation initiatives. Making an exception for India — without India granting something in return — would likely make its task of tightening the NPT-plus regime harder.

IAEA safeguards

Among American analysts, Selig Harrison and Ashley Tellis have suggested that the best way for the U.S. to integrate India into the global non-proliferation order as a de facto nuclear weapons state and allow it access to nuclear equipment and fuel is to insist that all existing and future power reactors be safeguarded by the IAEA.

The Indian atomic establishment is, however, wary of safeguards except at any new facility that is created with outside equipment or help.

Pointing to the importance of the indigenous fast-breeder reactor (FBR) programme, A.N. Prasad, former director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC), told The Hindu the suggestion of allowing safeguards "goes against the national interest." "Since FBRs will be the mainstay of India's nuclear power programme for some time, and since there is a lot to be established for the first time and improved upon to achieve a level of maturity required to make it a success, bringing in safeguards at this stage just because they are civil nuclear facilities will seriously hamper our efforts and cut into our freedom to pursue the development of this programme."

He said that "only those who have hands on experience in operating such facilities and also dealing with intrusive safeguards can fully appreciate this aspect" and warned that the issue "should not be taken lightly."

Dr. Prasad also said that the suggestion made in some quarters about separating civilian and military facilities for safeguards purposes is not feasible. Given the "small scale of the military activities involved," dedicating reactors for a single purpose "is not only impractical but also not cost effective."

In the context of the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, Dr. Prasad said any change in U.S. policy on the nuclear supplies front should be "carefully assessed to see if there are any unacceptable conditions." At no point should India "compromise the basic inherent strength so relentlessly built over the years under heavy odds."

Dr. Prasad's concerns were echoed by other serving and retired Department of Atomic Energy officials who said India needed U.S. support for its nuclear energy sector only to supplement planned capacity and facilitate the supply of fuel, particularly natural uranium. The DAE establishment insists the FBR must be the mainstay of the Indian nuclear power programme and that any light water reactors that Russia, France or the U.S. might supply will be an "additionality."

Scepticism

There is scepticism about the outcome of the Prime Minister's visit on the nuclear front. Joining issue with Ashley Tellis' recommendations that the easiest thing for the Bush administration to do is to invite India to join ongoing research programmes for next generation prototype reactors, a senior DAE official said that India needed fuel and equipment today.

Experimental projects like fusion energy (ITER) or the Radkowsky Thorium Fuel programme may yield dividends three or four decades from now. "In any case, when Radkowsky came here, it was clear that we are quite ahead on that front," the official said. "As for ITER, the Europeans have already invited us to join and they are very keen. An American endorsement is not a big deal."

A. Gopalakrishnan, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, is not convinced India should be looking at the U.S. for light water reactors even as an "additionality." "We are deep into our three-stage programme and you cannot just turn it off," he said. "The nuclear power sector is not like `aviyal' where you can mix all kinds of reactors. Inter-transferability of engineers is an issue. Besides, to run the LWRs safely, we will need to have our hands held for a long time. Can we rely on the Americans to do that?"

The critical issue for India right now, he says, is the shortage of natural uranium for its pressurised heavy water reactors. If the U.S. wants to help, it should facilitate the purchase of uranium, he says. India should also think of approaching Niger and Namibia, two countries with enormous reserves of uranium, which are not members of the NSG.

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

America, India and the outsourcing of imperial overreach

13 July 2005
The Hindu

America, India and the outsourcing of imperial overreach

In offering to make India a 'major world power', Washington wants a 'low cost ally' whose support in 'low-end tasks' will help free its own military for the 'high-end' military operations central to maintaining its power in Asia.

Siddharth Varadarajan

If there is one document everyone should read to understand the direction relations between the United States and India have begun to take in the past few years, it is The Indo-U.S. Military Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions , a report commissioned by the Pentagon in October 2002.

Written by Juli A. MacDonald of the Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC) , a Department of Defense-affiliated outfit, the 131-page report was based on in-depth, off-the-record interviews with 40 senior serving U.S. officials -- including military officers -- and around the same number of serving and retired Indian officials and officers. The aim: to "reveal the opportunities for and impediments to military-to-military cooperation" between the two countries.

Although the unclassified report was circulated in the upper echelons of government in both countries two years ago, its existence was never publicised by either side -- presumably because of the frank manner in which U.S. officials spoke of the value of India in America's emerging Asian strategy. Reading the report two years later, it is clear the Pentagon did not commission the study as an academic exercise. In 2002, U.S. officials believed the opportunities were infinite and the impediments relatively easy to overcome. Today, some of these "opportunities" are being realized, as the latest U.S.-India Defence Framework agreement suggests.

Anticipating the much-hyped naval cooperation between the U.S. and India in the aftermath of the Tsunami, the IATAC report argues that the "U.S. military seeks a competent military partner that can take on more responsibility for low-end operations in Asia, such as peace-keeping operations, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and high-value cargo escort, which will allow the U.S. military to concentrate its resource on high-end fighting missions" (emphasis added). The Pentagon's Global Posture Review 2004 suggests the era of permanent large-scale overseas deployment is over. Military action of the future requires small bases, or "lily pads", and a network of close allies with compatible "capabilities". This is where U.S. planners see India fitting in.

The 'tethering' of China

What the Pentagon's planners want is a military alliance of the kind the U.S. has with South Korea and Japan. The U.S. is looking ahead at the next 50 years. Japan is a declining power and Korea an unpredictable one. Alone in Asia, India offers the prospect of a power whose rise can be harnessed in order to help the U.S. deal with the strategic challenge of China. It helps that a section of the Indian economic and political elite believes China is a threat.

So confident is Washington of the inevitability of this new alliance -- and of its utility on the China front -- that it has begun speaking of India in the same breath as Japan and Korea. After her speech at Tokyo's Sophia University on March 19, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was asked about the challenge posed by China to the U.S.

"[As] we look to China's life", she replied, "I really do believe the U.S.-Japan relationship, the U.S.-South Korean relationship, the U.S.-Indian relationship, all are important in creating an environment in which China is more likely to play a positive role than a negative role. These alliances are not against China; they are alliances that are devoted to a stable security and political and economic and, indeed, values-based relationships that put China in the context of those relationships, and a different path to development than if China were simply untethered, simply operating without that strategic context." (emphasis added)

The use of the word 'untethered' is not fortuitous. George F. Kennan had just died and his intellectual legacy was weighing heavily on Dr Rice's mind. 'To tether' means "to tie a rope or chain to an animal so as to restrict him to a particular spot", precisely the aim Kennan hoped to achieve by 'containment' of the Soviet Union.

In her report, Ms MacDonald noted that while the Indians she interviewed were pre-occupied with "more immediate" challenges posed by China, "the American interviewees are focused on the longer term implications of the Chinese gaining a strategic position to threaten the U.S. position in Asia". She stresses the reluctance of Indian and U.S. officials to recommend or argue openly that the Indo-U.S. military relationship be directed primarily against China. "A U.S. admiral reasoned that … [t]he U.S. and India both view China as a strategic threat … though we do not discuss this publicly". She quoted one American colonel as warning against portraying India as a counter to China in U.S. strategy: "… Such a rationale for the relationship will make the task of selling the Indo-U.S. relationship to the Indian public exceedingly difficult." At the same time, China is the key. "This statement is typical", the IATAC report says:

"As the U.S. military engages India, as much as we say we do, we cannot separate our thinking on India from our thinking on China. We want a friend in 2020 that will be capable of assisting the U.S. military to deal with a Chinese threat. We cannot deny that India will create a countervailing force to China."

India as hedge

The American officials quoted in the IATAC report also said the U.S. needs to prepare for the day its traditional relationships in Asia weaken. A State Department official notes: "India's strategic importance increases in the event that U.S. relationships with other traditional allies (e.g. Japan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia) become more acrimonious or politically uncomfortable for both parties; or if access rights that the U.S. takes for granted become more restrictive… The U.S. needs to develop alternatives in Asia. India is the optimal choice if we can overcome the obstacles in building the relationship."

Lack of access to U.S. weapons technology is seen as the biggest obstacle from the Indian side. "An American major general summarized the contrasting aims: 'The Indians will laud the relationship as a success if they obtain the technology they want from the U.S. We will view the relationship as a success if we are able to build a constructive military cooperation program that enables us to jointly operate with the Indians in the future'."

But these aims turn out not to be so contrasting after all. The sale of U.S. technology will improve the "inter-operability" of Indian and U.S. soldiers and allow for the kind of joint 'multinational operations' the new U.S.-India defence agreement speaks of. "U.S. military officers who want India to be a capable partner convey a uniform message: The US must allow the sale of US technology and equipment to India", the IATAC report states. According to a U.S. general, "The only way to achieve any level of inter-operability requires the U.S. Government to sell India U.S. equipment. Not only will [this] help the two militaries communicate and operate together, they will also enable the U.S. military to more equally assess India's military capabilities".

The aim, of course, is not just to assess but to access Indian military capabilities. "Access to India would enable the U.S. military 'to be able to touch the rest of the world' and to respond rapidly to regional crises", one U.S. Lt General told Ms MacDonald. And another senior officer argued that the U.S. Air Force "would benefit from having access closer to areas of instability (e.g. Central Asia, Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf). India's well developed infrastructure could be useful for U.S. power projection into these areas".

Indians who feel flattered by the growing number of port calls by U.S. warships and joint exercises at sea and in air should realize there is a purpose behind everything. "American military officers are "candid in their plans to eventually seek access to Indian bases and military infrastructure", the IATAC report states. "The U.S. Navy wants a relatively neutral territory on the opposite side of the world that can provide ports and support for operations in the Middle East", a U.S. officer is quoted as saying. "Over time, port visits must become a natural event… In the same vein, the U.S. Air Force would like the Indians to be able to grant them access to bases and landing rights during operations, such as counter-terrorism and heavy airlift support." "Our ultimate goal", another U.S. officer said, "is to be able to work together with the Indians to respond to regional crises, particularly in Africa. We (India and the U.S.) should be seen as partners in restoring order and promoting democracy in the region".

If U.S. officials are candid about their expectations from India, they are also aware of the need to tie India down early. A U.S. colonel told Ms MacDonald: "The costs of building a relationship with India today are significantly lower than the costs of facing India as a spoiler in the future. Moreover, the costs of building a relationship with India will likely increase over time". "Many Americans", she notes, "advocated that 'the low cost of building a relationship today will pay large dividends in the future' by preventing India from acting in ways that could be counter to U.S. interests."

In the process of helping the U.S. "tether" China, India is likely to find that it has tethered itself as well. This is the essence of the 'offer' a senior U.S. State Department official made in March this year to "help India become a major world power". Such an offer is not only demeaning, it is aimed at ensuring India never plays a constructive role with China and others in developing a new, cooperative Asian security framework -- a framework in which there is no room for outside powers to maintain a military presence in the continent under the guise of providing 'balance'.

If he has not already done so, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh would be well advised to go through the IATAC report before setting off for Washington on July 16. Last week, he told reporters India would never be a supplicant or client state. He is right. India is far too big -- and its people far too proud -- to allow this to happen. But as his government rushes into a 'partnership' with the U.S. on all fronts -- especially military -- there must be no illusions about just what it is Washington wants.

EU, Rusia y China: lucha por el control de Asia central

6 July 2005
La Jornada (Mexico)

Miércoles 6 de julio de 2005

BAJO LA LUPA

Alfredo Jalife-Rahme

EU, Rusia y China: lucha por el control de Asia central

SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN (SV) advierte en un sólido análisis que el pacto de defensa con EU "hace entrar a India en un territorio riesgoso e inexplorado" (The Hindu; 1/7/05), y asienta que el "nuevo acuerdo militar con EU ayudará a Washington a avanzar sus objetivos estratégicos en Asia y a expandir el mercado global para los contratistas del Pentágono, pero no deja claro qué beneficio dejará a India y Asia". SV destaca los niveles "inimaginables" y "sin precedente" de cooperación entre EU e India: "el acuerdo refleja el deseo de llevar las marcas comerciales existentes a una cooperación estratégica entre los dos países a un plano cualitativamente diferente, en el que algunas de las tareas militares de la unipolaridad -operaciones multinacionales, respuestas a desastres, medidas de pacificación, expansión de la democracia (sic) en el mundo- puedan ser deslocalizadas en India". Baby Bush se ha arrojado literalmente a los pies de India; ¿llegará a la suprema perfidia de balcanizar Pakistán y vender Cachemira para complacer a India? Ni dudarlo.

SV REFIERE QUE "INDIA está siendo cultivada como palanca de EU para realizar un objetivo fundamental: permanecer arraigado en Asia cuando el continente emerge como el nuevo centro de gravedad mundial y China como el rival sin paralelo de EU", y enumera que el ejército estadunidense, con su "interminable guerra" en Irak, "representa la principal fuente de inestabilidad tanto en la parte occidental de Asia" como en su parte oriental, y "las amenazas de Washington contra Norcorea socavan la perspectiva de un arreglo negociado".

RESPECTO A LA SEGURIDAD energética, "Bush intenta aislar a Irán y desestabilizar Asia Central en nombre de la democracia, lo cual demuestra claramente el hecho de que los intereses asiáticos chocan con los de EU". Cita a un alto funcionario de Washington, quien, durante una reunión de estrategas a puerta cerrada en Nueva Delhi, aseveró que "el peor resultado es que seamos excluidos de Asia" y agregó que en los "pasados cien años el principal desafío de EU ha sido permanecer comprometido en todas partes y no permitir que cualquier potencia industrial domine una región dada".

NADA NUEVO APORTA el anónimo estratega: es la misma postura de los neoconservadores straussianos y su doctrina Wolfowitz, que desde más de una década hace agua, desde el punto de vista militar en Irak y Afganistán, y desde el geopolítico en Latinoamérica, donde EU enfrenta la rebelión contra la imposición de su modelo neoliberal feudal. El anónimo estratega alega que "China tiene como objetivo expulsar a EU de Asia, donde Washington tiene varias alianzas, pero carece en forma preocupante de una arquitectura", lo cual SV considera que le puede conferir el "acuerdo del 28 junio" entre EU e India "como elemento vital de la planificada arquitectura".

EN INDIA Y EU PADECEN obsesión por la deslocalización (outsourcing), que les ha rendido frutos en el software compartido de la globalización y que ahora pretenden hacer extensiva a la "vigilancia global" que contempla el "despliegue de fuerzas indias en operaciones multinacionales en el mundo, no muy bien definidas, sin tomar en cuenta su autorización por la ONU" cada vez que se encuentren en juego "sus intereses comunes". Entonces, ¿para qué desea India su legítimo asiento como miembro permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad si pretende, en conjunción con EU, ignorar las resoluciones de la ONU? ¿Cuáles son los "intereses comunes" de India y EU ¿con quién o contra quién?

EU NUNCA SE HA subordinado a nadie en sus operaciones multinacionales y en ese renglón el ejército indio pisa un "campo minado", asienta SV. ¿Aceptará el ejército indio el mando denigrante de los generales de EU? ¿Admitirá el Partido del Congreso del primer ministro Manmohan Singh, cuya coalición depende para gobernar del poderoso Partido Comunista (con 60 escaños de la mayoría de 272), aquello que le negó a la anterior coalición de la Alianza Democrática Nacional con el Partido Barathya Janata, epígono del fundamentalismo hindú?

SV PREGUNTA SI la poderosa "armada india se unirá a la de EU para detener a las embarcaciones sospechosas de transportar armas de destrucción masiva", en particular cuando EU desee aplicar en forma unilateral la muy controvertida Iniciativa de Seguridad sobre la Proliferación (PSI, por sus siglas en inglés) -prohibición unilateral de EU de zarpar en alta mar a un tercer país sospechoso de transportar armas de destrucción masiva-, que todavía no firma India y que rechazan China y los países islámicos Irán, Indonesia y Malasia. Este punto es muy fino porque el mendaz unilateralismo bushiano puede arrastrar al gobierno de Singh a cometer actos de bandidaje en alta mar que pueden resultar contraproducentes para la hasta ahora excelente imagen internacional de India y, sobre todo, perjudicar sus exportaciones mundiales. En similitud: ¿no habrán sido diseñadas las "misiones de paz (sic)" del desorbitado Fox para rellenar el faltante del reclutamiento en crisis del ejército de EU?

AL CONTRARIO DE LOS mordaces críticos, quienes consideran que "EU no habla en serio de vender armas de alta tecnología a India, por lo que no puede ser confiable como abastecedor a largo plazo", SV descuella la puesta en acción de un grupo bilateral de "producción y adquisiciones para vigilar el comercio de defensa para la coproducción y la colaboración tecnológica": EU incrustó la "lucrativa venta de armas" para "edulcorar el paquete total de asociación estratégica ofrecido a India".

SIN PUDOR, EU INTENTA armar tanto a India como a Pakistán mediante la venta de aviones F16, por lo que se frotan las manos de regocijo los coyotes de la trasnacional genocida Lockheed Martin, fabricante de los 126 aviones destinados a India. La venta a los dos países enemigos en la óptica bushiana "fortalece la presencia estadunidense en las fronteras de China y abre los mercados (sic) a los contratistas militares en toda Asia" (NYT; 16/4/05). ¿Cuál será la reacción de Pakistán y China cuando EU "asesore" a India en los sistemas misilísticos de defensa? Quizá SV sea demasiado quisquilloso (cual debe ser en tales circunstancias de destino) para las mentes intoxicadas por la deslocalización (outsourcing) ahora militarizada, pero antes el primer Singh (de la secta de los célebres sikhs) deberá franquear el mayúsculo obstáculo del Partido Comunista, muy ligado a Rusia, que puede descarrilar su mayoría gobernante; además no se puede soslayar que la mayoría del Partido del Congreso (de la dinastía Nehru-Gandhi) representa al nacionalismo indio y nada es más ajeno a su agenda consolidada que el "choque de las civilizaciones" del racista Samuel Huntington.

LA PERFIDIA BALCANIZADORA de la dupla anglosajona Bush-Blair busca repetir el "gran juego" (acuñado por el escritor británico Rudyard Kipling) del siglo XIX, escenificado entre Rusia y Gran Bretaña por el control de los "mares calientes", por lo que, a nuestro juicio, pretende empujar a India a cerrar el acceso del océano Indico a Moscú y a Pekín, que luchan para calmar las turbulencias creadas por el eje EU-Gran Bretaña desde el Transcáucaso hasta el mar del sur de China a lo largo y ancho de Asia central: la antigua "ruta de la seda", hoy en llamas deliberadas. India es la reina del océano Indico y sus rutas marítimas vitales conectan el mar Arábigo al superestratégico estrecho de Malaca, vinculado al Mar del Sur de China, donde pasa el petróleo proveniente de Medio Oriente.

NO FUE CASUAL que después de la cumbre histórica de Moscú y la declaración del "nuevo orden mundial del siglo XXI" (Ver Bajo la Lupa; 3/7/05), el presidente chino Hu Jintao haya visitado Kazajstán, relevante potencia petrolera y gasera centroasiática, donde firmó un acuerdo estratégico bilateral (China Daily; 4/7/05), pero, más que nada, donde se celebra la cumbre de la Organización de Cooperación de Shanghai (cuyos miembros son Rusia, China y las incandescentes repúblicas islámicas centroasiáticas de Kazajstán, Tadjikistán, Uzbekistán y Kirguizia), a la que concurre India en forma espectacular como "invitada especial". India puede ser uncida con el estatuto de observador permanente para "combatir el terrorismo internacional" y participar en una "cooperación económica estrecha" (sic) -lo cual huele a petróleo y a gas, como a nuevos trazados de oleoductos-, a lo que parece estar muy dispuesta, según declaró su ministro del exterior, Natwar Singh (Daily India; 4/7/05). El presidente de Kazajstán ha lanzado la audaz iniciativa de crear una unión de los estados centroasiáticos que expulsaría a la dupla anglosajona de la región y la inmunizaría por un buen rato contra los intentos balcanizadores.

INDIA, VERDADERA POTENCIA pivote (pero muy vulnerable por su carencia energética), no cesará -a riesgo del suicidio, como ha ocurrido con el México neoliberal de la generación aciaga de De la Madrid, Salinas, Zedillo y Fox- de pertenecer a su geografía asiática sin por lo tanto dejar de colaborar con EU, Gran Bretaña, Japón e Israel en el océano Indico.

EN EL HORIZONTE parece perfilarse la triple apuesta geopolítica de India de abordaje multidimensional con sus ventajas (la deslocalización del software) y sus vulnerabilidades (petróleo y gas): 1) cooperación en el océano Indico con EU, la mayor potencia marítima del planeta (mientras se desconozcan los alcances de los nuevos submarinos nucleares rusos); 2) colaboración en la "ruta de la seda" centroasiática con Rusia y China, dos magnas potencias terrestres que carecen de profundidad estratégica en los "mares calientes"; y 3) la "política hacia el este": el sudeste asiático (la antigua Indochina).

PERO NADA SE ASEMEJA a la dimensión geopolítica de Asia central, donde EU, Rusia y China -las tres principales potencias militares del planeta- se disputan su destino, que marcará el siglo XXI. ¿De qué lado estará India en el momento inapelable de las definiciones?

Oil, power and the new Silk Road in Asia

11 July 2005
The Hindu

Pipelines, power grids and the new Silk Road in Asia

Siddharth Varadarajan

India and Pakistan hold the key to unlocking multiple routes of cooperation.

WHEN INDIA's External Affairs Minister, Natwar Singh, called on Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev during the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Astana last week, his host made a proposal which could — if implemented fully — alter the dynamics of the international market for oil and gas. "Now that the prospects for peace between India and Pakistan are so bright," Indian officials recounted Mr. Nazarbayev as saying, "why can't Kazakhstan think of supplying you oil via the Caspian Sea and Iran?"

Kazakhstan is not the only resource-rich Central Asian country to see the collateral benefits the India-Pakistan peace process can bring to the region.

Tajikistan President Emomali Rakhmanov, also in Astana for the SCO meet, told Mr. Singh he wanted India to invest in his country's power sector. If an Indian company were to set up a hydroelectric power plant in Tajikistan, Mr. Rakhmonov said, the electricity generated could be moved to India via the Wakhan Corridor in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Though the terrain is mountainous, the technology for erecting High Voltage Direct Current transmission lines in a cost-effective manner already exists. Tajikistan, with an abundance of fast moving rivers, is the world's third largest producer of hydroelectric power after the U.S. and Russia. Last month, Iran signed an MoU to start work on the 220 MW Sangtudin-2 project on the Vakhsh river in Nurek in western Tajikistan while the Russian utility company, UES, will build Sangtudin-1. Kyrgyzstan is another country with excellent prospects for hydel generation.

Since any Central Asian power lines passing through the Wakhan corridor would likely enter Pakistan in the `Northern Areas' of undivided Jammu and Kashmir before moving across to the Indian side of the State, such a project could also help fuel the proposal to make the Line of Control "irrelevant."

As with the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline, which has now come on to the agenda after years of resistance from New Delhi, the principal bottleneck in both the Kazakh and Tajik projects is likely to be trust, not technology or finance. But if India has the political will and strategic gumption to see them through, these proposals could lay the foundations for a Pan-Asian energy grid linking the two energy surplus regions of West and Central Asia to the two energy-deficient ones of South and East Asia. In his speech to the Afro-Asian conference in Jakarta in April, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh spoke of the need for such cooperation: "While our continents include both major producers and consumers of energy, the framework within which we produce and consume energy is determined elsewhere."

Even without the involvement of Iran, the United States is likely to oppose the emergence of any alternative energy framework in which producers and consumers from the continent trade directly with each other and use land routes — directly from Central Asia into China, and also southwards from Iran, Pakistan and India going eastwards into southern China — rather than the sea for transportation.

U.S. pre-eminence & energy

U.S. pre-eminence in the world is linked to energy in three inter-related ways: first, through its direct and indirect control of the world's hydrocarbon trade, second, through the seignorage it derives from the `petro-dollar' and third, from its ability, as the world's only major maritime power, to "secure" (or block) sea lanes of communication vital to the energy imports of other countries. An Asian energy grid would, however, reduce the U.S. strategic thrust in the region along all three vectors. More so if some of the dire predictions about Saudi supplies tapering off — made most recently and effectively by energy analyst Matthew R. Simmons in Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy (Wiley, 2005) — prove to be correct.

By 2015, Kazakhstan's oil output is likely to be 3.5 million barrels a day. Though the Iranian option has long been seen in Astana as the shortest and most cost-effective route for exporting the region's hydrocarbons to the wider world, political pressure from the U.S. has so far blocked all consideration of this alternative. Not anymore. In the face of improving prospects for peace between India and Pakistan, Kazakhstan is looking anew at Iran.

Apart from its desire to isolate the Teheran Government, Washington has put all its political and financial muscle behind the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which will funnel Caspian oil down to Turkey's Mediterranean coast for onward export through tankers. After years in the making, the BTC pipeline finally became operational last month, though with a limited throughput. A small amount of Kazakh oil is being moved through this route, with the bulk still going through the Russian pipeline network to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. Once the ambitious new 960-km West-East pipeline from Atasu to Alashankou in north-western Xinjiang is complete, Kazakhstan will have yet another export route. Last week, Chinese President Hu Jintao also reached an agreement with Mr. Nazarbayev for a feasibility study on a natural gas pipeline to China as well.

Currently, Kazakhstan sells some oil via swap arrangements with Teheran. Kazakh oil is shipped by barge to the Iranian Caspian port of Neka for onward distribution. In exchange, the Iranians supply an equal amount of oil to Kazakhstan's actual customer at their Persian Gulf terminal in Bandar Abbas. The Chinese had once made a proposal for constructing a pipeline to Neka from the Kazakh Caspian port of Aktau but legal disputes over the demarcation of the Caspian have put a halt to all under-sea projects. One idea is to build an overland pipeline through Turkmenistan into Iran or Afghanistan. In the interim, the barge-to-pipeline route will help prospective Kazakh customers like India source oil more cheaply than other routes.

After having earlier missed the bus, ONGC Videsh Ltd appears fully committed to working in Kazakhstan. The Indian `mini-major' is now looking seriously at two offshore Kazakh blocks — Satpaev and Makhambet — and is finally opening a representative office in Astana. ONGC is also looking at buying whole or part of the $2.4 billion Canadian-owned PetroKazakhstan, with a view to feeding the Alashankou pipeline.

With the Kazakhs looking at India as a regional balance to China and the Chinese worried about western pressure on Kazakhstan, the involvement of Indian companies would make for a more stable and cooperative environment. China plans to take the Kazakh pipeline all the way up to Lanzhou in Gansu province but is wary of making the requisite investment until it is assured of the stability of oil supplies.

Later this year, India's dynamic oil minister, Mani Shankar Aiyar, will play host to a Round Table of major energy producers and consumers from North, South, and Central Asia. Among the consumers will be India, China, Japan, and South Korea, while among the producers will be Iran, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

One of India's aims is to see what can be done to eliminate the `Asian premium' paid by most Asian importers of crude oil but the one big idea that must also be explored is an Asian energy grid. Pakistan has not yet been invited since it is not one of Asia's "largest" consumers of oil and gas.

However, given the vital role Pakistan plays as the bridge connecting India to Iran and Central Asia, New Delhi would likely benefit by including Islamabad in the process right from the outset.

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

G-4 favours U.N. vote "around July 20"

11 July 2005
The Hindu

G-4 favours U.N. vote "around July 20"

Siddharth Varadarajan

Africa could help garner the magic figure of 128 countries

NEW DELHI: After taking stock of the international support for their proposal to expand the United Nations Security Council, the G-4 Foreign Ministers, meeting in London over the weekend, have agreed to put their draft resolution to vote in the General Assembly "around July 20."

This deadline is elastic but not open-ended, a senior official told The Hindu on Sunday, with everything depending on the "magic figure of 128" — the number of countries required to pass the resolution with a two-thirds majority. "This in turn depends on Africa," he added.

Crucial meet on July 17

External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh will meet his counterparts from Brazil, Germany and Japan in New York on July 17 for a final assessment of whether to press ahead with a vote or not.

If a compromise is reached with the African countries, voting, in all likelihood, will proceed on schedule. But if not, the vote will be put off till an understanding is reached.

In the run-up to that meeting, the G-4 Ambassadors to the United Nations will seek to bridge the difference between the G-4's draft and the proposals endorsed by the African Union (A.U.) at its summit in Libya last week.

The A.U. proposals are also in the process of being tabled as a separate resolution in the General Assembly. And as if the waters were not muddy enough, the `Coffee Club' group of countries, opposed to the addition of new permanent members, will also be tabling its resolution.

Harmonised text

"In our negotiations with the African countries, every effort will now be made by us to produce a harmonised text," a senior official said.

Like India, Japan, Brazil and Germany, the A.U. also wants the addition of six new permanent members, including two from Africa, but insists they must have the right of veto.

The G-4 countries had originally sought veto rights but agreed to hold that demand in abeyance for 15 years in order to win wider support. The A.U. proposal also involves one extra non-permanent seat for Africa, which would take the proposed size of the Security Council up to 26 rather than 25.

The weakest link

The Africans may drop their insistence on the veto but their plan to have an extra non-permanent seat could be a deal-breaker.

"I don't think any of the G-4 minds Africa getting an additional seat but then that would open up a can of worms. Latin America or the Caribbean may insist on one more for their grouping. More African countries would vote for our resolution but we would lose support on the other side," the official said.

"Africa is the weakest link. If a compromise is reached on the two resolutions, fine. But if at the end of the day there are still two separate resolutions, we might just have to accept that expansion [of the Security Council] will not happen this year."

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

China, Russia get Central Asians to say 'Yankees Out!"

7 July 2005
The Hindu


News Analysis

China and Russia up the ante in Central Asia

SCO asks the U.S. to set deadline for withdrawal of its forces

Siddharth Varadarajan

ASTANA: The strategic stakes in the Eurasian heartland have risen substantially with Tuesday's call by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation for the United States to set a deadline by which it will pull out its military forces from the region.

"We support and will support the international coalition, which is carrying out an anti-terror campaign in Afghanistan, and we have taken note of the progress made in the effort to stabilise the situation," the six-nation SCO said in a declaration issued at the end of its summit here.

Right after these words of praise came the kick: "As the active military phase in the anti-terror operation in Afghanistan is nearing completion, the SCO would like the coalition's members to decide on the deadline for the use of the temporary infrastructure and for their military contingents' presence in those countries."

Well-entrenched

In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. established a military presence in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, besides using air bases in Pakistan as a jumping point for its operations against the Taliban. Despite having the run of Afghanistan now, the U.S. still maintains a huge air base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan with as many as 1,200 military personnel, mostly from rapid deployment units. When Manas is fully completed, it will be able to accommodate upwards of 3,000 troops. In addition, the U.S. has been using the Karshi-Khanabad airfield in south-eastern Uzbekistan since late 2001, though it has not managed to convince the Islam Karimov Government to convert its temporary permission to operate from there into a permanent arrangement of the kind it has in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan, in any case, is also growing weary of the U.S. presence: a day after Tuesday's summit in Astana, Foreign Minister Roza Otunbayeva once again reiterated the SCO's call for Washington to specify when it will leave the region.

Indian officials, who were present at the SCO summit as observers, told The Hindu that Tuesday's plenary session got delayed as the language for the demand to ask the U.S. forces to leave the region was debated by the six member-countries for more than an hour.

The reference to coalition forces was made largely at the instance of Russia, which considers the U.S. military presence in Central Asia a threat to its own interests in the region. China, which is equally wary of the permanent stationing of U.S troops and airplanes in its neighbourhood, backed the Russian proposal enthusiastically, as did Uzbekistan.

Uzbek stand

Mr. Karimov, who was a close ally of the U.S. in the initial stages of the `war on terror', has drawn closer to Moscow of late fearing Washington's attempts to destabilise his Government. He signed a pact for strategic cooperation with Russia last year and followed it up this April by pulling out of a U.S.-backed grouping of the former Soviet republics linking Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Moldova (GUAAM). Last month's events in Andijan — where a popular uprising against his Government was suppressed with excessive use of force — unnerved Mr. Karimov. Though evidence suggests the protests were home-grown, the Uzbek strongman is convinced that Washington is out to overthrow him. Getting the SCO to ask for the U.S. forces to leave the region is a safe way of telling the Bush administration that it is no longer welcome to use Uzbek territory.

For the U.S., the SCO's call to set a timetable for the withdrawal of its forces from the region is a clear indication of the emerging political realities in Asia. Even though the war in Afghanistan has drawn down considerably, and the U.S. has no problem basing as many troops and planes in that country as it likes, it needs to maintain its presence in Central Asia at all costs.

Under the `Rumsfeld doctrine', the emphasis of the U.S. military strategy is less on large bases with tens of thousands of troops than on the forward deployment of small but highly mobile expeditionary or rapid reaction forces. In the Pentagon's Global Posture Review announced last year, the emphasis was on "capabilities" rather sheer numbers. The Manas air base and others like it are meant to serve as "lily pads" from which troops may be "leap-frogged" to nearby trouble-spots at a moment's notice.

In the event of a larger intended military engagement in the extended neighbourhood, these bases could also serve as way stations for additional forces and equipment lifted directly from the continental United States.

Russia and China know that the U.S. wants bases in Central Asia for reasons quite unconnected to the ongoing operations in Afghanistan.

Their joint statement last week on the new world order, their emphasis on a new security concept for Asia and now, their getting the SCO to call for the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region, all suggest a sharpening of contradictions between the world's major power centres.

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

U.N. reform: India may agree to defer vote on G-4 resolution

7 July 2005
The Hindu

India may agree to defer vote on G-4 resolution on U.N. Council

The feeling is that it might be better to have an open-ended debate

Siddharth Varadarajan

NEW DELHI: With the G-4 countries' "deadline" for tabling their draft resolution on U.N. Security Council enlargement fast approaching, India is now leaning towards not insisting on an immediate vote in the General Assembly.

At the initiative of the Brazilian Foreign Minister, a meeting of the G-4 foreign ministers will be held in London on July 8 to discuss the future strategy. External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh will attend, as will his counterparts from Germany and Japan.

According to official sources, India still sees tremendous merit in the draft framework resolution being submitted to the General Assembly as early as next week. But rather than pushing through with a vote immediately, the feeling is that it might be better to have an open-ended debate on the resolution's proposals. Many countries have not yet clarified their position and a debate would help them to air their views without the fear of having immediately to commit a vote this way or that.

Political decision

At the same time, the officials conceded that the G-4 ambassadors to the U.N. were keen on going in for a vote immediately. "They feel the numbers add up and they may be right from their perspective in New York," a senior official told The Hindu. "But the decision to press for a vote has to be a political one in which the wider implications are considered by each of the G-4 governments."

The official said that a number of countries friendly to India and its bid had counselled a postponement of any vote and that New Delhi would accord due consideration to these views as well.

If the G-4 agrees to defer voting for now, India is likely to prefer that the resolution be formally taken up later in the year, perhaps in September. The feeling is that any postponement beyond 2005 would kill the momentum for reform.

New Delhi is convinced that a substantial majority of the world's countries will speak in favour of the G-4 draft which envisages the creation of six additional permanent members of the Security Council — two each from Asia and Africa, and one each from Europe and Latin America. "The African Union (AU) summit in Libya (which concluded on Tuesday) has broadly endorsed what we want by calling for two permanent members from Africa, an official said. At the same time, the AU was insisting on an additional non-permanent seat, which would take the size of the enlarged Security Council to 26 — rather than 25 as envisaged by the G-4.

That might just be one too many members for those countries concerned that a bigger UNSC might lose its effectiveness.

Though India has received more pledges of support for its own candidature than for the G-4 framework resolution, the officials said New Delhi was determined to maintain the unity of the G-4 at all costs. If the AU had chosen its two candidates, the G-4 could have been expanded to include them as well. "But we are all going to work closely with the Africans on this," the official said.

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

Despite U.S. pressure, India and Pakistan to go ahead with Iran pipeline

6 July 2005
The Hindu

India, Pakistan to go ahead with pipeline

Natwar Singh, Shaukat Aziz stress cooperation in energy, economic, water and trade issues "The Iran gas pipeline project is an extremely complex one and it is crucial that work to tie up the loose ends begins."

Siddharth Varadarajan

ASTANA (KAZAKHSTAN): Despite Washington's negative reaction to the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran's new President, India and Pakistan intend to press ahead with their plans to construct a pipeline that will transport Iranian gas deep into South Asia.

In a 45-minute meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit here on Tuesday, External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh and Pakistan Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz reviewed the state of bilateral relations in some detail and agreed that emphasis must be given to cooperation in energy, economic, water and trade issues.

Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid Kasuri was also present at the meeting.

According to a senior Indian official, Mr. Aziz said that the Iran gas pipeline project was an extremely complex one and that it was crucial that the work to tie up the "loose ends" begin.

"He referred to the need for proper financial structuring, technical project studies, risk mitigation instruments and security guarantees," the official said, adding that these issues were likely to be addressed in due course.

Asked by Mr. Singh about U.S. pressure on Islamabad to scrap the project, Mr. Aziz said Pakistan would do what it felt was in its national interest to do.

In brief remarks to the press after the meeting, Mr. Aziz stressed the importance of the pipeline, which he described as a "win-win project" for both countries.

He also said he had raised the Baglihar issue in his meeting with Mr. Singh. Apart from energy, Mr. Singh and Mr. Aziz discussed trade-related issues with both leaders welcoming the imminent revival of the India-Pakistan Joint Economic Commission.

According to the senior Indian official, the Pakistan Prime Minister said he favoured the movement of trucks between the two countries as well as an increase in the frequency of transport links such as buses and trains. Mr. Singh said India was concerned that Pakistan had not done enough to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism and said that evidence about the functioning of certain facilities and camps was available.

According to the senior Indian official, Mr. Aziz replied that the Pakistan Government was "institutionally completely against" cross-border terrorism. "It is not in our interest," the official quoted Mr. Aziz as saying. "Those of us who have had attempts on our lives know there are no good and bad terrorists." In their review of the composite dialogue process, the two sides agreed that the past 18 months had been promising.

Mr. Aziz noted that the step-by-step approach was helping improve the atmospherics and that this would lay the foundation for the resolution of all disputes, including Kashmir.

The two leaders also felt the public reaction in both countries to the ongoing peace process was very good.

On the question of U.N. Security Council reform, Mr. Aziz told Mr. Singh that Pakistan and India could "agree to disagree." Pakistan's stand against the G-4 resolution was not India-centric, he said, but part of a wider "overall position."

Though India's recent decision to deny Pakistani Information Minister Sheikh Rashid permission to visit Kashmir did not come up in the meeting, a senior Pakistani official told The Hindu this did not mean the chapter was closed.

"The Government may not take it up but Mr. Rashid is quite capable of doing so on his own," the official said.

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

Don't impose vote on draft U.N. proposals, SCO tells G-4

6 July 2005
The Hindu

Dateline Astana

Do not impose vote on draft U.N. proposal, SCO tells G-4

Calls for `new security concept' for Asia-Pacific

Siddharth Varadarajan

ASTANA (KAZAKHSTAN): The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which India has just joined as an observer, ended its summit here on Tuesday with a call for United Nations reform to follow the "principle of the broadest possible agreement."

In a blunt reference to the G-4 draft framework resolution for expanding the U.N. Security Council, the SCO — which links China and Russia with Central Asia — said it opposed all attempts to "try to set a deadline for U.N. reform or to impose voting on draft proposals on which major differences exist."

Indian officials were, however, unfazed by this unflattering reference to one of New Delhi's most important diplomatic projects. They said the SCO's stand was not a surprise since it closely mirrors what Russia and China said in their communiquИ at the end of President Hu Jintao's visit to the Russian Federation last week. "Look, we know Russia's stand and China's stand and we know who is a member of the SCO," a senior official said. Though the decision on when exactly to table the draft would be taken by the G-4 collectively, the plan is to do so later this month, he said.
Apart from advocating consensus-based U.N. reforms, other sections of the SCO declaration bear the unmistakable impress of last week's landmark Sino-Russian joint statement on the principles for the `New World Order in the 21st Century.' Calling the globalisation process "controversial," the SCO said "the right of all peoples to their own path of development should be fully respected." Only "multinational cooperation based on principles of mutual respect, equality, non-interference into internal affairs of sovereign states, non-confrontational thinking and progressive movement towards democratisation in the field of international relations" could promote global peace and security, the final statement said.

The SCO heads of state also called upon the international community "regardless of any differences in ideologies or social structures" to shape "a new security concept" and world order based on strengthening mutual trust.

Chinese President Hu Jintao said the SCO summit assumed great importance in the context of the "profound changes" under way in the regional situation.

The forum was entering a new period of pragmatic cooperation in which the task was to translate the existing potential into real and tangible results.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said the SCO declaration had "great international significance" because of the need to "respect and protect the diversity of civilisations and development models."

In an indirect reference to the invasion of Iraq and the aggressive championing of "democracy" by the United States in the region and around the world, Mr. Putin said it was necessary to oppose "the imposition of templates on states through the use of force."

Asia-Pacific region

The Asia-Pacific region would play an important part in securing peace and development in the 21st century, the SCO heads of state noted, but said, "no dividing lines should ever emerge in the region as a whole or in any of its parts."

The SCO declaration also envisages closer cooperation by member states to "effectively counteract new challenges and threats to international and regional security and stability."

Among the measures proposed are joint planning and implementation of anti-terrorist activities, cooperation in the "development and use of modern technical equipment used to fight new challenges and threats," the training of relevant personnel and harmonisation of national laws governing security provisions.

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

India set to take big leap in Central Asian backyard

5 July 2005
The Hindu


India set to take big leap in Central Asian backyard

"SCO will help revive the interflow of ideas and commerce that marked the Silk Route era"

Siddharth Varadarajan

ASTANA (KAZAKHSTAN): When India is formally granted observer status to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation on Tuesday, it will join the ranks of a forum that is emerging as the principal basis for strategic interaction between Central Asia and the big and medium powers which surround the region.

In remarks to the local press upon his arrival here on Monday, External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh seized upon the significance of China, Russia and India — as well as Iran and Pakistan which also become SCO observers — working together as Asian powers to build linkages across the vast continent. Closer interaction by countries secure in their "Asian identity" would help "revive the intense interflow of ideas and commerce that marked the heyday of the famous Silk Route era," he said.

The historical reference is not without significance, for the Silk Route was the high point of mutually beneficial economic and cultural interaction in an area which outside powers were later to embroil in the "Great Game" and seek to dominate.

"Not a closed alliance''

The SCO was not a closed alliance or union, nor was it directed against any state or power, Zhang Deguang, the forum's secretary-general, told Mr. Singh during a courtesy call. However, the Indian side is well aware of the implications any Asian strategic architecture which excludes the U.S. is bound to have. Senior officials said it was significant that the only country bordering Central Asia not to be represented at the SCO — with the exception of the maverick Central Asian Republic, Turkmenistan — was Afghanistan, which had been invited last year but failed to turn up. With the United States very much in control of the broad contours of the Hamid Karzai Government's external relations, Kabul staying away obviously meant Washington was cool to the idea of the SCO.

Appreciating the role played by the host country of this year's SCO summit, Mr. Singh said India accorded the "highest priority" to developing relations with Kazakhstan and Central Asia. "We have followed with deep interest the proposals of President Nazarbayev for the establishment of a Central Asian Union. This initiative is part of the larger process currently under way in Asia for the creation of an Asian Union... It is in this context that we have shown our interest in participating in the work of the SCO."

Strategic significance

Mr. Singh also met Chinese President Hu Jintao here on Monday. According to a senior Indian official, Mr. Hu said India's participation in the SCO as an observer would enhance friendly relations with all member-countries. In particular, the SCO provided a new platform for enhancing Sino-Indian bilateral relations.

In the context of U.N. reforms, the Chinese President said Beijing favoured the world body devoting more attention to developing countries. China would not become an obstacle to India playing a bigger role in world affairs. As close neighbours and the biggest developing countries, the drawing together of India and China would have a strategic significance far beyond the bilateral, the senior official quoted Mr. Hu as saying.

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu

China, Russia and the Shanghai agenda

4 July 2005
The Hindu


News Analysis

China, Russia, and the Shanghai agenda

Siddharth Varadarajan

The Sino-Russian declaration on the `New World Order in the 21st Century' is an attack on the `alliance for freedom' concept being promoted by the U.S.

SUMMITS BETWEEN China and Russia have been an annual fixture of the diplomatic calendar since the end of the Cold War but deliberations between the two Presidents have rarely influenced the course of world politics. This year, however, is likely to be different. The joint declaration on political principles for the new world order issued on Saturday following the meeting between Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin is a political shot across the bow of the United States, whose alliance building with Japan and India and renewed espousal of `freedom' in Asia is being seen with great suspicion by both Beijing and Moscow.

Nowhere do the two countries name the United States in their statement. And yet the effort to distance themselves from the Bush administration's approach to terrorism, democracy, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international security suggests their post-9/11 honeymoon with the U.S. has come to an end.


Attacking "double standards" in the war against terror and the practice of linking terrorism to "particular countries, nationalities and religions," the two countries say the international community should "completely renounce the mentality of confrontation and alliance." There should be no pursuit of monopoly or domination of world affairs and every country must be assured of "the right to choose its own path of development that fits its national realities." "Differences and disputes must be resolved through peaceful means rather than through unilateralism or coercion. There should be no use or threatened use of force."

The Sino-Russian statement calls for the establishment of "a new security framework" on the basis of "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation" with "universally recognized norms of international relations" and "equal security rights of all nations" as its political foundation.

Contrasting perspective

By way of contrast, the "new framework" for the U.S.-India defence relationship released last week, identifies "a common belief in freedom, democracy and the rule of law" as the basis for advancing "shared security interests." The use of these words was not accidental. References to "freedom" and "democracy' are legion in most U.S. discussions about security in Asia and are seen, in Beijing if not elsewhere, as a thinly-veiled reference to the need to contain or restrict the rise of China as a major power.

On weapons of mass destruction, the Sino-Russian statement makes some significant points. "China and Russia support efforts to maintain global strategic stability, and the multilateral process of establishing legal systems of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation... The issue of proliferation of WMDs should be resolved through political, diplomatic and international cooperation within the framework of international law." They also called for the peaceful use of outer space, and voiced opposition to weapons deployment and arms races in outer space. "The two sides think that a U.N.-led global system should be set up to deal with the new threats and challenges on the basis of the U.N. Charter and international law."

Again the contrast with the U.S. approach — which India appears tacitly to support — is obvious. Rather than extra-legal instruments to check proliferation like the Proliferation Security Initiative, Russia and China are emphasising the need for multilateral legal systems. And anticipating that the U.S. programme of missile defence will very soon lead to the militarisation of space, the two countries are demanding a ban on any arms race in outer space.

To get some idea of how much the international system has evolved in recent years, it is instructive to compare the latest Putin-Hu declaration with the statement issued at the end of the 1997 summit between Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin. "The two sides," that statement had noted, "are extremely satisfied to point out that relations between China, Russia, the United States and Japan witnessed positive development during the recent summit meetings between the nations. China and Russia believe that the time when countries forged alliances and engaged in strategic competition targeted against a third country has passed."

Beyond terrorism


Given the sharpening U.S. policy in Asia today and the strategic and economic consequences of its own "peaceful rise," China can no longer afford to take such a sanguine view as it did in 1997. The growing U.S. involvement in Central Asia is also putting pressure on Russia in various ways. The latest proposal by Beijing and Moscow for a new security framework flows directly from this fast-evolving scenario.

Coming as it does a few days before the meeting in Astana of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the joint declaration suggests China and Russia will seek to push the six-nation grouping towards playing a more pro-active role in developing a cooperative security framework for the region. The SCO, started in 1996 at the initiative of Beijing, has six members — China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. India, Iran, and Pakistan will attend as guests and formally join the grouping as observers at the end of the SCO summit on July 6. Mongolia is already an observer.

From its inception, the SCO has been something of an amorphous enterprise dealing with issues as diverse as confidence-building measures in border areas, non-traditional security, and regional economic development. It may be only one of several groupings within the wider Central Asia region, but it is the vehicle China favours for elaborating its own strategic vision for the Eurasian landmass. Given its own economic needs, energy could well be the next big issue that is taken up.

The Indian Government, which has begun to activate itself in Central Asia in recent years, has tended to see the SCO as primarily a forum through which its own concerns on terrorism can be effectively articulated. After all, member states from day one identified "terrorism, extremism and separatism" as the "three evils" that must be vigorously combated.

However, the grouping's true potential lies not so much in providing solidarity in the fight against terrorism as in playing a pivotal role in fashioning a new strategic architecture for Asia.

© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu