24 June 2004
The Times of India
Manmohan's first month: Key inroads into Pak and China
By Siddharth Varadarajan
Times News Network
New Delhi: Belying the expectations of naysayers in the BJP - and in the wider foreign policy community - Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has, in his first month in office, managed to not just keep the ship of Indian diplomacy on even keel but to also steam ahead decisively in key areas.
Relations with Pakistan and China are as good today if not better than they were when the Vajpayee government demitted office. As for the US, the PM has skilfully used the semiotics of diplomacy - the signing of condolence books, the dispatch of Natwar Singh for Reagan's funeral - to make the quiet assertion of an independent foreign policy more palatable to the Bush administration.
Indian soldiers will not go to Iraq and New Delhi is unlikely to support Washington's missile defence programme, but the US has come away from all the interactions it has had with the new government so far convinced that the bilateral relationship is continuing as before.
But if the going has been good so far, the PM knows the hardest part is yet to come. At the end of the week, the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan will meet to discuss Kashmir. And then will follow the month-long round of talks on Siachen, Sir Creek, Tulbul navigation project, economic relations and terrorism.
In August, the composite dialogue will be reviewed by the two foreign ministers. PM has to ensure that enough is achieved by then to convince Pakistan of the need to remain engaged.
With Washington, the Indo-US conference on 'Space Science: Applications and Commerce' in Bangalore is being cited by senior officials as proof of the strong continuity in relations under the new government.
Sponsored by the Indian Space Research Organisation, the US State Department, Nasa and the US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, the conference has attracted financial support from major US defence and space contractors. Despite this interaction, 14 subsidiaries of ISRO remain on the US bureau of export control's 'entities list', meaning exports to them need to be pre-cleared by Washington on a case-by-case basis.
On the China front, external affairs minister Natwar Singh's hugely successful interaction in Qingdao with his Chinese counterpart, Li Zhaoxing, augurs well for the bilateral relationship. Apart from the meeting between the two special representatives on the border issue, a number of high-level contacts are on the cards, say officials.
20 June 2004
India, Pak agree nukes a 'factor of stability'
20 June 2004
The Times of India
India, Pak to ban nuclear tests
by SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
NEW DELHI: For the first time since they both became declared nuclear weapons states six years ago, India and Pakistan on Sunday publicly acknowledged that the nuclear capabilities of each other constitute a factor for stability and agreed to establish a dedicated and secure hotline to prevent misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to nuclear issues.
The hotline would connect the two foreign secretaries through their respective foreign offices, a joint statement released at the end of the two-day technical-level talks on nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs) noted.
In a reiteration of their joint desire to be accepted as nuclear weapons states at par with the big five powers whose status is recognised by the NPT, India and Pakistan called for regular working-level meetings to be held among all the nuclear powers to discuss issues of common concern. They also said they would continue to engage in bilateral consultations on security and non-proliferation issues within the context of multilateral negotiations.
Apart from the demand for a seat at the nuclear high table and the decision on a dedicated hotline, the joint statement said each side reaffirmed its unilateral moratorium on further nuclear testing. India and Pakistan also expressed their willingness to work towards concluding an agreement with technical parameters on pre-notification of flight testing of missiles. Furthermore, the existing hotline between the directors-general of military operations (DGMOs) would be upgraded, dedicated and secured.
In an MoU signed in Lahore in 1999, the two countries undertook to provide advance notification of missile tests to each other and conclude a bilateral agreement. Accordingly, the Indian side handed over a draft agreement, which the Pakistani side said it would study. Officials said the draft merely seeks to formalise the existing arrangement of issuing notice, warning shipping and civil aviation about impending tests in a specified area during a small window of dates.
Sunday's joint statement starts by noting that both sides recognise that the nuclear capabilities of each other, which are based on their national security imperatives, constitute a factor for stability and are committed to work towards strategic stability and to national measures to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons under their respective controls and to adopt bilateral notification measures and mechanisms to prevent misunderstandings and misinterpretations.
Although the two-day parleys also involved exchanges of opinion on the nuclear doctrines and security concepts of both countries, the joint statement avoids a specific mention of this subject. Officials say that since the doctrines are still subject to an evolutionary process, there was little point in dwelling on the subject. A senior Pakistani delegate also told The Times of India that since India and Pakistan had well-known differences on concepts like no-first use, no-war pact, strategic restraint, the two sides decided not to focus on these areas of divergence.
The 1999 MoU also committed the two countries to respecting their own moratorium on nuclear test explosions.
The Times of India
India, Pak to ban nuclear tests
by SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
NEW DELHI: For the first time since they both became declared nuclear weapons states six years ago, India and Pakistan on Sunday publicly acknowledged that the nuclear capabilities of each other constitute a factor for stability and agreed to establish a dedicated and secure hotline to prevent misunderstandings and reduce risks relevant to nuclear issues.
The hotline would connect the two foreign secretaries through their respective foreign offices, a joint statement released at the end of the two-day technical-level talks on nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs) noted.
In a reiteration of their joint desire to be accepted as nuclear weapons states at par with the big five powers whose status is recognised by the NPT, India and Pakistan called for regular working-level meetings to be held among all the nuclear powers to discuss issues of common concern. They also said they would continue to engage in bilateral consultations on security and non-proliferation issues within the context of multilateral negotiations.
Apart from the demand for a seat at the nuclear high table and the decision on a dedicated hotline, the joint statement said each side reaffirmed its unilateral moratorium on further nuclear testing. India and Pakistan also expressed their willingness to work towards concluding an agreement with technical parameters on pre-notification of flight testing of missiles. Furthermore, the existing hotline between the directors-general of military operations (DGMOs) would be upgraded, dedicated and secured.
In an MoU signed in Lahore in 1999, the two countries undertook to provide advance notification of missile tests to each other and conclude a bilateral agreement. Accordingly, the Indian side handed over a draft agreement, which the Pakistani side said it would study. Officials said the draft merely seeks to formalise the existing arrangement of issuing notice, warning shipping and civil aviation about impending tests in a specified area during a small window of dates.
Sunday's joint statement starts by noting that both sides recognise that the nuclear capabilities of each other, which are based on their national security imperatives, constitute a factor for stability and are committed to work towards strategic stability and to national measures to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons under their respective controls and to adopt bilateral notification measures and mechanisms to prevent misunderstandings and misinterpretations.
Although the two-day parleys also involved exchanges of opinion on the nuclear doctrines and security concepts of both countries, the joint statement avoids a specific mention of this subject. Officials say that since the doctrines are still subject to an evolutionary process, there was little point in dwelling on the subject. A senior Pakistani delegate also told The Times of India that since India and Pakistan had well-known differences on concepts like no-first use, no-war pact, strategic restraint, the two sides decided not to focus on these areas of divergence.
The 1999 MoU also committed the two countries to respecting their own moratorium on nuclear test explosions.
12 June 2004
Anti-war group slams UN's Iraq resolution
12 June 2004
The Times Of India
Anti-war group slams UN's Iraq resolution
SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
TIMES NEWS NETWORK
NEW DELHI - The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and
Peace (CNDP), an umbrella group of anti-war groups
formed after the 1998 nuclear tests, said on Saturday
that the latest UN resolution on Iraq was "a shameful
capitulation to the US " by the world body. Any
endorsement of this resolution by the Indian
government, let alone sending of troops, "represents a
betrayal of the Iraqi people, of elementary principles
of justice, and of an independent Indian foreign
policy," the group said.
Resolution 1546 "recognises as 'sovereign' an interim
government set up after June 30 that, like the
Governing Council, is established effectively by the
US and not the UN," said the CNDP in a statement.
"It legitimises an illegal, US-dominated occupation
force as a UN-mandated 'multinational' force and
endorses this occupation at least until December 31,
2005 when an elected 'transitional government' is to
be established."
Pointing out that any removal of US-led troops before
then by the interim Iraqi government is subject to
Security Council authorisation - where the US can
exercise its veto - the group said the resolution
endorses ultimate US and not Iraqi or UN control over
the deployment and use of "the occupying
'multinational' forces".
Moreover, Article 27 of the resolution allows all
US-organised contracts for oil companies before June
30, 2004 to continue to have immunity from any
scrutiny by the interim Iraqi government.
The Times Of India
Anti-war group slams UN's Iraq resolution
SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
TIMES NEWS NETWORK
NEW DELHI - The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and
Peace (CNDP), an umbrella group of anti-war groups
formed after the 1998 nuclear tests, said on Saturday
that the latest UN resolution on Iraq was "a shameful
capitulation to the US " by the world body. Any
endorsement of this resolution by the Indian
government, let alone sending of troops, "represents a
betrayal of the Iraqi people, of elementary principles
of justice, and of an independent Indian foreign
policy," the group said.
Resolution 1546 "recognises as 'sovereign' an interim
government set up after June 30 that, like the
Governing Council, is established effectively by the
US and not the UN," said the CNDP in a statement.
"It legitimises an illegal, US-dominated occupation
force as a UN-mandated 'multinational' force and
endorses this occupation at least until December 31,
2005 when an elected 'transitional government' is to
be established."
Pointing out that any removal of US-led troops before
then by the interim Iraqi government is subject to
Security Council authorisation - where the US can
exercise its veto - the group said the resolution
endorses ultimate US and not Iraqi or UN control over
the deployment and use of "the occupying
'multinational' forces".
Moreover, Article 27 of the resolution allows all
US-organised contracts for oil companies before June
30, 2004 to continue to have immunity from any
scrutiny by the interim Iraqi government.
07 June 2004
Interview with Morshed Khan, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh
7 June 2004
The Times of India
After the distrust and suspicion that marred relations with Dhaka during the Vajpayee years, Indo-Bangladeshi ties seem finally to be looking up. Bangladeshi foreign minister Morshed Khan , who was in Delhi last week, tells Siddharth Varadarajan that given the right chemistry and warmth, all outstanding issues between the two countries will be resolved.
You came as a special envoy of prime minister Khaleda Zia to congratulate the new Indian government but your visit — and meeting with external affairs minister Natwar Singh — seems to have opened a new chapter in bilateral ties after the difficulties of the past few years. Were you surprised by the friendly attitude of the new government?
No, not at all. Well, first of all I would say that from the Bangladesh point of view, we are dealing with India. We are not dealing with a particular party as such. And it's a government in continuity.
If you ask me what we have achieved, may be in concrete terms we have not achieved anything. But it seems the chemistry is working all right. And there's a great deal of warmth in my reception, and very frank exchange of opinions. Both sides did not shy away from the issues involved.
For the first time, it has been recognised that there are security concerns on both sides that need to be addressed. It is not an allegation from one side to the other side.
So this kind of understanding and mutuality definitely takes us a long way in building confidence, rather than just keeping on accusing somebody for something, which is unfounded, or hiding something under the carpet.
You mentioned Bangladesh has security concerns vis-a-vis India. What are these?
I have not sought to spell these out in detail because I don't want to create a misunderstanding, but we have genuinely been trying to convince New Delhi about our concerns.
Our top terrorists from Bangladesh, they have all found their way into India, either on the Agartala side, or the West Bengal side, north Bengal side. This is not an accusation as such, because this is not with the knowledge of the Indian government.
It is not our view that these people are harboured by the Indian government, that the government has to be blamed. But we have to address these issues together. There are people. Like General Hazari and others who have 20-30 murder cases.
Unfortunately, we find that they are all very comfortably living there. Today, the rapists, the dacoits, the outlaws of the country, they commit a crime and run away. One of the reasons is that we have a very porous border with India, 4,600 km long.
Therefore, there has to be some kind of coordinated effort from both sides to address these issues. And this is what we have decided. We are very grateful and glad that the political decision-makers have spoken. My talks with Natwar Singh went off very well. I found a great air of openness.
And with prime minister Manmohan Singh and Congress leader Sonia Gandhi?
This was mostly a courtesy call, as a special envoy of Khaleda Zia. I have handed over an invitation letter. Mr Singh has accepted very kindly. We will fix up the dates soon.
But we feel that with the CMP prominently highlighting SAARC and ties with Bangladesh, we have reason to believe that Dhaka should be his first foreign destination. For Mrs Gandhi too, we want her first destination abroad should be Bangladesh.
And not Pakistan?!
I didn't say that!
There is a perception in India, in our official circles, that militants from Assam and elsewhere have received a kind of sanctuary in Bangladesh. One of the Ulfa leaders was even handed over to the custody of the wife of a minister and then released.
Bangladesh is not a sanctuary. We have caught two of these persons, Anup Chetia and Sanjib Deb Burman. We filed a case against Burman, he went to the high court along with some human rights organisation which helped him in his case against the government.
Now the high court in its wisdom gave possession of Burman to the human rights group, released him to their custody, because a concrete case against him could not be established.
Now we understand that he has run away from that custody, but Chetia is definitely with us.
Officials here are not certain you will hand him over to the Indian authorities once his sentence is over. Have you given any assurances on this?
I don't give assurance through the newspapers. I give assurances to the leaders whenever assurances are needed. Anyway, we have addressed this issue, that both sides need to have a hands-on approach and address this security situation.
And at the same time, we have also discussed about the Shadin Bangabhoomi movement or the Purva Bangla Hindu Bhoomi, all these kinds of anti-state activities in Bangladesh being carried out by groups which have their printed addresses in Kolkata and West Bengal and other places.
So both sides have agreed that this kind of nonsense should come to an end. We must be realistic. We must create an ambience of togetherness.
Can you give us an update on the investigation into the massive arms haul at Chittagong? Where did the arms come from? Whom were they meant for?
The seizure is of such a serious nature, the only thing I can say is that we will get to the bottom of it. Therefore, I cannot explain beyond this. It is a very serious threat to our own security and we must get to the bottom of it.
The Times of India
Border Music
Interview with Morshed Khan, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh
Interview with Morshed Khan, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh
After the distrust and suspicion that marred relations with Dhaka during the Vajpayee years, Indo-Bangladeshi ties seem finally to be looking up. Bangladeshi foreign minister Morshed Khan , who was in Delhi last week, tells Siddharth Varadarajan that given the right chemistry and warmth, all outstanding issues between the two countries will be resolved.
You came as a special envoy of prime minister Khaleda Zia to congratulate the new Indian government but your visit — and meeting with external affairs minister Natwar Singh — seems to have opened a new chapter in bilateral ties after the difficulties of the past few years. Were you surprised by the friendly attitude of the new government?
No, not at all. Well, first of all I would say that from the Bangladesh point of view, we are dealing with India. We are not dealing with a particular party as such. And it's a government in continuity.
If you ask me what we have achieved, may be in concrete terms we have not achieved anything. But it seems the chemistry is working all right. And there's a great deal of warmth in my reception, and very frank exchange of opinions. Both sides did not shy away from the issues involved.
For the first time, it has been recognised that there are security concerns on both sides that need to be addressed. It is not an allegation from one side to the other side.
So this kind of understanding and mutuality definitely takes us a long way in building confidence, rather than just keeping on accusing somebody for something, which is unfounded, or hiding something under the carpet.
You mentioned Bangladesh has security concerns vis-a-vis India. What are these?
I have not sought to spell these out in detail because I don't want to create a misunderstanding, but we have genuinely been trying to convince New Delhi about our concerns.
Our top terrorists from Bangladesh, they have all found their way into India, either on the Agartala side, or the West Bengal side, north Bengal side. This is not an accusation as such, because this is not with the knowledge of the Indian government.
It is not our view that these people are harboured by the Indian government, that the government has to be blamed. But we have to address these issues together. There are people. Like General Hazari and others who have 20-30 murder cases.
Unfortunately, we find that they are all very comfortably living there. Today, the rapists, the dacoits, the outlaws of the country, they commit a crime and run away. One of the reasons is that we have a very porous border with India, 4,600 km long.
Therefore, there has to be some kind of coordinated effort from both sides to address these issues. And this is what we have decided. We are very grateful and glad that the political decision-makers have spoken. My talks with Natwar Singh went off very well. I found a great air of openness.
And with prime minister Manmohan Singh and Congress leader Sonia Gandhi?
This was mostly a courtesy call, as a special envoy of Khaleda Zia. I have handed over an invitation letter. Mr Singh has accepted very kindly. We will fix up the dates soon.
But we feel that with the CMP prominently highlighting SAARC and ties with Bangladesh, we have reason to believe that Dhaka should be his first foreign destination. For Mrs Gandhi too, we want her first destination abroad should be Bangladesh.
And not Pakistan?!
I didn't say that!
There is a perception in India, in our official circles, that militants from Assam and elsewhere have received a kind of sanctuary in Bangladesh. One of the Ulfa leaders was even handed over to the custody of the wife of a minister and then released.
Bangladesh is not a sanctuary. We have caught two of these persons, Anup Chetia and Sanjib Deb Burman. We filed a case against Burman, he went to the high court along with some human rights organisation which helped him in his case against the government.
Now the high court in its wisdom gave possession of Burman to the human rights group, released him to their custody, because a concrete case against him could not be established.
Now we understand that he has run away from that custody, but Chetia is definitely with us.
Officials here are not certain you will hand him over to the Indian authorities once his sentence is over. Have you given any assurances on this?
I don't give assurance through the newspapers. I give assurances to the leaders whenever assurances are needed. Anyway, we have addressed this issue, that both sides need to have a hands-on approach and address this security situation.
And at the same time, we have also discussed about the Shadin Bangabhoomi movement or the Purva Bangla Hindu Bhoomi, all these kinds of anti-state activities in Bangladesh being carried out by groups which have their printed addresses in Kolkata and West Bengal and other places.
So both sides have agreed that this kind of nonsense should come to an end. We must be realistic. We must create an ambience of togetherness.
Can you give us an update on the investigation into the massive arms haul at Chittagong? Where did the arms come from? Whom were they meant for?
The seizure is of such a serious nature, the only thing I can say is that we will get to the bottom of it. Therefore, I cannot explain beyond this. It is a very serious threat to our own security and we must get to the bottom of it.
01 June 2004
India, Pakistan and the 'Core' Issue
June 2004
The 'Core' Issue
Will the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan manage to get past their first
As India and Pakistan start to take the first hesitant steps towards the resumption of a formal dialogue process, it is perhaps natural that both sides should be plagued by anxiety, self-doubt and fear. If in Islamabad, the apprehension is that India will outmanoeuvre it by opening lengthy and possibly fruitless discussions on Kashmir, New Delhi fears embarking on any course which might, however improbably, lead to eventual adjustments on the lines of a map. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh put it most pithily in an interview to Jonathan Power the day after assuming office: "Short of secession, short of redrawing boundaries, the Indian establishment can live with anything" as far as the question of Kashmir and Pakistan is concerned.
The shock defeat of the Vajpayee-led NDA government has, not surprisingly, compounded problems on both sides of the border. Unnerved by some of the statements emanating from Delhi, Pakistan has been left wondering whether the Manmohan Singh government shares the same commitment to the framework and timetable agreed to on January 6, 2004, as its predecessor. As for the new government in India, it comes to the negotiating table acutely aware of being under the close scrutiny of an opposition party which can, at any moment, play the dangerous card of ultra-nationalism. The strain of discharging this burden of expectations affords the only logical explanation for why a seasoned diplomat like Natwar Singh, who now heads the external affairs ministry, has allowed an unseemly and wholly unnecessary war of words with Islamabad to cast a dark shadow over the yet-to-be-launched composite dialogue process.
As matters stand, there is little doubt that the dialogue at the level of foreign secretaries will begin later in June, most probably in the latter half but well within the timeframe envisaged in January. However, the real question is not whether the composite dialogue will begin, but whether there is enough substance in the discussions on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir to ensure the dialogue process does not come to an abrupt end when the two foreign ministers meet in August to review the progress made by their officials. Nothing would be more disastrous for bilateral relations than for the composite dialogue process to fizzle out the way it did in November and December 1998.
For that not to happen, both sides would have to do more than simply reiterate their stated positions. This of course begs the question of whether there is a point of intersection between Pakistan's fear of India conceding too little on Kashmir and India's fear of conceding too much. Right now, it doesn't seem like there is.
Judging by the remarks being made in Delhi and Islamabad, there is no doubt in my mind that when Shashank and Riaz Khokhar meet in New Delhi in June, their dialogue will probably begin with the following exchange:
Khokhar: Kashmir is the core issue and we should start discussing it.
Shashank: Actually, Kashmir is only one of eight issues that form the composite dialogue. It is not at all the core issue.
Khokhar: But the fact that the January 6, 2004 statement takes the name of only one of the eight issues, and that is Kashmir, means even you accept it is the core issue.
Shashank: But the statement also explicitly mentions your undertaking not to allow terrorism from territories under your control.
If the two foreign secretaries manage to get past this first semantic hurdle, their dialogue will then look something like this:
Shashank: Well, let us agree to disagree on what is core and what is periphery. India is prepared to discuss the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. But what is the
Kashmir issue?
Khokhar: The issue is that there is a freedom struggle in Kashmir.
Shashank: Actually, the issue is that there is a terrorist campaign in Kashmir, aided and abetted from across the border.
Khokhar: The issue is that the final status of Kashmir is yet to be settled.
Shashank: The issue of Kashmir's status is not at all an issue.
From this point on, matters could go rapidly downhill. There would be lengthy, scholastic discussions on the legality of Kashmir's accession to India, Khokhar would bring up the issue of UN resolutions, and then human rights and self-determination, whereupon Shashank would say that the only issue to discuss really is when and how Pakistan is going to return to India those parts of Jammu and Kashmir currently in its possession.
Rather than going down this dreary path, Indian and Pakistani negotiators should instead try and build upon the oft-repeated dictum of Musharraf that each side should negate those positions that the other finds unacceptable. Though the Vajpayee government never took this proposal seriously, Dr. Manmohan Singh, in his own way, has sought to engage with Musharraf's approach. His statement that secession and the redrawing of boundaries are the two red lines that India feels cannot be crossed, is an attempt to identify at least two unacceptable solutions. There are probably others as well. Pakistan should come up with red lines of its own and when Shashank and Khokhar meet, the list of outcomes unacceptable to both sides should be compiled and put on table.
It is of course likely that such a process will end up leaving no acceptable outcomes on the table to begin with. But at least the process of engagement with each other's bottom-line concerns would have begun, and a shift can slowly be effected from the historical, legal and emotional terrain of argumentation - which will produce no solution in a thousand years - to the realm of the political, where, given goodwill and statesmanship on both sides, a range of practical solutions are possible. Here, the Indian and Pakistani governments will also have to take into account the changing geo-strategic realities in Asia, including the negative implications of the emergence of the United States as a formidable military presence in the region, as well as the growing pressure for economic, commercial and cultural ties.
In all the ups and downs of the past year, it is easy to forget the very concrete gains that have already resulted from the peace process so far. For the first time since the irrational and immoral war in Siachen began nearly two decades ago, the guns have fallen silent and troops from both sides deployed in the icy wastes have a reasonable chance of coming down safely. Along the entire length of the Line of Control, the ritual exchanges of fire which were a deadly fact of life for villagers on both sides no longer take place. And people-to-people contacts, suspended by India in the wake of the terrorist attack on Parliament in December 2001, are back with a bang. Come what may, Dr Manmohan Singh and General Musharraf, Natwar Singh and Khurshid Kasuri must ensure the irreversibility of these excellent developments.
Terrorists may well try their level best to provoke India into snapping travel ties again, but New Delhi should learn from the experience of 2001-2002 that the coming and going of ordinary people across the border helps build a bigger constituency for peace and normalisation in both nations. As for Islamabad, the two assassination attempts on General Musharraf and the culture of sectarian violence that Islamist extremists have generated within Pakistan should be proof enough of the need for the military establishment to turn its back on the 'jihadi option' once and for all.
For all its insistence that what is going on in Kashmir is a freedom struggle pure and simple, Pakistan must realise that the proxy war approach has not brought it any closer to realising its political objectives. India, on its part, realised in 2002, that all-out war with Pakistan is not an option. To its credit, the Vajpayee government also had the courage to recognise that the insurgency in the valley cannot be ended without an attempt to engage with the demands of separatists like the Hurriyat Conference. On all fronts, dialogue has emerged as the only viable option and there is widespread popular sanction in both countries - and among the Kashmiris - for the rejection of violence, terrorism, repression and the threat of war.
The 'Core' Issue
Will the foreign secretaries of India and Pakistan manage to get past their first
semantic hurdle when they meet this June?
By Siddharth Varadarajan
By Siddharth Varadarajan
As India and Pakistan start to take the first hesitant steps towards the resumption of a formal dialogue process, it is perhaps natural that both sides should be plagued by anxiety, self-doubt and fear. If in Islamabad, the apprehension is that India will outmanoeuvre it by opening lengthy and possibly fruitless discussions on Kashmir, New Delhi fears embarking on any course which might, however improbably, lead to eventual adjustments on the lines of a map. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh put it most pithily in an interview to Jonathan Power the day after assuming office: "Short of secession, short of redrawing boundaries, the Indian establishment can live with anything" as far as the question of Kashmir and Pakistan is concerned.
The shock defeat of the Vajpayee-led NDA government has, not surprisingly, compounded problems on both sides of the border. Unnerved by some of the statements emanating from Delhi, Pakistan has been left wondering whether the Manmohan Singh government shares the same commitment to the framework and timetable agreed to on January 6, 2004, as its predecessor. As for the new government in India, it comes to the negotiating table acutely aware of being under the close scrutiny of an opposition party which can, at any moment, play the dangerous card of ultra-nationalism. The strain of discharging this burden of expectations affords the only logical explanation for why a seasoned diplomat like Natwar Singh, who now heads the external affairs ministry, has allowed an unseemly and wholly unnecessary war of words with Islamabad to cast a dark shadow over the yet-to-be-launched composite dialogue process.
As matters stand, there is little doubt that the dialogue at the level of foreign secretaries will begin later in June, most probably in the latter half but well within the timeframe envisaged in January. However, the real question is not whether the composite dialogue will begin, but whether there is enough substance in the discussions on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir to ensure the dialogue process does not come to an abrupt end when the two foreign ministers meet in August to review the progress made by their officials. Nothing would be more disastrous for bilateral relations than for the composite dialogue process to fizzle out the way it did in November and December 1998.
For that not to happen, both sides would have to do more than simply reiterate their stated positions. This of course begs the question of whether there is a point of intersection between Pakistan's fear of India conceding too little on Kashmir and India's fear of conceding too much. Right now, it doesn't seem like there is.
Judging by the remarks being made in Delhi and Islamabad, there is no doubt in my mind that when Shashank and Riaz Khokhar meet in New Delhi in June, their dialogue will probably begin with the following exchange:
Khokhar: Kashmir is the core issue and we should start discussing it.
Shashank: Actually, Kashmir is only one of eight issues that form the composite dialogue. It is not at all the core issue.
Khokhar: But the fact that the January 6, 2004 statement takes the name of only one of the eight issues, and that is Kashmir, means even you accept it is the core issue.
Shashank: But the statement also explicitly mentions your undertaking not to allow terrorism from territories under your control.
If the two foreign secretaries manage to get past this first semantic hurdle, their dialogue will then look something like this:
Shashank: Well, let us agree to disagree on what is core and what is periphery. India is prepared to discuss the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. But what is the
Kashmir issue?
Khokhar: The issue is that there is a freedom struggle in Kashmir.
Shashank: Actually, the issue is that there is a terrorist campaign in Kashmir, aided and abetted from across the border.
Khokhar: The issue is that the final status of Kashmir is yet to be settled.
Shashank: The issue of Kashmir's status is not at all an issue.
From this point on, matters could go rapidly downhill. There would be lengthy, scholastic discussions on the legality of Kashmir's accession to India, Khokhar would bring up the issue of UN resolutions, and then human rights and self-determination, whereupon Shashank would say that the only issue to discuss really is when and how Pakistan is going to return to India those parts of Jammu and Kashmir currently in its possession.
Rather than going down this dreary path, Indian and Pakistani negotiators should instead try and build upon the oft-repeated dictum of Musharraf that each side should negate those positions that the other finds unacceptable. Though the Vajpayee government never took this proposal seriously, Dr. Manmohan Singh, in his own way, has sought to engage with Musharraf's approach. His statement that secession and the redrawing of boundaries are the two red lines that India feels cannot be crossed, is an attempt to identify at least two unacceptable solutions. There are probably others as well. Pakistan should come up with red lines of its own and when Shashank and Khokhar meet, the list of outcomes unacceptable to both sides should be compiled and put on table.
It is of course likely that such a process will end up leaving no acceptable outcomes on the table to begin with. But at least the process of engagement with each other's bottom-line concerns would have begun, and a shift can slowly be effected from the historical, legal and emotional terrain of argumentation - which will produce no solution in a thousand years - to the realm of the political, where, given goodwill and statesmanship on both sides, a range of practical solutions are possible. Here, the Indian and Pakistani governments will also have to take into account the changing geo-strategic realities in Asia, including the negative implications of the emergence of the United States as a formidable military presence in the region, as well as the growing pressure for economic, commercial and cultural ties.
In all the ups and downs of the past year, it is easy to forget the very concrete gains that have already resulted from the peace process so far. For the first time since the irrational and immoral war in Siachen began nearly two decades ago, the guns have fallen silent and troops from both sides deployed in the icy wastes have a reasonable chance of coming down safely. Along the entire length of the Line of Control, the ritual exchanges of fire which were a deadly fact of life for villagers on both sides no longer take place. And people-to-people contacts, suspended by India in the wake of the terrorist attack on Parliament in December 2001, are back with a bang. Come what may, Dr Manmohan Singh and General Musharraf, Natwar Singh and Khurshid Kasuri must ensure the irreversibility of these excellent developments.
Terrorists may well try their level best to provoke India into snapping travel ties again, but New Delhi should learn from the experience of 2001-2002 that the coming and going of ordinary people across the border helps build a bigger constituency for peace and normalisation in both nations. As for Islamabad, the two assassination attempts on General Musharraf and the culture of sectarian violence that Islamist extremists have generated within Pakistan should be proof enough of the need for the military establishment to turn its back on the 'jihadi option' once and for all.
For all its insistence that what is going on in Kashmir is a freedom struggle pure and simple, Pakistan must realise that the proxy war approach has not brought it any closer to realising its political objectives. India, on its part, realised in 2002, that all-out war with Pakistan is not an option. To its credit, the Vajpayee government also had the courage to recognise that the insurgency in the valley cannot be ended without an attempt to engage with the demands of separatists like the Hurriyat Conference. On all fronts, dialogue has emerged as the only viable option and there is widespread popular sanction in both countries - and among the Kashmiris - for the rejection of violence, terrorism, repression and the threat of war.
Patil fails Indo-Pak missile test
1 June 2004
The Times of India
Patil fails Indo-Pak missile test
SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
TIMES NEWS NETWORK
NEW DELHI: Foreign secretary Shashank's sage counsel on Pakistan (and presumably India) avoiding controversies through the media came a day too late for Union home minister Shivraj Patil, who, on Sunday, deviated from the official policy to condemn Pakistan's testing of the Ghauri missile as "escalating the arms race".
Patil was obviously not familiar with the Indian government's long-standing policy of not criticising Islamabad for testing its missiles.
Senior officials in South Block are chafing at his reference to an "arms race" since that is precisely the phrase the US , Japan and others use to criticise India each time it tests its ballistic missiles.
Officials also said that Pakistan had, in fact, given advanced notice to India of Saturday's missile test.
In April 1999, Jaswant Singh, who was EAM then, reacted to the testing of a Ghauri missile by saying, "There is no arms race, there is no danger."
In October 2002, after Pakistan tested Shaheen-I, Yashwant Sinha said, "They are a sovereign country, they have tested their missiles, good luck to them".
After the May 25, 2002 Ghauri test, Nirupama Rao, who was MEA spokesperson at the time, said, "We do not take it seriously... we are not perturbed. It is part of the stocks, clandestinely procured by Pakistan , and aimed at addressing a domestic audience. Vajpayee also said, "We don't take the test-firing of missiles by Pakistan seriously".
The US , which does not see the development of new weapons as contributing to any arms race, regularly accuses India and Pakistan of indulging in an arms race whenever they test missiles.
The Times of India
Patil fails Indo-Pak missile test
SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
TIMES NEWS NETWORK
NEW DELHI: Foreign secretary Shashank's sage counsel on Pakistan (and presumably India) avoiding controversies through the media came a day too late for Union home minister Shivraj Patil, who, on Sunday, deviated from the official policy to condemn Pakistan's testing of the Ghauri missile as "escalating the arms race".
Patil was obviously not familiar with the Indian government's long-standing policy of not criticising Islamabad for testing its missiles.
Senior officials in South Block are chafing at his reference to an "arms race" since that is precisely the phrase the US , Japan and others use to criticise India each time it tests its ballistic missiles.
Officials also said that Pakistan had, in fact, given advanced notice to India of Saturday's missile test.
In April 1999, Jaswant Singh, who was EAM then, reacted to the testing of a Ghauri missile by saying, "There is no arms race, there is no danger."
In October 2002, after Pakistan tested Shaheen-I, Yashwant Sinha said, "They are a sovereign country, they have tested their missiles, good luck to them".
After the May 25, 2002 Ghauri test, Nirupama Rao, who was MEA spokesperson at the time, said, "We do not take it seriously... we are not perturbed. It is part of the stocks, clandestinely procured by Pakistan , and aimed at addressing a domestic audience. Vajpayee also said, "We don't take the test-firing of missiles by Pakistan seriously".
The US , which does not see the development of new weapons as contributing to any arms race, regularly accuses India and Pakistan of indulging in an arms race whenever they test missiles.
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