29 November 2004
The Hindu
ILO chief backs job guarantee programme
By Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI, NOV. 28. Endorsing the Common Minimum Programme's proposal for a national employment guarantee programme, the International Labour Organisation Director-General, Juan Somavia, said India has the potential to achieve "a real breakthrough internationally" with its promise of "more inclusive" growth.
In an interview to The Hindu , Mr. Somavia said the point of departure for any discussion on poverty and growth had to be "the fact that global policies today are not producing employment."
Calling for a change in the way the success of economic policy is measured, he said: "Today, growth is the main thing but growth is not sufficient because as the example of India and other parts of the world shows, you have jobless growth. So why not change the criterion of success to job creation and basic social protection?"
Once this baseline is laid out, a country should organise its policies to serve this goal. "Of course you want growth, sound macro-management and low inflation for providing employment. But we need the policies to converge towards the goal of employment."
`Enormous potential'
Asked about the proposed Employment Guarantee Act, Mr. Somavia said this approach had enormous potential. The CMP, he said, reflected the general aspirations of the Indian people. On the controversy surrounding the cost of implementing the employment guarantee scheme, the ILO director general acknowledged that implementation would not be easy. "But unless you set objectives, like the CMP does, things won't happen."
India, he said, has the advantage of the size of its economy and market. "So you can plan to generate jobs on the basis of asset creation. You can create three times as many jobs in infrastructure projects if you use labour-intensive technologies, especially on secondary roads and like projects, and you don't have to compromise on the quality or time taken to finish the job. This way, you also train people — they develop skills, their productivity increases."
The ILO had been emphasising an approach that linked job creation, the notion of decent work and fair globalisation to eradicate poverty, he said. Though a commitment to reduce and eradicate poverty was made at the Copenhagen World Social Summit in 1995, the commitment to full employment had disappeared along the way. "The link between poverty and jobs was lost. So, if we are to review the Millennium Development Goals and the poverty reduction strategies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, we have to put employment on the agenda."
National policy needed
While there was room for a variety of instruments from State intervention to private enterprise and micro-credit, Mr. Somavia said the creation of employment and the elimination of poverty required a focussed approach. "You need a national policy rather than saying, `Look how nice this micro-credit programme is doing.' What's missing is the scaling up, the connections. So one tends to have a spotted tiger of success stories — but no national policy."
The focus on employment guarantee would help upgrade the quality and productivity of workers in the informal sector, Mr. Somavia said. "You have enormous creativity with low productivity, which keeps one at subsistence level. If you put support under it — some management knowledge, social protection, including healthcare access, credit and some market knowledge, and these are not major things — productivity will shoot up right away."
He said one had to be realistic about the limits of national policymaking. "The fact is we need fair globalisation. Dealing with globalisation begins at home — you will have successful globalisation only if you have successful localisation. On the other hand, you may have good national governance but if there isn't good global governance — fair rules of the game in finance, trade, migration, workers' rights — then this is no use. If the rules of the game were not fair, the economy "is like a hole from which water continuously drips."
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
29 November 2004
28 November 2004
Kashmir: Still in search of a policy
28 November 2004
The Hindu
Kashmir: still in search of a policy
The noises are right and the gestures appropriate, but the Manmohan Singh Government has yet to come up with a coherent policy for peace in Jammu and Kashmir, writes Siddharth Varadarajan.
NOW THAT Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has completed his maiden voyage to Jammu and Kashmir and the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan is all set to enter its second round, it is tempting to surmise that the United Progressive Alliance Government has a well thought out policy to tackle the internal and external dimensions of the State's problems in the weeks and months ahead.
The reality, however, is somewhat different. Whether one agrees with it or not, the foreign office's approach to the external dimension -- of using confidence-building measures (CBMs) and people-to-people contact as stepping stones towards an eventual settlement -- enjoys a certain logical consistency.
But the Centre's approach to tackling the domestic aspect of the problem seems fitful, timid and inconsistent. A reduction in the number of troops deployed has been promised and partially effected.
But there is still no game plan in sight for dialogue and reconciliation, for taking the lead in proposing institutional and administrative arrangements that might strike a chord with the popular aspirations of the people in the Valley and across the State.
A dead end
Originally conceived of as two parallel tracks, the domestic spur of the Kashmir peace process has more or less reached a dead end. After two rounds of fruitless talks, neither the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference nor the Centre seems in any particular hurry to return to the negotiating table.
As for the external component — dialogue on the State's future with Pakistan — the process is continuing, but only just. During the first round of Foreign Secretary-level talks on Kashmir earlier this year, neither side went beyond stated positions.
On September 24, the Prime Minister asked the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, to spell out his ideas on the contours of a possible settlement. Indian officials took great pride in the fact that Dr. Singh's request found the General, for once, at a loss for words. He promised to revert, but when he did, by floating a trial balloon during an iftaar party in Islamabad last month, it was India that was not sure how quite to respond.
Novel and controversial
The fortnight or so that the Musharraf balloon was allowed to float was a time of freewheeling ideation on both sides of the border. The General's ideas were novel and also controversial and they sparked off a lively debate, helped, in part, by the low-key Indian reaction of not offering any official opinion until such time the proposals were made formally. Somewhere along the line, however, the decision seems to have been taken to prick the balloon.
Alarmed by the tone of editorials and articles appearing in the Valley's Urdu newspapers, the Intelligence Bureau warned against the cascading effect the Musharraf proposals might have if left unchecked. "It was necessary for us to reassure the pro-India forces," a highly-placed source told this reporter.
Accordingly, the Prime Minister, during his visit to Srinagar, publicly reiterated India's well-known position that there could be no change in external boundaries or a communal partition of J&K.
For good measure, Dr. Singh threw in some references to the Indian Constitution, something his predecessor, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had finessed by referring only to insaniyat, or humanism, as the binding constraint facing Government policy towards the State.
But lest the impression go around that the UPA was shutting the door on any change in the domestic status quo as well, highly-placed official sources told a number of newspapers, including The Hindu , immediately after the Prime Minister's visit to Srinagar, that the Government was open to the idea of restoring J&K's pre-1953 autonomy, except as far as the writ of the Election Commission and the Supreme Court was concerned.
The sources said that if both sides of the erstwhile princely State of J&K, including the so-called Northern Areas of Gilgit-Baltistan, could enjoy the same high degree of autonomy, then this, coupled with soft borders, might provide the ingredients for a final solution to the State's problems.
While this idea sounds promising, there is no reason why the question of the State's autonomy should be delayed in any way or held out as a bargaining chip in the dialogue process with Pakistan.
If official thinking is coming around to the view that Kashmir's pre-1953 status is intrinsic to any peaceful resolution of the conflict, steps should immediately be taken to explore this possibility.
Not a good record
Unfortunately, the track record of the Government of India on the question of autonomy has not been very good. In 1996, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao promised a "sky is the limit" level of autonomy. Since then, little has been done to operationalise this commitment.
Working on the basis of explicit but unwritten assurances from the erstwhile Vajpayee Government, the National Conference-led State Government in J&K formulated an autonomy proposal that might, at least, have provided the basis for a debate on the subject. "Dr. Farooq Abdullah, who was Chief Minister at the time, was told by both Mr. Vajpayee and L.K. Advani that the proposals would be reviewed by a high-powered committee and not dismissed peremptorily," a senior official familiar with the subject told this reporter.
"Accordingly, an inter-ministerial committee of officials was indeed set up to look into the J&K Assembly's autonomy report and examine what could be acted upon and what couldn't."
At some point, however, politics intervened with the sangh parivar leadership deciding the question of autonomy had to be officially repudiated. "Without even a Cabinet note on the subject before it, the Union Cabinet met on July 4, 2000, and summarily rejected any proposal for increasing J&K's autonomy," the official said.
The then National Democratic Alliance Government went through the motions of discussing the autonomy issue with the J&K Government but it was clear the Centre considered the issue closed.
Indeed, so entrenched is the official belief that the last word on autonomy has already been said that the following extraordinary paragraph figures prominently in the Union Home Ministry's annual report for 2003-4, released, it should be noted, well after Dr. Manmohan Singh became Prime Minister:
"Autonomy in literal terms can be defined as freedom to work/legislate independently. If this definition is applied in constitutional terms (sic), then autonomy means independent powers to make legislation on various subjects. The State of Jammu and Kashmir already enjoys the said autonomy, as may be seen from the aforesaid." (Paragraph 3.50, MHA Annual Report, 2003-4)
Part of the problem, of course, is that there is no centralised forum for policymaking over Kashmir. During the Vajpayee years, the PMO and the Home Ministry were busy running circles around each other, the Intelligence Bureau and RAW couldn't see eye to eye, while the Defence and External Affairs Ministries had their own perspective. Some attempt was made in September 2003 to hold regular high-level coordination meetings but this consultative process tended to be largely reactive.
Autonomy for J&K
If the UPA Government is serious about redressing the grievances of people in Jammu and Kashmir, it will have to display both political broadmindedness and greater administrative cohesiveness. Increasing the level of autonomy in J&K will put pressure on Pakistan to do the same in those regions of the State now under its administrative control.
This is especially so if autonomy is creatively combined with decentralisation of administrative power within the State to reflect the diversity of its ethnic and linguistic mix.
Along with respect for human rights and a determination to mete out exemplary punishment to any soldier or officer found guilty of violating the rights of the Kashmiris, autonomy can go a long way towards reassuring ordinary people in the State that it is possible to live with dignity and honour in India.
Softer borders and the possibility of the movement of people and produce across the LoC would give a big boost to the region's economy.
CBMs for people
To put things a little differently, it is all very well to push confidence-building measures with Pakistan. It is high time New Delhi came up with CBMs for the people of Jammu and Kashmir.
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
The Hindu
Kashmir: still in search of a policy
The noises are right and the gestures appropriate, but the Manmohan Singh Government has yet to come up with a coherent policy for peace in Jammu and Kashmir, writes Siddharth Varadarajan.
NOW THAT Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has completed his maiden voyage to Jammu and Kashmir and the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan is all set to enter its second round, it is tempting to surmise that the United Progressive Alliance Government has a well thought out policy to tackle the internal and external dimensions of the State's problems in the weeks and months ahead.
The reality, however, is somewhat different. Whether one agrees with it or not, the foreign office's approach to the external dimension -- of using confidence-building measures (CBMs) and people-to-people contact as stepping stones towards an eventual settlement -- enjoys a certain logical consistency.
But the Centre's approach to tackling the domestic aspect of the problem seems fitful, timid and inconsistent. A reduction in the number of troops deployed has been promised and partially effected.
But there is still no game plan in sight for dialogue and reconciliation, for taking the lead in proposing institutional and administrative arrangements that might strike a chord with the popular aspirations of the people in the Valley and across the State.
A dead end
Originally conceived of as two parallel tracks, the domestic spur of the Kashmir peace process has more or less reached a dead end. After two rounds of fruitless talks, neither the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference nor the Centre seems in any particular hurry to return to the negotiating table.
As for the external component — dialogue on the State's future with Pakistan — the process is continuing, but only just. During the first round of Foreign Secretary-level talks on Kashmir earlier this year, neither side went beyond stated positions.
On September 24, the Prime Minister asked the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, to spell out his ideas on the contours of a possible settlement. Indian officials took great pride in the fact that Dr. Singh's request found the General, for once, at a loss for words. He promised to revert, but when he did, by floating a trial balloon during an iftaar party in Islamabad last month, it was India that was not sure how quite to respond.
Novel and controversial
The fortnight or so that the Musharraf balloon was allowed to float was a time of freewheeling ideation on both sides of the border. The General's ideas were novel and also controversial and they sparked off a lively debate, helped, in part, by the low-key Indian reaction of not offering any official opinion until such time the proposals were made formally. Somewhere along the line, however, the decision seems to have been taken to prick the balloon.
Alarmed by the tone of editorials and articles appearing in the Valley's Urdu newspapers, the Intelligence Bureau warned against the cascading effect the Musharraf proposals might have if left unchecked. "It was necessary for us to reassure the pro-India forces," a highly-placed source told this reporter.
Accordingly, the Prime Minister, during his visit to Srinagar, publicly reiterated India's well-known position that there could be no change in external boundaries or a communal partition of J&K.
For good measure, Dr. Singh threw in some references to the Indian Constitution, something his predecessor, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, had finessed by referring only to insaniyat, or humanism, as the binding constraint facing Government policy towards the State.
But lest the impression go around that the UPA was shutting the door on any change in the domestic status quo as well, highly-placed official sources told a number of newspapers, including The Hindu , immediately after the Prime Minister's visit to Srinagar, that the Government was open to the idea of restoring J&K's pre-1953 autonomy, except as far as the writ of the Election Commission and the Supreme Court was concerned.
The sources said that if both sides of the erstwhile princely State of J&K, including the so-called Northern Areas of Gilgit-Baltistan, could enjoy the same high degree of autonomy, then this, coupled with soft borders, might provide the ingredients for a final solution to the State's problems.
While this idea sounds promising, there is no reason why the question of the State's autonomy should be delayed in any way or held out as a bargaining chip in the dialogue process with Pakistan.
If official thinking is coming around to the view that Kashmir's pre-1953 status is intrinsic to any peaceful resolution of the conflict, steps should immediately be taken to explore this possibility.
Not a good record
Unfortunately, the track record of the Government of India on the question of autonomy has not been very good. In 1996, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao promised a "sky is the limit" level of autonomy. Since then, little has been done to operationalise this commitment.
Working on the basis of explicit but unwritten assurances from the erstwhile Vajpayee Government, the National Conference-led State Government in J&K formulated an autonomy proposal that might, at least, have provided the basis for a debate on the subject. "Dr. Farooq Abdullah, who was Chief Minister at the time, was told by both Mr. Vajpayee and L.K. Advani that the proposals would be reviewed by a high-powered committee and not dismissed peremptorily," a senior official familiar with the subject told this reporter.
"Accordingly, an inter-ministerial committee of officials was indeed set up to look into the J&K Assembly's autonomy report and examine what could be acted upon and what couldn't."
At some point, however, politics intervened with the sangh parivar leadership deciding the question of autonomy had to be officially repudiated. "Without even a Cabinet note on the subject before it, the Union Cabinet met on July 4, 2000, and summarily rejected any proposal for increasing J&K's autonomy," the official said.
The then National Democratic Alliance Government went through the motions of discussing the autonomy issue with the J&K Government but it was clear the Centre considered the issue closed.
Indeed, so entrenched is the official belief that the last word on autonomy has already been said that the following extraordinary paragraph figures prominently in the Union Home Ministry's annual report for 2003-4, released, it should be noted, well after Dr. Manmohan Singh became Prime Minister:
"Autonomy in literal terms can be defined as freedom to work/legislate independently. If this definition is applied in constitutional terms (sic), then autonomy means independent powers to make legislation on various subjects. The State of Jammu and Kashmir already enjoys the said autonomy, as may be seen from the aforesaid." (Paragraph 3.50, MHA Annual Report, 2003-4)
Part of the problem, of course, is that there is no centralised forum for policymaking over Kashmir. During the Vajpayee years, the PMO and the Home Ministry were busy running circles around each other, the Intelligence Bureau and RAW couldn't see eye to eye, while the Defence and External Affairs Ministries had their own perspective. Some attempt was made in September 2003 to hold regular high-level coordination meetings but this consultative process tended to be largely reactive.
Autonomy for J&K
If the UPA Government is serious about redressing the grievances of people in Jammu and Kashmir, it will have to display both political broadmindedness and greater administrative cohesiveness. Increasing the level of autonomy in J&K will put pressure on Pakistan to do the same in those regions of the State now under its administrative control.
This is especially so if autonomy is creatively combined with decentralisation of administrative power within the State to reflect the diversity of its ethnic and linguistic mix.
Along with respect for human rights and a determination to mete out exemplary punishment to any soldier or officer found guilty of violating the rights of the Kashmiris, autonomy can go a long way towards reassuring ordinary people in the State that it is possible to live with dignity and honour in India.
Softer borders and the possibility of the movement of people and produce across the LoC would give a big boost to the region's economy.
CBMs for people
To put things a little differently, it is all very well to push confidence-building measures with Pakistan. It is high time New Delhi came up with CBMs for the people of Jammu and Kashmir.
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
25 November 2004
Let us reduce trust deficit, Aziz tells India
25 November 2004
The Hindu
Let us reduce trust deficit, Aziz tells India
By Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI, NOV. 24. So rare have they been in the past that high-level meetings between India and Pakistan invariably generate expectations out of sync with the specifics of each occasion.
In the run-up to this week's visit by the Pakistan Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, there was intense speculation about the radical Kashmir proposals he might bring along — and the answers that were supposedly awaiting him. But in the end, neither the Musharraf trial balloon nor the reiteration in Srinagar last week of India's stated position by the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, was allowed to interrupt the rhythm of the ongoing composite dialogue process.
"Mr. Aziz told our PM we need to reduce the trust deficit by moving ahead in tandem on all issues, including Kashmir," a senior Indian official told The Hindu. "We see confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a way of doing precisely that."
According to Indian officials, Mr. Aziz told Dr. Singh that Gen. Musharraf had come away from his September 24 meeting in New York with a positive frame of mind but that since then there had been "some statements and interpretations" which had caused confusion. Dr. Singh replied that if Mr. Aziz was referring to his remarks in Srinagar, these were no different from what he had himself told Gen. Musharraf in New York — i.e. that India could not accept a change in its borders or any partitioning of territory on a communal basis. Beyond these constraints, Mr. Aziz was told, India is prepared to examine all options. "After that, the discussion moved on," the official said.
In an interaction with Indian editors over breakfast just before his meeting with Dr. Singh on Wednesday, Mr. Aziz made it clear that Gen. Musharraf's `iftaar' proposals on dividing Jammu and Kashmir into seven regions was only meant to catalyse internal debate within Pakistan. He said he had brought "no proposals or anything" on Kashmir and that his talks with Dr. Singh would not be the "first or last meeting." "We're talking about a process. We should not look at these trips as transactions."
At the same time, Mr. Aziz urged the Indian Government to come up with new proposals of its own on Kashmir. Gen. Musharraf's remarks do not reflect a change in policy of the Pakistan Government, he said. "But I think all of us are trying to think out of the box, to address issues and approach them in different ways hoping that a viable and sustainable solution can be found. And if we all state our stated positions, then the gridlock may not end."
Mr. Aziz said Dr Singh's speech at a public rally in Srinagar was a mere restatement of India's traditional position on Kashmir. India and Pakistan need to come up with "credible scenarios" which could be accepted by the two countries and the Kashmiris as well, who are "important stakeholders" in the issue. "At least it gets the thinking process going. And very often, when one thinks out of the box, one can come up with credible solutions, which may be acceptable to all. But if we don't try, we will never get there."
Need to move in tandem
Stressing that now was the time to move "from tactical to strategic issues, to the core issues," Mr. Aziz rejected the suggestion that Pakistan and India follow the India-China dialogue pattern of not letting the border demarcation problem come in the way of normalisation.
"You can have parallel tracks but movement has to be in tandem. Cherrypicking may not be the right way to go. When you move in tandem, naturally Kashmir will be very much on the agenda. And the solution which reflects the feelings of the people in that area has to be brought out."
Mr. Aziz said: "For our stakeholders, it is very important that we show engagement and progress on discussing the Jammu and Kashmir issue." No country can force a CBM on the other unless it's a win-win for both, he added. Though he ruled out MFN status for India for the present, he said there were certain "win-win" issues on which the two countries could work together like agriculture in the two Punjabs and the gas pipeline. "It is Pakistan's wish that the trust deficit between us is reduced", he said.
"Let's not forget that till a year ago we couldn't even fly to each other's countries. And with due respect, we didn't interrupt that flight flow, India did. So let's look ahead now. Let's create an atmosphere where we can make progress on all these issues. But we can't wish any issue away."
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
The Hindu
Let us reduce trust deficit, Aziz tells India
By Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI, NOV. 24. So rare have they been in the past that high-level meetings between India and Pakistan invariably generate expectations out of sync with the specifics of each occasion.
In the run-up to this week's visit by the Pakistan Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, there was intense speculation about the radical Kashmir proposals he might bring along — and the answers that were supposedly awaiting him. But in the end, neither the Musharraf trial balloon nor the reiteration in Srinagar last week of India's stated position by the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, was allowed to interrupt the rhythm of the ongoing composite dialogue process.
"Mr. Aziz told our PM we need to reduce the trust deficit by moving ahead in tandem on all issues, including Kashmir," a senior Indian official told The Hindu. "We see confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a way of doing precisely that."
According to Indian officials, Mr. Aziz told Dr. Singh that Gen. Musharraf had come away from his September 24 meeting in New York with a positive frame of mind but that since then there had been "some statements and interpretations" which had caused confusion. Dr. Singh replied that if Mr. Aziz was referring to his remarks in Srinagar, these were no different from what he had himself told Gen. Musharraf in New York — i.e. that India could not accept a change in its borders or any partitioning of territory on a communal basis. Beyond these constraints, Mr. Aziz was told, India is prepared to examine all options. "After that, the discussion moved on," the official said.
In an interaction with Indian editors over breakfast just before his meeting with Dr. Singh on Wednesday, Mr. Aziz made it clear that Gen. Musharraf's `iftaar' proposals on dividing Jammu and Kashmir into seven regions was only meant to catalyse internal debate within Pakistan. He said he had brought "no proposals or anything" on Kashmir and that his talks with Dr. Singh would not be the "first or last meeting." "We're talking about a process. We should not look at these trips as transactions."
At the same time, Mr. Aziz urged the Indian Government to come up with new proposals of its own on Kashmir. Gen. Musharraf's remarks do not reflect a change in policy of the Pakistan Government, he said. "But I think all of us are trying to think out of the box, to address issues and approach them in different ways hoping that a viable and sustainable solution can be found. And if we all state our stated positions, then the gridlock may not end."
Mr. Aziz said Dr Singh's speech at a public rally in Srinagar was a mere restatement of India's traditional position on Kashmir. India and Pakistan need to come up with "credible scenarios" which could be accepted by the two countries and the Kashmiris as well, who are "important stakeholders" in the issue. "At least it gets the thinking process going. And very often, when one thinks out of the box, one can come up with credible solutions, which may be acceptable to all. But if we don't try, we will never get there."
Need to move in tandem
Stressing that now was the time to move "from tactical to strategic issues, to the core issues," Mr. Aziz rejected the suggestion that Pakistan and India follow the India-China dialogue pattern of not letting the border demarcation problem come in the way of normalisation.
"You can have parallel tracks but movement has to be in tandem. Cherrypicking may not be the right way to go. When you move in tandem, naturally Kashmir will be very much on the agenda. And the solution which reflects the feelings of the people in that area has to be brought out."
Mr. Aziz said: "For our stakeholders, it is very important that we show engagement and progress on discussing the Jammu and Kashmir issue." No country can force a CBM on the other unless it's a win-win for both, he added. Though he ruled out MFN status for India for the present, he said there were certain "win-win" issues on which the two countries could work together like agriculture in the two Punjabs and the gas pipeline. "It is Pakistan's wish that the trust deficit between us is reduced", he said.
"Let's not forget that till a year ago we couldn't even fly to each other's countries. And with due respect, we didn't interrupt that flight flow, India did. So let's look ahead now. Let's create an atmosphere where we can make progress on all these issues. But we can't wish any issue away."
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
'Gas project is win-win for India, Pakistan'
25 November 2004
The Hindu
''Gas project is a win-win for India, Pakistan''
By Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI, NOV. 24. The proposed pipeline from Iran is a win-win project for both Islamabad and New Delhi but if India does not wish to cooperate, Pakistan is prepared to strike a deal with gas exporting countries for its own domestic energy needs, Pakistan's Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, said here on Wednesday.
At a breakfast interaction with Indian editors, Mr. Aziz said he was convinced the pipeline was in India's interest too and that there was no need for Pakistan to grant reverse-transit rights for Indian products to Afghanistan in exchange. "India's economy is growing, you are going to need hydrocarbons... and you need many diverse sources and routes for this energy. Not everything should come through Kandla or the traditional ports."
Pakistan was also short of energy and its economy was growing fast, Mr. Aziz said, "so for us, if we can get Irani or Qatari gas, and there are other sources like Turkmenistan etc, let me tell you, we are going ahead anyway. It has nothing to do with whether India uses this route or doesn't, because it makes economic sense for Pakistan."
"If India is not interested, we're proceeding anyway," Mr. Aziz said. "But if you're going to lay a 12-inch pipe and you may want to do a 24-inch because it has to go beyond it, anybody who'll push the numbers will tell you it makes much more sense to start with a 24-inch pipe. But even a 12-inch pipe is fine. We are negotiating very hard."
At the same time, Mr. Aziz said that if Pakistan and India built the pipeline together, "we create mutual dependencies and linkages... if diplomacy has to succeed, these linkages have to be created." He acknowledged "the how and the mix is very complex and has to be looked at," but said that the pipeline would be a more secure CBM between the two countries than trade. "Trade is not permanent, trade can be switched off or on any time... but once you have a pipeline with international investors — today the financial world has got very sophisticated, there are some excellent techniques for risk mitigation which can protect ourselves and India against the traditional risks which may occur to people who are looking at this issue."
Mr. Aziz said people should not think the pipeline "is a real slam-dunk, or a real big advantage for Pakistan and not for India, or that we are doing this because we see some royalty or transit fees." He said one could add "bells and whistles" to the project "so that we have another prolonged discussion" but that if India and Pakistan were serious "it should be a simple clean process." Otherwise, we can have many task forces and committees to examine this till the cows come home and we won't make any progress."
Asked about India's demand for reverse transit rights to Afghanistan and Iran, Mr. Aziz was non-committal. "Eventually, we can look at transit also," he said. "We do allow inbound transit from Afghanistan to India... But reverse traffic is not allowed. That again can be considered when, in the judgement of the various stakeholders, we feel we are making progress (on Kashmir). This `in tandem' approach has to be clearly understood by all concerned."
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
The Hindu
''Gas project is a win-win for India, Pakistan''
By Siddharth Varadarajan
NEW DELHI, NOV. 24. The proposed pipeline from Iran is a win-win project for both Islamabad and New Delhi but if India does not wish to cooperate, Pakistan is prepared to strike a deal with gas exporting countries for its own domestic energy needs, Pakistan's Prime Minister, Shaukat Aziz, said here on Wednesday.
At a breakfast interaction with Indian editors, Mr. Aziz said he was convinced the pipeline was in India's interest too and that there was no need for Pakistan to grant reverse-transit rights for Indian products to Afghanistan in exchange. "India's economy is growing, you are going to need hydrocarbons... and you need many diverse sources and routes for this energy. Not everything should come through Kandla or the traditional ports."
Pakistan was also short of energy and its economy was growing fast, Mr. Aziz said, "so for us, if we can get Irani or Qatari gas, and there are other sources like Turkmenistan etc, let me tell you, we are going ahead anyway. It has nothing to do with whether India uses this route or doesn't, because it makes economic sense for Pakistan."
"If India is not interested, we're proceeding anyway," Mr. Aziz said. "But if you're going to lay a 12-inch pipe and you may want to do a 24-inch because it has to go beyond it, anybody who'll push the numbers will tell you it makes much more sense to start with a 24-inch pipe. But even a 12-inch pipe is fine. We are negotiating very hard."
At the same time, Mr. Aziz said that if Pakistan and India built the pipeline together, "we create mutual dependencies and linkages... if diplomacy has to succeed, these linkages have to be created." He acknowledged "the how and the mix is very complex and has to be looked at," but said that the pipeline would be a more secure CBM between the two countries than trade. "Trade is not permanent, trade can be switched off or on any time... but once you have a pipeline with international investors — today the financial world has got very sophisticated, there are some excellent techniques for risk mitigation which can protect ourselves and India against the traditional risks which may occur to people who are looking at this issue."
Mr. Aziz said people should not think the pipeline "is a real slam-dunk, or a real big advantage for Pakistan and not for India, or that we are doing this because we see some royalty or transit fees." He said one could add "bells and whistles" to the project "so that we have another prolonged discussion" but that if India and Pakistan were serious "it should be a simple clean process." Otherwise, we can have many task forces and committees to examine this till the cows come home and we won't make any progress."
Asked about India's demand for reverse transit rights to Afghanistan and Iran, Mr. Aziz was non-committal. "Eventually, we can look at transit also," he said. "We do allow inbound transit from Afghanistan to India... But reverse traffic is not allowed. That again can be considered when, in the judgement of the various stakeholders, we feel we are making progress (on Kashmir). This `in tandem' approach has to be clearly understood by all concerned."
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
09 November 2004
Galileo, fusion energy propel India, E.U. `strategic partnership'
9 November 2004
The Hindu
Galileo, fusion energy propel India, E.U. `strategic partnership'
By Siddharth Varadarajan
THE HAGUE, NOV. 8 . The decision to speed up the conclusion of an agreement for India joining the European Union's Galileo global positioning system and to establish an Energy Panel marked the high-point of the `strategic partnership' unveiled by the two sides here on Monday.
Galileo — with its network of 30 satellites becomes operational in 2008 — will provide the first real alternative to the U.S. military-run Navstar/Global Positioning System (GPS), which Washington has the power to turn off on a selective basis. And the Energy Panel will, inter alia, work on the modalities of Indian participation in the ambitious International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project on fusion energy.
If eventual Indian participation in Galileo will be the first concrete expression of Europe and India's desire to work for a multipolar world order, collaboration on the ITER will help New Delhi establish a new benchmark for its participation in international civilian nuclear initiatives — something Washington has not been too keen to encourage.
The joint statement issued at the end of the fifth India-E.U. summit noted that the two sides welcomed the "progress in the on-going discussion on the E.U.-India Draft Cooperation Agreement on the Galileo satellite navigation project. This discussion "will ensure India's equitable participation in Galileo space, ground and user segments" and "will guarantee the availability of highest quality signals over the Indian territory."
A new flexibility
The choice of words suggests a new flexibility on Europe's part, for at stake is the question of access to the encryption codes for the military-grade high-end Public Regulated Service (PRS) signal architecture. Until now, the E.U. has been reluctant to provide these in the event of New Delhi coming on board the Galileo venture, in part because of U.S. apprehensions. Highly-placed Indian officials said the matter of PRS codes had been a subject for discussion between the national security establishments of India, France and Germany and that a solution would emerge soon. India is also looking closely at the E.U.'s arrangement with China on Galileo, where the modalities for high-end access are still being worked on despite Beijing already being on board.
In his remarks at a joint press conference with E.U. leaders, the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, highlighted both the Galileo and ITER projects and said, in response to a question, that India would be willing to invest money "appropriate to our participation."
Fusion energy project
As for the fusion energy project, the European Commission President, Romano Prodi, said the E.U. was keen on including India. Describing the long-term energy supply situation as "dramatic" keeping in mind growth in India and China, he said he did not want India's development to stop because of lack of energy.
On their part, the Indian side told the E.U. that New Delhi supported the European proposal to locate the ITER's proposed tokamak reactor at Cadarache in France, rather than at Rokkasho Mura in Japan, as Washington and Tokyo are insisting. Apart from the E.U., Japan and the U.S., the others involved in ITER are China, Russia, Canada and South Korea. If successful, the project will lead to the provision of cheap and abundant power by around 2050 but because fusion reactors involve tritium — which is also an ingredient in nuclear weapons — the U.S. has certain "proliferation concerns" about ITER's doors being opened too wide.
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
The Hindu
Galileo, fusion energy propel India, E.U. `strategic partnership'
By Siddharth Varadarajan
THE HAGUE, NOV. 8 . The decision to speed up the conclusion of an agreement for India joining the European Union's Galileo global positioning system and to establish an Energy Panel marked the high-point of the `strategic partnership' unveiled by the two sides here on Monday.
Galileo — with its network of 30 satellites becomes operational in 2008 — will provide the first real alternative to the U.S. military-run Navstar/Global Positioning System (GPS), which Washington has the power to turn off on a selective basis. And the Energy Panel will, inter alia, work on the modalities of Indian participation in the ambitious International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project on fusion energy.
If eventual Indian participation in Galileo will be the first concrete expression of Europe and India's desire to work for a multipolar world order, collaboration on the ITER will help New Delhi establish a new benchmark for its participation in international civilian nuclear initiatives — something Washington has not been too keen to encourage.
The joint statement issued at the end of the fifth India-E.U. summit noted that the two sides welcomed the "progress in the on-going discussion on the E.U.-India Draft Cooperation Agreement on the Galileo satellite navigation project. This discussion "will ensure India's equitable participation in Galileo space, ground and user segments" and "will guarantee the availability of highest quality signals over the Indian territory."
A new flexibility
The choice of words suggests a new flexibility on Europe's part, for at stake is the question of access to the encryption codes for the military-grade high-end Public Regulated Service (PRS) signal architecture. Until now, the E.U. has been reluctant to provide these in the event of New Delhi coming on board the Galileo venture, in part because of U.S. apprehensions. Highly-placed Indian officials said the matter of PRS codes had been a subject for discussion between the national security establishments of India, France and Germany and that a solution would emerge soon. India is also looking closely at the E.U.'s arrangement with China on Galileo, where the modalities for high-end access are still being worked on despite Beijing already being on board.
In his remarks at a joint press conference with E.U. leaders, the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, highlighted both the Galileo and ITER projects and said, in response to a question, that India would be willing to invest money "appropriate to our participation."
Fusion energy project
As for the fusion energy project, the European Commission President, Romano Prodi, said the E.U. was keen on including India. Describing the long-term energy supply situation as "dramatic" keeping in mind growth in India and China, he said he did not want India's development to stop because of lack of energy.
On their part, the Indian side told the E.U. that New Delhi supported the European proposal to locate the ITER's proposed tokamak reactor at Cadarache in France, rather than at Rokkasho Mura in Japan, as Washington and Tokyo are insisting. Apart from the E.U., Japan and the U.S., the others involved in ITER are China, Russia, Canada and South Korea. If successful, the project will lead to the provision of cheap and abundant power by around 2050 but because fusion reactors involve tritium — which is also an ingredient in nuclear weapons — the U.S. has certain "proliferation concerns" about ITER's doors being opened too wide.
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
Combating terrorism, a priority say India, EU
| 9 November 2004 The Hindu International - India & World By Siddharth Varadarajan
THE HAGUE, NOV. 8. The partnership unveiled by India and the European Union envisages cooperation in a broad range of economic, political and cultural subjects and reflects the "strategic depth" in the relationship between the two sides, Indian and EU leaders said here on Monday. The `strategic partnership' represents a "substantive upgrading" of the relationship, the Dutch Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende, said at a joint press conference with the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh. The Netherlands currently holds the rotating presidency of the EU. "India and the EU are increasingly involved in world affairs," he said.The areas of convergence concerned diverse subjects such as counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, pushing the Doha development agenda at the WTO and the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Mr. Balkenende said that if one were to draw a line from Brussels to New Delhi, India and the EU "are two poles of stability with a lot of instability in the areas in between, from the western Balkans, the Middle East and Afghanistan." The joint press statement released by India and the EU details the agenda to be taken up over the next year, when a concrete plan of action will be finalised at the summit between the two sides in New Delhi in 2005. Disarmament
On the political front, this will involve institutionalised dialogue on disarmament and non-proliferation as well as issues such as peacekeeping, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. The joint statement notes that cooperation in combating terrorism "is a priority area for the action plan for a strategic partnership" but adds that the "fight against terrorism must be carried out in full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law." India and the EU also pledged to "enhance collective action to fight the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as the means of delivery... The response to proliferation challenges requires strengthened multilateral consultations and the pooling of all efforts and resources." While stressing the role that "effective export control measures for dual use goods" can play in preventing proliferation, the joint statement said "such measures should not hamper international cooperation in materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes." Though individual EU countries such as France and Germany have backed India's quest for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council, the EU as an institution does not have a common position. Thus the joint statement merely flagged the issue of U.N. reform but said both sides would look forward to the report of the U.N. Secretary General's high-level panel on the subject. The India-EU statement also expressed common views on a number of key international issues. The joint statement welcomed Israel's decision to withdraw from Gaza provided it is not the prelude to renewed settlements in the West Bank and provided it is a step towards two-state solution in accordance with the UNSC resolutions and roadmap. The two sides said they "welcome the restoration of full sovereignty to Iraq... and underline our concern that the current campaign of terrorist violence is leading to significant loss of life, particularly among civilians. India and the EU welcomed the commitment of the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to a peaceful solution to the conflict and called for the reopening of peace negotiations in Nepal. The EU also said it welcomed the "positive evolution of the relationship between India and Pakistan."
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu |
04 November 2004
The second coming of Mr Bush
| November 4, 2004 The Hindu Opinion - Leader Page Articles By Siddharth Varadarajan
GEORGE W. BUSH may have won the popular vote in the United States but the world at large is sure to look upon the prospect of a second Bush presidential term with bewilderment, concern and a fair amount of trepidation. The question on everyone's mind is whether Mr. Bush in his second innings will be emboldened by his domestic mandate — and march steadfastly down the path of confrontation with those who are judged to be "not with us" — or chastened by the deep, visceral divisions he has engendered among his own people. If it is the latter, he might just still effect a small change in the aggressive course being pursued by the U.S. globally in the name of fighting terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For one, this course is not working. Whether we speak of Iraq and Iran, Syria, Palestine or North Korea, Venezuela or Cuba, the Bush policy has failed to rally and unite America's allies or isolate and defeat its foes. But even if Mr. Bush were to substitute the fig-leaf of `collective action' for the unilateralism that has made Washington so unpopular around the world, the sheer weight of its accumulated strategic, military, and corporate interests will continue to push American policy in directions that are inimical to global stability. American power has already been committed; it can at best be refined or tempered, not redeployed. Donald Rumsfeld may or may not remain Secretary of Defence but his plan for the stationing of small, highly mobile forces on a chain of `lily pads' around Asia and the world will be the defining feature of American power projection in the 21st century. Along with the weaponisation of space via missile defence. And what if Mr. Bush and his team read the election verdict as a ringing endorsement of everything they have done since 9/11? From `pre-emptive war' in Afghanistan and Iraq to the suspension of civil liberties via laws such as the U.S. Patriot Act and the indefinite incarceration and even torture of suspects? Then it is reasonable to assume that we are entering a period not dissimilar to those in the past when legal and moral concerns and arguments are superseded by the chimera of national security. American voters who were driven to Mr. Bush by the insecurities of the post-9/11 world will doubtless be called upon to surrender a further part of their liberties the next time terror strikes the mainland. This is precisely what Osama bin Laden meant in his video-taped election-eve subliminal endorsement of Mr. Bush, when he said his strategy is to force the U.S. into a war which would bankrupt it. Terrorism wins if democracy ends up bankrupting democratic values in its `war against terror'. Osama fought in the CIA-funded jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and knows his history. He wants Mr. Bush to be the Brezhnev of the unipolar world. There are, however, some things a Bush second innings will not affect. Whatever the change in American politics, Tuesday's election verdict has not altered the reality of the situation of the ground in, say, Iraq, where the limits of American power have already been reached. A re-elected Bush administration will not find it any easier extricating itself from Iraq, or pursuing a muscular policy towards Iran or North Korea either. And there are other `rogues' out there who will look at these examples and draw appropriate lessons. It is not clear how easily Mr. Bush will be able to call the shots. In South Asia, New Delhi has been so used to looking at Washington through the limiting prism of Pakistan and terrorism that it seldom realises the very real ways in which the Bush doctrine of pre-emption is degrading the security environment in the wider Asian region. There are conventional and non-conventional threats to the security of the Asian region but these have to be tackled collectively, through institutions and arrangements that build on the architecture of international law rather than seeking to undermine it. India will soon be confronted with renewed pressure and blandishment on the question of assisting the Allawi `government' in Iraq, not so much with troops as with being on the ground during the impending January election. There will, in addition, be fresh feelers on some of the key policies of the Bush camp such as the controversial Proliferation Security Initiative. India will also be pressured to tone down its strategic relationship with Iran. The Manmohan Singh Government, which has done well to dispel the notion that it is "anti-American", will have to deal with these pressures as and when they come.
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu |
03 November 2004
Inside Kazakhstan-IV: Almaty's twin-track foreign policy
3 November 2004
The Hindu
Inside Kazakhstan-IV
Kazakhstan's twin-track foreign policy
The Hindu
Inside Kazakhstan-IV
Kazakhstan's twin-track foreign policy
By Siddharth Varadarajan
Almaty: With a land mass 86 per cent the size of India but a population of just 15 million, it is perhaps natural for the landlocked former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan to feel a little at sea in its neighbourhood.
Bordered in the north and east by Russia and China, it is small comfort to have on its southern frontiers Kygyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan — countries rich in natural resources but with unstable polities and restive populations. In order to pursue the somewhat elusive notion of strategic stability, the President, Nursultan Nazarbaev, has pushed his country's foreign policy along two distinct tracks.
First, he has struck a Faustian bargain with Washington, encouraging the U.S military presence in the region — first as part of NATO's `Partnership for Peace' expansion plan in the 1990s and, more recently, as an adjunct to the so-called global war on terrorism. Part of being a U.S. ally also means sending troops to Iraq, which Mr. Nazarbaev has done by deploying a small mine detection unit. But the second track of Kazakhstan's foreign policy involves developing the Central Asian region as a strategic and economic space on the basis of interaction with Russia, China and the wider continent of Asia, including India.
Strategic challenge
For many analysts, China poses the main strategic challenge to Kazakhstan. "China is a great country but a dangerous neighbour," says Mikhail Auezov, director general of the National Library of Kazakhstan and Kazakhstan's first Ambassador to Beijing. "I told President Nazarbaev that it is necessary to pay special attention to India because in Eurasia, only India can balance the activities of China." According to Mr. Auezov, "As a nation, we feel at the instinctive level that India is very close to us. The image of China, on the other hand, is one of danger for the Kazakh people."
Echoing Mr. Auezov's characterisation, Kamal Burkhanov, an adviser to Mr. Nazarbaev says: "Even for India, China is a great country but a dangerous neighbour. So for a country with a 15 million population, of course this is true! That is why we try to move quickly to be integrated into the world system, to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy, and support the U.S. and Russian presence in Central Asia. We would also like to support India's presence in Central Asia and Japan.
Alphabet soup
If China's presence — besides economic dynamism — weighs heavily on some analysts, others disagree that Beijing poses a threat to Kazakhstan in any way. "China is not a danger for us," says Bulat Sultanov of the Institute of World Economy and Policy. "The basis of our security comes from regional and sub-regional cooperation, and China is very much a part of this".
Providing a guide to the growing alphabet soup of regional organisations in Central Asia, Mr. Bulatov said the "first belt of security" for Kazakhstan is the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which protects the frontiers of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.
"The second belt is the anti-terrorist, anti-separatist alliance, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which links us to Russia and China". Then there is the Conference on Interaction and CBMs in Asia (CICA), of which India is also a part. "Finally, there is the integration process such as CIS, the Eurasian Economic Cooperation (EEC) and Eurasian Economic Space (EES)."
Though the U.S. presence in Central Asia has the negative consequence of making the region a target for Islamic extremists, "there are positive consequences too," says Mr. Burkhanov. If the U.S. is able to help a country such as Uzbekistan improve economically and go towards democracy, this will help bring stability in the region, he feels.
"The U.S. presence in Central Asia is a reality now, even if it is a delicate issue. We have to think of it as part of the great balance of power here. And also the struggle against terrorism."
For Askar Shomanov of the Kazakh Institute of Strategic Studies, however, terrorism in places such as Uzbekistan or Tajikistan has social and economic causes. "Terrorism in the Central Asian republics poses a threat because of social problems, with a great part of the population living below the poverty line. Also, the political regimes there are very weak in democratic terms — so opposition can take unstable and terrorist forms."
By establishing a military presence on the basis of supporting regimes which are not democratic — the British Ambassador to Tashkent was sacked recently for alleging that the U.S. and U.K. were only too happy to have Uzbekistan torture terror suspects for them — Washington might then perhaps be further contributing to inherent instabilities in these countries.
(Concluded)
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
02 November 2004
Inside Kazakhstan III: Those with pipelines call the tune
2 November 2004
The Hindu
The Hindu
Those with pipelines call the tune
By Siddharth Varadarajan Almaty: If there is one issue which is the source of even greater heartburn than the battle for control of the most lucrative oil fields of Central Asia, it is the struggle to decide how the region's vast reserves of energy will be transported out to the wider world. And as with most things in the current global system, it is geopolitics — meaning the sheer size of the military and political footprint of the United States — which is in command, relegating economics and rationality to the background.
Kazakhstan lies in the centre of Asia and is much closer to the energy-hungry markets of the continent such as China and India than to Europe or North America. ``There are four routes through which we can export our oil and gas'', says Kamal Burkhanov, head of the Institute of Russia and China and an adviser to the President, Nursultan Nazarbaev, on strategic affairs. ``First, a pipeline through Iran to the Persian Gulf either via Turkmenistan or the Caspian Sea; second, the Atasu pipeline to China; third, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) through Russia and its Black Sea port of Novorossisysk; and fourth, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) route'', where a pipeline is planned from Azerbaijan to the Turkish Mediterranean coast.
``The Americans want Baku-Ceyhan and are using all their influence in the region'', he says. ``And they are determined to ensure the Iran route doesn't develop''. According to Mr. Burkhanov, there isn't enough oil in the Caspian continental shelf to warrant investment in all routes, though the Kazakh Government backs all four. ``In my view, there is no doubt the most beneficial for Kazakhstan is the Iranian one, because the royalty costs, at around $1 out of $10 are far lower than the $3-5 we would pay through the CPC or BTC''. But though project work has begun for the other three pipelines, there has been no investment in the Iran option despite India and Japan supporting Teheran, at least in principle. Thus, the Kazakhs today limit themselves to selling small quantities of oil through Iran, mainly on a swap basis.
All this might change if the new resolve with which the External Affairs Minister, Natwar Singh, says India wants to develop energy relations with Kazakhstan and Central Asia is actualised quickly. The fact is that despite the grandiose declarations of the Vajpayee Government, Indian policy towards Central Asia and Iran remained hostage all these years to the `strategic partnership' with Washington — which did not wish to see New Delhi getting involved in the Iranian energy sector — and the prolonged, self-defeating stand-off with Islamabad, which meant a pipeline traversing Pakistani territory was considered taboo.
Today, the Manmohan Singh Government is working on the assumption that an Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline can be a win-win project for all the countries involved. With this change in mindset, the key to accessing Central Asian oil and gas is also within its grasp, since Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran all favour the construction of pipelines from the Caspian region heading south. ``So far, the Indians have lost out'', says Mr. Burkhanov, ``but with Japan supporting the Iranian project, India should get involved''.
For Kazakh analysts, Indian engagement is not just good for business but a vital element for strategic stability in Central Asia. ``Stability in our region is based on Russia in the north, the U.S. and European Union in the West, China in the east and India in the south'', says Bulat Sultanov of the Institute of World Economy and Policy. ``It is thus very important for us to have close relations with India".
``The pipeline to China was once thought of as utopian'', he says. ``But it will be completed by December 2005. In the same way, why can't we think of a fantastic project of a pipeline from Kazakhstan to India through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan?''
In fact, there is already a trilateral agreement for the Turkmen-Afghan-Pakistan (TAP) gas pipeline from Daulatabad in Turkmenistan to Herat and then Multan. The projected cost is $2.5 billion and the capacity will be 70 billion cubic feet of gas per annum. Adding India as a spur from Multan should not be difficult. What is needed is for India to think boldly and develop big plans for its Asian neighbourhood. In the energy business, delays can be costly. Last week, even as India continues thinking about what its negotiating strategy with Pakistan should be over the proposed Iran-India pipeline, China went and signed a mammoth death for the purchase of Iranian liquefied natural gas (LNG). The deal involves the annual purchase of 10 million tonnes per year (75 million barrels) for 25 years. The total size of the deal: $100 billion.
© Copyright 2000 - 2005 The Hindu
01 November 2004
Looking beyond Musharraf's proposals
1 November 2004
The Hindu
Looking beyond Musharraf's proposals
There are options on Kashmir which lie beyond what both India and Pakistan consider unacceptable. The challenge is to explore them.
By Siddharth Varadarajan
BY THINKING aloud about India and Pakistan exercising "joint control" over either a part or the whole of a "demilitarised" Jammu and Kashmir, General Pervez Musharraf has begun the intellectually unsettling - and politically hazardous - process of moving away from stated positions.
The specific suggestions made hardly matter, nor indeed the fact that they have been aired publicly. Ever since Agra, General Musharraf has argued India and Pakistan can make headway on Kashmir only if they negate those outcomes that either side finds unacceptable. When they met in New York last month, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh asked the Pakistani President to specify what these unacceptable outcomes were. The General's remarks last week do not answer Dr. Singh's question fully. But he has at least ruled out as unacceptable (to India) the idea of a plebiscite and (to Pakistan) the proposal that the Line of Control could be turned into an international border. In addition, he spoke of the undivided State as consisting of seven regions, making this the first time a Pakistani leader has agreed that the status of the federally-administered `Northern Areas' - through which the strategic Karakoram highway to China passes - is still an open question.
If plebiscite and `LoC as border' do not exhaust the full list of outcomes that might be unacceptable to either side, it is perhaps because New Delhi has yet to confront - let alone publicly air - its own views on this difficult question. As the country with more to lose in formal administrative terms from any final outcome different from the status quo, India is obviously reluctant to rank its second-best preferences. Nevertheless, we do need to deliberate upon what kind of final outcomes are completely unacceptable to us.
The Prime Minister has already stressed there can be no secession or alteration to India's frontiers. There are, of course, other red lines from India's point of view. It must not accept any outcome that is predicated on the communal partitioning of regions - such as the separation of Kargil from Ladakh or Poonch-Rajouri from the rest of Jammu - or an outcome where the rights of minorities are not guaranteed.
But if India vetoes any change in its external frontiers and Pakistan finds the `LoC as border' proposal unacceptable, is there any room at all for a solution? There is. Provided the two sides are willing to think about sovereignty and administration in a creative manner, there is no reason why modern politico-juridical institutions cannot be created which allow the entire population of undivided Jammu and Kashmir to affirm themselves as a people, as members of the State's distinct regions and collectivities, and also as citizens of India, Pakistan and South Asia.
Throughout the world, there are numerous examples of territorial disputes or sovereignty claims involving homogeneous, mixed or divided populations being tackled through constitutional broadmindedness. Not all of these are relevant to Kashmir, or indeed complete or successful in themselves. Many approaches are still in the suggestion stage. But they do offer important lessons. Among the settled issues are the Aland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden, and the South Tyrol dispute between Italy and Austria. Works in progress include the Anglo-Irish peace process over the status of Northern Ireland, the proposal for joint Anglo-Spanish control over Gibraltar, and the Noumea agreement for shared sovereignty in the French colony of New Caledonia. Finally, two exciting ideas still in the initial stages are the quest for a unified Sami sovereignty cutting across Norway, Sweden and Finland, and the Ibarretxe Proposal for peaceful settlement of the Basque question within Spain.
Before we examine these `models', however, one must clarify that two examples commonly cited in the Kashmir context - Andorra and Trieste - have no relevance. The Principality of Andorra, sandwiched between France and Spain in the Pyrenees, is today an independent country with a well-developed international personality, an outcome that would fail Musharraf's `Agra' test as far as India and Pakistan are concerned. As for the Free Territory of Trieste, over which Italy and Yugoslavia shared sovereignty until 1954, the lessons, if any, are negative. A.G. Noorani has rightly argued that the `Trieste formula' is nothing but communal partition, with the Treaty of Osimo giving the largely Italian port city of Trieste to Italy and the Croat-Slovene dominated Istrian region to the erstwhile Yugoslavia.
The Aland Islands, 40 km from the coast of Sweden and 25 km from Finland, are an autonomous, demilitarised Swedish-speaking province of Finland. The Islands were ceded by Sweden to Russia in 1809 and made part of the Grand Duchy of Finland. At the end of World War I, when the islands came under the control of an independent Finnish Government, the islanders and Sweden petitioned the League of Nations for the right to secede from Finland. The League decided in favour of Finnish sovereignty, but declared the Islands should be an autonomous, demilitarised territory with full protection to its residents' linguistic and cultural rights. Today, the 26,000 islanders have their own flag, postage stamps and police force, but are not independent.
The South Tyrol dispute was more protracted, but offers more similarities with Kashmir because of the division of the Tyrolean region between Austria and Italy and a heterogeneous population of German (70 per cent), Italian (26 per cent) and Ladin (4 per cent) speakers. South Tyrol belonged to Austria - along with North and East Tyrol - until it was annexed by Italy at the end of World War I and `Italianised' later by Mussolini. After WWII, the South Tyroleans collected signatures demanding reunification with Austria, but the Great Powers rejected this in 1946. Later that year, Italy and Austria signed the Paris Agreement in which Rome agreed to give South Tyrol autonomous legislative and executive power. However, the Italians did not implement the agreement sincerely, leading to terrorist bombings in 1957 and the decision by Austria to move the U.N. In 1969, measures to put genuine self-government in place were agreed but it took another 20 years to implement the fine print. It was only in 1992 that Austria informed the U.N. that the dispute was finally over.
Today, South Tyrol enjoys a high degree of autonomy and interacts with the sovereign Austrian regions of North and East Tyrol on a continuous basis. Local executive bodies are also structured to give representation to Italian, German and Ladin speakers.
Another creative example is the Sami Parliamentary Assembly, established in 2000, as a joint forum of the parliaments of the Sami indigenous people who reside in the northern regions of Norway, Sweden and Finland. The Sami have been demanding greater control over the land, water and natural resources of their ancient homeland. They elect representatives to their own regional parliaments but are now trying to develop a pan-Sami political institution to better protect their rights. The three Nordic countries have all been pulled up by the U.N. for their treatment of the Sami and many issues - such as Norway's decision to allow expanded bombing ranges for NATO warplanes - affect the indigenous population cutting across sovereign state borders. The Sami example is a case of an attempt by a partitioned people to craft meaningful political institutions from below, often in the face of indifference from above.
Similar to the Sami initiative is Basque leader Jose Luis Ibarretxe's proposal for `shared sovereignty and free association' of the Basque region of Spain. Conceived as an alternative to the "blind alley offered by ETA's violence," Ibarretxe's proposal is for the Basque region to remain a part of the sovereign territory of Spain but enjoy the right to establish economic relations with the Basque regions of France, as well as representation in the European Union.
There is also the Anglo-Irish agreement, which established structures for consultation between Britain and Ireland in their effort to resolve Northern Ireland's status and enshrines key principles like that of majority consent and non-violence. Pan-Ireland institutions dealing with transportation, tourism and fisheries were conceived of as vehicles for integration on the ground, even if thorny political issues take time settling. Finally, the 1999 Noumea agreement on New Caledonia - where the indigenous Kanaks are outnumbered by the descendants of European settlers and by other non-Melanesians - maintains French nationality over the colonial possession while establishing the idea of New Caledonia citizenship over a 20-year transition period till a referendum on final status. This example is unappealing in the South Asian context because Kashmir is not a `colonial possession.' Nevertheless, the notion of shared sovereignty is an interesting one.
By themselves, none of these examples offers a complete set of principles for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute but many individual elements are attractive. South Tyrol suggests the notion of cross-border provincial ties between Ladakh and the Northern Areas, Jammu and West Punjab, and Uri, the Valley and Muzaffarabad - all anchored in cast-iron constitutional guarantees of autonomy and ethno-linguistic representation. The Aland Islands suggest the virtue of demilitarisation, and Ireland the principle of democratic consent. The Sami plan suggests the idea of a pan-J&K parliamentary assembly, linked to separate assemblies within Indian and Pakistani sovereignties, but with broad powers to examine matters of transportation, forests, water, perhaps even taxation. Perhaps one way for India to get the ball rolling is to encourage dialogue between the Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC, as an adjunct to the ongoing composite dialogue process.
The Hindu
Looking beyond Musharraf's proposals
There are options on Kashmir which lie beyond what both India and Pakistan consider unacceptable. The challenge is to explore them.
By Siddharth Varadarajan
BY THINKING aloud about India and Pakistan exercising "joint control" over either a part or the whole of a "demilitarised" Jammu and Kashmir, General Pervez Musharraf has begun the intellectually unsettling - and politically hazardous - process of moving away from stated positions.
The specific suggestions made hardly matter, nor indeed the fact that they have been aired publicly. Ever since Agra, General Musharraf has argued India and Pakistan can make headway on Kashmir only if they negate those outcomes that either side finds unacceptable. When they met in New York last month, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh asked the Pakistani President to specify what these unacceptable outcomes were. The General's remarks last week do not answer Dr. Singh's question fully. But he has at least ruled out as unacceptable (to India) the idea of a plebiscite and (to Pakistan) the proposal that the Line of Control could be turned into an international border. In addition, he spoke of the undivided State as consisting of seven regions, making this the first time a Pakistani leader has agreed that the status of the federally-administered `Northern Areas' - through which the strategic Karakoram highway to China passes - is still an open question.
If plebiscite and `LoC as border' do not exhaust the full list of outcomes that might be unacceptable to either side, it is perhaps because New Delhi has yet to confront - let alone publicly air - its own views on this difficult question. As the country with more to lose in formal administrative terms from any final outcome different from the status quo, India is obviously reluctant to rank its second-best preferences. Nevertheless, we do need to deliberate upon what kind of final outcomes are completely unacceptable to us.
The Prime Minister has already stressed there can be no secession or alteration to India's frontiers. There are, of course, other red lines from India's point of view. It must not accept any outcome that is predicated on the communal partitioning of regions - such as the separation of Kargil from Ladakh or Poonch-Rajouri from the rest of Jammu - or an outcome where the rights of minorities are not guaranteed.
But if India vetoes any change in its external frontiers and Pakistan finds the `LoC as border' proposal unacceptable, is there any room at all for a solution? There is. Provided the two sides are willing to think about sovereignty and administration in a creative manner, there is no reason why modern politico-juridical institutions cannot be created which allow the entire population of undivided Jammu and Kashmir to affirm themselves as a people, as members of the State's distinct regions and collectivities, and also as citizens of India, Pakistan and South Asia.
Throughout the world, there are numerous examples of territorial disputes or sovereignty claims involving homogeneous, mixed or divided populations being tackled through constitutional broadmindedness. Not all of these are relevant to Kashmir, or indeed complete or successful in themselves. Many approaches are still in the suggestion stage. But they do offer important lessons. Among the settled issues are the Aland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden, and the South Tyrol dispute between Italy and Austria. Works in progress include the Anglo-Irish peace process over the status of Northern Ireland, the proposal for joint Anglo-Spanish control over Gibraltar, and the Noumea agreement for shared sovereignty in the French colony of New Caledonia. Finally, two exciting ideas still in the initial stages are the quest for a unified Sami sovereignty cutting across Norway, Sweden and Finland, and the Ibarretxe Proposal for peaceful settlement of the Basque question within Spain.
Before we examine these `models', however, one must clarify that two examples commonly cited in the Kashmir context - Andorra and Trieste - have no relevance. The Principality of Andorra, sandwiched between France and Spain in the Pyrenees, is today an independent country with a well-developed international personality, an outcome that would fail Musharraf's `Agra' test as far as India and Pakistan are concerned. As for the Free Territory of Trieste, over which Italy and Yugoslavia shared sovereignty until 1954, the lessons, if any, are negative. A.G. Noorani has rightly argued that the `Trieste formula' is nothing but communal partition, with the Treaty of Osimo giving the largely Italian port city of Trieste to Italy and the Croat-Slovene dominated Istrian region to the erstwhile Yugoslavia.
The Aland Islands, 40 km from the coast of Sweden and 25 km from Finland, are an autonomous, demilitarised Swedish-speaking province of Finland. The Islands were ceded by Sweden to Russia in 1809 and made part of the Grand Duchy of Finland. At the end of World War I, when the islands came under the control of an independent Finnish Government, the islanders and Sweden petitioned the League of Nations for the right to secede from Finland. The League decided in favour of Finnish sovereignty, but declared the Islands should be an autonomous, demilitarised territory with full protection to its residents' linguistic and cultural rights. Today, the 26,000 islanders have their own flag, postage stamps and police force, but are not independent.
The South Tyrol dispute was more protracted, but offers more similarities with Kashmir because of the division of the Tyrolean region between Austria and Italy and a heterogeneous population of German (70 per cent), Italian (26 per cent) and Ladin (4 per cent) speakers. South Tyrol belonged to Austria - along with North and East Tyrol - until it was annexed by Italy at the end of World War I and `Italianised' later by Mussolini. After WWII, the South Tyroleans collected signatures demanding reunification with Austria, but the Great Powers rejected this in 1946. Later that year, Italy and Austria signed the Paris Agreement in which Rome agreed to give South Tyrol autonomous legislative and executive power. However, the Italians did not implement the agreement sincerely, leading to terrorist bombings in 1957 and the decision by Austria to move the U.N. In 1969, measures to put genuine self-government in place were agreed but it took another 20 years to implement the fine print. It was only in 1992 that Austria informed the U.N. that the dispute was finally over.
Today, South Tyrol enjoys a high degree of autonomy and interacts with the sovereign Austrian regions of North and East Tyrol on a continuous basis. Local executive bodies are also structured to give representation to Italian, German and Ladin speakers.
Another creative example is the Sami Parliamentary Assembly, established in 2000, as a joint forum of the parliaments of the Sami indigenous people who reside in the northern regions of Norway, Sweden and Finland. The Sami have been demanding greater control over the land, water and natural resources of their ancient homeland. They elect representatives to their own regional parliaments but are now trying to develop a pan-Sami political institution to better protect their rights. The three Nordic countries have all been pulled up by the U.N. for their treatment of the Sami and many issues - such as Norway's decision to allow expanded bombing ranges for NATO warplanes - affect the indigenous population cutting across sovereign state borders. The Sami example is a case of an attempt by a partitioned people to craft meaningful political institutions from below, often in the face of indifference from above.
Similar to the Sami initiative is Basque leader Jose Luis Ibarretxe's proposal for `shared sovereignty and free association' of the Basque region of Spain. Conceived as an alternative to the "blind alley offered by ETA's violence," Ibarretxe's proposal is for the Basque region to remain a part of the sovereign territory of Spain but enjoy the right to establish economic relations with the Basque regions of France, as well as representation in the European Union.
There is also the Anglo-Irish agreement, which established structures for consultation between Britain and Ireland in their effort to resolve Northern Ireland's status and enshrines key principles like that of majority consent and non-violence. Pan-Ireland institutions dealing with transportation, tourism and fisheries were conceived of as vehicles for integration on the ground, even if thorny political issues take time settling. Finally, the 1999 Noumea agreement on New Caledonia - where the indigenous Kanaks are outnumbered by the descendants of European settlers and by other non-Melanesians - maintains French nationality over the colonial possession while establishing the idea of New Caledonia citizenship over a 20-year transition period till a referendum on final status. This example is unappealing in the South Asian context because Kashmir is not a `colonial possession.' Nevertheless, the notion of shared sovereignty is an interesting one.
By themselves, none of these examples offers a complete set of principles for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute but many individual elements are attractive. South Tyrol suggests the notion of cross-border provincial ties between Ladakh and the Northern Areas, Jammu and West Punjab, and Uri, the Valley and Muzaffarabad - all anchored in cast-iron constitutional guarantees of autonomy and ethno-linguistic representation. The Aland Islands suggest the virtue of demilitarisation, and Ireland the principle of democratic consent. The Sami plan suggests the idea of a pan-J&K parliamentary assembly, linked to separate assemblies within Indian and Pakistani sovereignties, but with broad powers to examine matters of transportation, forests, water, perhaps even taxation. Perhaps one way for India to get the ball rolling is to encourage dialogue between the Kashmiris on both sides of the LoC, as an adjunct to the ongoing composite dialogue process.
Inside Kazakhstan II: The race is on for Kazakh oil
1 November 2004
The Hindu
Inside Kazakhstan-II
The race is on for Kazakh oil; India misses the bus
By Siddharth Varadarajan
Astana: If Central Asia is the new Middle East, then Kazakhstan is surely its Saudi Arabia, with proven and estimated reserves of oil and gas well in excess of what the other energy-rich former Soviet republics such as Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan possess. To be sure, the absolute numbers today are far less than that of Saudi Arabia — the Kingdom has just agreed to increase its production of oil to 11million barrels per day (bpd), which is 10 times Kazakhstan's current output of one million bpd. But with proven reserves of 35 billion barrels and another 80-90 billion barrels in probable reserves, the future prospects for this country in the cockpit of Asia look so rosy that oilmen from around the world are flocking to its gleaming new capital in order to get a piece of the action.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Kazakhstan's oil production is set to climb to a peak of 3.5 million bpd by 2034 if it depletes its reserves in a "restrained" manner. Kazmunaigaz, the state oil company, says it will touch that volume by 2015. By way of comparison, Iran, which is the world's fourth largest producer today, currently pumps some 3.6 million bpd.
A new entrant
While oil majors from the U.S., Russia, France, Italy and Britain have already taken up key positions in the most lucrative oil fields, a new and aggressive entrant is China, Kazakhstan's eastern neighbour and a country whose booming economy accounts today for 35 per cent of the world's total growth in oil demand.
India, sadly is nowhere on the scene. And lest one starts believing that Kazakhstan's Caspian oil fields — at a distance of more than 2,500 km from India's western borders — are too far away to be of use to Indian consumers, consider this fact: The Chinese are speedily laying 1,300 km of pipeline from Atasu in eastern Kazakhstan to Alashanku in China's western Xinjiang province. Atasu is already connected to Kazakhstan's Caspian wells by a pipeline so when the Alashanku project is completed sometime next year, some 75 million barrels of oil will be pumped into China from more than 3,000 km away. A natural gas pipeline is also now under active consideration. Kazakhstan wants to lessen its dependence on the Russian route for energy exports; China's insatiable appetite provides the perfect answer.
Big players
In May this year, the two countries issued a joint statement saying, "Kazakhstan supports China's oil companies to participate in exploration and development of oil and natural gas in the Caspian Sea continental shelf." Unlike similar declarations India and Kazakhstan made in the past during the Vajpayee government days, Chinese companies are already big players. From the beginning, CNPC had a controlling stake in the Aktobe field, with recoverable reserves of one billion barrels. Last August, it bought up the North Buzachi oilfield from a Saudi minor and ChevronTexaco. And in December, Sinopec bought a 50 per cent stake in three large blocks near the Tengiz field.
Tengiz has reserves of 6-9 billion barrels and is run by a consortium consisting of Chevron, ExxonMobil, Kazmunaigaz (the Kazakh state company) and a small Russian firm. So promising is this field that Tengiz oil accounts for 20 per cent of Chevron's recoverable reserves worldwide.
Major oilfields
The other major oilfields are Karachaganak, where Agip, BG, Chevron and Lukoil have the concession, and the most lucrative of them all, Kashagan, where seven companies run a consortium with stakes ranging from 8.3 to 16.6 per cent.
Having missed the bus elsewhere and without much of an appetite for bidding for unproven blocks, ONGC Videsh Ltd. (OVL) thought it could enter Kazakhstan by buying BG's 16.6 per cent stake in Kashagan. But the remaining six partners are insisting on their right of pre-emption, and Kazmunaigaz itself is keen to buy out BG.
Unless the Kazakh government takes a political decision to let OVL come in to Kashagan, it is not clear how India can play a role in this country's lucrative upstream operations.
As for downstream activities, say Kazakh officials, the country already has an excess capacity in refining but there could be scope for Indian companies to invest in petrochemical industries such as PTA.
The Hindu
Inside Kazakhstan-II
The race is on for Kazakh oil; India misses the bus
By Siddharth Varadarajan
Astana: If Central Asia is the new Middle East, then Kazakhstan is surely its Saudi Arabia, with proven and estimated reserves of oil and gas well in excess of what the other energy-rich former Soviet republics such as Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan possess. To be sure, the absolute numbers today are far less than that of Saudi Arabia — the Kingdom has just agreed to increase its production of oil to 11million barrels per day (bpd), which is 10 times Kazakhstan's current output of one million bpd. But with proven reserves of 35 billion barrels and another 80-90 billion barrels in probable reserves, the future prospects for this country in the cockpit of Asia look so rosy that oilmen from around the world are flocking to its gleaming new capital in order to get a piece of the action.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Kazakhstan's oil production is set to climb to a peak of 3.5 million bpd by 2034 if it depletes its reserves in a "restrained" manner. Kazmunaigaz, the state oil company, says it will touch that volume by 2015. By way of comparison, Iran, which is the world's fourth largest producer today, currently pumps some 3.6 million bpd.
A new entrant
While oil majors from the U.S., Russia, France, Italy and Britain have already taken up key positions in the most lucrative oil fields, a new and aggressive entrant is China, Kazakhstan's eastern neighbour and a country whose booming economy accounts today for 35 per cent of the world's total growth in oil demand.
India, sadly is nowhere on the scene. And lest one starts believing that Kazakhstan's Caspian oil fields — at a distance of more than 2,500 km from India's western borders — are too far away to be of use to Indian consumers, consider this fact: The Chinese are speedily laying 1,300 km of pipeline from Atasu in eastern Kazakhstan to Alashanku in China's western Xinjiang province. Atasu is already connected to Kazakhstan's Caspian wells by a pipeline so when the Alashanku project is completed sometime next year, some 75 million barrels of oil will be pumped into China from more than 3,000 km away. A natural gas pipeline is also now under active consideration. Kazakhstan wants to lessen its dependence on the Russian route for energy exports; China's insatiable appetite provides the perfect answer.
Big players
In May this year, the two countries issued a joint statement saying, "Kazakhstan supports China's oil companies to participate in exploration and development of oil and natural gas in the Caspian Sea continental shelf." Unlike similar declarations India and Kazakhstan made in the past during the Vajpayee government days, Chinese companies are already big players. From the beginning, CNPC had a controlling stake in the Aktobe field, with recoverable reserves of one billion barrels. Last August, it bought up the North Buzachi oilfield from a Saudi minor and ChevronTexaco. And in December, Sinopec bought a 50 per cent stake in three large blocks near the Tengiz field.
Tengiz has reserves of 6-9 billion barrels and is run by a consortium consisting of Chevron, ExxonMobil, Kazmunaigaz (the Kazakh state company) and a small Russian firm. So promising is this field that Tengiz oil accounts for 20 per cent of Chevron's recoverable reserves worldwide.
Major oilfields
The other major oilfields are Karachaganak, where Agip, BG, Chevron and Lukoil have the concession, and the most lucrative of them all, Kashagan, where seven companies run a consortium with stakes ranging from 8.3 to 16.6 per cent.
Having missed the bus elsewhere and without much of an appetite for bidding for unproven blocks, ONGC Videsh Ltd. (OVL) thought it could enter Kazakhstan by buying BG's 16.6 per cent stake in Kashagan. But the remaining six partners are insisting on their right of pre-emption, and Kazmunaigaz itself is keen to buy out BG.
Unless the Kazakh government takes a political decision to let OVL come in to Kashagan, it is not clear how India can play a role in this country's lucrative upstream operations.
As for downstream activities, say Kazakh officials, the country already has an excess capacity in refining but there could be scope for Indian companies to invest in petrochemical industries such as PTA.
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