28 October 2001
The Times of India
HAQ WAS ON MISSION TO SIDELINE ALLIANCE
SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
TIMES NEWS NETWORK
NEW DELHI: Abdul Haq, the former Pushtun guerrilla
leader executed by the Taliban on Friday, was a
legendary commander of the anti-Soviet mujahideen war
who had retired from the fractious politics of his
country before being drafted by Pakistan and the US to
help foment a rebellion in the Jalalabad region last
week.
Haq left Afghanistan in 1992 after the Moscow-backed
Najibullah regime was overthrown. He moved to Dubai
and set up a trading company there, eventually drawing
close to the Rome-based exiled former king of
Afghanistan, Zahir Shah. In 1999, amidst reports of
Haq planning a political comeback centred around the
possibility of creating a broad-based Afghan
government, his wife and 11-year-old son were shot
dead in Peshawar by unknown gunmen. In the wake of the
September 11 terrorist attacks, Haq was regarded by
Islamabad and Washington as a leader around whom
Pashtun tribal chiefs inside Afghanistan could be
rallied to overthrow the Taliban. He was considered
particularly credible because he was not involved in
the bloody civil war that raged in Afghanistan from
1992 to 1996.
Significantly, he had been a commander of the Younus
Khalis faction of the Hizb-e-Islami, the same
mujahideen group to which Jalaluddin Haqqani, the
Taliban's Khost-based tribal affairs minister, also
once belonged before he defected to the Taliban.
Haqqani had visited Islamabad last week for urgent
consultations and is rumoured to be part of the
nucleus of "moderate Taliban" the Pakistani
authorities are cultivating. The province of
Nangarhar, where Jalalabad is, was once the stronghold
of the Khales faction.
Haq was in many ways more opposed to the Northern
Alliance than to the Taliban. In turn, he was regarded
as a Pakistani agent by the groups united under
Burhanuddin Rabbani and the late Ahmed Shah Masood. In
an editorial in the October 15 edition of the weekly
Omaid newspaper -- a mouthpiece of the Northern
Alliance -- Haq was clubbed together with Syed Ahmed
Gailani and Gulbeddin Hekmatyar as watanfarosh '', or
traitors, who were working with Islamabad to
"infiltrate the Loya Jirga process and provide the
basis for the next armed force to enter the fray in
Afghanistan with Pakistani mastership".
Haq's capture and killing is a setback for the
Pakistani and US plan to build a credible,
Pashtun-based military opposition to the Taliban. The
other Pashtun flank opened by the US is led by Hamid
Karzai, who is said to have moved in to Kandahar
province with hundreds of armed men.
28 October 2001
25 October 2001
Outside powers field Afghan proxies in new 'great game'
25 October 2001
The Times of India
Outside powers field Afghan proxies in new 'great game'
SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
TIMES NEWS NETWORK
New Delhi: As the US campaign to overthrow the Taliban progresses, differences over the composition of a future government for Afghanistan are coming into sharper relief.
Though committed to a "broad-based government", virtually every country with a stake is working overtime to ensure its favoured militia gets a headstart. Although the question of including Taliban "moderates" has become a point of division between the external powers, the real issue, say Indian officials, is that the Bush administration fears a Northern Alliance government will be closer to Moscow, New Delhi and Teheran than to Washington and its proxy, Islamabad.
After first trying to get Mullah Akhond, deputy chair of the Taliban to move against Mullah Omar, Pakistan is now trying to woo Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil and tribal affairs minister Jalaluddin Haqqani. The latter was formerly of the Khales faction of the Hizb-e-Islami - once powerful in the Jalalabad region - and is one of the few Taliban leaders to have fought the Soviets.
Pakistan is also cultivating Prof Abdur Rasool Sayyaf of the Northern Alliance. Sayyaf, whose troops have a key presence in the Panjshir valley, had opposed Masood's reliance on military aid from India and Russia. In May, there were reports the ISI was trying to broker a deal between the Taliban and Sayyaf in which the latter would emerge as the prime minister of a "broad-based" government.
The fact that the Northern Alliance has at least three components - the Jamiat-e-Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani and the late Ahmed Shah Masoud, the ethnic Uzbek militia of Gen Rashid Dostum, and the Iran-backed militias of Ismail Khan and Hezb-e-Wahdat - further complicates the picture.
The US is closest to Dostum, with whom it has cultivated ties through his principal backer, Turkey. US military advisers are already working closely with the general and Washington is keen for him to seize Mazar-e-Sharif as the first major opposition bridgehead inside Afghanistan.
In contrast, the US is not overly enthusiastic about the Rabbani forces - now commanded by Gen Mohammed Fahim - pushing southwards towards Kabul. While Russia and India are helping Fahim, most US airstrikes have been designed to assist Dostum. The Fahim group has also hurt its case in Washington by saying it will oppose US attempts to "dictate" the nature of the post-Taliban government.
As for the Iran-backed groups led by Ismail Khan and Abdul Karim Khalili which are trying to expand their pockets of resistance in and around Bamiyan, the US does not appear keen to help them.
Yet another wildcard is Hizb-e-Islami chief Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Currently based in Iran but without an army, he has come out strongly against the US bombardment of Afghanistan. As a prominent Pushtun figure, however, Pakistan may seek to turn him into an ally as and when the Taliban regime crumbles.
The Times of India
Outside powers field Afghan proxies in new 'great game'
SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
TIMES NEWS NETWORK
New Delhi: As the US campaign to overthrow the Taliban progresses, differences over the composition of a future government for Afghanistan are coming into sharper relief.
Though committed to a "broad-based government", virtually every country with a stake is working overtime to ensure its favoured militia gets a headstart. Although the question of including Taliban "moderates" has become a point of division between the external powers, the real issue, say Indian officials, is that the Bush administration fears a Northern Alliance government will be closer to Moscow, New Delhi and Teheran than to Washington and its proxy, Islamabad.
After first trying to get Mullah Akhond, deputy chair of the Taliban to move against Mullah Omar, Pakistan is now trying to woo Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil and tribal affairs minister Jalaluddin Haqqani. The latter was formerly of the Khales faction of the Hizb-e-Islami - once powerful in the Jalalabad region - and is one of the few Taliban leaders to have fought the Soviets.
Pakistan is also cultivating Prof Abdur Rasool Sayyaf of the Northern Alliance. Sayyaf, whose troops have a key presence in the Panjshir valley, had opposed Masood's reliance on military aid from India and Russia. In May, there were reports the ISI was trying to broker a deal between the Taliban and Sayyaf in which the latter would emerge as the prime minister of a "broad-based" government.
The fact that the Northern Alliance has at least three components - the Jamiat-e-Islami of Burhanuddin Rabbani and the late Ahmed Shah Masoud, the ethnic Uzbek militia of Gen Rashid Dostum, and the Iran-backed militias of Ismail Khan and Hezb-e-Wahdat - further complicates the picture.
The US is closest to Dostum, with whom it has cultivated ties through his principal backer, Turkey. US military advisers are already working closely with the general and Washington is keen for him to seize Mazar-e-Sharif as the first major opposition bridgehead inside Afghanistan.
In contrast, the US is not overly enthusiastic about the Rabbani forces - now commanded by Gen Mohammed Fahim - pushing southwards towards Kabul. While Russia and India are helping Fahim, most US airstrikes have been designed to assist Dostum. The Fahim group has also hurt its case in Washington by saying it will oppose US attempts to "dictate" the nature of the post-Taliban government.
As for the Iran-backed groups led by Ismail Khan and Abdul Karim Khalili which are trying to expand their pockets of resistance in and around Bamiyan, the US does not appear keen to help them.
Yet another wildcard is Hizb-e-Islami chief Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Currently based in Iran but without an army, he has come out strongly against the US bombardment of Afghanistan. As a prominent Pushtun figure, however, Pakistan may seek to turn him into an ally as and when the Taliban regime crumbles.
19 October 2001
India wary of Pak plans for Afghanistan
19 October 2001
The Times of India
India wary of Pak plans for Afghanistan
BY SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
TIMES NEWS NETWORK
NEW DELHI: Even as India, Pakistan and the US pay lip-service to the idea
that it is for the Afghan people themselves to decide the nature and
composition of their government, it is clear that all three countries are
doing their level best to determine the political contours of a
post-Taliban Afghanistan.
New Delhi which has invested considerable political capital and money in
the Northern Alliance and would be happiest to see President Burhanuddin
Rabbani back in Kabul believes Pakistan has begun a three-pronged
strategy to ensure it retains significant influence once the Taliban are
overthrown.
Given the bitter enmity between Islamabad and the Northern Alliance,
Pakistan has convinced the US to involve retired or defunct Pak-based
Pashtun factions in any national government. This idea is being sold under
the guise of ensuring the new government has a proper ethnic composition.
Secondly, say Indian officials, Pakistan is encouraging provincial Taliban
leaders to convene local shuras or councils which in turn are nominating
representatives for any government ex-king Zahir Shah might eventually
lead. We know that some of these representatives have already contacted
Zahir Shah in Rome, said a senior Indian official familiar with Pakistans
Afghan policy. Given the importance of such councils, it will be difficult
for Zahir Shah to veto these names.
Eventually, what the king will have is a large group whose role could be
dubious and counter-productive, said the official. We feel that anyone who
has to select people for the national council should study the names that
come out from these shuras very carefully.
Finally, New Delhi also sees the hand of Islamabad in the US plan to
accommodate moderate Taliban leaders. This is basically a Pakistani agenda
and the US is going along with it, said the official. With rumours
circulating about Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Mutawakil
eventually emerging as the nucleus of this moderate faction, Indian
officials who dealt with him during the hijacking of IC-814 to Kandahar
insist they saw little evidence of his moderation there. He is a gentle
and polite man but it became clear to us that he is very much a Mullah
Omar loyalist, said an official.
Indian officials say that if at all there was a moderate amongst the
Taliban, it was the late Mullah Rabbani, who died of cancer earlier this
year.
The Times of India
India wary of Pak plans for Afghanistan
BY SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
TIMES NEWS NETWORK
NEW DELHI: Even as India, Pakistan and the US pay lip-service to the idea
that it is for the Afghan people themselves to decide the nature and
composition of their government, it is clear that all three countries are
doing their level best to determine the political contours of a
post-Taliban Afghanistan.
New Delhi which has invested considerable political capital and money in
the Northern Alliance and would be happiest to see President Burhanuddin
Rabbani back in Kabul believes Pakistan has begun a three-pronged
strategy to ensure it retains significant influence once the Taliban are
overthrown.
Given the bitter enmity between Islamabad and the Northern Alliance,
Pakistan has convinced the US to involve retired or defunct Pak-based
Pashtun factions in any national government. This idea is being sold under
the guise of ensuring the new government has a proper ethnic composition.
Secondly, say Indian officials, Pakistan is encouraging provincial Taliban
leaders to convene local shuras or councils which in turn are nominating
representatives for any government ex-king Zahir Shah might eventually
lead. We know that some of these representatives have already contacted
Zahir Shah in Rome, said a senior Indian official familiar with Pakistans
Afghan policy. Given the importance of such councils, it will be difficult
for Zahir Shah to veto these names.
Eventually, what the king will have is a large group whose role could be
dubious and counter-productive, said the official. We feel that anyone who
has to select people for the national council should study the names that
come out from these shuras very carefully.
Finally, New Delhi also sees the hand of Islamabad in the US plan to
accommodate moderate Taliban leaders. This is basically a Pakistani agenda
and the US is going along with it, said the official. With rumours
circulating about Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Mutawakil
eventually emerging as the nucleus of this moderate faction, Indian
officials who dealt with him during the hijacking of IC-814 to Kandahar
insist they saw little evidence of his moderation there. He is a gentle
and polite man but it became clear to us that he is very much a Mullah
Omar loyalist, said an official.
Indian officials say that if at all there was a moderate amongst the
Taliban, it was the late Mullah Rabbani, who died of cancer earlier this
year.
15 October 2001
An Ignoble War: Earn your peace prize, Mr Annan
15 October 2001
The Times of India
The Times of India
An Ignoble War
Earn your Peace Prize, Mr Annan
Siddharth Varadarajan
The gentle Norwegians who decide on the Nobel peace prize have been accused of many things in the past — poor judgment, political correctness and regional bias — but no one ever suspected that behind their Nordic inscrutability lies an exquisite sense of irony.
To bestow their award on the UN and its secretary-general at a time when the world body’s most powerful member is attacking its weakest is to either mock the impotency of Kofi Annan and his colleagues or spur them into seeking an end to this senseless and cowardly war.
Unequal adversaries have often fought wars but never has such a formidable superpower attacked a people so miserable and defenceless as the Afghans.
No matter how many peanut butter and jelly sandwiches the US drops along with less edible humanitarian material like cluster bombs, this is a war in which civilians are go! ing to be killed in large numbers. Already, more than 300 innocents have perished. No one is arguing that the US has deliberately set out to kill civilians like the monsters who attacked the World Trade Center did. But it is bombing Afghanistan with lethal ordnance in the knowledge that noncombatants will die even without missiles going ‘astray’.
In 1999, NATO bombed Yugoslavia for making refugees out of the Kosovars. Today, forcing Afghans to become refugees under the threat of bombardment is considered the apogee of humanitarianism.
It is difficult to sustain the claim made by US ambassador to the UN John Negroponte that the attack on Afghanistan is in conformity with Article 51 of the UN Charter allowing the use of force in self-defence. Apologists for Washington have gone further, arguing dishonestly that the attack has been authorised by UN Security Council resolution 1368, passed unanimously on September 12. This when 10 days before the bom! bing began, National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice herself declared the US did not need UN permission.
Resolution 1368 is a text whose clever imprecision was presumably crafted by the US to allow the Security Council to avoid taking a stand on its desire to avenge the September 11 attacks. It correctly calls terrorism a threat to international peace and security but does not invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter under which punitive measures are envisaged. It makes no reference to Afghanistan or to earlier UN resolutions (1267 and 1333) asking the Taliban to hand over Osama bin Laden. Far from authorising the use of force, it states the Security Council’s ‘‘readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks in accordance with its responsibilities under the UN Charter’’.
The language makes it clear that Security Council members consider the UN (acting through its highest organ) to be the appropriate body to a! ct against terrorism. The right of self-defence is affirmed but in accordance with the Charter. To contend — as the European Council did at its meeting on September 21 — that ‘‘SC Resolution 1368 (means) a riposte by the US is legitimate’’ against any country is to argue that the right of self-defence is not subject to the legal constraints envisaged by the Charter.
Now that the US says it reserves the right to take military action in ‘self-defence’ against other countries as well, some European states are finally getting cold feet at the thought that Iraq, Syria, Libya or Iran might be the targets of a ‘‘riposte’’.
Though the US has the right to defend itself against an armed attack from another country or an armed group, the International Court of Justice ruled in the landmark Nicaragua case of 1986 that this does not confer on an aggrieved state a blank cheque to use force against anothe! r. The US would have to prove that the terrorists who struck on September 11 were sent ‘‘by or on behalf of’’ Afghanistan in order to fulfil the ICJ’s criterion for exercising the right of self-defence against that country. So far, the US has provided no such evidence.
Moreover, self-defence must respect the principles of necessity and propor- tionality: Washington has to demonstrate that the bombing is needed to stop an imminent attack from Afghanistan and not merely from terrorists who may already be in the US.
Elaborating on the ICJ’s ruling, Prof Louis Henkin wrote: The right of self-defence is ‘‘limited to cases of armed attack that are generally beyond doubt; a state’s responsibility for acts of terrorism is rarely beyond doubt and difficult to prove... Article 51 gives a right...to defend against an armed attack. This right does not allow for retaliation for armed attacks...or (force) to deter future atta! cks’’. That is why the international community has repeatedly condemned Israeli attacks on Lebanon and would surely criticise India for any strikes on militant bases across the Line of Control in Pakistan.
Even if the US can prove the complicity of the Taliban in the September 11 atrocities, international law stresses force should be resorted to after all avenues for a peaceful solution are exhausted. As it seeks to bring the conspirators to justice, the US could have sought a tightening of UN sanctions against the Taliban pending further action. The speedy implementation of UN Conventions against terrorism could also have been made a priority. Instead, the US has rushed headlong into a unilateral war that will not reduce the threat of terrorism by one iota.
While the UN has been paralysed, India, China and Russia have appeased the US violation of international law on the assumption that terrorism is being fought. When Washington speaks of widening t! he war against terrorism, it does not mean Pakistan, Xinjiang or Chechnya but Iraq, Iran and other opponents of US power. The US aim is to maintain its domination over the oil resources of the Gulf region and extend its military influence into the heart of Central Asia.
The only countries to take an honourable stand on the US attack are Iran and Cuba, both victims of international terrorism and critics of the Taliban and the September 11 atrocities. Iran and Cuba are proof of the Manichean absurdity of President Bush’s fatwa that ‘‘you are either with us or with the terrorists’’. More countries must join their ranks. Nobel winner Kofi Annan should issue an immediate call for the US to stop its war and return to the UN for discussions on how the scourge of terrorism can be fought. This month’s General Assembly debate saw many countries make proposals — legal, political and economic. These should be seriously examined.
An! ill-defined and unilateral war that undermines international law and the UN Charter can only lead to the perpetuation of terrorism, not its elimination.
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