Beyond the Ceasefire: Move quickly on the political front

30 December 2000
The Times of India

Beyond the Ceasefire
Move Quickly on the Political Front

By SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN

BOLD and innovative though it is, the Indian government's unilateral ceasefire is floundering on the mistaken assumption that Kashmir is primarily-if not exclusively-a military problem.

For the past 10 years, New Delhi has essentially pursued an armed solution to the problem in the state. When it found that this solution was not yielding quick-or even satisfactory-results on the ground, the political decision was taken to alter its form. The Ramzan ceasefire
announced by Prime Minister Vajpayee may now have stretched into a second month but what it represents, in essence, is a change of battlefield tactics. There has been no political initiative of comparable magnanimity. Granting some Hurriyat leaders-who are all Indian citizens-passports that should never have been denied them in the first place can hardly count as a concession.

Though there has been some back-channel engagement with the Hurriyat and with elements of the Hizbul Mujahideen, the government is still quite far away from conceiving a broad political framework within which the Kashmir problem can peacefully be resolved. We are not talking about an endgame here-whether Kashmir will remain an integral part of India forever, join
Pakistan or go independent-or even about the willingness of militant groups to `talk about talks'. What is needed is for New Delhi to recognise that there are concrete political steps it can take to alter the parameters of the problem.

Without a quick move on the political front, the government might be forced to return to the battlefield. It is clear by now that the ceasefire has led to a quantitative and qualitative escalation in militant attacks. Whether this is the product of the security forces having relaxed their grip or of militant groups anxious to demonstrate their contempt for the ceasefire is immaterial. In the absence of tangible political gains on the ground, public opinion, political parties and even the security forces are bound eventually to seek a revocation of the ceasefire.

Fortunately for the government, the security forces do not have a uniform view on the matter. If some commanders argue that a ceasefire allows militant groups to recoup and position themselves for future attacks, others believe that a hands-off policy weakens the insurgency both physically and psychologically, `softening' the homegrown militant and distancing him from the foreign mujahids. Nonetheless, the consensus seem to be that military means alone cannot solve the problem. This view was explicitly stated by Army chief Padmanabhan shortly after he took over in October this year.

But it is one thing to say that military means alone cannot solve the problem and another to admit that the manner in which the military solution was pursued in the past has contributed to the intractability of the problem. Thanks to a more enlightened approach, there have few major
incidents of human rights violations in recent months. Even so, the previous incidents-the killing of civilians in Bijbehara and Sopore, the disappearances-are like open wounds that continue to fester with each passing day that the guilty go unpunished.

Rightly or wrongly, the majority of Kashmiris in the valley see the Indian security forces as an occupying power on whom no laws or rules of engagement apply. Though the Army has moved to court-martial soldiers in some cases, the vast majority of rights violations by the security forces go uninvestigated. The National Human Rights Commission is denied jurisdiction and the judicial system has become a helpless spectator.

The most recent example was what happened at Pathribal-Panchalthan this year. After fierce protests in which unarmed civilians were fired upon and killed at Brakpora on April 3, the government agreed to exhume the bodies of five persons it claimed were militants responsible for the Chittisingpora massacre in March this year. All five bodies were claimed
by relatives and DNA samples were sent for testing. But as yet, there has been no move to try for murder in an open court those who were responsible for the fake encounter.

If the government wants to give an impetus to its ceasefire, it should make Pathribal a test case of its sincerity. A swift and transparent trial followed by exemplary punishment of the guilty would go some distance towards convincing Kashmiris that there is rule of law in this country.

Second, the government should realise that its policy of denying passports to Kashmiri leaders is not only illiberal and undemocratic but politically counter-productive as well. The government's view is that the Hurriyat Conference is a puppet of Pakistan. If that is so, the fact that
the Hurriyat leaders lack passports has clearly not been a hindrance for the puppet-master. New Delhi's decision to allow several Hurriyat leaders to travel to Pakistan is perhaps a belated recognition of this fact; even so, its reported refusal to grant the most pro-Pakistani leader of them all, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a passport smacks of bureaucratic myopia.

Third, New Delhi should make it unambiguously clear that its invitation for talks is completely without any riders or conditions. The government's initial response to the Hizb's ceasefire offer was a mature one which avoided any mention of the Indian Constitution. But two days later, the
waters were muddied by senior government officials insisting that any dialogue had to be within the four walls of the Constitution. By the time Vajpayee clarified matters, it was too late. Hardline elements within the Pakistani establishment were able to make use of the conflicting
statements to get the Hizb to back off.

On their part, the Hurriyat leaders must also rise to the occasion. When they go to Pakistan, they should ask Gen Musharraf - who recognises them as the authentic voice of Kashmir - to get all the militant groups to agree to a cease-fire and to think about settling their differences with New Delhi across a negotiating table. If Pakistan agrees, a major roadblock in the struggle for a peaceful solution will have been overcome and the path would be clear for Islamabad and New Delhi to also resume their dialogue.

But more than Pakistan or the militants, it is the ordinary Kashmiri that New Delhi needs to convince. Once the Kashmiri starts having faith in the Indian government's initiatives, Islamabad and the jihadis will have to fall in line.

Greek you can understand: Interview with George Papandreou

21 December 2000
The Times of India

A Greek You Can Understand

ATHENS: Greek foreign minister since 1999 and before that alternate minister of foreign affairs from 1996, George A Papandreou has been instrumental in building a higher profile for his country internationally. The son of Andreas Papandreou, former prime minister of Greece - who, along with Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, was part of the Initiative of the Six' for a global reduction of nuclear weapons - he once came to Delhi with his father. On the eve of his first official visit to India, he spoke with Siddharth Varadarajan about a number of international issues that are currently close to both countries:

What is on your agenda during this visit?

Our relations have traditionally been very warm; we must enhance these at all levels - political, economic and financial, and also cultural. We have similar thinking in many areas, which makes it more interesting to work together. As we move into a more globalised economy, political issues of all regions become interconnected. Therefore, issues in our region - the Balkans, Mediterranean, Black Sea - are all of great interest to India. Similarly, India's role in Asia, its relations with its neighbours, are of great interest to us. One other area which is newer is the new technology issues, where India has manpower of a high calibre.

With Bush as US president, do some of the policies that he has been espousing - on missile defence - worry you?

The whole concept of missile defence is something which brings up a number of concerns about the possibility of the creation of a new sense of insecurity in the world. Technological developments might have made this ideal more feasible but the political ramifications are not certain- whether this will create a more secure world or a sense of fear, and escalation of armed productions on the part of other countries. So I think there is some scepticism on these ideas in general, not only in Greece but in Europe as well.

The US claims it must defend itself from the threat of missile attacks from `rogue states'.

The policies of the EU (on missile defence) are conservative. The programme could create greater tension with other countries like Russia. We had similar experiences during the Cold War, where one move provokes another from the other side. We wouldn't want a similar situation now. New missile technology has created new fears - they are more accurate, long range. But how you deal with it - whether you try to create an umbrella which changes the balance of power - is an equally crucial issue because of the possible reaction and escalation from others. In Europe we are developing a regional security situation, of common security rather than a `one against another' kind of concept, and this could break this down as a result.

The US has cautioned the EU on its separate defence initiative. Do you see EU defence plans leading to the downplaying of NATO's centrality and the reduction of US influence in Europe?

I think there will be a new complementarity. We have stressed that this plan is not against anyone. It is to provide greater support for initiatives that Europe can take on its own. But certainly we are seeking the cooperation of the US and other NATO countries who may not be in the EU. In certain areas where we have had problems in our region - Kosovo and the former Yugoslavia, for example - one thing that has provoked this new EU initiative is that the Europeans have been seen as inefficient and unable to deal with crises on their own continent. Secondly, although Greece would not have a problem with a much more rigorous form of EU defence, today we are talking about specific tasks - peacekeeping, crisis management, humanitarian operations. So this EU army of approximately 60,000 soldiers would be for these types of tasks. It would be under the auspices of UN Security Council resolutions and could be deployed in other parts of the world as well.

In purely military terms, if there had been an EU army in place during, say, the Kosovo crisis, would things have been different? Would Yugoslavia still have been bombed? Also, would Greece - which disagreed with NATO strategy - find its concerns again been put on the side?

We would have to go back to how decisions are taken in NATO, but in the EU, the 15 member states have equal say on similar operations irrespective of size. Now, you may find yourself in the majority or minority, or sometimes alone. This happens in the EU with many countries and then you have to make a political decision as to whether you will maintain your position or go along with the majority. On the Kosovo war, we said we had our reservations on the issue of bombing but we did not stop this decision as we were the only country that had these reservations.

If there were a new conflict, Europe would have the ability to make autonomous political decisions. But it would work very closely with its allies outside, especially to use NATO assets. In future, this concept may also grow into a defensive operation for Europe itself, for defending Europe...

From whom? Where is the threat?

Hopefully none, but this may develop.

There is some concern in India about US reports of cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey on the nuclear issue. Is this something which worries Greece?

I have seen reports and articles but have not seen any specific information on the development of these programmes. But as a principle, we are against nuclear proliferation. Secondly, we would not like to see nuclear escalation in this region. Certainly, it would be alarming if one of our neighbours developed this. Now that we are in a period of trying to lower tensions with our neighbours, particularly Turkey, it would have a very negative effect. So we would share India's concerns on any further nuclear proliferation.

Like India and Pakistan, Greece and Turkey are considered implacably hostile neighbours. Yet you have worked hard to improve relations. Are you satisfied with the way Greek-Turkish relations are developing?

In the last year, a new path has been opened. This is a product of the desire of the peoples of both countries. This came out very dramatically during the earthquakes which took place in Turkey last year and then Greece. The response of people was quite moving. A political message came out of the humanitarian response, that people want peace and that the two governments should begin to work together more seriously. There are still quite big problems which remain - Cyprus, for example - but what we have decided to do is build a basis of trust slowly but surely on issues of common interest. We signed 10 accords last year on tourism, environment, culture, etc. That was quite a breakthrough considering it was 14 years after accords were last signed by us. Trade has doubled in one year, so there is a strong economic basis for good relations.

Dateline Athens: The stepping stone where dreams die

10 December 2000
The Times of India

Greece: The stepping stone where dreams die

By Siddharth Varadarajan
The Times of India News Service

ATHENS: For illegal emigrants from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh,
Greece has become the transit point of choice, the haven where one's
energies and finances can be recouped before making that final journey
to the promised land, Canada. Around 80,000 people from South Asia are
said to be in Greece: among them 10,000 Indians, most of whom work on
farms and piggeries.

Though the routes the migrants take vary, the idea is to get as close
to Greece as possible legitimately and then to do what is called
"dunki maarna'', or border jumping. Alternatively, the emigrant
acquires a seaman's book for Rs 30,000, joins a ship at a neighbouring
port as `crew' and then disappears once the ship docks at a Greek port.

In fact, the ship route is now such a well-organised racket that tramp
steamers make all their money transporting human cargo as `crew'.

"Last month,'' says India's Ambassador Gurdip Singh Bedi, "the Greek
authorities brought a shipowner to me who claimed his entire crew of 44
had disappeared. And you know the best part? All of them were Singhs
from Jalandhar!''

The whole operation is best described by Bhupinder, a young man from
Jalandhar. He admits he wasn't very good at geography in school. But
then even the brightest students from India, he says, would never have
heard of Moldova, the former Soviet republic on the edge of the Balkans
from where Bhupi and a band of enterprising Sikhs crossed over into
what they thought was `Europe'.

Though the journey to Moscow and Moldova was smooth, getting to Greece
had been traumatic. ``In Moldova, we destroyed our passports and
crossed into Romania. Our agent was to take us to Germany, instead we
came to Bulgaria. After three weeks, we walked across to Greece but
were caught and sent back to Bulgaria. Then the agent put us on a boat
and we landed in Turkey. Finally, another boat took us to a Greek
island, and then the mainland.'' In all, the journey took four months
and cost Bhupinder Rs 3 lakh.

Three years later, Bhupinder is still in Greece, speaks Greek haltingly
and has acquired work papers. ``But life is no good'', he says. ``I
earn 14 thousand rupees a month in a factory and some money from
selling things on the streets. I am just passing time before I move on
to Canada. I hear one an earn a lot there.''

Lost passports the key to golden future

The key to successful illegal emigration, whether to Greece or
elsewhere in the Balkans before making the final dash to the dream
destination, is to destroy passports and other document that could tie
a person down to the country of his origin, say some who have made it
thus far.

When an illegal immigrant is arrested, the Greek authorities cannot
immediately deport him. They need to establish his nationality, a time-
consuming process. Of the 243 illegal immigrants referred to the Indian
Embassy here by the Greek police this year, only 83 have so far been
authenticated as Indians and deported. ``At least 30 per cent of the
boys intentionally give us wrong information so that we can never
confirm that they are Indians,'' says Indi'a ambassador.

For sheer ingenuity and determination, however, it is hard to beat the
Bangladeshis. ``I moved to Calcutta and then Delhi, working a while in
both cities'', says Monir, a salesman of costume jewellery at a
streetside stall. ``Then I crossed the border into Pakistan through
Punjab and went to Karachi.'' Monir worked as a tailor for two years,
purchasing a Pakistani identity card. ``One of the ladies I stitched
clothes for was married to a top General and he got me visas for Iran
and Turkey.''

From Istambul, Monir came to Greece through the `dunki' route -- taking
a boat across the river that separates Turkey from Greece and then
trekking several days till he was far enough from the border to use
public transport.

In 1998, the Greek government announced an amnesty for those who had
been living in the country for more than two years. The announcement
led to a flood of new arrivals from South Asia. Once in Greece, they
would approach certain police stations and report their passport lost.
Armed with a police receipt, they applied for a duplicate passport and
proceeded to claim they had been living in the country for years. Other
supporting documents such as tax receipts and utility bills were
available for a small fee.

These past few months, with the Greek government on the verge of
announcing another amnesty, the number of arrivals has again increased
dramatically. ``Agents sitting in Jalandhar seem to know more about
immigration policy here than most Greeks,'' says Tito Singh, an Athens-
based journalist. ``It's all amazingly well-planned.''

The Christmas season also traditionally witnesses an increase in
illegal entrants. The reason? ``It's not that the police are more
relaxed,'' says Raja Mohammad, a native of Gujrat in Pakistan. ``Like
others, their expenses also increase during the festive season. They
need the extra earnings that people like us provide''.

Iran and West Asia

2008

India to make fresh proposals on Iran pipeline (31 October 2008)
Bush report says India complying with Hyde Act on Iran (15 September 2008)
Iran replies to Indian 'non-paper' on gas pipeline (29 July 2008)
Bolton has a way with words (15 July 2008)
The U.N. is escalating the Iran nuclear crisis (05 March 2008)

2007

On Iran, no news is good news for U.S. (17 November 2007)
Why Iran matters to U.S. (31 July 2007)
An Indian campaign for an Iranian scholar (15 June 2007)
Under siege, Iran ups the ante: The 'uncontrolled chain reaction' predicted by the IAEA chief when sanctions were first imposed continues, with no terminal state in view other than conflict. (11 April 2007)
More on Rademaker, India and Iran (13 March 2007)
Spinning its way to conflict again (27 February 2007)
Americans disown Rademaker (17 February 2007)
So now we know for sure... (16 February 2007)
Iranians rally in defence of right to nuclear energy (12 February 2007)
Iran rejects nuclear pressure (12 February 2007)
Iranian Government gears up for political show of strength (11 February 2007)
India sees speedy IAEA verification as the way forward on Iran (08 February 2007)
Peace pipeline: Iran for tripartite summit (07 February 2007)
Military means not a solution to Iran crisis, says India (8 February 2007)
From mega surge to dual rollback (06 February 2007)
Iran, the U.S. and the burden of history (02 January 2007)

2006

Shirin Ebadi interview: "The answer to the Iran nuclear issue is more democracy" (28 November 2006)
No Plan B, only the certainty of defeat (19 November 2006)
Iran: Gas, gas everywhere but not a bit to sell (26 August 2006)
Mehdi Karroubi: Down but not out, leading reformist looks ahead (24 August 2006)
In Iran, democracy wrestles with clerical authority (23 August 2006)
Little chance of nuclear compromise (22 August 2006)
Ahmedinejad interview: "We are still interested in dialogue based on justness and fairness" (10 August 2006)
If pressure continues, Iran can change mind on NPT (10 August 2006)
Ahmadinejad keen on energy ties with India (10 August 2006)
Larijani interview: "For the U.S., the nuclear issue of Iran is just an excuse" (7 August 2006)
Iran wants nuclear talks, but not at gunpoint (6 August 2006)
The Ahmadinejad Letter: An Iranian offer that America must heed (12 May 2006)
The game plan on Iran is becoming clearer (25 March 2006)
Let the IAEA do its work on Iran (7 March 2006)
That Syrian oil deal: Government lies about U.S. pressure (23 February 2006)
The IAEA votes to refer Iran (5 February 2006)
Latest IAEA report paints picture that is far from bleak (3 February 2006)
A messy compromise on Iran (1 February 2006)
What happens next: An idiot's guide to a familiar plot (1 February 2006)
After Iran gas, U.S. tells India to back off Syrian oil (28 January 2006)
India casting a wide net in its hunt for energy, but tactic calls for political dexterity (25 January 2006)
Energy the key in the new Asian architecture (25 January 2006)
India, Iran and the nuclear challenge (16 January 2006)
The Asian axis of oil (24 January 2006)

2005

Iranian nukes: When bullying is not enough, try disinformation (21 November 2005)
The unravelling of India's Persian puzzle (27 September 2005)
The Persian Puzzle III: The world must stand firm on diplomacy (23 September 2005)
The Persian Puzzle II: What the IAEA really found in Iran (22 September 2005)
The Persian Puzzle I: Iran and the invention of a nuclear crisis (21 September 2005)
Take me to the sea (13 September 2005)

tipu mauling

The Sangh is Vajpayee's soul

11 September 2000
The Times of India

The Sangh is Vajpayee's soul

By Siddharth Varadarajan
The Times of India News service

NEW DELHI: Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's declaration that no one
could take away his right to be a swayamsevak (volunteer) might have raised
eyebrows in political circles but he has only stated a point he has never
attempted to hide.

In February, he responded to the controversy over the Gujarat government's
order allowing its employees to join the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh by
saying, ``The RSS is not a political outfit. It is a cultural and social
organisation and I don't think objections should be raised on anybody
joining it.''

In May 1995, he wrote an article in the RSS organ Organiser titled `The
Sangh is my soul'. In it, Vajpayee described how he was drawn towards the
organisation as a student and how he decided, in 1947, to give up his
studies and devote his energies to the RSS.

According to Vajpayee, the RSS has a two-fold task. ``One is to organise the
Hindus...The other is to assimilate the non-Hindus, like Muslims and
Christians, in the mainstream. They can follow the faith of their own
conviction...But they must have a feeling of patriotism for this country''.
The prime minister's description echoed a fundamental tenet of RSS theology:
that all Indian Hindus are, by definition, patriotic, while Indian Muslims
and Christians have to be `assimilated' into loving their country.

Elaborating on the role of Muslims in India, Vajpayee repeated the familiar
RSS charge that Muslims have ``yet to learn the art of existing and
flourishing in a country where (they) are in a minority''. ``The Quran'', he
alleged, ``offers no guidance in this regard. It only talks of killing
kafirs or converting them to Islam. But they cannot do it always and
everywhere. How can they do it where they are in a minority? If they try to
do it, a major clash will take place and only the members of the minority
will be killed''.

Ironically, in August 1979, Vajpayee had written an article in the Indian
Express criticising the RSS for not doing enough to address the genuine
apprehensions of people. ``Its repudiation of the theocratic form of the
state was welcome, yet the question could legitimately be asked - why does
it not open its doors to non-Hindus...(and as a) natural
corollary...clear(ly) enunciate that by Hindu Rashtra it means the Indian
nation, which includes non-Hindus as equal members.'' To this day, the RSS
has never really answered that question, though in all fairness, Vajpayee
has never really bothered to ask it again.

tipu

The government's cult of secrecy

6 September 2000
The Times of India

The government's cult of secrecy

By Siddharth Varadarajan

Times News Network

NEW DELHI: Of the five wars India has fought since Independence, official accounts of only the first - Kashmir, 1948 - and last - Kargil, 1999 - are publicly available. Official military histories of the 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars exist but successive governments obsessed with secrecy have refused to make them public. Secure in the belief that an informed public lies at the heart of democracy, The Times of India is making available today the full text of one of these suppressed documents, the official History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965. `Sensitive' official papers are generally labelled Top Secret, Secret, Classified, Restricted, or Limited Circulation. The 1965 war history is a Restricted document.

Many countries have a 30-year rule for making public even highly sensitive official records; but in India, 35 years is not considered enough time for a rather sanitised account of a war to be released. This, despite the fact that it contains nothing which compromises the way the armed forces operate today. Lt. Gen. Harbakhsh Singh, who died recently, privately published his far more revealing official war despatches in 1991, after waiting in vain for several years for official permission. The 1948 war history was only released in the mid-1980s after the ministry of external affairs tried unsuccessful to block its publication.

Prepared by the history division of the defence ministry and handed over in September 1992, the 1965 war history was considered safe enough to be mooted for general release by N N Vohra, defence secretary at the time. However, the government - or more precisely, the committee of secretaries - thought otherwise. The committee consists of the Cabinet, defence, external affairs, home and finance secretaries. Permission to publish was denied on grounds of national security. The ministry was not even allowed to provide copies to the specialised training institutions for officers run by the armed forces. In investigating the fate of the suppressed history, what emerges is an obsession with secrecy, driven not so much by reasons of state but the trivial concerns and imaginary fears of the babus.

A retired bureaucrat, who was part of the committee of secretaries at the time and one of those who had opposed the release of the history, told The Times of India there were three reasons for the decision:

• "It revealed that the thrust to Lahore was mismanaged, with the Division commander losing contact with his base, and that there were sharp differences between Lt. Gen. Harbakhsh Singh and the Army chief.''
• "It gave information about certain aspects of command and control."
• "It had a number of details of operational decisions taken...which, in the context of tensions with Pakistan, we felt should not be made public.''

When contacted, Gen. S J F Rodrigues, who was the Army chief at the time the official history was prepared, said these objections showed that the committee of secretaries had ``a very naive way of looking at things''. Revealing that even he had not been shown a copy of the history, he said, ``The committee of secretaries is totally soul-less. They take decisions on the basis of incomplete knowledge and no one can then question them''. Pleading for openness, Gen. Rodrigues said, ``Unless you get a fair and impartial account of the past, you cannot deal with future challenges. If you don't know what the problems are, how on earth do you correct them?''.

Africa

African Union pours cold water on India's campaign for U.N. seat (6 August 2005)
UN reform: G-4 remains focussed on the African Union (29 July 2005)
Asia, Africa should end energy dependence: Manmohan (24 April 2005)
Bandung: Stage set for Asian-African partnership (22 April 2005)
India, Brazil, S Africa bloc forges ahead (6 March 2004)
India Inc makes inroads in heart of Africa (1 March 2004)

himal map

Dateline Kashmir: A mother appeals to Mother India for justice

21 August 2000
The Times of India

Dateline Kashmir
A mother appeals to Mother India for justice

By Siddharth Varadarajan
The Times of India News Service

ANANTNAG: Officially, Zahoor Dalal - a cloth merchant in this southern Valley town - is missing, one of an estimated 2,200 Kashmiris who have ``disappeared'' since 1989 after being arrested by some official agency or the other.

He vanished from outside his house around 7 pm on March 24 this year. Neighbours saw him being bundled into a red Maruti van. His uncle, Yusuf, ran desperately from one police station to another but no information was forthcoming.

According to district officials, the van had earlier been seized by the police. An officer surreptitiously commandeered it for the abduction but unknown to him, a vigilant constable noted his action in the station roznamcha.

Four other men disappeared from around Anantnag the same evening. Bashir Butt and Mohammed Malik from Halan village were in town collecting payments for sheepskins they had sold, when they vanished without a trace. In Brariangan, some 25 km away, uniformed men dragged away two villagers. They, too, could never be seen again.

The next morning, the Anantnag police' Special Operations Group and the Army's 7 Rashtriya Rifles made a sensational announcement. In a fierce encounter, they said, five foreign militants from Lashkar-e-Taiba were shot dead near Pathribal in the south of the district. The bodies of the five were burnt beyond recognition. The police claimed the slain men were wearing Army uniform and were the same militants responsible for the massacre of Sikhs at Chitisinghpora on March 20.

It took a few days for local people to link the encounter with the five missing men. They held daily protests demanding the militants' bodies be exhumed, something people in the Valley had never demanded before. One procession was fired upon at Brakpora, resulting in eight deaths. When the charred and decomposed bodies were finally disinterred, each family identified its missing man. Pathribal stood exposed as a monstrous fraud.

Though officially Pathribal was a joint police-Army operation, sources say the operation was essentially a Kashmir police one. Some officers from different elements of the security forces in the field like the Army, BSF and police said such incidents could affect relations between them. However, others contest this and insist the relationship among the security forces is very good at the functional level.

What seems to have happened is that the security forces, eager to ``solve'' Chitisinghpora, randomly abducted five men and killed them. Though the government handed back the bodies to the concerned families, it said murder charges would only be filed if DNA testing confirmed the victims' identity. The DNA results have been ready for the past three months but are not being released because, according to local officials, the government delayed the sanction of Rs 60,000 for lab fees.

However, Zahoor's mother, Raja Begum, doesn't need a lab report; she is convinced her son was shot, burnt and dumped by the police into a makeshift grave at Pathribal. Her brother, Yusuf, who brought up Zahoor after his father died in 1983, said if anyone could prove the young man had any connection with militancy, ``they can burn down my house and family''. Pointing to Raja Begum, he said: ``It is the duty of every Indian to ensure that she gets justice. The persons who did this to our boy did not even bother to hide their identity. They came on TV and said proudly, `We have killed five foreign militants'.''

According to the local administration, the Pathribal killings have done more to alienate the average Kashmiri than anything else the government has done in the past decade or so. They are confident that the Justice Pandian Commission - probing the Brakpora firings - will also expose the truth of Pathribal. ``If the guilty are punished, we will win the confidence of the people; if not, militancy will benefit,'' said one.

Just before leaving Zahoor's house, this correspondent asked Raja Begum, who had silently wept throughout the meeting, whether there was anything she wanted to tell the people of India. ``Zahoor can't come back but those who did this should be punished before my eyes,'' she replied. ``Why did they pick up an innocent man and murder him? If there is a government, if there is justice, the people who did this must be punished.''

(Fourth in a series)

Dateline Kashmir: Why the Hizb talked and why it'll talk again

19 August 2000
The Times of India

Dateline Kashmir
Why the Hizb talked and why it'll talk again

SIDDHARTH VARADARAJAN
THE TIMES OF INDIA NEWS SERVICE

Srinagar: Intelligence and counter-insurgency officials are convinced that the Hizbul Mujahideen will come back to the negotiating table. They are also certain the militant outfit will not split. indeed, many officers told this correspondent that either as soldiers or negotiators they would rather deal with a united group, and that if anybody in New Delhi was trying to split the Hizbul Mujahideen, they should not do so.

``If the Hizbul Mujahideen splits, it may be a tactical victory for us. But we will lose the big prize,'' said one army officer. Contrary to popular belief, Hizb commander Abdul Majid Dar's offer was neither the result of subterfuge aimed at allowing the Hizbul Mujahideen to recuperate nor of an operation being run by an Indian intelligence agency. Though there are rumours of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) having facilitated Dar's movements in the days preceding his July 24 announcement of the ceasefire - the word is that its hush-hush Special Frontier Force (earlier known as 2-2) flew him in on a special plane from either Kathmandu or Dubai - intelligence officials in Kashmir say the Hizbul Mujahideen ceasefire offer was the product of Dar's own assessment of the ground situation.

They say he had been moving around between different locations in the valley for several weeks. During that period, in fact, the security forces - who thought initially that he was trying to rejuvenate the Hizb - were desperately trying to track him down. ``If an Indian agency was running Dar,'' said a source, ``they were taking a huge risk by letting him move around because every other agency here was trying to bump him off.''

According to a senior officer from one of the security forces, Dar's offer may have come as a surprise but there were plenty of indications that something was brewing. ``We had been picking up reports that the Hizb leadership in Pakistan was upset with the ISI,'' he said. Its Muzaffarabad-based chief, Syed Salahuddin, had been growing wary of Pakistan's support for Maulana Masood Azhar's Jaish-e-Mohammed. In June, Salahuddin had a meeting with the Pakistan army and ISI, where, according to Indian intelligence reports, heated exchanges took place. The Hizb chief complained that his organisation was being ignored. He said the ISI had placed enormous funds at the disposal of the JeM and charged that this meant Kashmiris were not being trusted.

According to sources, Salahuddin said the jehad is of Kashmiris ``and we had asked outsiders to help us. But the purpose of JeM is to sideline us and give control to outsiders''. Salahuddin also tried to mobilise support from the other Kashmiri militant groups in the United Jehad Council and even tried to float a `Kashmir Liberation Army'. According to one report that an Indian agency received: ``Salahuddin has strongly objected to the formation of Jaish-e-Mohammed outfit. He said the present Pakistani government has lost faith in us and for this reason it has brought outsiders (non-Kashmiris) to participate in tehrik-e-jehad of Kashmir. He has appealed to members of Jehad Council to remain vigilant in this regard otherwise present movement will slip out of their hands''.

Under ISI pressure, the KLA plan was dropped but Salahuddin sent Dar across to test the waters. In the valley, Dar found a demoralised cadre. The Hizbul Mujahideen had borne the brunt of counter-insurgency operations for the past two years. He also found its political wing, the Jamaat-e-Islami, and its ameer, Ghulam Mohammed Butt, stressing the necessity for dialogue. Indian security forces sources say Dar's ceasefire offer took Pakistan by surprise but eventually Islamabad was able to pressure Salahuddin into scuttling the dialogue.

Several officers were also critical of the way New Delhi handled the situation. ``I don't think the government showed the right kind of maturity or discipline,'' said a senior officer. ``We had an excellent opportunity to turn Hizbul Mujahideen around. And had we done that, the other outfits would have had a tough time since they rely on Hizb cadre to move around the valley.''

However, most officers are confident the Hizb will eventually come back to talk. ``Pakistan is going to be even more suspicious of them,'' said one. ``And people here want dialogue to continue. I think the combined pressure will do the trick.''

Dateline Kashmir: No hot pursuit, we'll wait in ambush: Army

18 August 2000
The Times of India

Dateline Kashmir
No hot pursuit, we'll wait in ambush: Army

By Siddharth Varadarajan
The Times of India News Service

KUPWARA: Stung by the resumption of militant violence in Kashmir,
politicians in New Delhi are advocating extreme methods like `hot
pursuit'. But here, those involved in fighting extremists say they're
simply not interested.

With two-and-a-half securitymen for every resident, Kupwara is
virtually frontline territory. Militants trudge across thick forests
and undergrowth for several days before emerging exhausted at safe
hideouts on the Indian side. ``The terrain near the LoC is such'', an
army officer said, ``that those who stay put are at an advantage. A
person moving through makes so much noise he becomes an easy target. So
we prefer to wait in ambush''. He said that if the army were to start
chasing militants through the jungles, or across the LoC, ``we could
easily walk into a trap''.

A senior officer involved in counter-insurgency operations in northern
Kashmir told this correspondent, ``It's all very well for somebody
sitting in Delhi to make ignorant statements about pursuing militants
across the LoC. We are doing exactly what is required. What we want is
for the administration to play its part in winning the confidence of
the people, which it is not doing''. Another officer said: ``Often we
don't know where the training camps are, or they are more than 50 km
away from the LoC. Such operations cannot be launched without
considerable military risk''.

More than anything else, army officers say they need unity of command
at the functional level. While Lt Gen JR Mukherjee, GOC-in-C of the 15
Corps, exercises control over all security forces deployed in the
valley, there can sometimes be considerable confusion on the ground.
``I cannot even coordinate plans with the CRPF chaps who guard the
approach to my headquarters'', said one army officer. ``The Pahalgam
tragedy is a perfect example of what can happen when you have mixed
forces and mixed command''.

``As for the BJP's call for giving us a free hand'', said an officer,
``we are already doing fine.'' He said that with even with local
militants caught in cordon-and-search opeartions, the security forces
are ruthless. ``Please don't quote me'', he said, ``but the unwritten
policy is that we avoid taking prisoners.''

Another officer said that when politicians wanted a free hand for the
army, ``what they really mean is we shouldn't care about civilians
here. But that would be disastrous''. ``After years of bad
experience'', he said, ``we know that the more people-friendly our
operations, the more successful our counter-insurgency will be.'' Apart
from humanitarian considerations, another officer added, ``this is a
question of military efficacy. We want to increase the number of
operations based on hard intelligence (Hard Int). For this, we need
people to provide information. If ordinary Kashmiris are victimised by
the security forces, they will never come forward''.

Having said that, officers acknowledge civilians are routinely put
through great inconvenience by the security forces and that sometimes
innocent lives are lost. ``An error of intention is never forgiven by
the army but an error of judgment might be'', a senior officer claimed.
``But I can't say the same about the other forces''.

Army officers have harsh words for the Kashmir police-run Special Task
Force, which consists mostly of surrendered militants. STF personnel
are paid Rs 1500 a month and earn cash rewards based on the number of
militants killed, arms recovered etc. ``This is an invitation for
corruption'', said one officer. ``We know they extort money under the
threat of implicating people. If Kashmiris are alienated, the STF is to
blame''.

Box: What the officers say

• If the army were to start chasing militants through the jungles, or
  across the LoC, it could easily walk into a trap
• We are doing exactly what is required. What we want is for the
  administration to play its part in winning the confidence of the
  people, which it is not doing
• The more people-friendly our operations, the more successful our
  counter-insurgency will be

RSS forced Cabinet's hand on autonomy

7 July 2000
The Times of India

News Analysis
RSS forced Cabinet's hand on autonomy

By Siddharth Varadarajan
The Times of India News Service

NEW DELHI: Though it hasn't ended the autonomy debate, the Cabinet's
rejection of the Kashmir assembly resolution has at least scotched an
improbable cocktail circuit rumour: That the autonomy demand was a
ploy devised by Farooq Abdullah and Prime Minister Vajpayee to
undermine the pull of azadi.

Had it really been a ploy, Vajpayee would at least have kept the
charade going longer. By shooting the proposal down, Farooq's standing
has been undermined and the Hurriyat and Pakistan have been given the
opportunity to tell the world, ``We told you so''.

According to a ministerial source, the government chose to reject the
resolution because it had received ``intelligence assessments'' that
other assemblies such as Mizoram and Assam would pass resolutions
making similar demands, and that matters could easily have got out of
hand.

But apart from rejection, the government had other options:

• It could have ignored the resolution, like Indira Gandhi ignored the
  Tamil Nadu assembly's 1974 autonomy resolution.
• It could have launched a comprehensive review of Centre-state
  relations, parrying Kashmir's demands into the broader project of
  renewing Indian federalism.
• It could have resorted to `death by committee'. After all, it's been
  12 years since the Sarkaria report. The government could have promised
  to think about a fresh commission to look into Centre-state issues.

The third seems to have been the preferred option of a section of the
bureaucracy and of those dealing with internal security. The feeling
in these circles is that Abdullah's initiative should have been kept
alive, if only to provide another window for a political solution.

We also know that not all NDA constituents favoured a pointed
rejection of the Kashmir resolution. The DMK did not attend the
crucial cabinet meeting. Officially, its ministers were in Chennai
preparing for the PM's visit. Unofficially, as strong proponents of
autonomy, they could hardly be expected to come out against Farooq's
proposals.

What seems to have forced the Vajpayee government's hands were two
factors: The pressure from the RSS, which warned of a ``second
partition'', and the BJP's visceral aversion to any radical
renegotiation of Centre-state relations. To that extent, its fear of
copy-cat resolutions in other assemblies was a genuine one.

And yet, if it believes other states want the kind of autonomy Kashmir
wants, the BJP will have to confront this question head-on.

Economic reforms further complicate matters. Liberalisation is
generating uneven growth with some regions stagnating and others
surging ahead. This will generate political strains which are bound to
affect Centre-state relations. Another potential source of tension is
population. The reapportioning of Lok Sabha seats on the basis of
population cannot be postponed indefinitely; eventually, the Rajya
Sabha will have to be drastically redefined to protect the interests
of states with lower populations, such as in the south.

As a coalition, the Vajpayee government was well placed to use
Kashmir's autonomy demand to prepare the country to deal with these
strains. Rather than outright rejection, it could have engaged in a
process of dialogue that might have satisfied the aspirations of
Kashmiris and generated proposals to strengthen the Union. That
opportunity has now been closed. Unless the Centre comes up with
another initiative, this week's cabinet decision might well be
remembered more for the problems it generates than for the illusion of
stability it provides.

Autonomy issue just won't go away

5 July 2000
The Times of India

Autonomy issue just won't go away

Siddharth Varadarajan
The Times of India News Service

New Delhi: Having summarily rejected the autonomy resolution adopted by the Jammu & Kashmir Assembly, the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government will find it much harder to satisfy the aspirations of Kashmir - and of other states - with its anodyne promise of ''devolution of more financial and administrative powers''.

On Wednesday, home minister LK Advani promised ''suitable steps...to ensure harmonious Centre-state relations in the light of the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission''.

Justice Sarkaria submitted his report in 1988 but his recommendations have yet to see the light of day. Curiously, the Vajpayee government has not thought it fit to expedite the suggestions the BJP itself made to the Commission, such as on financial autonomy and the appointment of governors ''from a panel prepared by the Inter-State council'' and ''in consultation with the concerned state''.

The BJP may consider the autonomy resolution secessionist but for several constituents of the NDA - notably the DMK, MDMK, PMK and the Akalis - what the Kashmir assembly is demanding is not that different from what they themselves asked for in the past.

The three Tamil parties are still officially committed to the Rajamannar committee recommendations, as endorsed by the Tamil Nadu assembly in 1974. The resolution was moved by M Karunanidhi, then, as now, chief minister of the state. Its content was the same as the Kashmir resolution: ''The federal government should have only powers relating to defence, foreign affairs, inter-state communication and currency.''

Like the Kashmir assembly, the Rajamannar committee wanted the Supreme Court limited to constitutional cases and the Election Commission to conducting national and not state elections. But in politics, context is everything. There was no insurgency, no cry for separation. The Union cabinet did not rush to reject the Tamil Nadu resolution. Indira Gandhi simply ignored it, as she had the equally radical 1973 Anandpur Sahib resolution sponsored by the Akali Dal.

It was only in the early 1980s - with the shattering of the Congress hold on the south - that Centre-state problems became important. When the four southern chief ministers met in Bangalore in 1983 to demand equitable sharing of fiscal revenues, Indira Gandhi''s reaction was to appoint the Sarkaria Commission.

Since then, the salience of regionalism has dramatically increased. What has changed, also, is that the BJP has supplanted the Congress as the main defender of a centralised polity. The irony is that the BJP is forced to rule in alliance with regional parties, all of whom, to a greater or lesser extent, want a radical overhaul of Centre-state relations. Economic reform further complicates the picture. Liberalisation is leading to uneven growth with some regions stagnating and others surging ahead. This unevenness will generate political strains which, in turn, will require new flexibility in Centre-state relations. Another potential source of strain is population. Demographic changes are being swept under the carpet by postponing the reallocation of Lok Sabha seats on the basis of population.

Central Asia

Oil, power and the new Silk Road in Asia (11 July 2005)
China, Russia get Central Asians to say 'Yankees Out!' (7 July 2005)
India set to take big leap in Central Asian backyard(5 July 2005)
China, Russia and the Shanghai process (4 July 2005)
Indians take big stride in Kazakh steel town (31 October 2004)
The race is on for Kazakh oil (1 November 2004)
Those with pipelines call the shots (2 November 2004)
Neither east, nor west: Kazakhstan's twin-track foreign policy (3 November 2004)
Dateline Dunghuang: Old Silk Road discovers new prosperity (10 July 2004)

Latin America

Orden de Bernardo O'Higgins (31 March 2006)
Chavez is India's passport to Latin America (4 March 2005)
‘Globalised world needs rule of law’: Interview with Ricardo Lagos, President of Chile (30 January 2005)
Inside Venezuela IV: Ties with India to centre around oil (17 December 2004)
Inside Venezuela III: Using oil as a lever against U.S. (16 December 2004)
Inside Venezuela II: Endogenous development centres hold the key here (15 December 2004)
Inside Venezuela I: The Chavez phenomenon and the U.S. (14 December 2004)
Interview with Eduardo Aninat, former Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, on how the Fund went wrong in Latin America (18 March 2004)
India, Brazil, S Africa bloc forges ahead (6 March 2004)

International Security

My articles
The Persian Puzzle III: The world must stand firm on diplomacy (23 September 2005)
The Persian Puzzle II: What the IAEA really found in Iran (22 September 2005)
The Persian Puzzle I: Iran and the invention of a nuclear crisis (21 September 2005)
The truth behind the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal (29 July 2005)
India's nuclear bargain with U.S. may prove costly in long run(20 July 2005)
America, India and the outsourcing of imperial overreach (13 July 2005)
China, Russia get Central Asians to say 'Yankees Out!' (7 July 2005)
Don't impose voting on U.N. reform poposal, SCO tells G-4 (6 July 2005)
China, Russia and the Shanghai process (4 July 2005)
Defence pact with the U.S.: India entering uncharted, risky territory (1 July 2005)
Mr Bush and the Riga axioms (9 May 2005)
Tsunami relief should be led by U.N., not U.S.(3 January 2005)
The second coming of Mr Bush(4 November 2004)
Interview with Zhai Dequan, Deputy Secretary General of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, on China's reservations about the Proliferation Security Initiative (31 July 2004)
Eight theses on the war in Iraq(1 July 2003)
America’s endless war: The world is not enough (26 March 2003)
A ‘regime change’ in international affairs(1 October 2002)
Say No to Bush: The World Must Stand by Iraq(12 September 2002)
WTC Attacks: The U.S. will now look for revenge, but against whom? (12 September 2001)
Back to the Future: International Law after Nato’s War(13 November 1999)
The Test Ban Test: US Rejection has Scuttled the CTBT (16 October 1999)
Terror in Timor and the interventionist urge (9 September 1999)
The Piper's Price: India and the U.S. after Kargil (17 July 1999)
UN Fig Leaf: Nato Compellence and Global Norm(10 June 1999)
Ruses for War: Nato's New Strategic Concept (10 May 1999)
Kosovo Cauldron: Nato on a dangerous and illegal course (29 March 1999)
Nato and No-First Use: The Nuclear Debate in Germany (10 December 1998)
Cowboy Clinton: No Excuse for Vigilantism (24 August 1998)
Pokhran as Pandora: Remapping the Geography of Power (16 May 1998)

Terrorism

The final levee has given way... Indefinite detention is legal say U.S. courts(10 September 2005) The dodgy underbelly of India's war on terror (26 August 2005)
Playing on fear, from Godhra to Guantanamo (13 June 2005)
More facts needed in Geelani case (16 February 2005)
Combating terrorism a priority, say India, E.U. (9 November 2004)
Indian migrant killed in Macedonian fake encounter (4 May 2004)
IC-814 case was most successful: Al-Qaeda (5 February 2004)
POTA’s first trial: An interview with Prof Rajni Kothari (8 October 2002)
Dateline Islamabad: Was Daniel Pearl on to something? (March 11, 2002)
Beware the Bushfire: Use of force and the pathology of terror (15 September 2001)
WTC Attacks: The U.S. will now look for revenge, but against whom? (12 September 2001)
Nothing Islamic about terrorism (2 January 2000)
Cowboy Clinton: No Excuse for Vigilantism (24 August 1998)

Book reviews

C. Raja Mohan's Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Order (16 May 2006)
Mahendra Lawoti's Towards a Democratic Nepal, Surya P. Subedi's Dynamics of Foreign Policy and Law, and John Whelpton's A History of Nepal (11 April 2006)
Chinmaya Gharekhan's The Horseshoe Table — An Inside View of the U.N. Security Council (31 January 2006)
Michael Mandel's How America gets away with murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes against Humanity and Hans Kochler's Global Justice or Global Revenge: International Criminal Justice at the Crossroads (10 January 2006)
Achyut Yagnik and Suchitra Sheth's The Shaping of Modern Gujarat (24 September 2005)
Thomas Friedman's The World is Flat (2 August 2005)
Bjorn Lomborg’s Global Crises, Global Solutions (14 June 2005)
Manjushree Thapa’s Forget Kathmandu (1 March 2005)
Christopher Kremmer’s The Carpet Wars (30 September 2002)
PROBE's Report on Basic Education in India (22 January 1999)

Interviews

Baburam Bhattarai: The King is down but not out (11 May 2006)
Transcript of the complete Prachanda interview(11 February 2006)
"Multiparty democracy in Nepal will be message to Indian Naxalites"(10 February 2006)
Prachanda: From people's war to competitive democracy(9 February 2006)
Maoist leader unveils road map for change in Nepal(8 February 2006)
Phillipe Kirsch, President of the International Criminal Court, on the significance -- and limitations -- of the ICC (12 December 2005)
Amartya Sen, economist, on his new book, The Argumentative Indian (14 August 2005)
Deepak Nayyar, Vice-Chancellor, Delhi University, on the parlous state of India's higher education system (16 May 2005)
Natwar Singh, External Affairs Minister, India, on the country's relations with the U.S. (7 May 2005)
Yoriko Kawaguchi, foreign policy adviser to the Prime Minister Koizumi, on Japan's intention to stick to its energy projects in Iran (19 March 2005)
Ricardo Lagos, President of Chile, on Latin American solidarity, globalisation and the Pinochet case (30 January 2005)
Amartya Sen, Nobel laureate in economics, the need for a radical socio-economic agenda for India's poor (9 January 2005)
Juan Somavia, head of the ILO, on India's proposed employment guarantee programme (29 November 2004)
Zhai Dequan, Deputy Secretary General of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, on China's reservations about the Proliferation Security Initiative (31 July 2004)
Morshed Khan, Foreign Minister of Bangladesh on India-Bangla relations (7 June 2004)
Eduardo Aninat, former Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, on how the Fund went wrong in Latin America (18 March 2004)
Deepak Nayyar, Economist, on the ILO's Globalisation report (3 March 2004)
Louise Frechette, Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations, on the need for the U.N. to manage the political transition in Iraq (10 February 2004)
S.R. Sankaran, Supreme Court-appointed right-to-food commissioner, on food for justice (5 September 2003)
Prof Rajni Kothari, Geelani Defence Committee, on India's Parlianment attack case (8 October 2002)
Ruud Lubbers, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, on how 9/11 made his job tougher (20 June 2002)
Nisar Memon, Pakistan's information minister, on why his country continues to ban Indian channels (27 March 2002)
Lt Gen. Moin-ud-din Haider (retd.), Pakistan's Interior minister, on the Daniel Pearl case (22 March 2002)
Prof Makoto Itoh, leading Japanese Marxist economist, on the state of Japanese capitalismt (12 December 2001)
Maulana Motiur Rahman Nizami, head of Bangladesh's Jamaat-e-Islami, on the politics of his party (7 May 2001)
George Andreas Papandreou, foreign minister of Greece, on European security, missile defence and relations with India (21 December 2000)
Gen Mirza Aslam Beg, former Pakistani Army chief, on India's concern for democracy in Pakistan (24 November 1999)

United Nations

African Union pours cold water on India's campaign for U.N. seat (6 August 2005)
UN reform: G-4 remains focussed on the African Union (29 July 2005)
U.N. reform: India may agree to defer vote on G-4 resolution (7 July 2005)
Don't impose voting on U.N. reform poposal, SCO tells G-4 (6 July 2005)
Security Council reform: A bridge too far? (28 May 2005)
A veto proposal for the G-4 (29 April 2005)
India and the problem of U.N. reform (26 April 2005)
Tsunami relief should be led by U.N., not U.S. (3 January 2005)
U.N. panel not for change in veto power (2 December 2004)
Anti-war group slams UN's Iraq resolution (12 June 2004)
Louise Frechette, Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations, on the need for the U.N. to manage the political transition in Iraq (10 February 2004)
An Ignoble War: Earn your Peace Prize, Mr Annan (15 October 2001)
UN Fig Leaf: Nato Compellence and Global Norm (10 June 1999)

Kashmir

Index of my articles

Verify, but trust, is the best formula for Siachen pullout (20 May 2006)
From India now, 'out of the box' ideas on Kashmir (25 March 2006)
It's time for boldness on the Siachen issue (14 September 2005)
Hurriyat and the Indian government: Dialogue in search of common ground (5 September 2005)
Siachen: Solutions for the taking (20 June 2005)
Siachen: Manmohan’s visit offers a chance (9 June 2005)
The Hurriyat visit to Pakistan as a CBM (2 June 2005)
Kashmir: Slaying the demons of distrust (1 May 2005)
Kashmir: Peace roadmap is 'out of the box' (19 April 2005)
Kashmir: 'Soft border' emerges as common vocabulary (16 April 2005)
Kashmir: Still in search of a policy (28 November 2004)
Looking beyond Musharraf's proposals (1 November 2004)
India, Pakistan and the 'Core' Issue (June 2004)
Thirteen years on, Pandits face being wiped out (1 September 2003)
Inside Northern Areas IV: Chinese operators, missing women and tourists(30 March 2002)
Inside Northern Areas III: Tibetan script makes a comeback in Skardu (28 March 2002)
Inside Northern Areas II: Why Pakistan can’t let the region go (26 March 2002)
Inside Northern Areas I: Gilgit leaders deny they’re Indian agents (25 March 2002)
Slowly, Pak's new Kashmir policy takes shape (23 March 2002)
Kashmir: State of Discontent (1 February 2002)
Centre hangs up on Kashmiris (4 January 2002)
Musharraf drops Taliban to get Kashmir (19 September 2001)
Kashmir peace initiative hangs in balance (22 January 2001)
Beyond the Ceasefire: Move Quickly on the Political Front (30 December 2000)
Dateline Kashmir: A mother appeals to Mother India for justice (21 August 2000)
Dateline Kashmir: Why the Hizb talked and why it'll talk again (19 August 2000)
Dateline Kashmir: No hot pursuit, we'll wait in ambush: Army (18 August 2000)
RSS forced Cabinet's hand on autonomy (7 July 2000)
Autonomy issue just won't go away (5 July 2000)
Govt's olive branch may not work in Kashmir (6 April 2000)
Inside PoK: 'Azad' is how they want to stay (26 November 1999)
War and the Dharma of a journalist (7 August 1999)
The Piper's Price: India and the U.S. after Kargil (17 July 1999)
Don't Escalate Kargil To All-Out War (18 June 1999)
Bus must return with no war pact (18 February 1999)

Useful links and resources

Text of statement issued by PMO after Manmohan Singh-Hurriyat meeting, 5 September 2005
Text of joint statement issued by Government of India and the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference, New Delhi, January 22, 2004

Pakistan

Despite U.S. pressure, India and Pakistan to ahead with Iran pipeline (6 July 2005)
Siachen: Solutions for the taking (20 June 2005)
Siachen: Manmohan’s visit offers a chance (9 June 2005)
The Hurriyat visit to Pakistan as a CBM (2 June 2005)
Kashmir: Slaying the demons of distrust (1 May 2005)
F-16s for Pakistan, India will fuel arms race (27 March 2005)
Let us reduce trust deficit, Aziz tells India (25 November 2004)
'Gas project is win-win for India, Pakistan' (25 November 2004)
Looking beyond Musharraf's proposals (1 November 2004)
Gas fuels warmth in India-Pakistan ties (26 September 2004)
Jamali speaks to Manmohan (29 May 2004)
India, Pak join foces against U.S. move on N-proliferation (23 April 2004)
Ally badge for Pak, India stunned (18 March 2004)
Nigerian 'typo' stumps Pakistan with N-claim (4 March 2004)
Musharraf dares India to go to war (27 May 2002)
Inside Northern Areas IV: Chinese operators, missing women and tourists(30 March 2002)
Inside Northern Areas III: Tibetan script makes a comeback in Skardu (28 March 2002)
Nisar Memon, Pakistan's information minister, on why his country continues to ban Indian channels (27 March 2002)
Inside Northern Areas II: Why Pakistan can’t let the region go (26 March 2002)
Inside Northern Areas I: Gilgit leaders deny they’re Indian agents (25 March 2002)
Slowly, Pak's new Kashmir policy takes shape (23 March 2002)
Lt Gen. Moin-ud-din Haider (retd.), Pakistan's Interior minister, on the Daniel Pearl case (22 March 2002)
Dateline Islamabad: Was Daniel Pearl on to something? (March 11, 2002)
Islamabad meet begins with detour (8 March 2002)
Saarc trips over media visas (7 March 2002)
Musharraf drops Taliban to get Kashmir (19 September 2001)
Dateline Islamabad: India up, Pak down on US agenda, feel Pakistanis (27 March 2000 )
Dateline Islamabad: Clinton does some plain speaking (26 March 2000)
Clinton in Islamabad: Stage set for blunt exchange of views (25 March 2000)
Inside PoK: 'Azad' is how they want to stay (26 November 1999)
Gen Beg praises India's concern for democracy (24 November 1999)
Pakistan: Pressing on with write and wrong (19 November 1999)

Former Yugoslavia

Abu Ghraib & the Milosevic standard (9 August 2004)
Back to the Future: International Law after Nato’s War (13 November 1999)
UN Fig Leaf: Nato Compellence and Global Norm (10 June 1999)
Kosovo war: NATO reneging on accord terms (8 June 1999)
Dateline Belgrade: With the Dark Lord in a darkened city (6 June 1999)
Dateline Belgrade: The ‘Mad’ Tiger (3 June 1999)
Dateline Belgrade: As bombs fall, hope, despair and some humour (2 June 1999)
Dateline Belgrade: ‘Nato causing medical catastrophe’ (26 May 1999)
Dateline Belgrade: Nato waging war of deprivation (25 May 1999)
Dateline Belgrade: Yugoslavs itch for ground war (22 May 1999)
Dateline Belgrade: Nato strikes hospital as peace efforts continue (21 May 1999)
Dateline Belgrade: Bridge over troubled waters (20 May 1999)
Nato attacks enter deadlier phase (18 May 1999)
Lawyers charge Nato leaders before U.N. war crimes tribunal (15 May 1999)
ICJ takes up case against Nato (13 May 1999)
Ruses for War: Nato's New Strategic Concept (10 May 1999)
How NATO blacks out Belgrade (9 May 1999)
Kosovo Cauldron: Nato on a dangerous and illegal course (29 March 1999)
NATO is Kindling Balkan Tinderbox (2 October 1998)

Nuclear Issues

Bush unveils a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (18 May 2006)
Book Review: Less than allies, more than partners (16 May 2006)
Nuclear separation plan: An update (11 May 2006)

March 2006

Looking beyond the nuclear deal(29 March 2006)
And now on to the NSG (23 March 2006)
More light on the nuclear deal (17 March 2006)
The new deal: When Bush comes to shove(16 March 2006)
Not All Bright (15 March 2006)
The U.S. and the Iran pipeline: Did Bush really blink? (14 March 2006)
Nuclear deal: The action now shifts to Washington (11 March 2006)
Nuclear separation plan seeks fine balance (8 March 2006)
Let the IAEA do its work on Iran (7 March 2006)
Bush, India and two degrees of separation (3 March 2006)
The separation puzzle (1 March 2006)
Was Bush speech a warning on separation? (1 March 2006)

February 2006

Bush nuclear plan demotes India (24 February 2006)
A question mark now hangs over the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal (7 February 2006)
The IAEA votes to refer Iran (5 February 2006)
Persian Puzzle: What happens next? (1 February 2006)
IAEA report on Iran paints picture that is far from bleak (3 February 2006)
A messy compromise on Iran (1 February 2006)

January 2006

Coming to terms with nuclear regime change: An interview with Michael Krepon and Leonard Spector on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal (28 January 2006)
Indo-U.S. nuclear deal: Safeguards for breeder reactors a key obstacle (21 January 2006)
Make the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal more transparent (19 January 2006)
India, Iran and the nuclear challenge (16 January 2006)

December 2005

U.S. non-proliferation group ups the ante with draft separation plan (21 December 2005)
Stage set for nuclear separation talks (20 December 2005)
Keep fast breeder reactor out of IAEA inspections: U.S. expert (17 December 2005)
Fuel for Tarapur not related to nuclear deal with the U.S., says Manmohan Singh (5 December 2005)

September-November 2005

U.S. raises the bar on nuclear deal with India (4 November 2005)
Nuclear proliferation: India submits to the Bush doctrine? (28 October 2005)
Indo-U.S. deal: Negotiating the nuclear fine print (21 October 2005)
Neocon lite nuclear agenda: A review of George Perkovich et al.'s "Universal Compliance: A strategy for nuclear security" (11 October 2005)
The Congressional hearings on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal: A revealing transcript (1 October 2005)
The Persian Puzzle III: The world must stand firm on diplomacy (23 September 2005)
The Persian Puzzle II: What the IAEA really found in Iran (22 September 2005)
The Persian Puzzle I: Iran and the invention of a nuclear crisis (21 September 2005)

July-August 2005

What's wrong with an Indo-U.S. alliance?.... Transcript of an interview to ABC TV (17 August 2005)
The truth behind the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal (29 July 2005)
India's nuclear bargain with U.S. may prove costly in long run(20 July 2005)
Nuclear cooperation with U.S.: Experts urge caution (18 July 2005)

2004

Interview with Zhai Dequan, Deputy Secretary General of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, on China's reservations about the Proliferation Security Initiative (31 July 2004)
India, Pak agree nukes a 'factor of stability' (20 June 2004)
India, Pak join foces against U.S. move on N-proliferation (23 April 2004)
Iranian Chief Justice in India for key talks (9 March 2004)
New Delhi rejects charge Indian scientists might have leaked N-secrets (11 February 2004)

1998-1999

The Test Ban Test: US Rejection has Scuttled the CTBT (16 October 1999)
Nato and No-First Use: The Nuclear Debate in Germany (10 December 1998)
Pokhran as Pandora: Remapping the Geography of Power (16 May 1998)